Parental Alienation

                                                     In Divorce Litigation
























      Peter Karl Roscoe


               Nov  2008











Parental Alienation







Parental alienation has been recognized by Canadian courts in their rulings. The cases listed below are examples of approximately 180 alienation claims made by litigants in Ontario family law cases. The large number of claims would indicate it is a common complaint in divorce actions. From a comparative standpoint, alienation claims were found to be almost as common as claims of domestic violence and orders for income imputation. Complaints are primarily by fathers but mothers were also affected. The response by the courts is not consistent. Sometimes offending litigants are penalized, or measures to enhance access are ordered. Sometimes not. Police enforcement may be included in the access order to reinforce it. Psychological counselling may be ordered for the children and parents. In a small number of cases custody reversals were made in an attempt to cure the problem. Courts are often hesitant to penalize a custodial parent as discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99. The cases listed below merely identify claims by litigants of alienation. Specific circumstances and outcomes would have to be derived from a detailed examination of individual cases.








Jagodich v. Jagodich, 2003 CanLII 2010 (ON S.C.)


[7] While Mrs. Jagodich has, with great sadness, accepted the children’s alienation from her, she continues to wish involvement with them and she specifically wants to be able to follow their educational progress and medical conditions. This is resisted by Mr. Jagodich who sees himself as speaking on behalf of the children. It was clear to me from the evidence and demeanor of both parents that Mr. Jagodich has a major role to play, which he has neither identified nor accepts, in the interrupted relationship between mother and sons.


[8] I believe the Applicant’s evidence that these teens have been inappropriately involved by their father in the legal and financial dispute between their parents. Mr. Jagodich does not recognize his wife’s contribution financially or otherwise to this marriage and I have no doubt he has passed on to their sons this lack of regard.




Kocko v. Kocko, 2004 CanLII 12571 (ON C.J.)


[28] The respondent contends that, following the support order made in 1997, the applicant did not permit him to have access to his son and that there has been little or no contact since.




Sobotka v. Sobotka, 2005 CanLII 3399 (ON S.C.)


[3] Sadly, the conflicts have left the boys without the benefit of a relationship with their father during their critical teenage years. Each parent also blames the other for this. The boys have lived with their mother since separation. Though their father was actively involved in the parenting role and their hockey before separation, he has effectively had no access since separation. The children are now estranged from him.




Snodden v. Snodden, 2004 ONCJ 39 (CanLII)


20] In any event, the son Devin, who is now 15, has stopped seeing his mother and is not interested in resuming any access visits with his mother. Furthermore, Devin has expressed concern for his sister Natasha’s continued access with mother, if such access is unsupervised or supervised by family members or friends.




Purewal v. Prewal, 2004 ONCJ 195 (CanLII)


[10] After the applicant’s mother and sister returned to their own homes, the respondent continued to be so abusive that the mother stated that she fled with the baby and rented her own apartment, where there was tight security that prevented the respondent from pursuing her


[44] Moreover, the respondent did concede that there is no reason for him to have any communication with the applicant. Their relationship has clearly ended and he has no right of access to the children.


[45] The applicant is presently practising law from her residence and is fearful of relocating in an office where the respondent may again attend to embarrass her and to interfere with her clientele.


[46] The interests of the children, their welfare and their stability also require that there be no further disruption in their family life.




Mahood v. Mahood, 2005 CanLII 19841 (ON S.C.)


The evidence produced at this hearing leads to the conclusion that in 2000, the mother, Katherine Mahood, left the family home with the two children, David and Carolyn. She moved to Nova Scotia, apparently to reside with her parents who had retired to that province. There has been little contact between the moving party/father and the children from the date of separation. The moving party/father appears to be devastated by this separation and the loss of contact with his children.


[5] The father also sought other forms of relief, which I conclude this court has no jurisdiction to direct at this time, including an order that father receive immediate notification of any material change of circumstance for his son and daughter and an order that mother “cease and desist of any form of alienation”.




Montemurro v. Shavalier, 2003 CanLII 1976 (ON S.C.)


[20] Russell also testified that at that time he was not allowed to see his children and that when he inquired with Angela she hung up the telephone. This evidence was not challenged on cross-examination.


[21] Angela testified that she played no part in the changing of names and that Annie was anxious about changing her name from Shavalier to Montemurro. That testimony stretches credulity as Annie was merely nine years of age and Sean was seven.


[23] Russell testified that he had been denied access for several years after Angela met his girl friend. From his day timer notes (Ex. #7) it is clear that prior to the separation Russell had considerable involvement with his children and it was impressive in terms of the amount of attention and effort that he paid to them.


[24] However, after the separation, Russell had difficulty obtaining access to his children. Many times on scheduled visits he would be informed that his children were “not available.”




Fraser v. McKinlay, 2004 CanLII 5857 (ON S.C.)


Even today, they do not know where their father has been living or is now living.


There is still a window of opportunity for Mr. McKinlay to re-establish a good relationship with the children, though the intervention of a third party in a therapeutic/counselling role probably will be necessary.


[5] I am not satisfied that Ms. Fraser bears the blame for the fractured relationship between the father and the children.


[6] Having said that, I am not satisfied that an order for “no access”, as proposed by Mr. Eberlie, is suited to the best interests of the children.




Somerset v. Somerset, 2004 CanLII 16881 (ON S.C.)


I infer the mother would rather do without child support so long as the father had no access to the children.




A.S.C. v. S.C., 2008 MBQB 105 (CanLII)


[82] When it became clear that his wife would not return, S.C. followed through on his threats that A.S.C. would not see the children again. Thereafter he used the children as foot soldiers in his battle with their mother.


[83] Tragically S.C. has no insight into the impact that this has had on his children. They now express fear and hatred for their mother, and unqualified support for their father’s versions of events. Shortly after the separation they were happy to see their mother. As time went on, their stories about their mother became more frightening and entrenched.




DiMillo v. DiMillo, 2007 CanLII 1340 (ON S.C.)


In that regard, I ask the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to consider intervening in this particular case, given that Mr. DiMillo has not seen his children for over a year.


[27] However, the issue of access is conditional upon Mr. DiMillo paying into court at least $15,000.00 towards the arrears within forty-five days of this decision and the balance of the arrears to be paid within forty-five days after the expiry of the first forty-five day period.




Charlton v. Ferguson, 2004 CanLII 10401 (ON S.C.)


[1] On January 14, 2003, Justice R. Spence of the Ontario Court of Justice made an order as follows:


4. There shall be no access to the children namely Brittany Charlton born

January 2, 1995 (8) and Kevin Charlton born October 25, 1996 (6) by

the respondent.


[21] If access needs to be further dealt with, or if the earlier order of Justice Otter needs to be refined, or changed, it can be dealt with in the Ontario Court of Justice. I would fix the costs of this appeal in the total amount of $3500.00. The appellant is hereby ordered to pay the sum of $1750.00 forthwith to the respondent, Angela Ferguson, and the sum of $1750.00 forthwith to the respondent, the Director of the Family Responsibility Office. Order accordingly.




Pearson v. McAteer, 2005 CanLII 32002 (ON S.C.)


[5] Mr. McAteer is obsessed with how he thinks he was wronged by Ms. Pearson during their relationship, their separation and throughout the post-separation era. This obsession has tainted and warped Mr. McAteer’s perception of his relationship with his daughters. It is his belief that Ms. Pearson has systematically plotted to influence his daughters against him. It is his belief that Ms. Pearson has influenced their oldest daughter to such an extent that Jacklyn, between 2001 and 2003, deliberately sabotaged the access visitations. Jacklyn would be 10 to12 years old while committing these alleged deliberate, pre-meditated acts




Bak v. Dobell, 2005 CanLII 36463 (ON S.C.)


In April of 1994 the parties separated and the Applicant moved to Ottawa while the Respondent remained in Toronto. The Respondent Mark Dobell has not sought access to his child Jacqueline for the past eleven years and in fact has not seen the child since the separation of April 1994




Pochodaj v. Pochodaj, 2006 CanLII 13104 (ON S.C.)


[1] Both parties agree that Oksana, father (and, if necessary, mother) will participate in family counselling to endeavour to restore a positive relationship between father and daughter and to restore access/visitation rights already ordered in favour of the father




J.J.C. v. K.G.M., 2004 CanLII 10578 (ON S.C.)


[5] As it is indicated that the respondent mother earns income, has a partner who has assumed the status of father of the two children for over ten years, moved the children without consent in order to cut off all contact with the applicant, and has neither tried to enforce the 1987/88 support orders nor shown any interest in the present proceeding, and the applicant not having benefited from non-payment (he has virtually no assets and his income over the years is that of a marginal worker), it is ordered that arrears to which the respondent would be otherwise entitled are rescinded. No need by the children for the applicant’s support during non-assistance period has been established. The respondent and the children’s present father have established a new family unit devoid of any recognition of, or requirement for support or involvement by the applicant.




Baxter v. Beharry, 2006 ONCJ 1 (CanLII)


He has not seen Kyron Baxter, his other son, for approximately seven years. He candidly acknowledges that he did not take these applications for child support seriously until after he had spent two separate periods of time in jail.




Balo v. Motlagh (Madsen), 2004 ONCJ 166 (CanLII)


[8] The father’s lawyer submits that the father began this action because, after about a year, he finally tracked down his child in Toronto and tried to start to get access to him. She further submits that the mother had concealed the child’s whereabouts.




Malcolm v. Vassell, 2005 ONCJ 77 (CanLII)


What is beyond dispute is that the father has not seen the child since Jivan was an infant




Dent v. Flynn, 2005 CanLII 14317 (ON S.C.)


Whatever the reason, the respondent’s contact with Rachael has been sporadic and infrequent, even through her senior teenage years and now into her twenties.




L.A.G. v. M.E.F.G., 2004 CanLII 53222 (ON S.C.)


During this second statement he inveighed against the Canadian legal system. He states that in the past 18 months the Court had been engaged in a deliberate misuse of authority or abuse of power. He claimed that he had been forcibly prevented from seeing his children. He alleged that the Court had helped Mrs. L.A.G. in her “criminal harassment” of her own children. He claimed that the Court was gender-biased and prejudiced and wholly incapable of deciding impartially and fairly any issues relating to the children and himself. He alleged that the Court was incompetent and corrupt.


Mr. M.E.F.G’s access to P.G. and S.G. was suspended by order of Justice Langdon on April 25, 2003. Justice Clarke’s order of May 7, 2003, provided that Mr. M.E.F.G have supervised access to S.G. and P.G. for 2 hours on both Saturday and Sunday of each week at the Family Visiting Centre


Mr. M.E.F.G has not seen T.G. since January of 2001.




Azimi v. Mirzaei, 2007 CanLII 16445 (ON S.C.)


Every issue is in dispute. There are charges pending against Mr. Azimi as a result of alleged assaults against Ms. Mirzaei. Mr. Azimi is allowed only limited supervised access to Danielle, but she refuses even that.




Dang v. Hornby, 2006 CanLII 12973 (ON S.C.)


He says that the Mother and her new husband contacted him, saying that the husband wanted to adopt her two children, and asked him for his consent. He made it clear that he would not give his consent to such an adoption. He claims that the Mother and her husband became “agitated and threatened court action.” He says that the Mother also spoke to the children about this. He says that the Mother now refers to the children as “Jamie’s children.”


The Mother’s January 1, 2005, E-mail gets even more aggressive and emphatic that the Father is not to interfere with her sole custody of the children. This was after the Father replied to her on December 31, 2004. He starts off by telling her, “…extortion and holding people for ransom is an illegal act.”




Armstrong v. Armstrong, 2004 CanLII 12100 (ON S.C.)


[8] As noted above, the husband has had no access to his children since June of last year when Family and Children’s Services indicated after an investigation that his accommodations were not suitable for overnight stays. No explanation was given at trial for the lack of any access whatsoever including daytime access since that time.




Meade v. Meade, 2002 CanLII 2806 (ON S.C.)


In the period following the separation, the children and their father had an ongoing relationship. That stopped in October 2000. Mother and father have different explanations for the interruption in access. Each parent blames the other.




Tran v. Lee, 2003 CanLII 11863 (ON S.C.)


[34] The husband argues that because of this alienation, the wife is disentitled to retroactive child support.


[35] The wife argues that as a result of mistreatment by the father and the unfounded charges laid by the husband, the children refused to have anything to do with their father




Simmonds v. Simmonds, 2007 CanLII 8007 (ON S.C.)


The father has not been in the child’s life, except for the odd phone call, since April 2006.


The first of six visits with the father alone was agreed to be on Saturday, March 10, 2007 between 10:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. when he shall return the child to the mother. This is to be part of a transition period to allow the father to re-engage in McKenzie’s life




McKenzie v. McKenzie, 2004 CanLII 9465 (ON S.C.)


He felt that his children were withheld from him. He felt that he was missing out on his children’s lives.




Gill v. Jhajj, 2003 CanLII 2126 (ON S.C.)


[2] When this trial began, counsel advised me that there were no issues about access. I assumed incorrectly that this meant that the children were seeing their father on a regular basis. At the conclusion of his examination in chief and cross-examination, I asked the father when he had last seen the children. His reply was September 2001. I raised this matter because I was concerned about the content of a letter written by Amrit, the older child, now 14. The letter is dated June 2, 2002, addressed To Whom It May Concern. It is contained in the opening trial statement of the Petitioner/wife. While the letter is not evidence, I was struck by the fact that Amrit complained that she had not seen her father nor had he tried to contact her for over a year and a half




Matwiyw v. Matwiyw, 2004 CanLII 7764 (ON S.C.)


[14] It is of some concern that the daughters have “unilaterally” withdrawn from any relationship with their father. This is evidenced by Sonia’s e-mail to her mother’s counsel. They have no relationship with their father. Nevertheless they expect him to pay, in addition to ongoing child support for them, for their university education, notwithstanding they have reached the age of majority.


[15] However, they do not want their father to know where they are going to school, what courses they are taking, or even how they are doing.




Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 2003 CanLII 2227 (ON S.C.)


[4] The respondent’s contact with the children has been minimal; he says his wife refused him access. She says he did not care. One child is now an adult and attending university. Is she still a “child of the marriage?” The other child is now 13 years of age; and the husband wants to re-establish a relationship with him. Due to his young age at the time of separation, he has never really known his father.




Wilson v. Sinden, 2007 CanLII 47161 (ON S.C.)


He was not hiding, but he was certainly making himself scarce. He voluntarily gave up exercising his right of access to the children soon after the separation, and declined to follow up on a lame attempt to resume the relationship in 2000. This gave him the advantage of an even lower profile, and I conclude that that is why he did it. He has not kept the FRO or the Applicant apprised of his whereabouts or his employment.




Park v. Thompson, 2005 CanLII 14132 (ON C.A.)


Since April 2001, Vanessa has refused to spend time or communicate with her father. He has made many attempts to communicate with her and has been rebuffed. The father believes that the mother has done nothing to facilitate his relationship with Vanessa.




Cowie v. Makin, 2004 CanLII 5762 (ON S.C.)


Sadly, almost immediately Mr. Makin ceased to be involved with the children. He and Ms. Cowie offer conflicting explanations for this result.




Danis v. Danis, 2004 CanLII 8245 (ON S.C.)


[8] Not much turns on this issue, as custody has been resolved, as has access. For whatever reason Mr. Danis has had no contact with his daughter since approximately 1992 and with his son since approximately 1993 or 1994 until 2003. Notwithstanding the lack of access, support was paid for the children on a regular basis at the ordered amount.


[11] In late August 2003, Blake Danis attempted to commit suicide. While hospitalized, he contacted his father. After a short stay with his maternal grandparents, in September 2003 he moved to his father’s home where he continues to reside today. Mrs. Danis has only seen her son three times since he has left home: at Christmas, Thanksgiving and on Krystal’s birthday.




Lavigne v. MacCaskill, 2003 CanLII 2014 (ON S.C.)


[10] Ali testified under oath, despite her young age. She said that she no longer wants to see her mom because she is scared of her


She says her mother even threatened to “kill her” and to “take me away from dad”, over the past two years. She also testified that her mother lied to her often and had said bad things to her about her father. She complained that the Children’s Aid Society did nothing about matters although she had told them of her mom’s conduct. When asked what she’d expect for her mother, she replied that her mother needed help, that she needed an anger management course so that the other kids would not get hit




Kerr v. Kerr, 2005 CanLII 16613 (ON S.C.)


[40] For his part, Mr. Kerr alleges that Mrs. Kerr has “poisoned and frustrated” his contact with the children since separation. In January she attended at both his girlfriend’s home and his office with some of the children. She yelled at Mr. Kerr, called his girlfriend a “whore”, caused a disturbance and permitted or encouraged the children to leave hurtful letters regarding their father and his girlfriend. The police were contacted. In addition, an anonymous letter was received by the president of Mr. Kerr’s union, making allegations about Mr. Kerr and his girlfriend. The letter makes reference to events which only Mrs. Kerr would know. Finally, Mr. Kerr’s co-worker provided sworn evidence of a telephone call from Mrs. Kerr in mid-January during which she alleged that Mr. Kerr gave her a venereal disease and that she would do everything in her power to get him fired.




McGinn v. McGinn, 2006 CanLII 3281 (ON S.C.)


[18] Lawrence is estranged from his father who rarely sees him, through no fault of his own.




D.J.C. v. N.C., 2004 CanLII 47783 (ON S.C.)


