Self Represented Parties
In Divorce Litigation
(note: this file has been redated to for privacy issues)
Eastern Judicial Region 2
Southwest Judicial Region 37
Northeast Judicial Region 48
Central East Judicial Region 58
Central South Judicial Region 72
Central West Judicial Region 89
Northwest Judicial Region 103
Self Represented Parties in Divorce Litigation
Some divorcing men and women choose to represent themselves in court. Others are forced to do so when they run out of money and can no longer afford a lawyer. A fully contested divorce may cost in the 100’s of thousands of dollars. Divorcing spouses often have lowered income and increased expenses. Bankruptcies are common. The Ministry of Justice has estimated that between one quarter and one third of divorcing litigants appear self represented.
Cases with self represented litigants were often protracted,
acrimonius, and had poor outcomes. Many self represented parties had
difficulties coping with the complex legal procedures involved. The 205 cases
that follow are examples of some of the worst. The large number of problematic self represented cases would indicate
it is a common with divorces. From a comparative standpoint, problematic self
represented cases were found to be as common as claims of domestic violence,
and orders for income imputation. A breakdown of the cases themselves shows 87
% involved male self represented litigants. Regional averages show almost 19
cases in eastern
Self Represented Litigants in Family Cases
36 ( 100 % )
34 ( 94.4 % )
2 ( 5.4 % )
25 ( 100 % )
20 ( 80.0 % )
5 ( 20.0 % )
26 ( 100 % )
25 ( 96.2 % )
1 ( 3.8 % )
28 ( 100 % )
25 ( 89.3 % )
3 ( 10.7 % )
30 ( 100 % )
25 ( 83.3% )
5 ( 16.7 % )
21 ( 100 % )
15 ( 71.4 % )
6 ( 28.6 % )
17 ( 100 % )
16 ( 94.2 % )
1 ( 5.8 % )
22 ( 100 % )
19 ( 84.2 % )
3 ( 15.8 % )
205 ( 100 % )
179 ( 87.3 % )
26 ( 12.7 % )
Discrimination Ratios ( DR = Male Losses / Female Losses )
Central Ont DR =
Eastern Judicial Region
Family Responsibility Office v. P.K.R., 2005 CanLII 33530 (ON S.C.)
P.K.R. ) In person
However, he alleges that, “his constitutional rights have been violated by a child support order that does not conform with the laws and was obtained by fraud and error”. He further pleads that, as a result of having his pleadings struck, he was precluded from seeking relief in the action and that this constitutes a violation of his rights to have a full trial of the issues raised by him in the action
Here are some of the arguments he puts forward:
(d) The rule allowing a judge to strike a pleading breaches a party’s fundamental rights to full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) as it provides too much discretion, lacks proper control and as such is an unreasonable power. A much more limited power would be sufficient to meet the objectives and therefore the rule contravenes his charter rights because it does not minimally impair those rights.
(e) The rule was improperly and arbitrarily applied by
Justice de Sousa who he maintains is statistically the judge who uses this rule
more often in the whole of
(f) He also maintains that those same statistics indicate that the rule is almost exclusively used against male self-represented litigants. As such, it’s application contravenes s. 15 of the Charter because it discriminates against a particular class of litigants.
17] I find that Mr. P.K.R. has not brought evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption that he does not have the ability to pay.
. In default of this order, Mr. P.K.R. is to be committed to jail for a period of 60 days.
P.R. v. K.R., 2005 CanLII 44186 (ON S.C.)
P.R. ) In person
 Enough is enough.
 I am satisfied that Mr. P.R. is a vexatious litigator.
He is abusing the processes of this Court. Indeed, during the argument before
me on November 18, 2005, Mr. P.R. informed the court that he has been in this
Court and in the
This confirmed my suspicion that, insofar as Mr. P.R. is concerned, the litigation is litigation for its own sake and is brought to harass Ms. K.R. and entertain Mr. P.R.. The litigation has become the thing
 I find that, throughout this litigation, Mr. P.R. has exhibited a contumelious attitude toward court orders and procedures
Orser v. Grant, 2003 CanLII 2277 (ON S.C.)
Andris Peter Grant, Self-Represented
Madam Justice Sachs struck Mr. Grant’s pleadings and ordered that they could not be reinstated until he paid the child support and costs previously ordered, after which the application could proceed to trial and issues of credibility could be canvassed.
The latter motions have all been stayed pending the disposition of a motion brought by the support recipient, Mrs. Orser, pursuant to s.140 of the Courts of Justice Act, to have Mr. Grant declared a vexatious litigant.
 After being served with notice of this motion by the FRO, Mr. Grant filed a notice of cross-motion requesting an adjournment as he had filed and served, on April 10, 2003, a notice of constitutional question, and wished to set a half day to argue that issue.
To require counsel for the FRO and the judge on a default hearing under s. 41 of the FRSAE Act to review 305 pages of largely irrelevant material and hear submissions based on that material would be a waste of time and cause unnecessary delay
Other than his financial statement which, as previously noted, did not have any supporting documentation attached, the other documents are not relevant to the issues under the FRSAE Act.
 Therefore, pursuant to Rule 14(22) and (23) of the Family Law Rules, I am striking Mr. Grant’s notice of motion and cross-motion and all affidavit evidence and documentation filed in his motion and cross-motion records, other than his recent financial statement. He is not entitled to any further order of the court and cannot file any further material on any proceeding under the FRSAE Act until he fulfils the conditions outlined in paragraph 4 of Justice de Sousa’s January 15, 2003 order.
Booth v. Hildebrandt, 2007 CanLII 57460 (ON S.C.)
ANDREW HILDEBRANDT ) Self-Represented
In a letter to Justice Aitken he said:
… You made a choice to not address those concerns and in this regard demonstrated bias.”
I have made a formal request to the Attorney General asking for a review [sic, of] your endorsement and the manner in which you conducted yourself in this case
I will communicate with the appropriate Judicial Council as well for them to review your actions
 Following Justice Aitken’s decision of May 23rd last, the respondent’s conduct has been reprehensible.
 In his factum filed on the motion, Mr. Hildebrandt accuses Aitken J. of acting in contravention of her oath of office.
 I order that the respondent refrain from commencing any further motions in these proceedings without first obtaining consent from this Court to do so.
DOUGLAS GRIFFIN ) On his own behalf
 Finally, I order that pursuant to Section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, Dr. Griffin is prohibited from instituting further proceedings without leave of the court.
He has recently sworn an information in order to have a public mischief charge laid against his ex-wife but the Crown refused to lay the charges, as a result of what Dr. Griffin refers to as the anti-male gender bias present in our courts
Sleiman v. Sleiman, 2003 CanLII 1982 (ON S.C.)
GHASSAN SLEIMAN ) Not present, unrepresented
C. Aitken J.
Pursuant to Orders of Cosgrove J. dated April 3, 1997:
(i) Ghassan Sleiman was to have supervised access and telephone access to Phillip Sleiman, and after certain conditions had been met, unsupervised access to Philip
Pursuant to the Orders of Metivier J. dated October 7, 1999 and June 14, 2001:
(i) The pleadings of Ghassan Sleiman were struck for failure to comply with earlier court orders regarding disclosure and production
Pursuant to the Decision of the
(i) Ghassan Sleiman was given the right to maintain his claim for access and to assert that claim in the divorce proceedings
The issue of access could not be dealt with on a final basis because Ghassan Sleiman was not given any notice of the trial date.
Mr. Sleiman has not seen Philip since 1997
Luedtke v. Vuletic, 2001 CanLII 2328 (ON S.C.)
He told me he didn’t want to “play this court game” but just wanted his child. I told him that it was basically his unwillingness to participate properly in the court proceedings, which were not a game, which had led to his Answer having been struck leaving him a non-participant. Thereafter, the respondent sat with a young woman in the body of the Court and, after one or two interruptions during the early part of the proceedings, observed quietly.
Pike v. Cook, 2005 CanLII 2034 (ON S.C.)
Some five months later, on May 13, 2002, Ms. Cook obtained a final order from Justice Lafrance-Cardinal which granted her sole custody of Jeremy and provided Mr. Pike with alternate weekend and alternate Thursday evening access. This order was granted on an uncontested basis. The continuing record documents a series of consent adjournments and then a finding of default against Mr. Pike and an order that the matter proceed to an uncontested trial. The final order was directed to be served personally on Mr. Pike. He took no steps to appeal this order. In those circumstances, I reject Mr. Pike’s argument that the Court proceedings and final order took him by surprise because he was under the misapprehension that the mediation was still under way. Rather, I find that Mr. Pike chose not to instruct counsel to go on record on his behalf, although he was receiving legal advice.
I find that he acquiesced in the final order because it created a custody and access regime with which he was comfortable notwithstanding the reduction of his access.