I accept the evidence of the various professionals who recognized as early as 1999 that there was a very unhealthy enmeshment that the respondent had nurtured with respect to all three children and herself. She had written knowledge


57] I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. C.’s actions and lack thereof constituted the offence of civil contempt. It is also clear that the actions of the respondent were contrary to the best interests of all three children. These children, as all children do, needed a mother and a father. It is the right of all children to have a relationship with their mother and their father. There is no evidence before this court that would indicate that Mr. D.J.C. was anything but a good father, a loving father, and a father who throughout the last seven years wanted to be involved in any capacity in his children’s lives. He has admirably and heroically been before this court on at least 15 separate occasions trying, unsuccessfully, to obtain access with his children. He still continues valiantly to attempt to have a relationship with his children.


[61] The behaviour of the wife in this file has created a travesty. As a result of the respondent’s behaviour the children have little or no relationship with the father who loves them, who has tried to be a good father, and who has been a good provider throughout their lives.




K.J.B. v. S.M., 2006 ONCJ 87 (CanLII)


[4] Although both parties now agree that both children should be allowed to enjoy a meaningful relationship with their father, the mother has frustrated such access in the past and has imposed unrealistic conditions, resulting in the father’s not having seen his children since June 2005.


[11] After considering all the evidence filed and submissions heard, I find that, since the birth of the children until June 2005, the respondent father has been engaged with the children and that his ability to continue a meaningful relationship with the children since June 2005 has been frustrated by the mother.




Miglin v. Miglin, 2001 CanLII 8525 (ON C.A.)


Notwithstanding the observation in his report six months earlier that the current arrangements were "excellent", in his March 15th assessment he was of the view that the mother was interfering with the father's access.


[23] The following summarizes Dr. Goldstein's view that the mother was creating problems for the children and for their relationship with their father:




Gregory v. Brown, 2005 ONCJ 284 (CanLII)


SUPPORT ORDERS — Entitlement — Child — Defences — Estrangement between payor and child — Since separation from mother, stepfather had substantially reduced his contact with child (now 15 years old), his desire to see her had waned since court proceedings began and child no longer wished to see him — Once stepfather had formed “settled intention” to treat child as member of family, however, it was irrevocable and he could not now, at will and to child’s detriment, cast aside support obligation that his own conduct had created — Word “settled” denotes quality, not duration




Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99


After their separation, the wife was granted custody, with generous visiting privileges to the husband, and more specific orders of access were later issued. The husband maintains that his former wife did everything in her power to frustrate his access to the children: she moved to distant cities without notification, changed the children's surname and religion, told them that the appellant was not their father, forbade telephone conversation with him, and intercepted his letters to them. The husband alleges he has undergone considerable expense and has suffered severe emotional and psychic distress because of this conduct and claims damages from respondents flowing from their wrongful interference with the legal relationship he had with his children.


Permitting civil actions against the custodial parents cannot be said with any certainty to be in the best interests of the child, whether this be by creating a tort or by recognizing a fiduciary relationship arising out of a court order. Like the resort to fines and imprisonment permitted by the Act, these proposed remedies could encroach on the resources of the custodial parent and could cause the child to suffer from the knowledge that one parent has taken such drastic action against the other


The torts of conspiracy, intentional infliction of mental suffering and of unlawful interference with another's relationship should not extend to the family law situation, notwithstanding the fact that the threshold circumstances necessary to them existed.




Townsend v. Florentis, 2004 CanLII 25801 (ON S.C.)


In November 1998 he moved in the Ontario Court of Justice for custody of, or access to Amelia. That motion was dismissed on December 4, 1998 by Justice Lajoie, who also struck out his pleadings and prohibited him from bringing any further proceedings before that court without leave.


Also included is the order of Power J., of December 6, 2001, in effect preventing the plaintiff from entering the City of Kingston, in order to protect Ms. Drake from harassment by him.


[54] To sum up the present situation, the plaintiff has consistently failed in his pursuit of custody of, and access to, his daughter, Amelia. That issue has been the subject of a final order following trial and, accordingly, a significant change in circumstances must be shown to have taken place in order to re-open that issue. Despite the absence of any such change in circumstances, he has persisted in motions with no apparent merit and no success.




C.S. v. M.S., 2007 CanLII 6240 (ON S.C.)


[1] This case is even sadder than the usual family tragedy we see in the Family Court. After more than four years of warfare between the parents, during which the children were dragged by both parents into the middle of their relationship issues, three of the parties’ four children have left the mother’s home for the father’s home and no longer speak to their mother. Their recent communications with her – infrequent, and almost exclusively by email – have been marked by an angry and scornful tone toward her. Fearing the father and the other three children will work to cause the loss of her relationship with the fourth child, the mother has not allowed that child to see the father or the other three children. The couple’s considerable assets, which would ordinarily be the children’s inheritance, have been spent on legal fees. Both parents are emotional wrecks and are psychologically unfit to work. The father has been on long term disability for two years. The mother has been in counselling and unable to work for at least as long. The damage to the children is enormous too, though they at least are doing well in school.




Evans v. Evans, 2003 CanLII 2021 (ON S.C.)


[45] Throughout 1998, the applicant saw Christopher regularly every two to three weeks. In the early part of 1999 the applicant had difficulty exercising his access to Christopher. Although these problems resolved somewhat and he saw Christopher every two weeks until June, the applicant felt that his opportunities for access with Christopher were thwarted throughout the summer of 1998 and became progressively worse in the fall of 1999 to the point where he did not see Christopher after October 1999. In fact, notwithstanding that in their minutes of settlement the parties agreed that the applicant would have reasonable access to Christopher upon reasonable notice, the applicant did not see Christopher from October 1999 to March 2003 nor did he receive any information about him




T.R. v. R.T., 2006 ONCJ 173 (CanLII)


[39] Mr. R.T. has not seen his children since December 2004. He has had some limited telephone conversations with A.T.. C.T. refuses to speak with his father.




Howlett v. Howlett, 2004 CanLII 21288 (ON S.C.)


[7] The child Annie is a troubled child, estranged since separation from the Applicant.




Stewart v. Stewart, 2006 CanLII 42608 (ON S.C.)


To perhaps oversimplify, Mr. Stewart’s position is that he has been a victim of circumstances of Parental Alienation Syndrome orchestrated by Ms. Stewart as part of her strategy to succeed in the outstanding matrimonial litigation over the family property.




J.T. v. S.C., 2007 CanLII 13370 (ON S.C.)


The assessment report also considers the belief of Ms. S.C. that the Applicant has sexually abused the children, which has been found to be unfounded by the assessor and the child protection authority in Quebec (the “D.P.J.”). In his report the assessor states that there is a risk of parental alienation as a result of Ms. S.C.’s unfounded belief that the children have been sexually abused by the Applicant and because Ms. S.C. has arranged for counselling for the children to prevent and deal with sexual abuse.




P.L.C. v. C.J.P., 2007 CanLII 57080 (ON S.C.)


[75] Mr. P.L.C. testified that Ms. C.J.P. has engaged in parental alienation by intentionally keeping him away from N.J.C. and that, if she had her way, she would like to see Mr. P.L.C. “hit by a bus”.


[76] He testified that Ms. C.J.P.’s intent can be inferred from the fact that he had only supervised access with N.J.C. for about 6 years and there has not been “any progress” with respect to access in the almost 8 years since separation. He testified, “After 8 years you have to ask what’s wrong with this person” and “She’s scary” and “Reason is not in her vocabulary”.




M. Al. O. v. Me. A. O., 2005 CanLII 2740 (ON S.C.)


[10] The worker, Ms. Kearns continues to see the children on a regular basis. It was her evidence that neither child wished to visit with their father at this time.




M.N. v. R.S.N., 2004 CanLII 6220 (ON S.C.)


[18] Presently there is no access between the respondent and his three children. There has been no access between the respondent and B.D.N., the eldest, for some five years, except his invitation to her graduation and some sporadic telephone contact. There has been no access, and no contact between the other two children and their father since September 2003.




J.L.M. v. I.H.M., 2004 CanLII 47774 (ON S.C.)


[30] The position of M.T. and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer is that the children’s views as expressed are their own heartfelt views and preferences and that given their ages, 16, 14 and 11, their wishes should be given serious consideration. The children should not, against their will, be ordered to the custody of or attend access with their father.


[31] Mr. I.H.M.’s position is that M.T. effectively alienated the children from him to their detriment. He submits the children’s position that they do not wish any relationship with him flow directly from the mother’s negative influence and that of J.C. without which the children would be open to such a relationship




El-Murr v. Kiameh, 2006 ONCJ 125 (CanLII)


The reports from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer in this case cite the father’s concern about parental alienation and the mother’s stance that any alienation is driven by the father’s own conduct in relation to the child


At this point in this child’s life, his actuality is that he has moved on to establish a father-and-son relationship with his stepfather. From his perspective, he does not need any other father-and-son relationship.




Forte v. Forte, 2004 CanLII 8672 (ON S.C.)


[2] In April, 2004, I released my decision in which I awarded sole custody to Daria on the basis of parental alienation by Sandro.




Hart v. Hart, 2003 CanLII 2130 (ON S.C.)


It should be noted, however, that as stated at paragraph 11 of the respondent’s submissions, the respondent’s position throughout was that the mother’s attempt to deny access was leading to parental alienation




Clarke v. Clarke, 2002 CanLII 2720 (ON S.C.)


Parental Alienation


[39] Has Zachary formed his opinion based on a systematic campaign by his father to undermine his mother? This question is not so easy to answer.




Bauer v. Bauer, 2006 CanLII 42596 (ON S.C.)


[18] Mr. Bauer further seeks relief in this motion for an order that his access be re-introduced, that Mrs. Bauer give her consent to allow Kira to attend family counselling with Mr. Bauer and that Mrs. Bauer be further sanctioned if the mother fails to accommodate access and therapy sessions.


[20] Mrs. Bauer’s position with respect to the contempt aspect is initially to point out that Mr. Bauer has not paid any of the outstanding costs orders against him




Parks v. Barnes, 2002 CanLII 18301 (ON C.A.)


[6] The respondent argues that the trial judge’s finding that there had been a material change of circumstances can nonetheless be supported on the basis of the mother’s “campaign of parental alienation” and her continued unwillingness to promote a relationship between Ethan and his father, despite certain admonitions contained in an assessment report prepared for the court in September 1999. Indeed, the trial judge’s reasons are essentially focused on the mother’s conduct, and his decision to award custody to the father is largely based on certain recommendations contained in the assessor’s report


[14] The appeal is therefore allowed, the order of Dandie J. is set aside, and the respondent’s application to vary custody is dismissed. Consequently, the consent order providing for custody to the mother continues in effect.




Wright v. Wright, 2004 CanLII 19944 (ON S.C.)


[10] Skeeter did not see the children for four months after she left. Michael says that was because she did not come around to see the children, she wanted to see them after 9:00 after the children were in bed. Skeeter says that Michael would not allow her to see the children.


[11] On August 29, 2001 Justice Templeton ordered that on an interim interim basis the children were to be in the care and control of their mother during the week and in the care of their father from 6:00 p.m. on Fridays until 8:00 p.m. on Sundays.


[12] Despite Justice Templeton’s Order, Michael kept the children with him for the summer of 2002. They spent their days at the Public Library while he was at work. Nicollette missed summer camp, Ebony missed summer school and both missed a cruise that had been booked for them by Skeeter.


[13] On August 13, 2002 Justice Walters ordered that the children were to be returned to the mother as per the Order of Justice Templeton


15] On October 24, 2002 Justice Seppi ordered that Michael return the children to Skeeter forthwith. She ordered the Peel Regional Police to assist.


[16] On October 31, 2002 I ordered Michael to return the children to Skeeter and to their school. I ordered that pending trial Michael’s access was to be every Saturday from 12:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m


It appears from the history of this matter that Michael does not have a great deal of respect for court orders. As detailed above, there are three court orders compelling Michael to return the children to Skeeter. In support of the motions asking that Michael return the children to Skeeter are affidavits detailing allegations of parental alienation and brainwashing of the children. Skeeter takes the position that Michael used his time with the children to turn them against Skeeter and to convince them that they wanted to live with him.




Ponzo v. Kovacs, 2004 CanLII 18439 (ON S.C.)


[1] Seven year old Stefan Ponzo is the unfortunate object of a protracted, multi-court, multi-national, custody and access battle between the parties. Both parents allege the other has abducted Stefan, disobeyed court orders, and breached the terms of parenting agreements. Dean Ponzo (“Father”) alleges Monika Kovacs (“Mother”) breached an undertaking given to this Court not to associate with her allegedly criminal boyfriend and has given false information to the Court. The Mother has raised issues of parental alienation by the Father




Sider v. Sider, 2004 CanLII 7575 (ON S.C.)


[18] Ms. Sider intends to present evidence at trial that her husband is engaged in a campaign to alienate Bethany from her. She feels that Mr. Sider has improperly influenced Bethany to say that she wants to move. She is convinced that, if Bethany is allowed to move, Mr. Sider will continue to alienate her and Ms. Sider will be reduced to a marginal role in her daughter’s life. She points to Mr. Sider’s reports to the Children’s Aid, both in Niagara and here, in support of her position. She has also filed affidavits from mutual acquaintances, who seem to share her concerns of parental alienation by Mr. Sider




Geremia v. Harb, 2006 CanLII 29654 (ON S.C.)


Twice thereafter, the OCL updated its investigation and two further reports were generated. In one of the reports, the author recommended therapeutic reconciliation counselling “to reconcile the relationship between” the child and her father (who alleges parental alienation by the mother) and to address the pronounced custody-and-access conflict consuming the parties




Ali v. Williams, 2008 CanLII 13609 (ON S.C.)


Although Justice Dunn made an interim order for joint custody, with primary residence to the mother and specific access to the father, in fact, Mr. Williams has had little interaction with the children in the past 18 months, and she has been the de facto custodial parent.


Because of the limited access the children have had to their father in the past 18 months, she suggests that Mr. Williams’ access should be supervised and limited to three hours every second weekend, and should occur only when the children are willing.


With respect to his failure to exercise regular access to the children in the past 18 months, Mr. Williams places the blame on Ms Ali, accusing her of parental alienation.


Considering all of the factors under s. 24 of the CLRA, I have determined that Ms Ali will have sole custody of the children.




Cojbasic v. Cojbasic, 2008 CanLII 8256 (ON S.C.)


[2] There is clear authority for awards of joint custody and equal residential care, if necessary, in order to protect a child’s relationship with a parent.


3] The Respondent has presented an arguable case on this motion. The two older children have refused to see him since the separation. The oldest child, Ryan, who is 19, has submitted an affidavit in the litigation. It includes a letter which he has ostensibly written himself, which however contains sophisticated language and opinion that may not be his own words. Ryan videotaped his father in an argument with his mother and hand-delivered the recording to the Children's Aid Society. Shortly after the separation, he attended at the Ottawa Police station to lay a charge of assault with a weapon, to wit a pool cue, against his father, arising out of an incident which he said had occurred in December 2004, some two years prior. Ryan has also given other dates when this alleged occurrence took place.


[4] In his interviews with the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL), Sean has used language and expressed points of view which seem to exceed that which would normally be expected of a child of his age.


[5] At one of Sean’s recent hockey games, the second child, Vanessa, who is 16, confronted the person sitting next to her father with the fact of the criminal charge he was facing, asked this woman to find out from her father how he intended to plead and then, she and her mother moved seats in order to sit directly behind the Respondent throughout the balance of the game.


[13] These conclusions fall short of what would be required in order for the father to succeed on his motion as framed.




T.P.S. v. K.E.S., 2007 CanLII 1900 (ON S.C.)


The three children have had their primary residence with K.E.S. since the date of separation. At this time, the elder two children do not wish to have regular access with their father and have not visited with him since 2005


She did not tell Mr. T.P.S. where the children were and she changed the children’s names when she registered them in new schools.


[17] Ms. K.E.S. and the children lived in shelters until Ms. K.E.S. obtained employment in Etobicoke with A[…] Inc. and was able to get her own accommodation. Mr. T.P.S. did not have any access to the children until April 2000, when access was ordered every Sunday from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., supervised by his sister, B.S.1. Initially, the children were dropped off at Ms. B.S.1’s home; however, due to difficulties experienced with K. and M., commencing in May 2000, the drop-off and pick-ups were at McDonalds. Ms. K.E.S. then accused Ms. B.S.1 and her husband of abusing the children. More particularly, she accused B.S.1, a kindergarten teacher, of being a pedophile. Ms. K.E.S. stopped access between June and October 2000 while an investigation ensued.




P.S. v. K.S., 2004 CanLII 6326 (ON S.C.)


[21] It is one of the perhaps more salient features of this case in which we can clearly see the result of parental alienation in children. For whatever reason Mr. S. appears to have discouraged active contact with Mrs. S., expressing concerns about abuse and lifestyle. Access was eventually discouraged and then terminated by both children writing letters to their mother that were filed as exhibits at the trial, indicating that they no longer wished to see their mother.


[22] From the tenor of the letters, it is clear to the Court that a parent dictated these letters, and I find it very unfortunate in the circumstances that the children were manipulated in such a fashion




Tock v. Tock, 2006 CanLII 44281 (ON S.C.)


[22] This was, unfortunately, the calm before the storm. When Justin and Goldie returned after an overnight with their father, Justin yelled and swore at his mother, saying “You’re a terrible parent. You lied. Drop the charges. Dad said you lied”. Goldie then started to cry. She said, “You ruined my life.


23] The next day, the children and their mother went for an appointment at the Jewish Family and Child Service (“JF&CS”). During the meeting with the social worker, Justin and Goldie both yelled, “We don’t like her. We don’t want to live with her.”


[26] Ms. Buchbinder Tock was quickly cut out of her older children’s lives. Two days after the children moved in with him, Mr. Tock wrote a letter to the vice-principal at Goldie’s school advising him of Goldie’s change in residence. He indicated in his letter that “Goldie has been counselled in measures to take in the event her mother tries to pick her up against her will”.




J.S. v. J.W., 2005 ONCJ 329 (CanLII)


CONTEMPT OF COURT — Punishment — General — Words “do anything else that the court decides is appropriate” in clause 31(5)(d) of Family Law Rules includes power to transfer custody of child from custodial parent who has been found in contempt of custody or access order to other parent — Custodial mother in this case not only denied father access to his son and stepdaughter for almost 2 years under previous consent order but continuously and deliberately refused to abide by string of court orders directing her to co-operate with Office of Children's Lawyer, thereby thwarting court’s ability to gain insight into why children refused to see their father




G.M. v. A.M., 2006 ONCJ 344 (CanLII)


At the time of the order of 4 September 2003, the father had had almost no contact with the children since separation. All three girls were clear that they did not wish to see the father.


The motions to change, in which the mother also requested a restraining order and the father requested an order for access to the three girls, first came before me for a hearing on 27 March 2006.


I granted the mother’s motion requesting an order restraining the father from molesting, harassing or annoying or contacting her or any of the children, except in so far as contact was permitted to implement any access order. I also dismissed the father’s motion for an order granting him access to S.M., T.M.1 and B.M., as there was no evidence of any change since the order was made relevant to the issue of access to those children.




Orszak v. Orszak, 2000 CanLII 22529 (ON S.C.)


[55] If the parties had sufficient means, I would order the involvement of an access monitor to provide a neutral service in ensuring access takes place and meets the best interests of the children. Since the parties lack the resources to hire someone to perform this function and it is not available as a public resource, I have had to modify the access requirements accordingly. I am attempting to introduce regularized and normalized access in a more gradual way in order to overcome what may be parental alienation syndrome which has been developing over the past while




Moudry v. Moudry, 2005 CanLII 22220 (ON S.C.)


[2] This is a blatant case involving parental alienation by the respondent of the child from the father


[22] There has been no communication and no access to date from the respondent wife. The respondent has continued to deny access to the father and has not brought the child to Mississauga for contact with the father at all. At the time of this trial the father had not seen the child for over four months.




N.L. v. S.L., 2007 CanLII 46697 (ON S.C.)


[7] In June 2004, A.M. told her mother that “dada boo boo me”, “dada boo boo pee pee place”. In July, the mother noticed redness and inflammation and took A.M. to the doctor but did not disclose the child’s statements. Then in January and February 2006, A.M. made references to her “dada” touching her “bummie place”.


The Children's Aid Society was notified and a Children's Aid Society/police investigation ensued. Abuse was not verified.


[9] The boys continue to reside with Mr. L. They are also doing well. They have had some access to Ms. L., but their father ended this in August 2007.


[12] Mr. L. seeks sole custody of A.M. He is adamant that he has not abused or mistreated her in anyway. He maintains that Ms. L. has misinterpreted, failed to investigate, or coached the child to make the statements that she has made. He views this as parental alienation, and since it has not stopped despite repeated unverified investigations, he sees the transfer of custody to him as the proper response


This worker, Ms. Towns, also noted in testimony that A.M. used words like supervised access and separation




A.F. v. I.V., 2006 CanLII 727 (ON S.C.)


20] In all, the respondent made approximately 31 calls with allegations to the police and approximately 36 calls with allegations to the Children’s Aid Society. All the allegations to date, have been determined to be unfounded. The unfounded allegations made to the Children’s Aid Society were as follows:


[30] The applicant and the child have endured and suffered a life of harassment by the respondent for the past 11 years. The respondent has made a career of making false allegations, trivial and heinous, concerning his care of J.A.I.F. and against him personally since their separation in 1994. Ms. I.V. has falsely alleged physical, emotional and sexual abuse over and over and over again.


[54] Dr. Berman in cross-examination admitted:


5. that in the course of cross-examination he has come to believe that it would be very unlikely that Ms. I.V. would ever facilitate a relationship between J.A.I.F. and her father;


15. he now agrees that this is a classic case by Ms. I.V. of parental alienation


[76] Even after the horrific drama of the enforced access on January 25, 2002, Ms. I.V. again denied access on January 31, 2002, February 8, 2002 and February 14, 2002. On January 31, 2002, she and the child were simply not at home. On February 8 and 14, 2002, Ms. I.V. alleged again that J.A.I.F. was sick. There is no corroboration of this allegation. Ms. I.V.’s behaviour is in no way defensible, her excuses are not credible and it is apparent to this Court that this is a classic case of parental alienation. Her denial of access was repeated, deliberate, and wilful.




J.M.M. v. G.S.M., 2006 CanLII 6457 (ON S.C.)


[88] Mr. G.S.M. was convicted of assault after a trial in November, 2003. He was put on probation for 12 months, which has expired. Since April, 2003 when Ms. J.M.M. commenced this application, Mr. G.S.M. has only seen two of the children, R.M. and D.M., on one supervised visit on January 1, 2004, and Mr. G.S.M. has not seen J.M. at all.




M.M.F.1 v. G.R., 2004 CanLII 52811 (ON S.C.)


He also sought custody of his son with an equal sharing of time in the care of his son, with the Respondent, Ms. G.R. The evidence showed that Mr. M.M.F.1 has not had any contact with his son since August of 2001, a period of approximately twenty-seven months


[4] In his evidence Mr. M.M.F.1 took the position that Ms. G.R. has denied him access merely out of revenge based on the fact that he would not resume cohabitation with her, something which he is not prepared to do.




L.P.G.M. v. J.M., 2006 CanLII 5455 (ON S.C.)


The respondent’s access has been problematic.


[5] On August 5, 2003, Madam Justice Snowie found the petitioner to be in contempt of court due to the failure of the petitioner to facilitate the respondent’s right of access


[27] With regard to the assault charge, the respondent testified that he plead guilty only because the Crown Attorney told him it would be a long time until trial if he claimed he was innocent. The petitioner would not allow the respondent access to M.A.V.M. until that issue was resolved.


Apparently this charge of assault related to the incident when the petitioner’s family was changing the locks on the matrimonial home. According to the respondent, the petitioner threatened that he would never see M.A.V.M. again. The respondent sprayed liquid soap on the petitioner and her mother. After his plea of guilt, he received a conditional discharge.


[28] The respondent testified that the petitioner made many calls to the police to try to have him arrested. In fact, he was arrested on a charge of uttering threats, but the charges were withdrawn at trial on November 2003 when the calls were traced to R.T.


[29] The respondent testified that the petitioner tried unsuccessfully to have him arrested for harassment, theft, threatening, acts of vandalism, and has made five complaints to the Children’s Aid Society, which were dropped upon investigation.


[34] This witness overheard the petitioner’s earlier counsel advising that they would criminally charge the respondent, which was introduced as evidence that the respondent was being set up in order to deny him access to M.A.V.M.




Blackwell v. Burden, 1996 CanLII 4896 (ON S.C.)


Since separation, the mother and child had changed residences seven times, sometimes on the mother’s mere whim. At trial, the mother revealed herself as an immature, unusually flighty and headstrong individual who had no qualms about raising many serious but unfounded allegations to advance her cause and whose actions seemed often to be dictated by personal whim without regard to their effect on others, particularly her son


When the father obtained an interim order requiring the child’s return, the mother herself returned but not the child.




D .K. v. D. K, 2003 CanLII 2365 (ON S.C.)


[5] This is a very sad case. The father has not seen his son R. since 1998 when R. told him he no longer wanted to have anything to do with him. On her 12th birthday, J. advised her father by letter that she too no longer wanted to see him. And now as of March of this year K., according to her mother, no longer wants to see her father.


[6] The parties separated in August of 1995, when the mother accused the father of assault. He was charged and subsequently acquitted of the charges in April of 1996.


[7] During his period out on bail and before his acquittal the father was allowed by the recognizance of bail to have access to his children through a third party. That third party was the children’s paternal grandmother. The evidence shows that the mother allowed the father only one visit from August 1995 to January 1996.


[8] Regular access for the father was granted only after arguing for access in the courts. The mother objected to the father being able to have access to his children.


[11] As of March 1st, 1998, (3 days after the divorce judgment is granted), the mother moves with the children from Sarnia to London, Ontario without any notice to the father. The father is informed of the move by the school principal who advised him that the children were no longer in school and was wondering why. The mother had left no phone number or address


The father brought his first motion for contempt before Justice Desotti on April 8th 1998.


[13] Yet again, a further denial of access occurred which led to another motion for contempt which Justice Desotti dealt with on June 24th, 1998 by providing the father with a makeup visit


20] On December 4th, 2002 Justice Browne found the mother, yet again, in contempt with respect to her denial of telephone access for K


[22] The motion for change of custody for K. was brought in February of 2003 to be heard at the same time, at the trial of the contempt proceedings




Somerville v. Somerville, 2006 CanLII 9984 (ON S.C.)


[10] The applicant’s conduct throughout these proceedings and at trial have demonstrated to the court that he has no respect for the respondent. If he were granted custody, he would not consult or discuss with her. The Court has concluded that it is the applicant’s intention to eliminate the respondent from any role and diminutize and destroy her role as a parent. If the Court were to permit him to relocate the children, I can see he would do so at the earliest convenient time to himself and he would move to a place that would cause great difficulty for the respondent to exercise access. I have concluded that this action is the first step in the applicant’s plan to remove the applicant from his and his children’s lives. I have further concluded that it would not be in the best interest of the children for the applicant to make the important decisions as they relate to the children’s health, education and welfare.


[11] Accordingly, there will be an Order that the respondent will have custody of the children and the primary residence of the children will be with her




L.D. v. E.E.O.D., 2003 MBQB 236 (CanLII)


A recognizance was issued in May 2002 which included the condition that there be “no contact, communication with L.D., except through counsel in accordance with any Queen’s Bench orders relating to custody and access”. Mr. E.E.O.D. did not have any visits with his children, except in the course of the court ordered assessment, since that episode in May, 2002




R. v. Tavenor, 2001 CanLII 24139 (ON C.A.)


[18] At trial, the jailhouse informant testified about conversations with Mr. Tavenor. According to the informant, Mr. Tavenor said he had confronted the deceased some time prior to her death about sleeping with other men. Ms. Taylor responded by threatening to call police if he gave her a hard time, and by saying that he would never see his son




R. v. Brown, 2001 NFCA 8 (CanLII)


[1] The appellant entered a guilty plea to the offence of attempting to murder his girlfriend, mother of their three month old daughter, by stabbing her repeatedly with a knife because she refused to let him see the child. He was convicted of the offence pursuant to s. 239 of the Criminal Code and the trial judge imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.




Roach v. Kelly, 2003 CanLII 1991 (ON S.C.)


[8] On June 11th, 2002 as the respondent and her partner were going to pick up the child at her day care, the applicant came upon them and severally beat Mr. Perrault. The applicant told the respondent that if she did not let him see the child, the next time it would be her, but worse.




Pollastro v. Pollastro, 1999 CanLII 3702 (ON C.A.)


He made death threats to Reesa and said he would not rest until she was in jail and would never see her son again.



R. v. V.D.F., 2006 CanLII 40676 (ON S.C.)


However, he called her several times, at least four, saying, in effect, "…I want to see my son… if you don't let me see him, I will kill you…".




X. v. Canada (Immigration and Refugee Board), 2001 CanLII 26855 (I.R.B.)


11. The claimant was afraid for her children. She took the necessary steps so that her husband could not see them. Then applications followed, as well as a social investigation, close surveillance and a criminal charge against the claimant for failing to produce the children, a charge on which she was convicted in XXXXXXXX 1998 and for which she was sentenced in absentia to four months’ imprisonment in XXXXXX 1998 by the Chalon-sur-Saône tribunal de grande instance.


12. In the meantime, the husband was granted legal custody of the children on XXXXXXXX XX, 1998. The claimant did not attend that hearing.


44. France is well known to be a democratic country and is presumed to be capable of protecting the claimant and her children against the real risk of persecution by Mr. XXXXXX. The claimant has the burden of rebutting that presumption. The analysis supports the conclusion that she has succeeded in doing this.


65. With respect to the fact that the claimant actually kidnapped her children so she could find refuge in Canada, there is nothing to indicate that in so doing she was guilty of an act contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.



The claimant and her two children are Convention refugees within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Immigration Act




Kovacs v. Kovacs, 2002 CanLII 49485 (ON S.C.)


[1] FERRIER J.:—In March 2001, the respondent arrived at Toronto’s Pearson International Airport from Hungary with her three-year-old son, Gergo, and 14-year-old daughter, Anett. A few days before leaving Hungary, she had separated from her husband, the applicant, and had surreptitiously left the country with her children. Anett is a child of the respondent’s previous marriage and is not the subject of any claim by the applicant.


[2] The applicant had not known of, nor consented to, Gergo’s removal from Hungary, nor had he consented to the respondent removing Gergo from his care.


[3] Upon her arrival at the Toronto airport, the respondent claimed refugee status for herself and on behalf of her children.


[14] The basis of the respondent’s refugee claim, in short summary, is that she was subjected to physical and psychological abuse by the applicant; that on two occasions the child was physically abused by the applicant; and that the state of Hungary was unwilling or unable to protect her and the child




Terris v. Terris, 2002 CanLII 46107 (ON S.C.)


On 1 September 2001, Mrs. Terris, while on maternity leave from her employment, left Canada with the two children on a three-week vacation to visit her mother who resides in Australia. Justin was a little over two years old and Victoria was approximately four months old. Mrs. Terris extended her three-week visit into months and then unilaterally decided to change permanently the residence of the children in Australia and refused to return the children to Canada, contrary to Mr. Terris’s wishes.


[9] The second concern that Mr. Terris has relates to Mrs. Terris’s conduct over the last nine months in preventing him as a father of the children from sharing in his children’s lives, especially Victoria who does not know him as a parent.




Sh. É. C. v. G. P., 2003 CanLII 2028 (ON S.C.)


[1] The applicant and respondent are the mother and father of O.C., who turned 13 just before the end of the trial. O.C. is not seeing her father. He says it is because the mother is poisoning O.C.'s mind against him and preventing her from seeing him.


[5] So O.C. has been living with her mother for the last 2½ years under an order for joint custody, primary residence to the mother and supervised access to the father at the paternal grandmother's home. There has not been any access since January, 2001,




Johnson v. Johnson, 2004 CanLII 21289 (ON S.C.)


2. This is a very sad case. The parties separated in 1991. They have three children, Paul who is 23, Mark who is 21, and Celina who is 17. The parties separated in 1992, were divorced in 1995, and fought a 10-day court trial over custody of access to the children in January 1996. Mr. Justice Weekes’ reasons for judgment found that the two boys were alienated from their father.




Lobesack v. Lobesack, 2003 CanLII 2171 (ON S.C.)


[3] The applicant/father has not had access to the children since September, 2002




Di Manno v. Di Manno, 2002 CanLII 2673 (ON S.C.)


4. Although I have limited evidence of the custody/access tensions it can be discerned that among them are the estrangement between the Respondent and 12 year old John and whether or not there should be overnight access. I am persuaded that the Respondent's willingness to accept the Applicant's offers (the one before me or those previous) was impeded by the restricted terms of access suggested as well as the bitterness that grew in relation to those issues.




Nichols v. Nichols, 2005 CanLII 3473 (ON S.C.)


[2] A separation agreement by way of a domestic contract was entered into on July 14, 2004, at which time the child Erin was residing with her father and apparently was somewhat estranged from her mother, having resided with her father since the date of separation.


[6] The position of the applicant is that “respondent demanded Erin vacate his residence” and has completely severed his relationship with her.




K.(M.) v. K.(M.), 2004 ONCJ 75 (CanLII)


6] There has been little or no contact between Mr. M.K. and the children since 1998. This has been as a result of the existence of various court orders and circumstances upon which I shall provide further comment in these reasons




Worthington v. Worthington, 2000 CanLII 22469 (ON S.C.)


[12] By the time of trial (December 2000), the respondent had not seen Jennifer since December 1997 (one month following the separation) and had not visited with Rebecca or Brandon since October 1998 (when the NCDC refused to participate in further supervised access).




Moro v. Miletich, 1998 CanLII 14881 (ON S.C.)


Indeed, there is uncontroverted evidence that, for significant periods of time, Mya refused to even communicate with her mother due to various behaviours of the applicant that had alienated her daughter




Phiroz v. Mottiar, 1995 CanLII 7037 (ON C.J.)


[49] On the facts of this case as they exist at this time, it is understandable that Zal would react as he has, considering the number of times that he has been rebuked by his father. In my view, the present reluctance of Zal to communicate with his father is the inevitable consequence of his father’s previous legalistic posturing.




C.(P.) v. C.-G.(P.C.), 2004 ONCJ 130 (CanLII)


Father had not seen daughter for past 4 years, even though he had right to apply for access upon expiry or order banning access for 1 year




Surerus-Mills v. Mills, 2006 CanLII 32907 (ON S.C.)