 A somewhat unique aspect of this case is that Ms. Cook
was permitted to move Jeremy to
Kim v. Kim 2001 CarswellOnt 502
1 This matter came before me as an uncontested trial which had been set pursuant to R. 10(5) of the Family Law Rules.
Mr. Kim appeared at the case conference on October 3 and indicated he wished to retain counsel. He was ordered to file all responding materials on or before October 16, 2000 and the matter was adjourned to November 7, 2000 for a further case conference.
On November 7 the case conference was held with both parties present with Korean interpreters. At that time, the respondent had not complied with the October 3 order in that no answer and no financial statement had been filed. He was ordered to file all responding documents on or before November 20, failing which it was made clear that pursuant to R. 10(5), the matter would be set for an uncontested trial.
6 Based on the evidence of the applicant, I find that during the course of the 10 year marriage, the respondent physically, mentally and emotionally abused the applicant causing her physical injury, anxiety and fear.
7 Since the date of separation, the respondent has not seen the children and although he has attempted to communicate with the applicant
I order final custody of the children Junghwan and Edward Kim to their mother. Given the abusive behaviour of their father and the lack of interest that he has shown in their welfare, access to the respondent will be supervised and in the discretion of the applicant, mother.
9 Given Mr. Kim's abusive and threatening behaviour, he is restrained from molesting, annoying or harassing the applicant or the children, pursuant to s. 35 of the Children's Law Reform Act.
I find the respondent's income to be $65,500 and order him to pay child support in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines in the amount of $884 per month for the two children of the marriage, payable on the first of each month, commencing February 1, 2001.
I order the respondent to pay spousal support to the applicant in the amount of $1,000 per month commencing February 1, 2001 and payable on the first of each month thereafter
21 The evidence before me is that Mr. Kim is an abusive, uncooperative individual who has failed to respond to the applicant's application despite two orders to do so and who has failed to make child support payments despite an existing court order. Under these circumstances and given the respondent's current financial situation, it is my view that a monetary equalization payment would not likely be paid. Mr. Kim would, in all likelihood, ignore the court's order
Title to the property known as
26 Ms. Kim provided evidence that Mr. Kim has recently purchased a vehicle and has stocks. She attended at the license bureau and was provided with information that the vehicle purchased is a 1998 Ford WND. I hereby order that all right, title and interest in the 1998 Ford WND be transferred to and vested absolutely in the sole name of Ms. Wonhee Kim.
a charge shall be secured in her favour against Mr. Kim's Jetform stocks and stock options to a maximum of $30,000 to be adjusted after the sale of the home and the transfer of the vehicle and the determination of the subsequent remaining amount owing on Mr. Kim's equalization payment.
J.M.M. v. G.S.M., 2006 CanLII 6457 (ON S.C.)
 Mr. G.S.M.’s pleadings, except with respect to access, were ordered struck on November 10, 2005 as a result of his failure to comply with an Order made at a Trial Management Conference on September 20, 2005
 In his Financial Statement sworn May 22, 2003 when Mr. G.S.M. was represented by Counsel, Mr. G.S.M. states that he is self-employed by Clear Choice Water Systems and that he has no income whatsoever as of that date. On August 25, 2003 in a handwritten unsworn Financial Statement produced by Mr. G.S.M. in the course of the Court proceedings when he was not represented by Counsel, he states that the business is no longer in operation and that he has no income.
 In Mr.G.S.M.’s Financial Statement sworn August 26, 2004, when Mr. G.S.M. was not represented by Counsel, Mr. G.S.M. stated that he had no income and that he had been unemployed since June 24, 2004.
 In Mr.G.S.M.’s Financial Statement sworn May 30, 2005, when he was not represented by Counsel, Mr. G.S.M. stated that he was living in Seeley’s Bay, paying rent of $500.00 per month. This is contrary to his earlier statement that he was not paying rent at his parents’ cottage. Mr. G.S.M. stated that he was earning $1,600.00 per month and that he was presently employed since December of 2004 as a casual labourer and was paid on a gross basis.
 In Mr.G.S.M.’s Financial Statement sworn September 10, 2005, Mr. G.S.M. gives the identical information as set out in his Financial Statement sworn May 30, 2005
On the evidence, I find that an income of $70,000.00 should be imputed to Mr. G.S.M. pursuant to clause 19(1)(a) of the Ontario Child Support Guidelines
The retroactive child support including special and extraordinary expenses, I find and fix at $40,368.00
As Mr. G.S.M. has paid no spousal support whatsoever to Ms. J.M.M., Mr. G.S.M. is ordered to pay to Ms. J.M.M. retroactive spousal support fixed in the sum of $3,600.00
 Based on these calculations, I order Mr. G.S.M. to pay an equalization payment of $53,524.00 to Ms. J.M.M..
I find that it would be appropriate to partially satisfy this equalization payment by vesting Mr. G.S.M.’s interest in the matrimonial home in Ms. J.M.M..
Mr. G.S.M. has only seen two of the children, R.M. and D.M., on one supervised visit on January 1, 2004, and Mr. G.S.M. has not seen J.M. at all.
 Based on the evidence, I find there is a risk of harm to Ms. J.M.M. and the children if a restraining Order is not in place
 Mr. G.S.M. shall pay costs payable forthwith of $35,000.00 inclusive of GST to Ms. J.M.M. in addition to the Orders for costs in the amount of $5,000.00 already made in this matter.
Martin v. Martin, 2007 CanLII 8638 (ON S.C.)
M. Linhares de Sousa, J.
 In this matter, except on the one issue of spousal support, Ms. Martin has been substantially successful on all issues.
 Other factors to consider in awarding costs in this matter are the following. Mr. Martin was unrepresented at the trial. That was his choice. The transcript of the trial will show that he was given much flexibility throughout the trial because of his lack of legal representation and lack of legal knowledge. Nonetheless, there was no question that this matter took as long as it did because of Mr. Martin’s lack of preparedness for the trial.
 Mr. Martin’s overall financial circumstances are dire
A self-represented litigant cannot be treated any differently, with respect to costs, than one that is legally represented. That would be unfair to the party who seeks legal representation. It would also encourage self-represented litigants to litigate with impunity regardless of the merits or the lack of merits of their case.
 For all of the above reasons, I order Mr. Martin to pay Ms. Martin’s costs of this litigation which I fix at $40,000.00.
I ordered that based on his declared income of $36,000.00 Mr. Martin pay $518.00 per month child support for two children. I was under the impression that the evidence indicated that $518.00 per month was the child support payment attracted by that level of salary under the Child Support Guidelines. That was clearly incorrect. Based on that declared income, Mr. Martin should pay $537.00 per month for two children pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines
Simpson v. Grignon, 2007 CanLII 17038 (ON S.C.)
MICHELE LYSE GRIGNON ) Respondent Self-represented
 The Respondent attended and was present throughout the uncontested trial. I permitted her to address the Court after the Applicant had presented his case.
J.B.G. v. L.B., 2004 CanLII 53230 (ON S.C.)
Justice Paul F. Lalonde
Father's attitude was factor in court's decision to convert joint custody into sole custody for mother
Father admitted his errors but brushed off 4-day trial as learning experience for him - Court found his conduct outrageous and levelled costs against him.
The father has been repeatedly found in breach of his obligations, to the point that Justice Wildman struck out his answer and he has continued to resist without explanation. I found that his motion had no merit and that much of the material filed in support of it was irrelevant and improper.
 The applicant shall pay the respondent, costs, that I set at $20,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements and G.S.T.
Justice Perkins allowed $12,000 on the $25,857.05 claimed.
I avoided discussing the offer to settle that Mr. J.B.G. handed over to me at the conclusion of the trial because it is so far off the mark that it shows that Mr. J.B.G. did not understand what he was told by Justice Manton and Justice Rutherford in previous court appearances, and I do not hold much hope that what I have said in this trial will be understood any better
In 2003, Mr. J.B.G.’s income was $72,175.68 and the table amount is $568 per month. Mr. J.B.G. paid $465 per month. He owes $103 per month for 12 months totalling $1,230.
In 2004, Mr. J.B.G.’s income was $72,175.68 and the table amount was ordered at trial at $568 per month. He owes six months at $568 per month for a total of $3,408.
T.P.S. v. K.E.S., 2007 CanLII 1900 (ON S.C.)