Although the children were relatively young when the parties separated in 1983, the communication that one would have expected as a result of the children’s ages was non-existent. Accordingly, Motions and more Motions were brought in the years following their separation and eventual divorce in 1987. As a result of the acrimony between the parents, no father-daughter relationships ever had a chance to develop. Years went by without any type of communication between the father and the daughters.




Bennett v. Bennett, 1997 CanLII 12388 (ON S.C.)


[27] Tragically, the one child who has chosen to ally herself with her mother has done so at the cost of being excluded from her siblings’ attention and affection. She has not received Christmas or birthday gifts or cards from any of her siblings. She was not welcome at her former home after she chose to live with her mother. On one occasion when she showed up, her older sister, Heather, called the police to have her removed.


[28] It is of significant note that this child, presently residing with her mother, continues to seek, and is allowed and encouraged to seek, a place in her father and her siblings’ lives. Her father has seen her once but has not pursued access in any significant way.


[29] Overall then, the antipathy of Heather and Earl to their mother is of such a level and degree that on considering the totality of their evidence, its contradictions and the lack of any ring of truth to much of their testimony,




M.C.J. v. J.J.J., 2006 CanLII 23936 (ON S.C.)


Indeed the evidence suggests that E.A.J.’s father has gone to extremes to undermine the mother’s parenting and efforts at discipline, both before and after separation


The evidence discloses that Mr. J.J.J. encouraged the children to blame their mother for breaking up the family and reporting his assaultive behaviour to the police, with the result that he was prosecuted and jailed. The


The flavour of the evidence called at trial is that Mr. J.J.J. actively and consciously has attempted to alienate both the children from their mother. The result of this conduct is undoubtedly hurtful to both the children and likely to affect their adult relationships, both with their parents and with future partners and others.




Andrade v. Kennelly, 2006 CanLII 20845 (ON S.C.)


[73] In sum, I conclude that Dr. Kennelly wants to establish a life for herself and the children with respect to which Mr. Andrade plays little if any part




R.(A,L,J.) v. R.(H.C.G.), 1995 CanLII 6877 (ON C.J.)


[22] There remains one last issue. The father is to have custody and put his plan into effect. What about access to the mother? I find from the evidence that the mother has gone to extreme lengths to exclude the father from seeing her daughter. There has been a deterioration in her mental stability as shown by the events of 25 October 1995. Access should be permitted to the mother but under the supervision of the children’s aid society, as it is presently carried out




Layzell v. Layzell, 1997 CanLII 479 (ON C.A.)


[1] In our view, there was a material change in circumstances affecting the children in this case. At the time the earlier order for custody had been made, the respondent had absconded to Switzerland with the children, in contravention of an existing order granting her custody and access to the appellant




Maratib v. Zafar, 2005 CanLII 19842 (ON S.C.)


26] I am concerned that the longstanding separation from their father has not been in the best interests of the children




Schmidt v. Seidel, 2003 CanLII 2417 (ON S.C.)


[6] Mr. Schmidt was acquitted of an assault charge arising out of their separation in May of 2000 and argues that since the date of separation the mother has attempted to alienate the children from their father.




Stajkowski v. Stajkowski, 2004 CanLII 26185 (ON S.C.)


On the other hand, an order will go prohibiting the Father from interfering with the children’s access to their Mother either personally or by telephone




Lanfrey v. Lanfrey, 2003 CanLII 2162 (ON S.C.)


She also granted the respondent an order of non-removal from the jurisdiction regarding children, on the applicant’s evidence of her intent to deny access and move the children in her care from the jurisdiction




Garelli v. Rahma, 2006 CanLII 13555 (ON S.C.)


[1] This is an application by Mr. Garelli for the return of two children, ages nine and 14, to Italy, pursuant to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Schedule to s. 46, Children's Law Reform Act, (“Hague Convention”). The application is opposed by Ms. Rahma, who is the children’s mother


[2] Stated briefly, these are the facts. The parents separated in Italy on March 10, 2000. They were awarded joint custody of the children, principal residence to the mother, access to the father. On September 3, 2004, the mother and children traveled to Ontario to visit her family. She had return tickets booked for September 28, 2004. The father was aware of the visit and the return date. However, she did not return and notified the father of her intention to remain here, with the children.




Ndegwa v. Ndegwa, 2001 CanLII 28132 (ON S.C.)


[3] In November 2000, the mother left the matrimonial home in Kenya, without notice to the father. She subsequently removed the children from their schools, without notice to the father and without his consent. In December, she removed the children from Kenya to Ontario, again without the father’s knowledge or consent.


[34] My decision to refuse the father’s request to set aside my order dated February 23, 2001 and to stay the mother’s proceedings here is based on the jurisdiction provided by s. 23 of the Children’s Law Reform Act and my finding, on the balance of probabilities, that the children would suffer serious harm if removed from Ontario where the custody order in favour of their mother protects them from physical harm, directly or indirectly, arising from the violent environment in which they resided in Kenya, and as well, the exposure in that environment to emotional and physical harm.




Dababneh v. Dababneh, 2003 CanLII 1959 (ON S.C.)


Ms. Dababneh has not seen her grandson for years now, because of the tragic alienation that has occurred to this family




Reid v. Mulder, 2005 CanLII 38108 (ON S.C.)


On June 16, 2003 an incident occurred as a result of which father was charged with assault upon mother. Following that charge, father was effectively prevented, by terms of his recognizance, from any contact with mother or with Maia.


[5] In any event, as a result of the charge laid against father, there was in effect no contact between father and Maia through the summer, fall and winter of 2003




Sawyers v. McKechnie, 2003 CanLII 2232 (ON S.C.)


[3] Except for two brief visits with their father at Families in Transition in April 2003, the children have not seen their father for 2 ½ years.




A.J.K. v. S.L.M., 2003 CanLII 1969 (ON S.C.)


At the case conference, A.J.K. received a copy of a report by Barbara Chisholm that makes clear the mother’s position that she was seeking to deny the father any access.




Shamli v. Shamli, 2004 CanLII 12363 (ON S.C.)


[22] Dr Shamli’s failure to admit wrongdoing, his consequent lack of remorse, his covert activities leading up to the abduction in 2000, his repeated ignoring of the orders of this court in 2000, his strong connections in Libya, the possibility that Dr. Shamli could obtain another Libyan passport with Adam on it, his unfair dealing with his wife when he decided to return and his lack of any expressed concern for the impact of his behaviour on his son lead this court to conclude there is no way to ensure Adam does not go through another abduction other than by tightly supervising access. The past cannot be ignored as it cannot fail to be other than a reasonable predictor of the future. The curtailment of Adam’s relationship with his father must continue to prevent a future abduction.




R.J.J. v. K.R.J., 2004 CanLII 34359 (ON S.C.)


[11] As far as I can tell, access never occurred at the Durham Supervised Access Centre. The respondent has refused to see his children there and, for their part, the children have likewise declined. They want to see their father in the community, without any restrictions.


[12] Although it is far from clear how it came about, sometime in October 2003, the parties agreed to counselling for the respondent and the children. The idea was to facilitate the normalization of access. Ms. Nancy Wood was retained to do that.




I.(F.) v. F.(K.), 2000 CanLII 22875 (ON S.C.)


After parents of 2 children (girl and boy, now 11 and 9 years old respectively) separated, father cohabited with another woman for almost 2 years, during which time he had access to his children under consent order — When that relationship ended, woman disclosed to family doctor that boy had been victim of father’s sexual abuse that his sister had witnessed — Court then required all access to be supervised but then suspended access some 3 years ago after father announced that he was leaving Ontario — Thus, allegations of abuse had never been tested in formal court proceedings — In fact, father would periodically return to Ontario but had not seen children in all that time nor did he make payments under child support order — Last year, he sought to have access suspension lifted, but court had dismissed his motion and he did not appeal




Wiltshire v. Wiltshire, 2003 CanLII 2275 (ON S.C.)


[2] On April 4, 2003, the wife made an exparte application resulting in an order suspending the husband’s access set out in Zelinski J.’s order, even though she now complains that the husband hasn’t exercised access since 1999.




Curle v. Lowe, 2004 CanLII 22947 (ON S.C.)


[4] The plaintiff alleges that Deanna Lowe failed to advise him of the birth of the child, and that she, aided by the other two defendants, moved the child, without his knowledge or consent from Thunder Bay on November 28, 1999, to southern Ontario. He also alleges that the child’s location was kept from him, both in Thunder Bay, and after the mother’s move. He states he was denied access to the child prior to the interim order of March, 2001, that gave the mother custody, and specified the plaintiff’s access




Barrett v. Barrett, 2002 CanLII 49564 (ON S.C.)


2 The parties were married on August 8, 1992 and separated on or about the October 22, 1999. There is one child of the marriage, Desirae Cecilia Faye Barrett, born November 12, 1993. Since the date of separation the child has resided with the Plaintiff.


3 The Defendant has not been heard from subsequent to the entering into of a separation agreement in October 1999. That agreement provided for interim custody of the child to be with the Plaintiff and for the Plaintiff to have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.


4 The Defendant’s whereabouts are currently unknown and the Plaintiff has not been able to locate him despite strenuous efforts




Mikan v. Mikan, 2004 CanLII 5062 (ON S.C.)


[7] At or about that time Larissa began to refuse to go on access visits. She has refused ever since.


24] Some of the other aspects of the Order which I propose to make now may not have been expressly sought in the motions before me. Notwithstanding that this is so, in view of my extreme concern over the issue of alienation, I am invoking, if need be the parens patriae jurisdiction of this Court to justify those orders and to put an end to the alienating behaviour.




Hyatt v. Whitney, 2002 CanLII 49537 (ON S.C.)


[9] I keep in mind that for the last fifteen years there has been little contact with Mark by the respondent and that the applicant’s new spouse Richard Dolson has acted in loco parentis as father to Mark




X.M. v. S.A.M., 2007 CanLII 14935 (ON S.C.)


58] Ms S.A. did not exercise any access from August, 2006 until March 2007




Johnston v. Johnston, 1991 CanLII 4085 (ON C.J.)


After that point, father had no further contact with his children for almost 2 years, although he persisted in his efforts to restore access




P.S. v. K.S., 2004 CanLII 6326 (ON S.C.)


 [19] After the separation in 1990, unable to maintain herself and the two children financially, Mrs. S. attempted prostitution in Niagara Falls. She was arrested for the same and shortly thereafter, lost custody of her children to her husband. Due to a number of factors, access to the children was lost thereafter, depriving Mrs. S. of any contact with her children at all for many many years




Hassan v. Mufti, 2008 CanLII 29771 (ON S.C.)


[33] Subsequently the mother informed him she was going to take both children, threatening to keep him from seeing his child again, to have him jailed here and in Saudi Arabia, and to burn down his house with his family in it.




M.M.K. v. P.R.M., 2000 CanLII 22536 (ON S.C.)


[1] This is the hearing for sentence following my finding on January 17, 1997, that P.R.M. (P.), father of J.M. (J.), born January 19, 1990, was in contempt of my judgment dated August 26, 1996. He removed J. from the jurisdiction in October 1996, and since that time has effectively denied the access required between J. and her mother, Ma. K. (Ma.). Before being arrested while attending a recent educational conference in Toronto, P. had taken no steps to purge his contempt. He first appeared before me on May 9, 2000. At that time, I made it clear that he would not be released from custody until he took steps to purge his contempt by facilitating a reasonable process to initiate access between J. and her mother.


[2] Specifically, I required that J. be brought to Ontario to begin the reintegration process with her mother. I also required that P. take steps to ensure that the Bermudian court order was varied to ensure compliance with the process of reintegration that P. has consented to, and in particular, removing the restriction preventing the child from leaving Bermuda.




Ibrahim v. Girgis, 2008 ONCA 23 (CanLII)


[1] This case deals with a child who, at a very young age, was wrongfully retained in Ontario and with the Hague Convention on international child abduction, which governs such retentions. The chief question is whether the father, who stayed in Florida while his wife took the child to Ontario, acquiesced in the retention and should therefore be denied his son’s summary return under the Hague Convention




New v. New, 2007 CanLII 17033 (ON S.C.)


[5] Hunter is their only child. He was born in Kentucky. He is an American citizen.


[23] At 7:30 that night the Father received a phone call from the Mother’s stepfather, who informed him that the Mother and Hunter were at his residence in Brantford, Ontario. Apparently they had taken the bus


[48] While she does make complaints about threats and says that this man, with all of his health concerns, held her prisoner from time to time, the facts make nonsense out of this.




Johnson v. Athimootil, 2007 CanLII 41434 (ON S.C.)


[4] The marriage deteriorated dramatically during the months following the move. The circumstances surrounding the separation are controversial and will be discussed further below. What is clear is that while all the parties were visiting family in India early in 2007, Sarah and Dennis, the two oldest children, left with Mr. Athimoottil and returned to Saudi Arabia with him. Their mother has not seen them since. Ms. Johnson, having unsuccessfully approached the Indian authorities to seek their return, travelled back to Canada with the youngest child, Hannah. Fortunately, she has been able to re-obtain her previous employment. She immediately brought legal proceedings here in the provincial court seeking custody of the oldest two children.




Rajani v. Rajani, 2008 CanLII 11645 (ON S.C.)


[2] The father has a final order in Tanzania granting him custody. This order was obtained by him with the aid of false affidavit evidence. The mother is concerned that the father will remove the child to Tanzania. She failed to return to Tanzania with the child as she had undertaken to do. The full account appears in Reasons for Decision released September 10, 2007.


[3] I am satisfied that there is a substantial risk that the father will abscond with the child. The Hague Convention has not been adopted in Tanzania. He has already shown in the litigation between the parties a willingness to do or say anything which will secure his goal. No doubt he thinks that turnabout is fair play




S. v. S., 2004 CanLII 1233 (ON S.C.)


[5] The applicant and the child came to Canada on a Visitor’s Visa on July 22, 2003 to visit with her mother and stepfather. The mother and child were scheduled to return to Japan on August 23, 2003. However, the applicant called on August 23, 2003 and told the respondent’s mother that she would not be returning to Japan with the child. On August 25, 2003, the applicant filed an application to remain in Canada on compassionate and humanitarian grounds.


[23] The applicant has provided this court independent and credible evidence, in the report of Dr. Willock, that she and the child lived in an abusive and dangerous environment and, on the balance of probabilities, the child would suffer serious harm if removed from Ontario.




Benditkis v. Benditkis, 2007 CanLII 53232 (ON S.C.)


[3] This summer, Mr. Benditkis left Canada with Matthew, on July 7, for what was to be a vacation during one of the father’s two week residential periods with Matthew. They did not return. Both Mr. Benditkis and Matthew communicated with Ms. Benditkis their intention to reside in the Czech Republic.


[4] In the result, Ms. Benditkis sought the ex parte order that was granted on July 26, 2007. She also applied under the Hague Convention to the Central Authority for the Czech Republic.




Courtney v. Springfield, 2008 CanLII 35920 (ON S.C.)


[1] On December 14, 2007, the Respondent traveled from England to Canada with Kita, age 8 and Freda, age 6, for the stated purpose of a holiday visit with her family in Ottawa. Their return date was set for January 8, 2008. On December 31, the Applicant received a letter from the Respondent, dated December 12 and post-marked in England after her departure, to the effect that her trip to Canada had been a permanent move and neither she nor the children would be returning.




Parker v. Parker, 2008 CanLII 17130 (ON S.C.)


[6] In my findings I ruled that the Respondent had acted contrary to the Hague rules. She had improperly detained the child. Even after my ruling, she still resisted compliance with the ruling


[9] Because of the actions of the Respondent, there must be a costs sanction against her.




M.L.E. v. J.C.E. (No. 1), 2005 ONCJ 88 (CanLII)


U.K. statute avoided concepts of “custody” and “access” and instead favoured survival of joint “parental responsibility” upon separation unless parents or court order made specific provisions for “residence” and “contact” — Because of absence of court order or parental agreement, father argued that no “rights of custody” under convention had been violated — Ontario court concluded that nothing in U.K. law suggested that either parent lost any rights or obligations merely on separation and father certainly did not thereby acquire unilateral right to determine children’s removal from U.K. — Thus for purposes of convention, there had been breach of custody and therefore wrongful retention of children




Hadissi v. Hassibi, 1994 CanLII 7566 (ON S.C.)


CHARTER OF RIGHTS — Fundamental justice — Right to hearing — Father, mother and child (now 3½ years old) were residents of California — With father’s permission, mother recently took child to visit friends or relatives in Ontario, at which point she refused to return or to allow child to return




Astudillo v. Bayas, 1997 CanLII 11576 (ON S.C.)


CIVIL PROCEDURE — Case management — Need for expeditious disposal — Action under (Hague) Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Childhood Abduction — Father had unlawfully removed 40-month-old daughter from Ecuador to Ontario but mother’s claim for child’s return under Convention did not get heard by Ontario court until some 28 months later




French v. Onderik, 1996 CanLII 1132 (ON C.A.)


In September 1993, a further interim order was made by the Michigan court. That order provided that the mother was to have access to Angel for one week in September, October, November and December of 1993. That order was made on consent. Early in September 1993, the mother brought Angel to London during one of her authorized access periods. She has subsequently refused to return the child to her father. Angel has lived in the London area since September 1993




McFadden v. Sprague, 2007 CanLII 46696 (ON S.C.)