T.P.S. ) Unrepresented
Her impression was that Mr. T.P.S. had placed his penis in the dog’s mouth as a sexual act and had ejaculated. Ms. K.E.S. said nothing that night. The next day she called the police. They called the Children’s Aid Society (“CAS”). The CAS interviewed the girls and they claimed that their father had hit them. When interviewed by the police and the CAS, Mr. T.P.S. denied any abuse and denied doing anything inappropriate with the dog
 On January 15, 2000, Mr. T.P.S. took a Zoloft overdose
and was hospitalized briefly at the
Ms. K.E.S. then accused Ms. B.S.1 and her husband of abusing the children. More particularly, she accused B.S.1, a kindergarten teacher, of being a pedophile
 In June 2005, Ms. K.E.S. contacted the CAS in
 Mr. T.P.S. is now facing two criminal charges, assault
and theft, arising out of an incident in the parking lot of
 In October 2005, Ms. K.E.S. moved out of her Manotick home, … , She has moved herself and the children to Greely, Ontario, where she has rented a large home which includes use of a gym, swimming pool and tennis court, … , I do not accept that Ms. K.E.S. does not have the funds to repair the septic system in Manotick when she can afford to pay $25,200 annually in rent at the Greely home.
T.P.S. v. K.E.S, 2007 CanLII 17382 (ON S.C.)
The parties were unrepresented at trial. The children were represented by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. Mr. T.P.S. claims that he has incurred legal costs in regard to his separation from Ms. K.E.S. in the amount of $85,827. He wishes to recover 75% of those costs. Ms. K.E.S. claims that she has incurred legal costs of $62,756. In addition she has lost $20,000 in wages.
Mr. T.P.S. incurred legal expenses of $76,819, though some of these may have related to issues not strictly covered by this matrimonial litigation. Ms. K.E.S. incurred legal expenses of $47,000. Both figures include the cost of the family unit assessment
At this point, Mr. T.P.S. incurred $9,000 in legal expenses and Ms. K.E.S. incurred $18,700 in legal expenses. This latter amount includes the cost of various court appearances required because Mr. T.P.S. was not making proper financial disclosure.
In regard to the legal costs incurred by Ms. K.E.S., the
evidence is that she paid $10,038 to Peter Brennan in
Ms. K.E.S.’s legal expenses were incurred more evenly between 2000 and 2006. It was only in the period leading up to the trial and at trial that Ms. K.E.S. was unrepresented
 As of the date of trial, Mr. T.P.S. was $57,558.43 in arrears under the original order of Walters J.
 In regard to spousal support, I refused Mr. T.P.S.’s request for spousal support from Ms. K.E.S.,
 That being said, in the early stages of the litigation, the behaviour of Ms. K.E.S. was unreasonable. She refused any access between Mr. T.P.S. and the children for a three-month period, and then refused to consent to any access – even supervised access
 Once access was commenced at the X. household, Ms. K.E.S., without justification, accused Ms. X. and her husband of abusing the children. More particularly, she accused Ms. X. of being a pedophile, an especially odious allegation considering Ms. X. is a kindergarten teacher. A.Ms. K.E.S.’s insistence, access was again stopped while an investigation ensued.
I find that, in a further attempt to thwart Mr. T.P.S.’s
involvement with the children, Ms. K.E.S. moved the children to the
Once again, Mr. T.P.S.’s involvement with the children went from being very frequent to being virtually non-existent. This necessitated his returning to court on July 14, 2004 for an emergency motion. The motion was adjourned to a case conference on August 18, 2004. The Office of the Children’s Lawyer was appointed on January 17, 2005
 I find that Ms. K.E.S. again acted unreasonably in regard to the children when she contacted the Children’s Aid Society in the summer of 2005
 Issues between Mr. and Ms. K.E.S. again escalated when an altercation occurred between them in the presence of T., when Mr. T.P.S. was picking him up for an access visit. Mr. T.P.S. was driving his car, even though his licence had been suspended. Ms. K.E.S. intervened in a controlling fashion and physically tried to get T. to come home with her. Subsequently she had criminal charges laid against Mr. T.P.S. for assault and theft.
Mr. T.P.S.’s abusive behaviour was the primary cause of the separation, and he has to assume primary responsibility for the events that subsequently unfolded
The trial could have been reduced to two days at the most had Mr. T.P.S. acted reasonably and accepted the recommendations of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer in regard to custody and timesharing.
He, on the other hand, did not assume any responsibility for
his income being as low as it was in the years after his move to
Mr. T.P.S. was by far the least forthcoming regarding his financial circumstances, not filing any income tax returns since prior to the date of separation. As well, his contempt of the order of Walters J. regarding the freezing of his bank account where he had placed $72,000 of the parties’ joint funds requires costs sanctions. Finally, Mr. T.P.S.’s refusal to pay an appropriate level of child support to Ms. K.E.S. throughout the course of this litigation also calls for costs consequences
P.K.R. v. K.R., 2003 CanLII 2037 (ON S.C.)
P.K.R. ) In person
M. Linhares de Sousa, J.
Mr Roscoe never did comply fully and completely with the existing disclosure orders. As a result, the court on Apr 25 2003 ordered that Mr Roscoe’s pleadings be struck.
 Mr Roscoe’s assault on Mrs Roscoe led to criminal charges. After a criminal trial, Mr Roscoe was convicted of 2 counts of domestic assault. He is currently on probation and is restrained from having any contact with Ms Roscoe that is not related to his exercise of access to the child. The restraining order will continue until August 23 2003.
 According to the evidence, Mr Roscoe is not employed. Ms Roscoe testified that to her knowledge he has had no renumerative employment since 1975.
Although he pursued university courses for approximately eleven years, he never obtained a university degree
 It was the evidence of Ms Roscoe that throughout the relationship of the parties, she was the main financial supporter of the family and all her resources went into the family. She worked throughout the marriage, both before and after the birth of her son. Mr Roscoe contributed his half share of the rent when they rented accomodation but did not contribute financially in any other substantial way, including any contribution to the expenses relating to the child such as childcare expenses.
However most of his time was spent on his many physical activities such as swimming, bicycling, canoeing, skiing, and socializing away from the family.
CUSTODY AND ACCESS
 Ms Roscoe testified that the frequent visits Karl has with his father since the order of Nov 27 2002 and his fathers inability to parent him properly may be contributing to Karls recent behavioural problems.
 Ms Owens’ social worker enquiry and report conducted by the Office of the Childrens Lawyer substanciates many of Ms Roscoe’s concerns about Mr Roscoe’s parenting of Karl
Ms Owens states at pg 21 of her report
…, Karl is going to sleep at 9:30 on school nights, … , Karl was told to eat “ only what you want “, … , Peter Roscoe does not feel the content of his play with Karl is overly violent and stated Karl knew it was pretend when they captured the bad guys and drowned them in the bath., … , Peter Roscoe says he uses bribes, threats, distraction, time – outs, pinches Karls nose and even lets Karl hit him as methods of discipline. , …
 In response to my question, Mr Roscoe took the position that a parenting course for himself as recommended by Ms Owens is not necessary.
Even though Mr Roscoe had the time and opportunity to be more involved in Karls care he chose not to do so and to pursue his other interests and activities.
In the face of this the prognosis for the development and change in Mr Roscoe’s parenting skills, strongly recommended in her report, does not appear hopeful.
Mr Roscoe attempted to convince the court that Ms Roscoe has intentionally denied him access since the date of separation. Based on all the evidence I was not persuaded by this allegation.
When she asked the court to reconsider Mr Roscoe’s access during the course of many motions leading up to trial I cannot say she did so without the best interests of Karl in mind.
 With respect to access I am convinced that Mr Roscoe’s access to his son should be reduced to two afternoons a week as suggested by Ms Roscoe.
 I have examined the values found on Ms Roscoe’s net family property statement, … , I have also heard Ms Roscoe’s oral evidence how she used her husbands own statements throughout cohabitation and in the course of this litigation in order to fix a value for some of Mr Roscoe’s assets, …
 I note there are differences in some of Mr Roscoe’s limited disclosure and in Ms Roscoe’s net family property statement.
At no time during the course of her evidence was I given reason to doubt the accuracy and reliability of Ms Roscoe’s evidence. I accept her net family property statement and I therefore find that the equalization payment owed to her pursuant to s.5 of the Family Law Act is $ 129, 983.07
 The evidence indicated that Mr Roscoe had not been employed since 1970 despite his obvious family responsibilities. The reason for this is not clear.
 Mr Roscoe is not highly educated. He completed high school and pursued university for many many years but never succeeded in obtaining a university degree. He is not particularly trained in any field.
 I find Mr Roscoe to be intentionally unemployed. For that reason I impute employment income to him of $ 14,000 per annum.
 If one examines the notices of assessment for the years 1996 to 2000, Mr Roscoe seems to have reported the following income
1996 $ 15,320
1997 $ 22,052
1998 $ 15,713
1999 $ 15,418
2000 $ 14,670
 Based on all of the above evidence I find Mr Roscoes income to be the following for the purposes of child support pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines
Imputed Employment Income $ 14,000
Rental Income $ 16,800
Investment Income $ 15,000
Total Annual Income $ 45,800
 At the end of the trial and at the request of Ms Roscoe pending my decision in this matter I granted an order preventing Mr Roscoe from depleting, transferring or accessing any money or stocks of any kind whatsoever in his TD Waterhouse account and his family property
 A restraining order prohibiting Mr Roscoe from having any contact with Ms Roscoe, except for purposes of realizing access shall continue until further order of this court
Roscoe v. Roscoe, 2003 CanLII 2037 (ON S.C.)