In addition, she points out that it was Ryan’s complete refusal to return to his father that led to the motions; she did return Ryan to the court’s jurisdiction and did comply with its orders here.


[13] I have made several findings which reflect poorly upon her

She has influenced him with regard to where he wants to live and how he feels about his father




D.Q. v. R.A., 2006 CanLII 42375 (ON S.C.)


[61] Mr. R.A. blamed the Q. for his lack of contact either by visits or by telephone to his children between October 2004 and July 2005




Moberg v. Peterson, 2001 CanLII 28262 (ON S.C.)


[37] The Applicant’s evidence is that the Respondent did everything within her power to prevent the Applicant from having access to their children. The Respondent sent a letter to this Court presenting a very different picture. For the purpose of this application, I do not consider it necessary to make any findings of fact as to why the Applicant has not seen his children in over 10 years


[38] For these reasons, I am not inclined to accept either the Applicant’s lack of access to his children or his fathering four more children starting in 1993 as reasons to vary the child support payable by him to the Respondent on behalf of their five children between 1989 and 1994.


43] This retroactive variation results in the outstanding arrears being reduced to $59,664, and I fix the arrears at this level




Braun v. Cousins, 2004 CanLII 4786 (ON S.C.)


I do not find that her behaviour was primarily motivated by a desire to restrict or thwart Mr. Cousins’ access so as to prevent Austen from having a meaningful relationship with his father. I attribute her behaviour to many factors.




Grantier v. Drapeau, 2000 CanLII 22577 (ON S.C.)


A third child, Sarah Jane Grantier, born April 26, 1983 was Ms. Drapeau’s natural child by a previous relationship. During the marriage, Mr. Grantier adopted Sarah Jane. With respect to this child, there is no on-going access between her and Mr. Grantier, a situation that has existed since the separation.




D.R.D. v. S.E.G., 2001 CanLII 28122 (ON S.C.)


11] Even if I accept that Mrs. G. was simply attempting to determine if Mr. G. was D.’s father for her own edification, I simply cannot condone the use she made of such information. I have no doubt that she provided this information to Mr. D. and to D. in an attempt to destroy the relationship between D. and the man he believed to be his father and to end access.


There has been no meaningful access between Mr. D. and D. since 1997.




Einstoss v. Starkman, 2002 CanLII 2777 (ON S.C.)


[3] Custody, access and support issues were completed by Minutes of Settlement and incorporated into a judgment by Chapnik J. dated May 2, 2000 (the "Judgment"). Ms. Starkman is alleged to have violated the access provisions of that Judgment on a number of occasions. Her denial of access resulted in Mr. Einstoss commencing a contempt motion, which was later followed by another contempt motion for the same conduct but related to another court order


[40] Subrule 60.11(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure grants the courts a wide discretion in imposing a penalty for contempt. This includes an order that the "person in contempt, (f) comply with any other order that the judge considers necessary". Therefore, and with the above as a guide, I order the following:

1. Mr. Einstoss' access of Jake shall be varied. Commencing on the next scheduled period of access, Mr. Einstoss' access will be for a period of one week and shall occur on each and every alternate week. Each access period shall commence on the Friday and conclude the following Friday





J.K.L. v. N.C.S., 2008 CanLII 30289 (ON S.C.)


[1] The applicant mother, who is a 49-year-old university graduate, brings this action for an order giving her sole custody of her 13-year-old son who she alleges has been completely alienated from her by the actions of the respondent father. Parental alienation is a difficult issue increasingly faced by the courts, and it appears that the means to deal with this issue are very limited in this province


[207] I must conclude by saying that the respondent clearly loves his son and appears to be doing a commendable job in raising a fine young man. I simply find that he has no perception of the damage he is exposing his son to in the future. If he does realize it, he has chosen to ignore it and hopes it will never occur. I sincerely hope that he will immediately avail himself of intense counselling with Dr. Goldstein or someone equally qualified, so that he will recognize the importance to LS of both parents having a meaningful relationship with him.


[209] Pursuant to section 17(3) of the Divorce Act, Ms. L (the “Applicant”) shall have sole custody of the child of the former marriage, LS (the “child”), born October 20, 1994, and the Applicant shall primarily reside with the child in Toronto or Homesville as she, in her discretion, decides.


[210] Pursuant to section 17(3) of the Divorce Act, Mr. S (the “Respondent”) shall have no access to the child pending the review of this matter, as referred to below at paragraph 215, save and except for the purpose of counselling as also referred to below at paragraph 211 (b)(iii




Lampron v. Lampron, 2006 CanLII 16375 (ON S.C.)


[3] Both Isabelle and Paul are over the age of 18 years of age. They are mature children who have reached the age of majority and they have unilaterally terminated a relationship with their father from whom support is sought. They refuse to have anything to do with their father. In a letter written to their father they called him a professional thief and told him that they do not want to talk to him or have anything to do with him


[6] I find the mother is partly responsible for the children’s attitude towards their father and that she did very little to encourage the children to speak to their father


[7] Spousal support is terminated as of June 30th, 2006




Cho v. Cho, 2001 CanLII 6637 (ON C.A.)


[7] After an argument with Walter in 1987, the respondent had no further direct or indirect contact with Walter, Stella or the appellant.




J.T. v. C.Th., 2004 ONCJ 278 (CanLII)


In the notice of motion in this case, the mother included two statements. The first merely identified the order of which the respondent was alleged to be in contempt and stated that the respondent had not allowed the applicant any access.




Boudreau v. Benaiah, 1998 CanLII 14650 (ON S.C.)


[3] On or about April 21, 1990, Boudreau left Canada with Luke and flew to Hawaii in violation of the custody order governing Boudreau’s access rights of Luke. In so doing, Boudreau was also breaching an earlier order relating to another unrelated matter. Boudreau and Luke were eventually apprehended in Hawaii and returned to Canada on or about October 21, 1990 where Boudreau was charged with abduction of Luke and other related charges.




Caruso v. Caruso, 2006 CanLII 44268 (ON S.C.)


[4] The parents and child traveled to Italy in March 2005 and stayed there for six weeks, returning to Canada in mid-April 2005. They traveled again to Italy on June 12, 2005. Mr. Caruso understood that the purpose of the visit was to visit his wife’s family and, in particular, her ailing father. According to Mr. Caruso, he was advised a couple of days later that Ms. Caruso and Giuseppe would not be returning to Toronto with him. The police arrived and ordered Mr. Caruso to leave the home. Mr. Caruso tried to convince Ms. Caruso to return with the baby to Toronto but she refused. He gave up trying to convince her and left Italy on July 7, 2005. Ms. Caruso and Giuseppe stayed in Italy where they remain to this day




Broz v. Broz, 2001 CanLII 28205 (ON S.C.)


[16] Mr. Broz has not seen Jannie or had any contact with him since 11 months ago and, in the 12 or 13 months before that, he had only a few visits




L.C.M. v. C.A.V., 2003 CanLII 47888 (ON S.C.)


[1] When any court formally terminates a parent-child relationship, that is an event that is inevitably sad. It has now become clear that, in this case, that result has been sadly inevitable


[10] Throughout the two days, Ms. C.A.V. flitted about, in and out of the courtroom, into the body of the court public seating area (where she, from time to time, would shout imprecations and slurs at opposing counsel and the presiding justice), calling them both, from time to time, “child abusers”,


Just minutes before noon, they did comply with that order, but only to the letter. I find that it is not a coincidence that the minute that Mr. L.R.F. delivered the children to the principal, all three scattered in different directions, off of the school property, back to their mother’s and Mr. L.R.F.’s home. Mr. L.R.F., with a smirk, proudly described in court that the “escape” engendered glee and cheers from other public school children in the schoolyard.




Ingles v. Watt, 2003 CanLII 2136 (ON S.C.)


[13] The mother’s stated position that she wants to foster a relationship between the girls and their father is not borne out by her actions. She must know that she faces very serious consequences if she is found in contempt at the trial. Given that her conduct suggests a strong basis for a finding of contempt, I find it highly surprising that she now uses the “fee” issue as a method of impeding court ordered access. She knows that each visit costs $600.00 in supervision fees. Her share is $300.00. She also knows that without payment the supervisors will not attend. She knows that if there is no supervision, there will be no access. I note that supervision was put in place to appease the mother’s concerns




Nitkin v. Nitkin, 2006 CanLII 23153 (ON S.C.)


[4] Mr. Nitkin is the father and the payor party. He is the estranged father of the three children of the marriage, namely, Brenna age 18 Avery age 15 and Terrah age 12


The children’s move to New Mexico and the cessation of any prospect of a renewed relationship between them and their father does not support Mrs. Nitkin-Siegal’s claim.


[109] Mr. Nitkin feels that in the absence of any just cause for terminating her relationship with him, he is viewed as nothing more than “a wallet” or cash machine by Brenna and her mother. He submits that Mrs. Nitkin-Siegal’s alienating influences have resulted in Brenna rejecting him. No court has found Mr. Nitkin’s conduct to be deserving of this result


[115] I find that Brenna as a mature young lady has unilaterally terminated a relationship with her father without any apparent reason. This is a factor that I have considered in determining whether she remains “a child of the marriage”. In and of itself, the unilateral termination of the father and daughter relationship in this case is not determinative of whether Brenna remains “a child of the marriage”. This determination requires an examination of all of the circumstances which includes a review of the relevant circumstances identified in Farden and again, in Rosenberg.


[120] While I am sympathetic to Mr. Nitkin’s situation, he remains Brenna’s father and she remains his daughter albeit, in a broken relationship. Nevertheless, she still continues to be “a child of the marriage” and requires his help and her mother’s help in respect of her post-secondary school education.




Frankum v. Frankum, 2007 ONCA 429 (CanLII)


[20] The non-contact order is difficult to understand as the father has never been described by an independent assessor as anything but a good father to his child. His only failing, identified by Macdougall J., was his inability to understand the importance of Troy having a relationship with his mother.


[22] None of the court’s orders in the record or reasons for those orders indicate any reason for imposing the non-contact provision. None state any reason why the father should be denied access to Troy. None indicate why the father’s access should be supervised




Johannesson v. Johannesson, 2003 CanLII 2013 (ON S.C.)


[6] After a family vacation to Stratford in July 2001, the Petitioner-Wife decided she needed to remain in Canada for extra time with her family. So the Respondent-Husband returned to Iceland alone on August 9, 2001.


[7] He was led to believe by the Petitioner-Wife that the marriage was continuing


[12] On December 30, 2002, on an emergency basis, I made an Order that the Petitioner-Wife refrain from interfering with the Respondent-Husband’s access and extended the access for a further ten days.


13] In spite of this, the Respondent-Husband claims that the Petitioner-Wife continued to deny him the access which had been ordered.


[14] The Petitioner-Wife says that she was fearful that the Respondent-Husband would attempt to remove the children from Canada to Iceland.


Whatever that fear may have been, it was not based on any state of reality that had existed between the parties. However, she had come to understand that there were custody proceedings ongoing in Iceland as well as allegations as against her abducting the children, when there were in fact no such proceedings on either count.


[28] A refusal to permit access out of a legitimate concern for the children, rather than a desire to frustrate access or deny contact, does not amount to contempt.


[30] In any event, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Petitioner-Wife’s conduct was deliberately designed to result in a breach of that Order




Robert v. Robert, 2007 CanLII 37690 (ON S.C.)


[6] On December 22, 2002 in the night the wife was assaulted in her bed at her parents’ residence and stabbed by an intruder. The perpetrator was her older son Daniel. The injuries which she suffered were serious although not life threatening.


On December 30, 2002 her husband and son were arrested for the assault on her. They were denied bail. The husband was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. He was sentenced on December 19, 2003 to four years in the penitentiary. The son was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to a penitentiary term.




Duits v. Duits, 2006 CanLII 45084 (ON S.C.)


[5] On November 17th, 2005, after making arrangements with her mother and other family members, Mrs. Duits took the children and moved to Hamilton. There had been difficulties in the marriage and when marriage counseling seemed to fail, Mrs. Duits determined there was no longer any hope for the marriage to survive. She discussed an exit plan with the marriage counselor and put it into effect when Mr. Duits was away from the matrimonial residence




Claer v. Claer, 2006 CanLII 32612 (ON S.C.)


[7] The matter of access to Curtis was determined after hearing put to me by counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer the views and preferences of the child, which were consistently that he did not want direct in-person contact with his father, because of issues of family violence. I accepted the Office of the Children’s Lawyer’s recommendation that access be in accordance with Curtis’ views and preferences.


[9] It is true that the Applicant heatedly walked out of the motions room on more than one occasion during the hearing. But my Ruling does not find a basis of concern in that. This Court recognizes the raised emotional state often surrounding many Family Law Hearings in our courts and it would be folly to rise to the bait and also punish an offending party in costs, after having made a significant ruling against that party on the merits of a substantial issue


[14] On this basis, I fix the Respondent’s costs at $5,000, all inclusive.




McMillan v. McMillan, 1999 CanLII 14982 (ON S.C.)


[1] This is a motion in which a finding of contempt has been made against the ex-wife of the moving party. The contempt is in respect of a denial of access to the children of the parties. The children, a boy and a girl, currently are 12 and 14 years of age, respectively.


[29] It has been necessary for Mr. McMillan to launch four separate contempt motions since the divorce judgment was granted in 1991.


[30] I am aware that there is a period of time immediately following the separation of spouses when emotions run high and otherwise sensible people are prone to act like vengeful lunatics. A court order deliberately breached during that delicate time frame may attract the compassion of the court. However, a court order which is wilfully, deliberately and repeatedly breached many years after such compassion can reasonably be expected to extend, is an entirely different matter


[38] For the reasons already expressed, Ms. McMillan shall be incarcerated for a period of five days in punishment for her contempt




MacKinnon v. Duffy, 2000 CanLII 22427 (ON S.C.)


[10] According to the husband, on or about October 15, 1986 the wife informed him that she was moving to the United States to remarry.


[14] The husband deposes that, following the letter, he did not hear from his wife. He assumed that she moved to Maryland, married and that the letter of October 27, 1986 had been acted upon. He says that his first knowledge that things were otherwise came in July 1999 when he was contacted by the Family Responsibility Office and told that he owed $241,500 in unpaid support.




Worthington v. Worthington, 2000 CanLII 22469 (ON S.C.)


10] In October 1998 the NCDC advised that it was not prepared to assist further with supervised access because of the “demeanour” of the respondent, his “aggressive and oppositional behaviour toward the child care worker” and his “persistence in asking Rebecca inappropriate questions, such as ‘Does mummy have a boyfriend?’”


[11] Faced with an unwillingness by the NCDC to assist in the visits, the respondent had no means by which he could lawfully exercise access and so there was none. On July 9, 1999 this status quo was formalized in an order terminating access. As well, the order provided that:

3. …the respondent is to be restrained from molesting, annoying, harassing or communicating directly or indirectly with the children and is not to attend within 500 metres of the applicant’s residence. This paragraph is to be enforced by the Niagara Regional Police Department pending a final order.




Wedgbury v. Wedgbury, 2006 CanLII 10531 (ON S.C.)


Either way, whether consciously or unconsciously, whether calculating or sincere, it is clear that Ms. Wedgbury wishes to diminish and damage the relationship between the children and their father.




Salvador v. Salvador, 2004 CanLII 5861 (ON S.C.)


[1] This is a troubling case concerning access for the father, Rino Santo Salvador (“Rino”) with his two daughters, Haley (now aged eleven and a half) and Alisha (now aged ten). Except for two supervised five minute sessions, Rino has not had access with Haley and Alisha in two years. He longs to see them and work towards re-establishing his relationship with them. They do not share these feelings.


[2] Something has gone very wrong here; despite a sincere commitment, Rino appears to be as far from receiving access today as he was two years ago. Better steps must be taken to rectify matters. Unlike a bottle of fine wine, estrangement is not improved by being laid down in storage for a period of years




Islam v. Rahman, 2005 CanLII 16607 (ON S.C.)


Her fear is that, should the respondent have more time with him, Saad will be overwhelmed by the respondent’s alienation and her relationship with the child will deteriorate drastically


[27] In summary, the respondent made numerous negative, unfair and false statements with respect to the applicant in his five page, self-serving note given to the investigator,. The Investigator had an obligation pursuant to s.112 of the Courts of Justice Act to conduct her investigation in a fair and unbias manner. This was not done. I reject her recommendations.


[29] I concur with the applicant’s concerns.


[30] The applicant testified that these concerns continue to this date. The applicant testified that she has heard the respondent coaching the child to say he wants to live with his father since approximately January, 2002. This date is prior to their physical separation. She testified that the respondent has consistently attempted to alienate the child from her throughout their three year separation. Her allegation is supported by the evidence of Constable Carty, of the Peel Regional Police Force. An incident occurred on August 22, 2004 that was investigated by Peel Regional Police. Constable Carty testified that Saad told him on that occasion that his father told him that his mother was trying to keep the father and son apart.


[31] The applicant testified that the child “parrots” the respondent’s view that he should live with his father. The applicant testified that the child tells her that the respondent yells at him, gives him times out, denies him T.V. etc. if the child had a nice time with his mother. I find the applicant’s testimony credible and very disturbing.


[33] The child has consisently said to the clinical investigator that he wishes to live with his father and visit with his mother three times a week or whenever he wishes to. However, the child’s preferences must be carefully examined for undue influence and not simply taken at face value.


[34] The respondent testified that Saad tells him that he does not like his mother and that he wants to live with the respondent.


[39] I find that the respondent is creating negative pressure directly and indirectly on this child.


[41] This Court orders:

(a) That the applicant mother shall have sole custody of the child Saad Rahman born August 4, 1995


(i) The child shall attend counselling as directed by Peel Children’s Centre (PCC) and/or Peel Family Services. This counselling shall be arranged by the Applicant and is for the benefit of the child. The parents shall participate and have involvement as directed by the counsellor only




B.R. v. E.K., 2007 CanLII 1875 (ON S.C.)


1] K. is 10 years old, and in grade five. She lives with her mother. She has not seen her father for the past 4-½ years, since June of 2002, when access was refused on the basis that K. would not willingly go with her father for access


This urgent family case, although ordered expedited, has not been reached in a timely manner because of the long backlog of civil and family cases that has accrued while judges have struggled to meet the constitutionally mandated requirement of reaching criminal cases before they are stayed on the basis of delay. In non-criminal matters, children and families and litigants with personal claims have suffered, at times significantly, from the same lack of resources that imperils criminal cases in this historically overstressed region. This case is one of many many examples of that reality


The failure to provide adequate resources to the family courts cannot be simply shunted aside as an ongoing, or implicitly acceptable, systemic problem. It must be seen as an unfortunate and unacceptable reality, with an impact on specific victims as well as the community as a whole.




Szczecina v. Piatek, 2003 CanLII 2255 (ON S.C.)


[6] The most significant aspect of this dispute is that the mother has a demonstrated history of denying access of the daughter to her father. Her position seems to be that because the child is “of tender years” and that she has been the primary caregiver that there should be no access by the child to her father




Toth v. Toth, 2003 CanLII 2259 (ON S.C.)


[3] All three children are the biological children of the wife born during her first marriage. The wife receives child support from the children’s biological father in the sum of about $650.00 per month, but the biological father has no relationship with the children nor has he had since 1997. The wife in effect states the petitioner was the only father these children had during the parties’ relationship. The youngest has no memory of her biological father. The husband states he made it clear to the wife he wanted no parental involvement with her children during their marriage and that any indicia of a parental relationship or involvement in the parenting of the children were due to his wish to be a good husband to his wife.




Bell v. Bell, 2006 CanLII 23927 (ON S.C.)


[3] There is one child born of the relationship, namely Parker Bell, born August 17, 2001 (age 3). Ms. Bell also has a child from a previous relationship, Justyce Regular, born February 26, 1995 (age 11). The biological father of Justyce has never been involved with the child.


[8] I accept the submissions of Mr. Bell that he was an active, involved and loving parent to Parker, and that both before and after separation Parker spent considerable time in his care. However, the parties will be residing approximately 1500 kilometres apart. Parker resides with his mother. He has not seen his father since February. Ms. Bell is his primary parent.


He and Justyce have not seen one another since August 2005, which he attributes to Ms. Bell, whom he states “poisoned” the relationship between him and Justyce.


[14] I am reluctant to impose a schedule of access, presently to be exercised in Marathon and later in Hamilton, since the only submission made by Mr. Bell was that all access be in Hamilton and, by Ms. Bell, that all access be in Marathon. , … , If the parties are not able to agree upon a schedule for access, then Mr. Bell is at liberty to renew his motion to determine a schedule for access, that at the beginning would be exercised in or around Marathon


While I appreciate that in light of the fact that Mr. Bell is unemployed, the cost of staying in Marathon could be a financial burden


Mr. Bell shall pay support for Justyce and Parker in the sum of $302.00 per month, for March 1 and April 1, 2006, based on his income of $21,476.00




R.A. v. H.D.A., 2004 CanLII 24484 (ON S.C.)


Mrs. R.A. takes the position that Mr. H.G.A. should have no access; indeed, she does not want custody of the children if I order any access in favour of Mr. H.G.A


Mrs. R.A. has indicated that if the children are left with Mr. H.G.A., she wants no access.


Mrs. R.A. offered to transfer custody of the children to him and to get out of the children’s lives in exchange for $30,000. When he indicated an unwillingness to pay her that sum, she suggested that she required a minimum of $15,000 because she wanted to buy a car.




K. M. O. v. L. O., 2004 CanLII 2544 (ON S.C.)


[14] Unfortunately, her relationship with her father has broken down.


While they went to Jamaica for a holiday during Christmas of 2000, they communicated very little afterward, and have not seen each other since, until recently at the trial. A small present and card that K. sent to the Husband for Christmas of 2001 was returned with a note that read: “I think you have sent this to the wrong person”.




Weiler v. Phifer, 2007 CanLII 9240 (ON S.C.)


[6] The parties disagree significantly with what transpired over the next six month period. Mr. Phifer alleges that Ms. Weiler “disappeared with the girls.” It has been his position throughout that she “abducted” the girls from Texas and hid them from him.




Davis v. Davis, 2003 CanLII 2300 (ON S.C.)


Custody is not in issue and a final order will go with custody granted to the petitioner wife with reasonable access to the respondent father who is presently estranged from his younger son











Influences by Government Agencies





C.J.A. v. L.R.G., 2004 CanLII 18593 (ON S.C.)


[4] On March 22, 2000 the court ordered that the wife have custody of the two children and the husband would have generous access.


[6] In July 2002 the wife was charged with impaired driving while the two children were with her in her car. She eventually pleaded guilty to the charge. As a result of this incident the Children’s Aid Society in Halton took the children into their care and released them to the father’s care.


[7] The wife entered into extensive rehabilitation programs and in October 2002 the Children’s Aid Society determined that the children were no longer in need of protection and in November the Children’s Aid Society advised the Court that they were content that the children be returned to the custody of the wife.


[8] The husband would not consent to the return of the children to the wife. The Children’s Aid Society brought a motion returnable February 25, 2003 to have the children returned to the wife and it was at that time that the husband consented to the order.




Kawartha-Haliburton Children's Aid Society v. V. C., 2003 CanLII 2292 (ON S.C.)


Kay Roberts was concerned for the children and she contacted the Children’s Aid Society. Ms. Roberts confirmed that V.C. told her that C.A. had to smoke dope in order to be able to care for D.C. Ms. Roberts also confirmed that on several occasions, V.C. told her that C.A. had threatened to leave and take the children such that she would not see the children again.


Ms. B. E. testified to the fact that V.C. was a different person before she met and lived with C.A. In her prior life, she described V.C. as a good mother who kept a clean home and clean children. After she met and lived with C.A., V.C.'s home was so unsavoury that B.E. rarely would go into it, always visiting by sitting outside.


[36] As a result of Ms. Forest's observations, she could not support V.C.'s parenting skills while V.C. was in a relationship with C.A. She advised that she believed that V.C. was unable to do what she needed as a parent while she was living with C.A


[42] V.C.’s evidence was to the effect that the Children’s Aid Society was unnecessarily intrusive in their affairs.


Upon review of the evidence, I find the evidence of the workers was more plausible than that of V.C.


[110] These children are entitled to have stability and live in a healthy environment. Given the fact that the evidence points to a tenuous attachment between the children and the parents, there is no need to offer the children institutional care by awarding access to the parents.




Children's Aid Society of Algoma v. N.(R.) (No. 2), 2000 CanLII 17228 (ON C.J.)


Father had interim care and custody of 3 children under terms of supervision by children’s aid society when he was convicted for offences that earned him prison time during which children came into care of children’s aid society — Upon his discharge, father sought children’s return to his interim care — Father had never made arrangements for children’s care when he was arrested — His history of impulsiveness, his indifference to consequences for himself or for his children and his refusal to co-operate with any authority such as children’s aid society meant that supervision order would likely be ineffective, regardless of conditions imposed — In fact, father’s undisciplined behaviour was at heart of troubles that drove this case — Finally, upon his discharge from prison, father had no accommodations for children even if they were returned to him


Just before her brief arrest on questionable criminal charge, mother had made arrangement for her daughter’s care by another person from whom children’s aid society thereafter apprehended child — Society never contended that mother’s emergency care arrangement was somehow improper or created risk of harm to child — Likewise, court had no basis for inference that her alleged inability to control her own behaviour in this incident showed recklessness to risk of arrest with consequent inability to care for child — Society’s affidavit of information and belief that merely repeated information about incident from police office that, in turn, repeated information from yet another person carried less weight than mother’s first-hand account of this incident — Court directed child’s interim return to mother subject to society supervision.




Children's Aid Society of Thunder Bay v. K.(K.), 2006 ONCJ 158 (CanLII)


[10] On 14 March 2005, the society received information that Ms. K.K. had given birth to a boy, D.F., on 12 March 2005. It was later revealed that Ms. K.K. gave birth to the child in the bathroom of her residence and that the child had fallen and hit his head on the floor during birth. At this time, Ms. K.K. and Mr. A.F. were still in a relationship and wanted to parent D.F. Contrary to her evidence at trial one month earlier, Ms. K.K. indicated she had no concerns regarding Mr. A.F.’s anger problems and domestic violence.


Ms. Brassard expressed the following concerns about the parents based on her interaction with them at her office, at their home and during access visits:



Mr. A.F. continues to have anger management problems. He has poor impulse control and is verbally aggressive to society staff and Ms. K.K.



Mr. A.F.’s parenting skills are suspect. He is intrusive, he has a low tolerance when D.F. is in distress and is critical and sarcastic towards Ms. K.K.



Mr. A.F. has not addressed his issues surrounding domestic violence.



Ms. K.K. lacks confidence and self-esteem. She continues to be victimized by Mr. A.F., although she has admitted to instances of verbal and physical aggression towards Mr. A.F


If Ms. K.K. maintains her relationship with Mr. A.F. and does not address her parenting deficiencies, either through parenting courses or individual counselling, Ms. Brassard believes that D.F. remains at risk




Windsor-Essex Children's Aid Society v. J.(K.), 2005 ONCJ 270 (CanLII)


[11] The society’s account of the charges of assault brought by the mother and the father consists of hearsay from the children and statements of denial and explanations offered by the mother or father. There is little to no investigative analysis reflected in the society’s material.


[33] I am satisfied that the children’s best interests can be maintained by having them remain in their mother’s care, subject to the following terms and conditions and subject to an interim order of supervision in favour of the applicant society.


[34] The following order shall issue:

1.The mother shall have no direct or indirect association or communication with the father pending this adjournment.


[35] As for the father’s access, I have the following to say: The unfortunate events of 2 October 2005 have now appeared to result in an allegation of assault against the father. This court is mindful of his concerns related to access and his prolonged separation from the children. In light of the undertaking that he has executed, I will not make an order that would be inconsistent with the terms of his release. For that reason, I make no order for access in his favour at this time.




Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. B.(S.M.), 2004 ONCJ 444 (CanLII)


The society alleges that, when C.B. was four months old and while he and his sister J.B. were in the care of their mother, Mrs. Su. M.B. shook C.B. and inflicted permanent brain damage. The other members of the family, Mr. F.B. (father), Mrs. M. Ca. (maternal grandmother) and Mr. Li. C. (maternal uncle) were at work. The society now wishes to provide permanency planning for both C.B. and J.B. by way of adoption.


[2] Both parents filed answers seeking return of the children to their care. Prior to the trial, Mr. F.B. consented to the finding in need of protection and a Crown wardship order. At the trial, Mr. F.B.’s position was that he wished to maintain an access relationship with his children.


[33] In December 2002, Mr. F.B. left the family home. He filed a motion and plan of care with the court seeking return of the children and unsupervised Christmas access. The case management judge denied Mr. F.B. the relief sought. Mr. F.B. then filed a second plan of care, which was subsequently withdrawn. In March 2003, Mr. F.B. consented to a finding in need of protection and an order of Crown wardship.


[149] Dr. Kushnir, an expert in the area of child psychology, also spoke of the significance of permanency planning and its effect on children’s emotional well-being. She highlighted the fact that children who are adopted view themselves differently from children who are wards of the State. In simplified terms, permanency encourages stable family relationships; stable family relationships encourage emotional well-being.


[155] For all of these reasons, I have concluded that the society’s request for Crown wardship without access for the purposes of adoption is appropriate, reasonable and in the best interest of these children.




Children's Aid Society of Algoma v. P.(D.), 2006 ONCJ 170 (CanLII)


[3] If a “finding: is made, the society requests the child be placed with her mother subject to the supervision of the society for a period of 12 months on terms and conditions


The involvement with Mr. C.S. has put the mother and the child at serious risk.




Children's Aid Society of Nipissing and Parry Sound v. P.(C.), 2004 ONCJ 432 (CanLII)


CHILD PROTECTION — Form of order — Crown wardship — Likelihood of change in circumstances — Despite terms of previous supervision orders, mother persisted in her “on-again, off-again” volatile relationship with child’s father that resulted in frequent changes of residence, drug use and incidents of domestic violence — Mother had repeatedly demonstrated that her first loyalty was to child’s father and not to her parenting responsibilities — Mother’s attitudes and level of immaturity were unlikely to change — Because child’s stay in society care had now exceeded statutory ceiling, court’s options were reduced to Crown wardship and returning child to mother under supervision — Supervision option was unworkable in light of mother’s behaviour — Court ordered Crown wardship without access




Children's Aid Society of Halton Region v. K. J. H., 2004 ONCJ 119 (CanLII)


4] As a result of the deteriorating relationship between the parents, the respondent mother brought a motion without notice to the respondent father on 18 July 2003, seeking an order for temporary custody of the three children, for supervised access by the father, for no access unless the children consent, a restraining order against the respondent and an order for police assistance. As a result of this motion, Justice P.H. Marjoh Agro made a temporary order on that day awarding custody of the three children to the respondent mother, no access to the respondent father without further court order and a restraining order against the respondent father


On 22 December 2003, the court ordered that the respondent parents have joint custody of all three children and that the children have various periods of residence with the respondent as set out in their temporary minutes of settlement.


[6] Throughout the time that the parties were separated up to just prior to the time of the making of the temporary joint custody order on 22 December 2003, A.J.H. continued to demonstrate behavioural problems including being engaged in self-harming behaviour in November 2003. At that time, A.J.H.’s destructive behaviour had been escalating and the respondent mother expressed to Lisa Potts that she could not cope with A.J.H.’s behaviour and asked that A.J.H. be placed in the care of the society pursuant to a temporary care and custody agreement. Ms. Potts, on behalf of the society, rejected that suggestion and refused to take A.J.H. into “care”. Instead, she encouraged Ms. K.J.H. to continue to try to work with A.J.H. and her problems.


A.J.H. then moved in with her father.


[8] On 12 January 2004, A.J.H. disclosed to Lisa Potts that she had been sexually assaulted by her father. As a result, A.J.H. was interviewed and Ms. K.J.H. was then asked to have A.J.H. return to her care. To this request she agreed and A.J.H. was, in fact, returned to her care by the Halton society on 12 January 2004


[11] On 19 January 2004, the applicant society apprehended all three children from the care of their mother, allegedly on the basis of her failure to follow through with the terms of the current custody and access order, which the society claims was designed to protect the children, as well as on the basis of the mother’s alleged failure to comply with the request that she not have any contact with the father during the ongoing criminal investigation, the mother’s alleged refusal or inability to believe A.J.H.’s allegations that she had been sexually abused by the father, the father’s belief that he had done nothing wrong and the mother’s alleged failure to acknowledge that the children needed to be protected from the father




Children's Aid Society of Peel Region v. K.(M.), 2006 ONCJ 459 (CanLII)


[1] JUSTICE J.D. KARSWICK:— By notice of motion and with respect to the two children, S.K. and Mk. K., the Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Peel (the “society”) seek a finding of parentage pursuant to subsection 37(1) of the Child and Family Services Act, as amended.


[3] Prior to proceeding upon the motion for summary judgment and upon a review of the affidavit of Ms. Mary Beth Moellenkamp, sworn on 12 September 2006, and the mother’s answer, and upon submissions from both counsel, and with respect to the child S.K., the court made a finding that Mr. J.F. is not a “father” and, pursuant to subsection 37(1), he is not entitled to notice. There is no male person who qualifies as a “parent” pursuant to the Act.




Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. H.(M.), 1994 CanLII 5235 (ON C.J.)


[6] At that time, Ms. Ma. H. took up an interest in Satanism.


[7] Through the auspices of her friends in the cult, Ms. Ma. H. met Mr. Au. Ho. who is admitted to be the father of D.H., Ms. Ma. H.’s first child. I note here that Mr. Au. Ho. has not been found to be a “parent” within the meaning of the Child and Family Services Act.


[11] Although Mr. I.G. is the father of two of Ms. Ma. H.’s children, his help and guidance to the family has been minimal. Mr. I.G. and Ms. Ma. H. have separated on a number of occasions between early 1991 and the spring of 1993. Mr. I.G.’s behaviour towards D.H. was a matter of great concern to Ms. Ma. H. and to the society. In fact, his conduct led to the first application made by the society in January 1993. The basis of that application was real or apprehended physical harm to D.H. at the hands of Mr. I.G.


He has assaulted Ms. Ma. H. and D.H. It is also alleged that he, at one stage, abused Me. H. sexually, although this allegation has no support in the evidence before me. Mr. I.G. has a criminal record and he has refused to co-operate with the children’s aid society respecting counselling.