P.K.R. ) In person
M. Linhares de Sousa, J.
On the other hand, Mr. P.K.R. has conducted himself throughout these proceedings in both an unreasonable manner and in bad faith. By his behaviour, his clear disrespect for court orders, his multiple proceedings that generally failed, his failure to provide disclosure, and his dishonesty with the Court, he has unduly prolonged the time and the cost of these proceedings.
I, therefore, order that Mrs. K.R.’s costs that I fix at $35,900.00 be paid by Mr. P.K.R. forthwith.
THOMAS VINCENT HINKE ) Self-Represented
M. Linhares de Sousa, J.
 On this motion to change brought by Mr. Hinke there was divided success. Mr. Hinke, by my decision, obtained a substantial change to his on-going support obligations as well as a substantial reduction in his support arrears. He was, however, not successful on the question of arrears prior to the order of Madame Justice Bell dated, March 29, 1999.
 Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 as amended, the successful party is presumptively entitled to its costs. In view of the divided success in this matter, I cannot conclude that any one party is presumptively entitled to their costs
 After considering all of the above factors, I come to the conclusion that Mr. Hinke should contribute to Ms. Lake’s costs, which contribution I fix in the amount of $10,000.00
Coady v. Boyle, 2004 CanLII 15122 (ON S.C.)
MARY MARTHA COADY ) Self-represented
R. Smith J.
My decision directed that this part of her motion should proceed in compliance with the Family Law Rules, provided she first obtained leave from a judge, given the finding that Ms. Coady had conducted frivolous, vexatious and abusive litigation against her ex-husband, Brian Boyle
 I found that Ms. Coady’s motion was frivolous and vexatious litigation, and was an abuse of the court’s process
 Ms. Coady’s conduct in this litigation is clearly unreasonable and outrageous and deserving of disapproval of the court and her conduct justifies an award of costs on a substantial indemnity basis in order to deter any such future conduct by her against her former husband.
 In any event, Ms. Coady’s limited financial circumstances cannot be used as a shield against her unreasonable conduct, which has caused substantial unnecessary expense to her former husband.
Therefore, Ms. Coady is ordered to pay costs in the amount of $67,000 for fees plus GST, plus disbursements of $3,261.68 inclusive of GST
Cunningham v. Lefebvre, 2006 CanLII 5602 (ON S.C.)
CHARLES LEFEBVRE ) Unrepresented
 In paragraph five of my Endorsement I noted that:
Mr. LeFebvre has advised that he will pay the costs of $500 ordered by Ratushny J. within seven days
 I ordered that Mr. LeFebvre pay interim child support for the three children of $2,283 per month commencing March 1, 2005 based on an annual income of $150,000, that he pay interim spousal support in the amount of $1,000 per month commencing March 1, 2005 and that he advance the amount of $15,000 to the Mother to enable her to retain professional advice with respect to the financial affairs of Mr. LeFebvre.
He ordered payment of costs of $3,000 by the Husband forthwith
 This matter was next brought before Toscano-Roccamo J. on July 27, 2005 and she ordered the Father to pay $1,500 to the Mother forthwith
With respect to support, Sheffield J. ordered that child support was to be paid directly to the Applicant, rather than the children, that July and September child support was to be paid to the Mother by October 1, 2005 and ordered costs of $2,000 to be paid by the Father to the Mother forthwith
 With respect to the outstanding child support and the outstanding costs order, the Father refers to an e-mail dated January 18, 2006 sent to the Mother in which, inter alia, he states:
I owe you 2,000.00 (legal) plus 3,000.00 spousal support and 2,283 x 3 child support less the abovementioned credit for child support. I will arrange for PCL to surrender the van to you in lieu of money owed to the trust.
I only have 2,000.00 in cash at this time that I can spare
 My overriding obligation is to balance the rights of these parties to ensure a just result as contemplated by the Family Law Rules.
 I find that, notwithstanding the orders made by this court referred to, the Respondent has consistently and without excuse failed to comply with the orders of this court. The Respondent has had numerous warnings as to the consequences of such failures.
 I conclude that, in these circumstances, the proper remedy is the sanction of striking the pleadings of the Respondent.
 I award costs of this motion to the Wife.
 The Wife may proceed to an uncontested trial on the basis of affidavit evidence at any time she sees fit.
Swanson v. Swanson, 2004 CanLII 48679 (ON S.C.)
Justice Patrick Smith
The Respondent has continually delayed the proceedings and is currently being represented by his sixth lawyer having also represented himself for a brief period;
48] During his testimony at trial the husband blamed his previous lawyers for the disclosure problems
57] In his financial statement sworn November 15, 2004 the husband declares that he receives the sum of $620.00 per month as social assistance and lists his monthly expenses as totaling $1,191.00 per month thereby leaving him with a deficit of $571.00 per month.
 When the behaviour of the husband is viewed in its totality, I find that the evidence establishes that, his failure to find suitable employment was, and continues to be, part of a strategy to punish his wife and children for the separation
The husband has two liens in his name registered against the property - a legal aid lien in the amount of $5,000.00 and an Ontario Works lien of approximately $16,000.00, which may be subject to adjustment upon negotiation in the future.
110] Based upon the totality of the evidence, I find that the husband is intent upon making his wife's life as difficult as possible and further, that, based upon the finding, it is highly unlikely that he will ever make periodic child support payments even if ordered by this Court to do so
129] In view of my finding that this is an exceptional case where a lump sum order for future child support be ordered and, based upon the expert testimony of Robert Bateman, I find that the sum of $80,203.88, with no adjustment for inflation, is an appropriate, and conservative lump sum award and so order
the wife shall have judgment against the husband in the amount of $40,648.55 to equalize the net family property of the parties
Boileau v. Boileau, 2003 CanLII 2288 (ON S.C.)
Pierre Boileau, self-represented
 The Court is being asked to effect an equalization by merely dividing the husband's pension, since it is the only asset which has "survived" the bankruptcy.
 The reasoning of Madam Justice Greer in Re Hughes, October 23, 1997, Doc. 32-071120, when she granted leave to pursue the equalization claim against the husband's pension, saying that "such a declaratory order is a special remedy against exempt assets", is compelling. She also stated that, in her view, bankruptcy proceedings were not "intended to wipe out property equalization claims against persons under the Divisional Act and the Family Law Act, which were instituted prior to the bankruptcy".
 Therefore, I order that the current maximum transferable amount of $96,659 be forthwith transferred to Mrs. Boileau, pursuant to the provisions of the Pension Benefits Division Act.
 I order that beginning in June 2003, Mr. Boileau shall pay his wife spousal support of $300 per month.
 As of the first of the month following termination of child support payments for Eric, Mr. Boileau shall pay $600 per month as spousal support.
John Hamilton ) Self-represented
C. Aitken J.
 The equalization payment arises out of the fact that the capitalized values of Mr. Hamilton’s pension and sick leave benefits with the Ottawa Firefighters were included in his net family property, and no capitalized value of Ms. Hamilton’s two disability pensions were included in her net family property.
 Mr. Hamilton did not comply with a number of court orders. As has already been stated, he did not comply with the initial order of Mackinnon J. regarding financial disclosure. He did not comply with the order of Sedgwick J. dated July 13, 2000, and this resulted in his being found in contempt. Mackinnon J. made further orders on June 8, 2001 which again were not complied with by Mr. Hamilton, and this resulted in a further order of Roy J. on October 9, 2001 confirming that earlier orders had not been obeyed
J. v. J., 2003 CanLII 1967 (ON S.C.)
RMJ ) Not in attendance
C. Aitken J.
 On February 27 and 28, 2002, I heard the Applicant’s claim for a divorce, corollary relief and an equalization payment. The Respondent was in attendance, but did not participate in the hearing. His pleadings had been struck on December 31, 2001 as a result of his persistent non-compliance with various court orders.
I did not restrict the Respondent’s access to the children to the extent that the Applicant requested, though I did reduce it from the time he had been spending with the children prior to trial.
I refused to impute an income to the Respondent of $200,000 annually; instead I imputed an income to him of $80,000 effective September 1, 2002.
In short, the Respondent acted in bad faith from the commencement of this litigation. He never made proper financial disclosure, he refused to comply with court orders, he consciously took steps to place some of his assets out of reach of the Applicant and the court, and he intentionally mislead the court.