[40] The society has filed with the court its position on terms of supervision and access. The supervision terms requested by the society are as follows:



Mr. I.G. to continue residence outside the H. home.




Mr. I.G. to have no direct or indirect contact with D.H. unless approved by the Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto. Mr. I.G. not to attend the family home at any time, without the approval of the children’s aid society, unless satisfactory progress reports of counselling services are received by the society. Mother to report any breaches to the society immediately.




Ms. Ma. H. to ensure that Mr. I.G. and Ms. E.H. have no access to D.H. other than that which is approved by the Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto.



41] I have concluded that these terms are appropriate and they are to be included in the supervision.




Children's Aid Society of Thunder Bay v. E.-S.(S.), 2005 ONCJ 517 (CanLII)


Statutory ceiling on temporary care had expired long ago and court’s options were limited to Crown wardship or returning children to mother — Latter option, however, was not viable — Mother’s plan of care, although well-intentioned, effectively invited court to conduct experiment with children’s lives — Mother was currently living with drug dealer with criminal record and her attempts to address her problems by herself, given her fragile state, was foolish and would impact negatively not only upon her health, but upon her ability to parent and would ultimately pose risk to children — Sole viable option for court was Crown wardship.




Tikinagan Child and Family Services v. S.(I.), 2005 ONCJ 147 (CanLII)


12] She described the visits that she had with the children since apprehension and found it difficult with the children placed in Dryden and stated that the agency worker did not appear for one visit. She described the one-week Christmas access visit of 2004 as a happy occasion where the children visited with their father.


[13] Since February of 2005, visits were cancelled because the mother and the father had resumed cohabitation.




Children's Aid Society of Algoma v. S.(P.) (No. 1), 2004 ONCJ 382 (CanLII)


[34] From any reasonable point of view, their prior relationship — dysfunctional at best and destructive at worst — was over. There was no need for her to have any direct contact with him. There were many reasons for her to not have any further contact with him, the most important of which from the court’s standpoint, was the risk that such contact might create for the children.


[35] Yet the evidence of the society, not contradicted or even commented upon by the mother, is that she admitted not only to being at his home on a number of occasions, but that she had been struck by him. These disclosures were made 22 December last year. The mother was questioned for details. I interpret the evidence to state that she refused to provide any details to the society.


[37] How credible is the mother’s assertion that she does not presently have a relationship with the father? I am ready to believe her. But she is not asking to have the children back for the present. She wants them for the future. I am, however, less sanguine about the prospect that her relationship with the father will remain non-existent in this future, on the basis of the evidence of what has happened in the past — and I would add, in the not too distant past.


[38] The mother is alleged to have disclosed to the society not only that she had been at the father’s home and that he had struck her, but also that he had been using drugs and that he had both swore at and struck the children. Then she refused to provide details of what could only have referred to her first-hand observations.


[51] I do not propose to order that the mother’s access be unsupervised at this point. The society will continue to have discretion whether any occasion of access is supervised and to what extent.




Children's Aid Society of Algoma v. R.(D.), 2004 ONCJ 339 (CanLII)


In this case, society had been involved with family for more than decade but apprehended children only recently when father (whose substance abuse had made him “thorn” in family’s side) was briefly sole custodian — Since that time, mother (who was always primary caregiver) had returned




Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. C.(S.A.), 2005 ONCJ 274 (CanLII)


CHILD PROTECTION — Child in need of protection — General — Nature of “risk” — Risk inherent in household with spousal battering — Where child lives with caregiver who is perpetrator of spousal violence, there is very serious and significant failure in parenting (failure to protect the child’s caregiver and failure to protect child emotionally and in some cases physically), which meets any definition of child abuse — Child faces risk of harm on several levels: (1) perpetrator may also be directly, physically or sexually abusive to child; (2) exposure to spousal violence, anti-social and aggressive behaviour may have detrimental impact on child’s development; (3) perpetrator may include child abuse as part of violence against partner; (4) child may feel guilty, assume burden of blame and feel depressed; (5) child may develop fears, insecurity and low self esteem after witnessing domestic violence; and (6) child may suffer emotional confusion that manifests itself in bed-wetting, nightmares, sleeping or eating disorders, self-harm and weight loss — Where mother perpetually returned to dangerous relationship with totally irresponsible and dysfunctional man who almost killed her on at least two occasions, who had little or no child-care knowledge or skills and against whose behaviour she could not protect herself, let alone protect child, court had no doubt that child was at risk of significant harm unless it issued Crown wardship order that would remove child from abusive environment.


If she were adopted, any disruption in superficial attachment to mother would be minimal compared to overwhelming risk associated in returning child into care of mother and her partner — Any further access to mother would impair child’s future opportunities for permanent adoption placement — Crown wardship without access.




Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. R.(S.), 2006 ONCJ 212 (CanLII)


Court saw several problems, however: (1) Mother track record of rarely accepting suggestions from service providers and of little or no follow-through on her commitments; (2) Court had no confidence in mother’s ability to shield her children from contact with violent and abusive father who would be released from prison in less than 2 years because history of her relationship with this man (even recent events) showed that mere existence of court order directing her to take appropriate action would mean nothing to her; (3) Mother’s plan hinged on maternal grandfather as primary caregiver but this man held children’s aid society in low regard and would tolerate none of its prying into his affairs, refusing even to show his face in courtroom during entire 19-day trial; court had no confidence in his willingness to co-operate with society under terms that it would supervise




Children's Aid Society of Renfrew County v. G.(R.) (No. 2), 2005 ONCJ 471 (CanLII)


When boy (then 4½ years old) made allegations of sexual impropriety against his father, local police investigated but decided not to lay charges, probably because case was too weak to support prospect of conviction — Nevertheless, local children’s aid society began its own investigation and father’s access to child was thereafter was strictly supervised — Society’s lawyer suspected that mother had fabricated and had carefully coached child in repeating allegations — Ten months later, after tightly supervised visit at paternal grandparent’s home, child made fresh allegation that police again investigated and again decided not to lay charges — Society, however, chose not to conduct investigation into second incident despite availability of several persons who could have indicated impossibility of child’s allegation and decided to pursue child protection hearing — Less than two weeks before trial, father made reasonable offer to settle that was supported by Office of Children’s Lawyer but that society rejected — Court found that, at all times, society acted in good faith and that, until second allegation, society had conducted itself appropriately and professionally — Nevertheless, because of different standards of proof in criminal and civil proceedings, society should have embarked upon its own investigation after police found no basis for criminal intervention with respect to second allegation — Court concluded that, if society had done so, it would realized that there was insufficient evidence to persuade child protection court on balance of probabilities that another act of sexual impropriety had occurred and it could then have pursued other options to resolve case — Child protection trial could have been entirely avoided if society had accepted father’s offer that turned out to be consistent with ultimate decision made in trial of this case — For its failure to investigate and to re-assess case, society had to be accountable in costs for needless trial




Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel v. S.R.-T., 2003 CanLII 52497 (ON C.J.)


Father’s limited intelligence and other personality traits left him childlike and inappropriate with children, incapable of providing guidance, structure or imparting values to them and unable to put child’s needs above his own — Father had not harmed his children directly but he was easily frustrated and quick to anger and, when angry, he used physical aggression to get his point across — He was verbally, if not physically, abusive of children’s mother — Stresses and frustrations inherent in parenting several young children would present significant problems for him — Father’s history of aggressive behaviour, poor anger control and alcohol abuse presented risk of physical harm — Mother was also of low intelligence and, although capable of some parenting with constant supervision, was unable to retain lessons taught to her — She had effectively abandoned 3 older children by previous union, apparently sacrificing them in order to maintain abusive spousal relationship with father of her last 4 children




Children's Aid Society of Waterloo Region v. B.(N.), 2006 ONCJ 502 (CanLII


Despite previous order of supervision with very specific terms (including absence of mother’s abusive and drug-dealing boyfriend from home), mother ignored order and repeated warnings from children’s aid society


Court gave her credibility very low rating and noted that she could not be trusted to comply with any order that the court might make — Court ordered Crown wardship for all three children




Children's Aid Society of the County of Lanark v. B.S., 2006 CanLII 36955 (ON S.C.)


[3] Without detailing all that evidence, I would confirm that I have read those affidavits, and that the facts stated therein support the Society's position that this child cannot be adequately protected while in the care of these parents for the following reasons, as articulated in their Plan of Care. B.S. is unable to care for this child due to continuing issues around mental health, anger and impulse control. He has consistently presented as both angry and aggressive as well as paranoid. T.A. is unable to care for E.M.S. due to her relationship with B.S., in which he is controlling and abusive towards her, and her inability to protect E.M.S. from him




Ottawa (Children's Aid Society) v. H. C., 2003 CanLII 38754 (ON S.C.)


Child’s return to “care and custody of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention” — Terms of supervision — Interim retraining order against access parent — Court ordered non-custodial father to avoid vicinity of child’s school and of mother’s home, but did not raise court’s jurisdiction to include such conditions as terms of child’s supervision under clause 51(2)(c) of Child and Family Services Act


Reasonable grounds to believe in risk of likely harm to child — Custodial father had attempted to alienate 11-year-old son’s affection for mother and had actively involved him in stalking mother — Father now faced serious criminal charge and was out on bail on conditions that he not communicate with mother and that he submit to mental health assessment — Court had evidence of father’s own sister and of mother’s brother about father’s obsessive and disturbed behaviour towards them and towards mother — Police considered father a high-risk offender and regarded child to be at high risk if returned to father — Court persuaded that children’s aid society met onus of showing that child would not be adequately protected by terms and conditions of temporary supervision order if returned to father’s care — Child placed in mother’s care and custody subject to society’s supervision on terms.


Reasonable grounds to believe in risk of likely harm to child — Custodial father had attempted to alienate 11-year-old son’s affection for mother and had actively involved him in stalking mother — Father now faced serious criminal charge and was out on bail on conditions that he not communicate with mother and that he submit to mental health assessment — Court had evidence of father’s own sister and of mother’s brother about father’s obsessive and disturbed behaviour towards them and towards mother — Police considered father a high-risk offender and regarded child to be at high risk if returned to father — Court persuaded that children’s aid society met onus of showing that child would not be adequately protected by terms and conditions of temporary supervision order if returned to father’s care — Child placed in mother’s care and custody subject to society’s supervision on terms.




Children's Aid Society of Sarnia-Lambton v. S.(D.R.), 1995 CanLII 5593 (ON C.J.)


Despite every effort from children’s aid society to assist family, father with history of drug addiction and domestic violence had repeatedly failed to follow through with commitments — For considerable period, he ignored society’s efforts to contact him and failed to exercise any access — On eve of status review, he re-appeared with plan of care but all evidence indicated that prospect of his adherence to it was quite remote


In meantime, children were quite adoptable and any delay now would threaten their acute need for appropriate and stable adoptive home — Attempt to experiment with father’s plan would only expose children to further risk if he should fail to follow through as he had so often in past — Crown wardship without access with view to adoption.




Durham Children's Aid Society v. T.B., 2003 CanLII 2450 (ON S.C.)


Apprehension occurred when she had contact with T.B., who had a history of being abusive to her and the children. The Society and the children’s lawyer are concerned about a return of the children at this time in case there is another contact with Mr. T.B.


I am satisfied that the relationship between Mrs. T.R. and Mr. T.B. does not continue to exist. The information suggesting otherwise is anonymous.


Mother is cooperative. She will continue with her own counselling and agrees to supervision by the C.A.S.




Children's Aid Society of the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry v. L.F., 2003 CanLII 1922 (ON S.C.)


[2] At the commencement of trial, Mr. Giovaniello asked for permission to withdraw on the basis that the position of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer in this matter with respect to the child was identical to that of the Applicant Society and that, therefore, the Children’s Lawyer had nothing to contribute to the trial and was satisfied that all relevant material evidence would be put before the Court. In the circumstances, I allowed Mr. Giovaniello and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to retire from this case.


When confronted by the Society, Mr. D. agreed to leave the home and Ms. F. was instructed by the Society to refuse him access to the home when the children were present. She was warned that her failure to do so would cause the Society to apprehend the


[23] On June 12, 2001, the Society decided to apprehend all four children. When apprehended, the children advised the Society that they had earlier lied about Mr. D. being at their home when they were present. They advised the Society that Mr. D. had stayed over at their home upon his removal from the hospital and they stated that “they had to lie as Mr. D. had advised them that if they told they would be put in foster care”.


[102] In the result, therefore, I refuse the Society’s application pursuant to section 57 to make R.J.S.D. a ward of the crown and place him in the care of the Society with no access with a view to adoption. I order that the child be returned to Ms. F. and Mr. D. subject to the supervision of the Society for a period of twelve (12) months




Family, Youth and Child Services of Muskoka v. D.F., 2002 CanLII 2660 (ON S.C.)


The matter was adjourned for a myriad of reasons, including the unavailability of Counsel for the Applicant, the Respondent mother's plan to move to Thunder Bay, Ontario and the Respondent father's involvement in a separate CAS trial from September 30 to October 8, 2002


[15] Counsel for the Respondents submit that the several Affidavits of the child protection worker Cate Schenk filed in relation to this proceeding are unreliable, lack clarity and do not comply with the Rules.


[28] The Reasons for Judgment also relate an assessment report prepared by the Office of the Children's Lawyer in July, 2000 in a custody and access case. That report deals with the Respondent father and his parenting capacity. The Trial Judge characterizes the report as the most damning assessment he has ever read concerning parents.


. Accordingly, based on these findings of fact, I conclude that an Order shall issue pursuant to s. 51 (2) (d) for temporary care and custody of the child with the Society.




D.S., Re, 2001 CanLII 28177 (ON S.C.)


In this protection application, brought by the Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton, the Society seeks firstly, a finding that all four children are in need of protection. Specifically, it seeks such a finding pursuant to s. 37(2)(f), (f.1) and (g) (emotional harm, substantial risk of emotional harm in the care of their father) pursuant to the Child and Family Services Act. Secondly, the Society seeks, if the court finds that the children are in need of protection, an order granting the care of the children to their mother under certain conditions and the supervision of the Society.


2. As time went on and as the conflict intensified, there was seldom the exercise of access, without some distressing incident occurring, particularly at the exchange of access. These incidents were happening in the presence of the children. Emotions were raised. Verbal and at times physical altercations took place. The following are only some examples of the happenings relating to access that raised the anger of the parties and made access very stressful: the videotaping of the access by Mr. P.; the bringing of third parties to be present at the access and to take notes of the interaction; the father’s intervention in the access when he felt the mother was not handling the difficult behaviour of the children; the father remaining near the S. residence once he had delivered the children there for their access so that he could assure himself that T.P. was alright; the pushing and shoving by adults in the presence of the children and the involvement of the police on child abduction calls that were clearly unfounded; the unilateral denial of access by Mr. P., sometimes at the last minute, and the angry outbursts this provoked on the part of Ms S. such as the throwing of the car seat from the van and the alleged assault on Mr. P. I am convinced that all of these incidents and the many other negative interactions between the parents created tension and stress which was communicated to the children and felt by them




Children's Aid Society v. T.C., 2007 CanLII 27972 (ON S.C.)


[2] These minutes specified that H.C. would be in her father’s care from Tuesday afternoon, May 8, 2007, until Sunday evening, May 13, 2007. On May 7, 2007, the Children's Aid Society ("Children's Aid Society") served a Notice of Motion seeking to vary the April 19 order so that H.C. would remain in its care and custody until trial, and changing the father's access back to every weekend from Friday until Sunday evening. The motion date provided by the court was May 14, 2007. Although the father had received these court papers, he communicated to the CAS his intention to pick his daughter up on May 8 in compliance with the existing order.


[3] In the result, H.C. was kept home from school on May 8, 9 and 10, so that the father could not pick her up there.


[4] The father was allowed his weekend access from May 11 to 13 and the matter returned to court on May 14, when it was adjourned on terms. By the next date, June 4, the father had delivered his motion seeking a finding that the CAS and two of its social workers were in contempt of court for denying his access on May 8, 9, and 10.


[46] It was Ms. Valcin, on advice and direction from her supervisor, who intercepted the foster mother and child to prevent the father from enforcing the access order from that location and similarly, who communicated the decision not to send H.C. to school.


[47] In my view, there is a doubt whether Ms. Valcin herself was deliberately, willfully disobeying the order, or whether she was simply communicating the Society's decision to disobey it




Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. S.D., 2001 CanLII 28152 (ON S.C.)


1 The Respondent, Mr. S., brings this motion seeking to have the Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton found in contempt of an order granted by myself on November 1, 1999. He further seeks a finding that the Society has no jurisdiction or legal authority to retain the care and custody of the child, J.M., born September 8, 1997. By way of relief, Mr. S. seeks an order that the Society comply with my order of November 1, 1999 and return the child to the father’s care. The Society contests the motion, denying that it breached the court order. It seeks to stay the order of November 1, 1999 pending the appeal being brought by the Society


2. The Society by letting the permanency planning for this child to remain in limbo so long. It has allowed an existing order to expire without any further process. It has behaved unreasonably and unfairly to Mr. S. by prolonging this matter by not perfecting the appeal in a timely manner. It has not conducted these proceedings in the child’s best interests




Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. P.Y., 2007 CanLII 14325 (ON S.C.)


[1] This case is about whether the child in this matter, G. S., is in need of protection. The Children’s Aid Society and Ms. Y, the mother, are in agreement that G.S. is a child in need of protection and that the disposition should be a sole custody order to the mother pursuant to s. 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.