 The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Applicant $22,500 as costs for the divorce proceedings up to and including the trial on February 27 and 28, 2002, the signing of the order and the arguments on costs
J. v. J, 2003 CanLII 1966 (ON S.C.)
No one appearing for any of the Respondents in regard to costs submissions
C. Aitken J.
By ex parte Order dated August 22, 2002 obtained on behalf of Jennifer J:
o The funds in various accounts at TD Canada Trust were ordered paid into court.
By ex parte Orders dated September 6, 2002 obtained on behalf of Jennifer J.:
o The funds in various accounts in the names of various persons, including Ric J, Karyn J, Luiz D.S were frozen.
o September 12, 2002 was set for the return date of the motion regarding the freezing of these accounts.
o Directions were given regarding
the contents of
o Title to
By Order dated October 28, 2002 relating to costs associated
with the sale of
o The sum of $11,581.13 was ordered paid to Jennifer J. from the net proceeds of sale of xxxx Avenue, Ottawa relating to her reasonable legal fees and expenses associated with getting an order for the sale of the property, getting various orders relating to the sale of the property, and incurring out of pocket expenses related to giving vacant possession of the property
By Order dated May 29, 2003, arising out of the August 12-13, 2002 hearing attended by Jennifer J. and her counsel, but not by Ric J., Jennifer J, Drew J. or Luiz D.S.
o Luiz D.S was found to be a party to various fraudulent conveyances from Karyn J.to himself relating to the funds she had originally received from the Eileen M. J.Trust.
held to be jointly and severally liable with Ric J.and Karyn J.to pay
into the Superior Court of Justice (
 Ric J., Karyn J. and Luiz Da Silva are jointly and severally liable to pay Jennifer J. the sum of $37,315 for costs relating to the fraudulent conveyance litigation. Drew J. is jointly and severally liable with the other three to pay Jennifer J. the sum of $34,065 for costs relating to the fraudulent conveyance litigation
J. v. Da Silva, 2003 CanLII 49354 (ON S.C.)
 This is a Garnishment Hearing in which the Respondent Luiz Da Silva, the “Payor” disputes the validity of garnishee proceedings commended by the Applicant Jennifer J., the “Recipient”, against him and his employer, the “Garnishee”.
It is apparent from the materials filed on behalf of Mr. Da Silva that he does not accept the basis upon which orders were made against him by Aitken J
 On December 3, 2001, Linhares de Sousa J. struck the Respondent’s pleadings and ordered that a default hearing proceed during the February 2002 Family Court sittings. The default hearing was conducted by Aitken J. On February 28, 2002, she issued a detailed endorsement. The relevant parts of her order may be summarized as follows:
(a) A divorce was granted;
(b) The Applicant was awarded sole custody of the two children subject to access by the Respondent;
(c) The Respondent was ordered to pay to the Applicant an equalization payment of $30,000;
(d) The Respondent was ordered to pay a lump sum spousal support payment of $40,000
Karyn J. is the wife of the Payor, Luiz D.S.
 On September 5, 2002, Chadwick J. found Karyn J. in contempt of the orders of Aitken J. and sentenced her to sixty (60) days in the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre. He also found Ric J. in contempt. He was sentenced to one hundred and twenty (120) days.
M.M.F.1 v. G.R., 2004 CanLII 52811 (ON S.C.)
M.M.F.1 ) In Person
Madam Justice M.T. Linhares De Sousa
 Mr. M.M.F.1 denies that he ever assaulted his wife or his son. He explained in his evidence that he pleaded guilty to the charge of assault on his wife merely in order to see his son.
According to her, Mr. M.M.F.1 only began to see her and her son regularly after April 2001, when under pressure from Mr. M.M.F.1 she signed a consent to visit letter as was required under the terms of Mr. M.M.F.1’s probation.
 After she revoked her consent to have Mr. M.M.F.1 visit with M.M.F.2, Ms. G.R. made it very clear and it is clearly stipulated in exhibit #6 that Ms. G.R. consented to having Mr. M.M.F.1 continue his access to M.M.F.2 under supervision
 Mr. M.M.F.1’s lack of detail in his testimony makes his testimony and credibility suspect.
 With respect to Mr. M.M.F.1’s allegation that his son wishes to see him and that his mother has been “brainwashing” the child against him for her own motivation, this is not supported by the evidence.
 With respect to access. On the basis of the evidence before me, I must unhappily come to the conclusion that it would not be in M.M.F.2’s best interests to order access at this time.
He is presently on Social Assistance although he provided little evidence as to why he is not employed full-time in the work for which he is trained. His annual declared income for 2001, 2002 and 2003 were below the Child Support Guidelines threshold (See exhibits 2 and 3).
Scott v. McKinley, 2002 CanLII 13273
William L. C. Scott, the appellant in person
 William Scott appeals from the order made by Linhares de Sousa J. ("the application judge") on June 29, 2001, granting him limited access to his three-year-old son.
 The history of this dispute includes a conviction of the father for assaulting the mother, allegations of failing to comply with a probation order forbidding the father from contacting the mother, and allegations that he was harassing her.
At the time of the application to Linhares de Sousa J., the father had not seen the child for some eight months and there had been very few access visits in the two years before that
 We essentially agree with the approach of Linhares de Sousa J. However, we are of the view that the one visit per year by the father is too restrictive to give effect to the intention of paragraph 1 of the order, namely that “[b]oth parties shall make an effort to promote contact and a relationship between the child … and his father …”.
Piskor v. Piskor, 2003 CanLII 53692 (ON S.C.)
Respondent, in person
In this new stage of one of the longest running and most protracted family law cases in the Ottawa Courthouse, the respondent George Piskor seeks to vary the spousal support obligation placed upon him on October 29, 2000 by the judgment of Madam Justice Linhares de Sousa. Her judgment enforced the settlement agreement reached between the parties after 8 years of litigation. The agreement included provision for indefinite spousal support at the rate of $3500 each month.
He continued to pay the required support after the judgment, but stopped paying entirely after October 2002 and as of this month, arrears stand at $21, 000. In his oral presentation before me today, he stated, “ I stopped payment in October simply because I have no money
 Mr. Piskor stopped paying the indefinite support he agreed to pay and was then ordered to pay. He said he did so because he has no money. He says that for a number of reasons, he has not earned income since last September. I observe that there was evidence of a similar fall-off in earning capacity prior to the approach of the trial in the fall of 1999. Mr. Piskor said during argument that he was surviving only on family loans, borrowings against insurance policies, the reimbursement of some of the costs incurred following a motor vehicle accident involving his wife, and they are even renting out the barn on their rural property
Mr. Piskor must be current in the payment of his support obligations to Ms. Piskor if he is to pursue the variation application proceedings. He may pursue his application as long as he pays the required support. If he does not, the proceedings are stayed
Davis v. Morris, 2006 CanLII 8196
On appeal from the orders of Justice Maria Linhares de Sousa
 The appellant was not present on the return date of the two motions. He had filed no materials. Métivier J. granted the appellant’s solicitor’s motion to be removed from the record. She did so despite the short service of the notice of motion. No reasons were provided.
As there had not been personal service of that motion, a contempt order could not be made. Respondent’s counsel nonetheless made reference in his submissions to the appellant being in contempt and, specifically, that the appellant’s conduct warranted an award of costs on a full recovery basis. Métivier J. struck the appellant’s pleading and granted most of the relief sought by the respondent.
 The appellant brought a motion returnable on November 26, 2004 to set aside Métivier J.’s order.
The motion judge then dismissed the motion.
Brown v. Brown, 2004 CanLII 12750 (ON S.C.)
MARK GORDON THOMAS BROWN ) Unrepresented
C. Aitken J.
He claimed that he had been meeting his expenses through the use of various disability benefits which he had received since the separation ($10,880 in all) and by cashing in all of his liquid assets aside from his life insurance policies. Mark testified that he has run out of assets to liquidate, he is not in receipt of any disability benefits, and he has no other source of income
 Mark provided oral evidence and filed a number of medical reports to substantiate his claim that he is totally disabled.
 Brenda has been the primary wage earner for the Brown family.
In any event, I believe that Mark requires an incentive to assume financial responsibility for himself and the children. Not being able to rely on spousal support from Brenda will provide that incentive
 The equalization payment owing from Brenda to Mark is $41,386.19. This equalization payment shall be satisfied as follows:
• $2,720 shall be paid into the children’s RESP in satisfaction of the debt Mark owes to the children’s trust accounts;
• $30,000 shall be held in trust by Brenda as security for future child support payments pursuant to the terms set out above;
94] Commencing September 1, 2004, Mark shall pay Brenda $294 per month as child support for the three children based on an income of $15,000 imputed to Mark as of that date
J.R. v. J.G., 2005 CanLII 14983 (ON S.C.)
J.G. in person
C. Aitken J.
 Rule 14(23) of the Family Law Rules states that a party who does not obey an order that was made on motion is not entitled to any further order from the court, unless the court orders that this subrule does not apply
 I have found that the Respondent has failed to comply with earlier court orders in at least three important respects relating to the business valuation and financial disclosure. He is not entitled to come and ask for further assistance from the court, when he, himself, has not respected earlier court orders. More particularly, the Respondent cannot come to court seeking a finding of contempt against the Applicant when he has failed to live up to earlier court orders made against him. For this reason, and as a result of the findings provided below regarding access to G., the Respondent’s contempt motion is dismissed.
 For the same reason, I will not entertain the Respondent’s motion for a certificate of pending litigation at this time. That motion is stayed pending the Respondent’s compliance with earlier court orders.
 Taking all of these factors into account I conclude that it is in the best interests of the children for the Applicant to have temporary sole custody.
The Respondent’s access to G. shall be suspended at this time. It shall not be reinstituted until the Respondent individually has undergone counseling dealing with anger management and parenting skills and until he and G. have had some joint counseling as recommended by the Children’s Aid Society, the Family Service Centre or the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.
 At the hearing of the motion, the Respondent stated that he did not need counseling because he is a good parent
Stoate v. Stoate, 2005 CanLII 13820 (ON S.C.)
Jeffrey David Stoate ) Self represented
C. Aitken J.
As of trial, he remained unemployed
 Mr. Stoate acted “intentionally” within the meaning of s. 19(1)(a) when he chose to attend college rather than work. By doing so, Mr. Stoate became intentionally unemployed in January 2004
 I find that through a serious effort to find work in the fields in which he had been working for the previous 20 years, Mr. Stoate could have continued to earn at least $33,000 annually; and this is the income I impute to him
N.L. v. B.P., 2000 CanLII 22516 (ON S.C.)
B.P. in person.
 B.P. and N.L. had a brief relationship in the summer of 1991. They never married nor resided together. On March 13, 1992, S.L.P. was born. Mr. P. initially denied paternity. However, after blood tests confirmed that he was S.’s father, Mr. P. was ordered to pay child support. He has never had a relationship with his daughter and has no access nor contact with her
In addition, he argues that he has significant debts and may be forced into bankruptcy in the near future. He argues, therefore, that the existing arrears, totaling over $22,000 should be rescinded and his child support should be varied
 Mr. P. is a healthy, well-educated, articulate, 44 year old man. However, he made it clear that he has no intention of pursuing a career in social work but is intending to go on social assistance and perhaps retrain. I am satisfied that he has the skills, training and experience to obtain employment and earn income in the field of social work or child and youth work
 Therefore, given Mr. P.’s failure to provide adequate income information and my finding that he is intentionally underemployed, I will impute income to him in the amount of $40,000 per year.
I cannot find a material change in circumstances. Mr. P.’s motion to vary the existing child support order will be dismissed
42] Mr. P. has had the capacity to earn the imputed income of $40,000 since he stopped paying child support in August of 1996. Therefore, based on the above analysis, I decline to rescind or vary the amount of arrears
I will order that the child support payments be secured by a charge on both Mr. P.’s
Marshall Romaniuk v. Marshall Romaniuk, 2005 CanLII 14985 (ON S.C.)
CLIFFORD MARSHALL ROMANIUK ) Self Represented
 During the relationship Mr. Marshall was the primary breadwinner. Ms. Romaniuk however always worked and the evidence demonstrated that she had a variety of part-time jobs until the date that they separated in July of 2003
 In February of 2004, Mr. Marshall declared bankruptcy ,despite the fact that negotiations were taking place between counsel with respect to how the parties were to divide the jointly held debts. , … ,
 In February of 2004, an interim order of spousal support in the amount of $2,000 per month was ordered
 Mr. Marshall should be responsible for some of the debt, and support should flow from him to Ms. Romaniuk in relationship to that debt. I find as a fact that Mr. Marshall ought not to have declared bankruptcy in the circumstances of this case. His declaration of bankruptcy directly results in Ms. Romaniuk absorbing a debt that is in part his responsibility. She is dependant upon him and some form of compensatory support to offset the increased debt load would be reasonable in all of the circumstances of this case
Younger v. Younger, 2008 CanLII 155 (ON S.C.)
First, in her submissions Ms. Younger challenged my rejection of her adjournment request, contending that the “system is prejudiced against people who represent themselves”.
Malerba v. Malerba, 2004 CanLII 34791 (ON S.C.)
Cataldo Malerba, in person
 The Husband has failed throughout the matrimonial proceedings to co-operate and failed to comply with Court Orders.
I find that the Bankruptcy came at a time the Husband knew that his contempt would soon be dealt with, and he deliberately tried to remove his assets from any claims his Wife had.
The Husband will simply have to continue to work and not take early retirement, as he financially must continue to support his children as well. Order to go that the Wife’s lump sum spousal support which I fix at $180,000 be secured against the Husband’s Pension. Interest shall run on that amount from July 13, 2004 until date of payment, at the Courts of Justice Act rate for post-judgment interest
 With respect to the Husband’s contempt and sanctions to be ordered by me, the Wife asks the Court not to Order a sentence of imprisonment for the Husband, as this would defeat his ability to continue to work and pay his child support.
 The Husband tells the Court that “I am not a villain or a crook nor will I take the money and run.” While the Husband has committed no Criminal Code offence, he has behaved in a contemptuous and egregious manner throughout these proceedings.
He is aware that this conduct has led his Wife and children to want no further contact with him.
(4) Costs of Wife are fixed at $10,500 plus GST plus disbursements plus GST. These Costs are part of the Wife’s Spousal Support
Ballentine v. Ballentine, 2001 CanLII 28151 (ON S.C.)
Richard Ballentine for himself
1 Mr. Ballentine seeks to vary his spousal support obligation of $4,552.23 per month to nil and to cancel all arrears currently owing in the amount of $307,668.57
2 By counter-application, Ms. Ballentine requests an order:
(a) dismissing the application of Mr. Ballentine on the basis that it is frivolous, vexatious, and/or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court, and is barred by the doctrine of res judicata:
. . .
(c) that no further proceedings, under any form, be instituted by Mr. Ballentine with respect to spousal support and arrears of spousal support save with leave of the court
8 In support of this variation application he filed a financial statement sworn June 21, 2001 showing nil under every asset category.
Justice Cullity found that Mr. Ballentine had not provided evidence to establish that there had been a necessary material change of circumstances pursuant to section 17 of the Divorce Act. Mr. Ballentine has not provided any further or different evidence of a material change in his circumstances since August of 1999
18 The counter-application is allowed. No further proceedings under any form may be instituted by Mr. Ballentine with respect to spousal support and arrears of spousal support save with leave of the court.
19 Costs to Ms. Ballentine of the application and cross-application are fixed in the amount of $7,500
Ziomek v. La Selva, 2001 CanLII 28197 (ON S.C.)
4] The former wife brought an application in May, 1999 to set aside the Minutes of Settlement and consent judgment. There have been numerous court appearances since then. The former husband has been ordered to provide disclosure and pay support arrears and costs. He has failed to do so, has been found in contempt and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Following a contempt finding, his pleadings were ordered struck. Greer J. ordered on May 31, 2000 that he has no further standing in this proceeding, that he is in contempt, that he pay $6,000 to cover arrears owing at the private school, $7,000 for a forensic accountant, $2,500 for costs before Day, J. who presided over one of the attendances and $2,000 for costs before Greer J. He failed to comply with the order. On the last return date, he appeared without counsel. Pursuant to an order by me, he paid $17,500 to the former wife immediately, and was required to file financial information by February 1, 2001. He agreed to return on February 26, 2001 for a hearing before me. The former husband did not appear for the hearing and did not move to defend the application. However, he retained counsel to appear only to request that the court not proceed with the hearing. No reason was given for his non-attendance. The husband has made some but not the complete disclosure that was ordered on January 15, 2001. The request for an adjournment was denied. Mr. Ziomek’s pleadings had been ordered struck in previous proceedings and he had no standing in this matter.
 The former wife sought to proceed at this hearing on an uncontested basis which was granted. She submitted that the earlier judgment and Minutes of Settlement be set aside and that the court should impute income to the former husband and order child support based upon that income of $250,000
 On the evidence, I am satisfied that the income of the former husband was greater than $50,000 at the time of his application in 1997. Because of material non-disclosure, the consent judgment on the issue of support must be set aside. Income must be attributed to the former husband for expenses claimed through the business and the related company as well as through income-splitting. A more accurate estimate of his annual income was $250,000. Had the husband properly disclosed his income in 1997, the table amount under the Guidelines on income of $250,000 was $2,801 per month. The husband paid $700. The difference is $2,101 per month. That amount must be calculated for 34 months and shall include interest. Ongoing child support shall commence on April 1, 2001 and shall be paid at the rate of $2,801 for the support of the two children, Rachel and Sara.
Writer v. Peroff, 2006 CanLII 38363 (ON S.C.)