Given the damaging behaviour by Mr. S that led to the finding that G.S. is in need of protection, the only available option that is in the best interests of G. S. is to give sole custody of her to Ms. Y. Mr. S’s access should be supervised by the Supervised Access Program and access will occur once per week for two hours. There will also be a restraining order pursuant to s. 57.1(3) CFSA restraining Mr. S. from molesting, annoying or harassing Ms. Y.




Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. D.-R.(L.), 2007 ONCJ 706 (CanLII )


In her risk assessment report of 6 September 2006, social worker M. Wilcox, who conducted the risk assessment, stated that the father “behaves in an offensive, demeaning and provocative manner with female CAS staff”;

The father states in his e-mails that his “gender is the only explanation” for the fact that he is regarded as a “defective parent”. In other e-mails, the father describes “the ongoing failure of our system that habitually views fathers as some sort of scourge” , or states “I’m not the first father to be victimized by such a team, so let’s get on with it”; “What right gives your gender the right to speak for the children?”; etc. In one e-mail, the father stated that “Many fathers so not have many options left at this stage of the game. Given the failure of the Family, the courts in most cases side with the mother”;

In describing the options for fathers in situations similar to his own, the father posits that among the available options are kidnapping the children or having the opposing parent killed




Children's Aid Society of the United Counties of Stormont v. J.F., 2007 CanLII 21973 (ON S.C.)


[2] The Society is seeking an order that both these children be found to be in need of protection. It is also seeking, for both children, an order of Crown Wardship without access with a plan for adoption.


[8] A trial was held before Madame Justice MacKinnon with respect to E. who ordered that she be made a Crown ward with a plan for adoption. The reasons for her decision are found at Tab 16, vol. 7 of the Trial Record. Madame Justice Mackinnon accepted the evidence of Dr. Moytane that the child would be at risk with the father, given the father’s personal difficulties and violent tendencies. She also found that Ms. F. gave priority to her relationship with Mr. C. over that of the children. Madame Justice Mackinnon found that the mother’s alternate plan to care for the child alone was vague and not concrete and remained a “distant second choice” to her desire to remain with Mr. C.


52] It is in the best interests of these children that they become Crown wards without access with a view to their adoption and it is so ordered




Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. K. F., 2005 CanLII 10886 (ON S.C.)


[1] The Society brings this care and custody motion pursuant to section 64(10) of the Child and Family Services Act (CFSA) seeking an order that the child, H. D., born […], 2004, be placed in the care of her mother, Ms. K. F. under the supervision of the Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa (Society) and the conditions listed at page 7 of its status review application found at tab 2 of the status review continuing record. In its status review application, the Society is seeking an order of supervision to Ms. F. for a period of 6 months. Ms. F. consents to the Society’s motion and status review application.


[2] The child is currently in the care of her father, Mr. D. D., and has been in his care since shortly after her apprehension from the care of her mother on July 25, 2004.




Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. P. H., 2003 CanLII 2049 (ON S.C.)


[11] As a result of that incident, the children remained in care until September 2002 when they were returned to their mother’s care under a supervision order with numerous, onerous conditions aimed at addressing Ms. P.H.’s personal and parenting problems. Ms. P.H. admitted that it was understood that she would not have any contact with Mr. S.P.




Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. G. S., 2004 CanLII 7360 (ON S.C.)


CHILD PROTECTION — Evidence — Assessment report — Weight and reliability — Reliability of assessor — Factual basis for conclusions — As result of single, brief and superficial interview with father and child, author of critical parenting capacity assessment claimed to have obtained “sense” of father as person and concluded that he was incapable of forming emotional attachment to child and would pose threat to child’s emotional health


He also relied heavily on observations children’s aid society workers that supported his views but neglected to contact observers who could have given him more favourable evidence about father




Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. M.S., 2005 CanLII 42251 (ON S.C.)


[26] Unfortunately, once again, Ms. S. did not follow these conditions. She and Mr. W. were continually breaching the no contact condition. In fact, both admitted that they had been residing together throughout this period of time. The Children's Aid Society social worker was unable to reach Ms. S. Ultimately, it was determined that she had been avoiding the Children's Aid Society, given that she was residing with Mr. W.


[27] When Mr. W.’s charges ultimately came to trial on March 4, 2004, Ms. S. did not appear for trial and a material witness warrant was issued for her arrest. Ultimately the charges were stayed, but Mr. W. entered a guilty plea to breaching his recognizance by communicating with Ms. S. and was put on probation.


[28] On January 16, 2004, all three children were apprehended due to breaches of the conditions of supervision and further concerns regarding their safety.




Kawartha-Haliburton Children's Aid Society v. B.P., 2002 CanLII 2736 (ON S.C.)


[2] Initially, the Children's Aid Society sought to make the two older children Society wards for a period of four months. On January 17, 2001, the court ordered that the status review application be amended to Crown Wardship without access.


[34] During the period August 26th, 1999 through to October 13th, 1999 difficulties with housing persisted such that the mother and children relocated to Colborne without advising the Children’s Aid Society and further the reason for the relocation was because of arrears of rent. At this time, Mr. D.C., N.C.’s father, was not to have contact with Ms. P. as a result of a recognizance order as a result of an alleged assault on her by Mr. C. Not only did Ms. P. and Mr. C. continue to have contact during this period of time in face of prohibition to do so, they had removed the children from the community contrary to the supervision order.




Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. A.C., 2006 CanLII 23949 (ON S.C.)


[5] The Society takes the position that given these personal challenges Mr. S. will not be able to attain the parenting capacity required to care for M. The supervised access notes demonstrate Mr. S.’s parenting deficits.




Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. Ki. T., 2003 CanLII 2281 (ON S.C.)


[23] Justice Linhares de Sousa had concerns regarding Ri.F. and K.C. Their capacity to parent was questionable and she found they had a negative influence on Ki.T.. Ki.T.’s relationship with P.M. had been shortlived and Justice Linhares de Sousa questioned its stability and whether it was another potentially abusive relationship. She stated:

Evidence about [P.M.]’s distant and current past raise some very serious questions about [Ki.T.’s] perception of [P.M.] as a partner and father to her children as well as of the stability and harmony of their relationship


42] After P.M. left the family home, a supervision order was made on September 21, 2001 to Ki.T. alone, on the same terms and conditions as the earlier supervision order with the additional stipulation that P.M. was not to have any access to the home or to the children except as approved by the Society


[114] In this case, I do not find the relationship between Ki.T. or P.M. and the children beneficial and meaningful to them. In addition, as noted above, there are a number of permanent, adoptive placements available for both children together. Access would impair M.M. and C.-A.M.’s opportunities for permanent placements. Therefore, I order that both children be made Crown wards without access to their parents for the purposes of placing them in a permanent, stable, adoptive home




Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. N.B., 2007 CanLII 41429 (ON S.C.)


[35] I have considered the evidence before the Court with respect to frequency and the quality of the father’s access visits with the children. However, Mr. B. has not satisfied me that this access is “beneficial and meaningful.”


[36] In reaching my conclusions concerning the possibility of access, I have relied heavily on the testimony of Ms. Tara Cunningham, a foster care/adoption worker employed by the Society.




Children's Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. T. P., 2003 CanLII 2397 (ON S.C.)


[10] On July 6, 2002, the mother and the child resumed cohabitation with D.V. Four days later, when the CAS learned of this, they sent a worker who, with the aid of police officers, attended at the residence of D.V. and apprehended the child.




Purves v. Purves, 2004 CanLII 6249 (ON S.C.)


[4] On 23 May 2002, Cavarzan J. granted an order requesting the involvement of the Children’s Lawyer. Ms. Nancy Katzsch, a social worker and clinical investigator, was engaged by the Children’s Lawyer to investigate and report on matters of custody and access pursuant to section 112, Courts of Justice Act. Her report was completed on 18 December 2002.


[5] The trial started on 11 February 2004. Both parties testified and called witnesses. As no evidence was presented by either party as to the views and preferences of the children, on 18 February 2004 I granted an order requesting the re-involvement of the Children’s Lawyer. Ms. Katzsch was engaged to investigate and present an updated report. Her assignment was completed on 23 April 2004.


[6] Father served a dispute regarding these reports. Accordingly, I directed Ms. Katzsch to attend court to be cross-examined by both parties.


[7] On 4 June 2004, at the conclusion of the trial and after hearing submissions, I granted judgment, in part, with written reasons to follow, whereby sole custody of the children was granted to the mother


[14] Father is demanding and controlling, although I suspect he is not aware of such personality problems.


[15] Father fails to recognize mother’s role as a parent. He has been demeaning of her in the presence of the children.


[17] Father has been frustrated with the issues not being resolved. He initiated several contempt motions and has contacted the police on numerous occasions.




J.P.M.P. v. G.W.F., 2003 CanLII 2337 (ON S.C.)


[18] Both assessors recommended sole custody.


[19] There will be an order for sole custody in favour of Ms J.P.M.P..


[26] Drummond White conducted the first assessment on behalf of the Children Lawyer and recommended that the two children not have access at the same time.


[27] His report completed in March 2001 also recommended that Mr. G.W.F. undertake counselling to deal with the ongoing access difficulties:


Mr. G.W.F. is a loving father who appears to be easily distracted and who has no immediate feedback or model regarding parenting skills. The services of a professional counsellor or therapist might help him develop insight regarding childhood behaviour and development, including the effects of separation and divorce upon children. Using professional guidance would supplement those resources. Mr. G.W.F. might also benefit from help in dealing with his personal issues of loss and anger management.




B.F. v. V.L., 2006 ONCJ 112 (CanLII


[11] The Children’s Lawyer, expressing the child’s wishes as set out in an affidavit of its social worker, seeks a continuation of the suspension order. If the court is not prepared to grant that, she seeks a supervised access for her young client.


[41] The disposition of this motion is as follows:





The order suspending access between W.F. and his father, B.F., is to continue pending a trial adjudication of the competing claims between these parents.



For clarity, that suspension applies to telephone as well as to face-to-face contact.



The father is also to stay away from the child’s home, school, day care and any extra-curricular program in which he knows the child to be engaged.



During this suspension, the father may make written communication with this child through the Children’s Lawyer, provided that the content of such communications expresses the father’s acceptance of the child’s need for a break from contact between them and places no pressure on the child to resume contact until he feels ready.



The Children’s Lawyer is authorized to read each communication before delivery to the child and to withhold any communication that does not comply with the conditions for communication. Any undelivered communication is to be retained by the Children’s Lawyer, with father advised accordingly.



The mother is to sign whatever releases are needed to enable a full and frank disclosure to the father and to the Children’s Lawyer on the child’s management of his school life.



Toronto Police Services are authorized to assist in the enforcement of this order.




T.(P.) v. A.(S.), 2004 ONCJ 295 (CanLII)


[27] I have adopted the recommendation of the Children’s Lawyer that would require the father to attend for post-separation counselling, as I am satisfied that he lacks an appreciation of how his behaviour towards the mother is affecting his son.


[30] For the above reasons, I make the following order:

(1) The applicant, Ms. P.T., shall have sole custody of the child, A.J.A. (the child), born on […] 1999




G.M. v. A.M., 2006 ONCJ 344 (CanLII)


[17] Viva voce evidence before me established that Mr. Chmielewski has master’s degrees in psychology and social work and has 26 years’ experience working for the Family Service Association as a family therapist. He has done contract work as a clinical investigator for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer for 6 years.


[18] Mr. Chmielewski testified that he interviewed T.M.2, as well as the other children, separately and at their schools. T.M.2 expressed to him a clear wish to have no contact with his father. When asked why, T.M.2 said that he had “bad thoughts’ about his father and that he was fearful of the consequences of his father’s following him home from visits — “this wasn’t supposed to happen”.


Mr. Chmielewski recommended that the father undertake counselling for anger management, parenting and substance abuse


[41] As the father currently has no access to any of the children, there is no right for him to obtain information about them under subsection 20(5) of the Children’s Law Reform Act,




L.(Y.Q.) v. H,(T.T.), 2006 ONCJ 127 (CanLII)


Local children’s aid society and Office of Children’s Lawyer had intervened because father’s intemperate statements had frightened child badly on several occasions — Statements included suicidal threats and threats of harm to child and even mother, which were repeated to third parties, such as children’s aid society worker — Even if father did not mean them to be taken seriously, he knew or should have known that such statements would at least cause extreme anxiety and he was reckless and indifferent to impact that these statements would have on child’s emotional stability — Court had no evidence to lead it to believe that father would not heedlessly continue to make such statements to child if he had unsupervised access


There was no genuine issue for trial and court granted mother’s motion for summary judgment of sole custody.


No genuine issue for trial here and court allowed mother’s motion for summary judgment of supervised access.




T.R. v. R.T., 2006 ONCJ 173 (CanLII)


the social worker from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, Ms. Wendy Kirk


[43] The report of Ms. Wendy Kirk recommends sole custody to the mother, even though she acknowledges the problems that the mother has had in controlling C.T. and protecting A.T.. I agree with those recommendations.


The respondent father, R.T., shall have supervised access to the child, A.T., on alternate Saturdays for a period of two hours at the supervised access centre at Child and Parent Place.

If C.T. wishes to have access to his father, he may do so at the Child and Parent Place.




K.(M.) v. K.(M.), 2004 ONCJ 75 (CanLII)


[45] Dr. Phillips, in his up-dated report (September 2000) stated that any access to the children by their father would still to be considered a highly risky endeavour. In his view, the children remained intimidated and might well regress at an emotional level if challenged with issues resulting from exposure to their father.


[62] The court makes the following orders:

(a) The applicant, Mrs. M.K., shall have sole custody of the children, E.K. (born on […] 1985), K.J.K. (born on […] 1989), S.E.K. (born on […] 1992) and A.J.K. (born on […] 1995);

(b) There shall be no access by the respondent, Mr. M.K., to the children;




Cormier v. Abu-Safat, 2004 ONCJ 169 (CanLII)


[40] The final witness was Pauline Walsh who was a clinical investigator appointed by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer at the request of the court.


[41] In cross-examination by the father’s counsel, Ms. Walsh defended her report and its conclusions and, in particular, her relating that, by her observation, the father was angry and very bitter with no respect for Canadian society and that he wished to raise the children in his traditional societal beliefs. Further, she noted that the father saw himself as a victim and, without any specific evidence, she determined in her report that he would be capable of taking the children away from the mother if he chose to do so.


Ms. Walsh’s impression, however, was that, although Mr. Abu-Safat would not knowingly want to undermine the mother to the children, it could happen because his beliefs were very strong and very different from the mother’s beliefs and he wants the children to be raised differently


She stated that, if the parties were the same parties that they were when she last saw them over a year ago, it was likely that they would not be able to co-parent.


[60] My order therefore commences as follows:

1. The applicant mother will continue to have custody of the children.




Lawrie v. Turcotte, 2006 CanLII 12971 (ON S.C.)


[1] On this motion, the mother seeks orders from the court for summary judgment for sole custody of Seon, aged 8, and for the Father to be granted final or temporary access to Seon only in accord with the second report of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. That report recommended that access to the Father be supervised, and that consideration be given to unsupervised access only once the Father has agreed to undergo psychiatric assessment and treatment




Hewitt v. Hewitt, 2004 ONCJ 325 (CanLII)


[6] The lawyer representing the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and the children agrees with the recommendations of the assessment report


[8] As far as I am concerned, Mr. Hewitt has now met many of the conditions that the assessors felt that he had to meet prior to being given unsupervised access. He still has to connect with an individual therapist or counsellor


[11] I will expect a report from the children’s therapist by return date of 2 June 2005 for this matter so that I can determine whether I should allow unsupervised access at that time. I will also expect a report from Mr. Hewitt’s therapist or counsellor at that time to see whether he is ready for unsupervised access.




M.C. v. D.L., 2006 CanLII 26164 (ON S.C.)


5. The court ordered that the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL) become involved and a very experienced assessor was assigned to investigate and report to the court. Rachel Birnbaum authored the report of the OCL, which is found at Exhibit A to the respondent’s affidavit sworn on June 21, 2006. Ms. Birnbaum has noted in her report of June 15, 2005 at page 7 as follows:

“The children present as traumatized and M.G.C. in particular continues to fear her father. Whatever occurred or did not occur it is clear that the children at this point in time cannot even tolerate having their father’s name mentioned in their presence.

There is not benefit at this time to force any type of access on these 2 children and in fact it could be more harmful to them. The children require further counseling to explore their feelings. They have grown since the initial allegations and can benefit from further therapy.

Therefore, the Children’s Lawyer is recommending that there be no access between the children and their father at this time. The issue of access needs to be explored at some future time when the children have acquired sufficient internal controls to help them master their thoughts and feelings.”




Korevaar v. Allard, 2003 CanLII 2151 (ON S.C.)


[1] The Respondent moves for adjustment of child support and the Applicant cross-moves for increased access with reduced restriction and for the supervision to be eliminated.


[3] In separate proceedings relating to Brandon, there was a Report of the Children’s Lawyer by Clinical Investigator, Paula Carter, which speaks to the concerns about the Applicant’s involvement with alcohol.


[4] On the evidence before me there is a strong indication that alcohol is a serious problem for the Applicant, that his judgment has historically been reduced to the point of driving while impaired with a child in the car, that he has incidents of domestic violence past and present and that he is in denial.