The Motion to Strike was heard by Madam Justice Backhouse on February 2, 2006. She released her Endorsement on February 3, 2006. She says in paragraph 12 of her Endorsement that despite two court orders, the Father has not complied with his disclosure obligations. She then says, “It will be the rare family law litigant who will be able to continue in the face of concerted efforts to stonewall.
While there was more disclosure by the Father, it did not fulfill his obligations under other Orders. Therefore Madam Justice Backhouse made an addendum to her Endorsement and said, that given her findings made in that Endorsement, she struck the Father’s pleadings and evidence. She then said, “Ms. Writer is permitted to proceed to an uncontested hearing.”
The uncontested hearing on retroactive and on-going child support was then set down and was heard by me on November 7, 2006
 Disclosure, which was eventually made by the Father, included copies of his Income Tax Returns remitted for the years 2002 to 2004 inclusive. They show the Father’s reported income as follows:
1. 2002 - $24,107.43
2. 2003 - $50,655.67
3. 2004 - $41,780.44
 I find on the evidence before me that the Father owes the following amounts and all the following Orders shall issue accordingly:
1. Retroactive arrears of child support in the amount of $30,913 from February 2002 to November 2006.
2. Retroactive S.7 Expenses for the same period as above in the amount of $22,333.
3. On-going child support from December 2006 and 2007 in the amount of $1,294 per month based on the 2005 attributed income of $155,402.
4. S.7 Expenses on a go forward basis from December 2006 and 2007 in the amount of $28,332, as set out in Tab 7 of the Mother’s S.7 Brief of Documents. The Mother faces additional respite care for Jamie now, given the Father’s failure to keep exercising his access time, and given the Wednesday afternoon extra time.
5. The Father still owes the amount of $12,500 in Costs awarded by Madam Justice Backhouse as incidental to child support, which she says shall be enforced by F.R.O. as an incident of support. Added to this amount are the Costs of $12,000 awarded to the Mother by the Court of Appeal, which it says are also “enforceable as support by the Family Responsibility Office.”
6. The Mother shall be entitled to her Costs of this proceeding, which I fix at $32,124.78, inclusive of disbursements and GST and those Costs of the appearance before Madam Justice Sachs on one of the many adjournments requested by the Father.
v. Frantel, 2004 CanLII 16317 (ON
Peter Hartmann the appellant in person
 With respect to her order striking out the appellant’s pleading, Low J. was acting on the order of Himel J. dated August 8, 2002 which, in turn, followed upon the order of Wright J. dated March 19, 2002, which the appellant has not properly appealed and with which the appellant has not complied
 In the disposition of this appeal, we do not find it necessary to have regard to the further evidence sought to be adduced by the respondent nor the responding evidence sought to be adduced by the appellant.
 Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs, fixed in the sum of $3,000.00
Hartmann v. Amourgis, 2008 CanLII 29106 (ON S.C.)
Peter V. Hartmann in person
 In March 2002, Wright J. awarded Ms. Frantel interim
exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and interim support. Mr. Hartmann
paid no support and in May 2002, the Court ordered that his Answer and Counter
Petition would be struck if the previously ordered support was not paid within
30 days. Mr. Hartmann’s failure to pay prompted an Order by Low J. to strike
his pleadings in September 2002. His appeal from Low J.’s Order was dismissed
by the Court of Appeal in January 2004. Mr. Hartmann also attempted to appeal
the Order of Wright J., which was rejected by the
His subsequent application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed in June 2005
 Katarynych J. issued the Order sought by the Director, citing specifically Mr. Hartmann’s failure to make full and frank disclosure of his financial affairs. Arrears were fixed at $45, 337.58, to be discharged in full by June 30, 2005, failing which Mr. Hartmann was to be imprisoned for a period of 90 days. Mr. Hartmann’s appeal of this Order was dismissed in November 2005 by Backhouse J. with costs payable by Mr. Hartmann to the FRO.
 The statement of claim alleges various ways that Ms. Amourgis lied to the court and thereby harmed the plaintiff. Ms. Amourgis appeared as counsel for the wife.
24] Insofar as the statement of claim can be said to assert that Ms. Amourgis was a party to a conspiracy against the plaintiff, it is clear that a lawyer, in acting for a client, is merely an agent of the individual and not a distinct entity and therefore incapable of being a party to a conspiracy.
Mr. Justice Finlayson gave reasons and concluded that the law “clearly establishes a judicial immunity from negligence for the Law Society’s discipline process, including the investigative functions at the front end”. Justice Finlayson concluded that imposing liability on the Law Society would, absent bad faith, be inconsistent with its “public interest” role
 This pleading is clearly directed against the legislation and general policy of the Government of Ontario and is not directed at operational decisions or actions, and it is unsustainable.
Family Court System
 The plaintiff has attempted to claim that the Government of Ontario could be held liable for the “embedded and pervasive gender based discrimination in the Family Court System” and goes on to cite specific decisions rendered by justices on the bench.
 I agree with the submissions of the Crown. The Crown cannot be held liable in tort for decisions made by judges carrying out their judicial functions (see PACA, s.5(6)). There is no basis in law for such a claim.
Charter Claim – Discrimination
 The plaintiff attempted to ground a claim on s.15(1) of the Charter, alleging that there was “rampant discrimination against fathers and men in general”. This claim arose out of dealing with the FRO, related legislation, and the Ontario Policing Manual.
Charter Claim – Presumption of Innocence
 Mr. Hartmann claimed that the default hearing procedure contained in the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, (“FRSAEA”) violated his right to be presumed innocent (and would theoretically violate s. 11(d) of the Charter, although the Charter breach is not specifically pleaded).
 The plaintiff brought a claim based on s.11(d) before Backhouse J. in previous proceedings. In addition to disclosing no cause of action here, this issue is also res judicata and a further abuse of process.
 For all these reasons, this action is dismissed in its entirety. There is no possibility that any amendment could serve to make it whole. The plaintiff’s statement of claim is struck and the action dismissed against all defendants.
 The defendants are clearly entitled to their costs, if demanded. I will accept written submissions in this regard if necessary.
Graham v. Bruto, 2007 CanLII 4867 (ON S.C.)
Rosario Bruto Respondent - Self-represented
The husband has a Business Administration diploma and is a mortgage consultant and property manager.
His first financial statement prepared on his behalf by his then solicitor, Gene Coleman, was sworn November 19, 2002. It showed $3,059/month as “allowances and support from others” as his only source of income and expenses of $5,686/month. His second financial statement prepared on his behalf by his then solicitors, McCarthy Tetrault, was sworn July 14, 2002. It continued to show $3,059/month in “allowances and support from others” but noted that the support will decrease to $1,600/month at September 1, 2003. His expenses were shown as $5,727/month. His third financial statement prepared on his behalf by his then solicitors, Niman Zemans Gelgoot, was sworn June 8, 2004. It showed no income and expenses of $5,148/month. His fourth financial statement prepared on his behalf by his then solicitor, Jacqueline Mills, was sworn January 19, 2006. It showed commission income based on the previous 4 months of $1,660/month and expenses of $7,835/month. His fifth financial statement he prepared himself.
He failed to make the most basic financial disclosure, notwithstanding his undertaking to the court to do so. His financial statements and his evidence on his income and expenses were so contradictory as to be nonsensical. I reject most of his evidence
The wife shall have sole custody and shall be the parent entitled to make decisions for the children
Since 2002, the husband has been saying that he has been looking for contracts and other employment and that he fully intends to work to support his children. Yet, he purported to have no earned income in 2002, 2003 or 2004. Either he is not being truthful about his earnings or his is deliberately underemployed. He submitted that his income should be deemed to be $35,000/year which exceeded any earned income he disclosed to date. In my view, the husband’s current income should be deemed to be $50,000/year.
The wife’s current income is $102,000/year.
Accordingly, the husband shall pay to the wife child support for 2 children in the amount of $835/month commencing January, 2007. In addition, commencing in January, 2007, he shall pay 33% of camp expenses and any tutoring expenses upon the receipts being provided to him. The Family Responsibility Office shall enforce this upon the filing of the receipts.
Accordingly, child support is awarded to the wife for the period from September, 2003 to December, 2006 in the amount of $626/month x 40 months = $25,040.
Bush v. Mereshensky, 2007 ONCA 679 (CanLII)
 The appellant appeals a finding of contempt made against him by Backhouse J., September 14, 2006 and the two month term of imprisonment imposed as the result.
 The appellant initiated his appeal during his incarceration and as the result his appeal was listed as an inmate appeal of a criminal matter. In fact, the appeal concerns a civil finding of contempt.
 On June 29, 2006 Jarvis J. made an order, without notice to the appellant that he:
• pay $317,000 (USD) into court pending a determination of title between spouses;
• on an interim basis, be directly and indirectly restrained from depleting any property in his control
 Finally, we note that the appellant is currently on parole as a result of a further order made by Backhouse J. on April 26, 2007 since she found he was still in contempt of the order of Jarvis J.
We would hope that Legal Aid Ontario would be able to assist him in that respect given that he has difficulty with the English language
No one appearing for the Respondent Wife, as her Pleadings have been struck
 Later, in the Wife’s Answer and Counterpetition, sworn June 23, 2003, the Wife says in paragraph 7 that she is employed as a compliance officer with Fish & Associates and earns approximately $30,000 per year and also does freelance and office work. This does not make sense, given that the Wife’s Financial Statement was sworn only 20 days earlier.
The Wife was in breach of Court Orders to provide full financial disclosure and she refused to do so. Therefore the Wife had her Pleadings struck
 I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the Husband should have sole custody of the two children of the marriage.
 Given this information, I impute as an approximate gross income to the Wife for the year 2003 the sum of $75,000.
I have attributed to the Wife, an income of $41,250 for 2006
The following amounts are therefore owed by the Wife to the Husband:
(a) 2003 under the old Child Support Guidelines, the sum of $605 per month or $7,260 per year.
(b) 2004 under the old Child Support Guidelines, the sum of $450 per month or $5,400 per year.
(c) 2005, the same as 2004 or $5,400 per year.
(d) 2006 under the old Child Support Guidelines from January to April at $356 per month or $1,424 for the first 4 months and under the New Child Support Guidelines at $379 per month or $3032 for the 8 months.
The total of this retroactive child support to December 31, 2006 is $22,120. Order to go that the Wife pay to the Husband the sum of $22,120 on account of retroactive child support
The Wife therefore owes the Husband and Equalization payment of $72,698.88 rounded to $72,700. Order to go accordingly
The total of these three payments is $133,432.00. I am of the view that the Wife will not willingly pay these sums to the Husband and there is no evidence of her current assets, other than her interest in the parties’ jointly held properties. The Wife’s one-half interest in the Kerslake, matrimonial home, is currently valued at $97,500 and her one-half interest in the Portuguese property, is currently valued at $35,000. These two values total $132,500. In my view, the most appropriate Order to make is that the Wife’s one-half interest in each of these properties shall be transferred to the Husband to satisfy the amount so owing to the Husband. The consent of the Wife to the two such transfers is hereby dispensed with.
v. D.M., 2003 CanLII 18880 (ON
The appellant submits that in the event this court were to find that the order was improper, we should order instead that the mother be allowed unsupervised access to her child.
He therefore made the costs order for $49,405
19] The mother was not represented by counsel at the trial.
Orszak v. Orszak, 2000 CanLII 22529 (ON S.C.)
Erik Orszak for himself.
 The parties received a divorce judgment on January 30, 1998. Prior to that, there was an interim order of access by the husband on alternate weekends with a condition that the husband abstain from the use of alcohol and drugs during access. At the time of the divorce, O’Connell J. ordered that the husband pay $1500 in child support based upon an imputed income of $125,000. There were never any orders of interim spousal support and no claim was pursued. On April 23, 1998, Wright J. ordered that an assessment take place pursuant to section 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act and that the husband have supervised access on alternate weekends.
The father maintained throughout that access was being denied by the wife. Various motions for contempt were brought. On July 20, 1999, Kiteley J. dismissed a motion for contempt brought against Ms. Orszak.
As at the date of trial, Mr. Orszak had not seen his children since October of 1999
10] Upon separation, Mr. Orszak provided Ms. Orszak with $6,000 per month support paid through his brother and their company. That continued from November, 1996 to May, 1997. In May, the amount of support was reduced to $3,500 and then to $2,500. In January, 1998, pursuant to O’Connell J.’s order, he began to pay $1,500 a month.
While Ms. Orszak hopes to complete her doctorate in education, there is no clear timeframe in mind and no evidence on the prospects of employment.
In 1998, his wife filed an income tax return claiming Mr. Orszak as a dependant and without income and in 1999, Mr. Orszak filed his own income tax return showing an annual income of $45,000. He testified that he worked with his brother until October, 1996 but no longer does so.
He also says that he tried a number of ventures after moving
On the financial issues, he claims that he is unable to pay support at the rate of $1,500 per month and maintains that his income is only $45,000.
 My judgment is summarized below:
Mr. Orszak is responsible for arrears of support to May 1, 2000 which have been calculated at the rate of $1,500 per month.
Alternatively, he shall purchase a car on a onetime basis for the use of Ms. Orszak and the children, or provide the sum of $15,000 to Ms. Orszak to purchase the vehicle herself.
Commencing on June 1, 2000 and on the first day of each month thereafter, Mr. Orszak shall pay the sum of $1,240 based on an imputed income of $100,000
Akerboom v. Steele, 2004 CanLII 29451 (ON S.C.)
Andrew Akerboom, in person, acting on his own behalf on his Motion to vary support
 Akerboom claims that he had lost his job twice during the period in question, having been laid off in June, 2002 as manager of IT services for his employer. He then opened his own business in used computer equipment in 2003 and it failed and closed in October, 2003, when he sold off the inventory and fixtures.
He says that he does not qualify for legal aid and cannot afford a lawyer. He claims to have tried to get his former wife to see his position and says he has “wasted 400 hours” of his own time trying to reduce his payments. He has now filed for Bankruptcy and made a proposal to his creditors, showing debts of $198,132, of which $160,000 is a mortgage.
The money he and his wife live on comes from somewhere.
 It is clear that Akerboom is underemployed and this appears to be deliberately so, given his two business attempts and his bankruptcy proceedings.
Further, Akerboom has failed at two businesses that he really had no experience in and thereby depleted his capital.
 In his Financial Statement sworn in January, 2004, Akerboom shows his actual monthly budget as being $4,301 or requiring an income of $51,612. This “ACTUAL BUDGET”, as it is headed in the Financial Statement says what it means. The entries are to be based on actual expenses. I therefore attribute that income to Akerboom in 2003 and in 2004, since the Statement was sworn in the year 2004.
Bonair v. Bonair, 2007 CanLII 28322 (ON S.C.)
Wendel J. Bonair appearing in person
 For the motions, Mr. Bonair’s position is that: (a) on a go-forward basis, he should pay child support based on an income of $11,000 per annum; namely $104 per month under the Federal Child Support Guidelines
If Ms. Duval is to be blamed for not paying child support for 38 months and if a retroactive order were to be made, then it would be the children for whom the child support was to be paid who would suffer.
 For the above reasons, I order (a) Mr. Bonair to pay child support on a go-forward basis based on an imputed income of $22,000; namely $335 per month under the Federal Child Support Guidelines effective as of July 2006;
She held that Mr. Brown had more income than what Mr. Brown submits he has. For example Mr. Brown asserts that the application judge erred in stating that he had income of $53,000 for the year 2000. The application judge had the benefit of the reasons of Kitely J. who had previously denied Mr. Brown’s variation application and whose judgment was not appealed.
The application judge held that the
In our opinion, the arrears with respect to orthodontic expenses were encompassed by the phrase “all arrearages” and the trial judge erred in excluding this.
 Finally, the trial judge did not err in principle in declining to award costs to the appellant who was self-represented.
Richards v. Richards, 2005 CanLII 3398 (ON S.C.)
Gary George Richards, In Person
The defendant’s threatening of his wife led to the laying of criminal charges and the ultimate separation of the parties on or about November 27, 2001. There was as well a restraining order against he defendant, arising from those unfortunate events.
 Since the separation of the parties, there has been virtually no contact between the defendant on his son
Mr. Richards claims now to be impecunious, and to be burdened with the support of a 16-year-old brother who lives with him and the imminent prospect of another child arising from the pregnancy of a current girlfriend of his.
 Such records as have become available indicate that at the time of the marriage, Mr. Richards had assets of $63,517.78, and at the time of separation $164,631.90. Notwithstanding the March 5, 2002 order of Kiteley J. enjoining the parties from depleting assets, the defendant now claims to be penniless.
 Concerning Mr. Richards’ financial circumstances, therefore, I am of the view that the imputation of income to him invited by counsel for the plaintiff, is wholly warranted. Accordingly, for the purposes of the child and spousal support order later made, an income of $60,000. per annum is imputed to the defendant.
 Three years in the life of a child still under the age of six is a very long time. The defendant’s failure to establish or maintain contact with the child for more than three years, which the evidence indicates, represents a singular and unilateral failure on the part of the defendant.
 In the result, therefore, the wife shall have judgment for $49,982.06 by way of equalization, together with interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act, an order for child support in the amount of $507.00 per month, plus $23.00 per month by way of section 7 expenses, and an order for spousal support in the amount of $1,000.00 per month. The support orders shall be effective as of December 1, 2004.
Grimalyuk v. Concelos, 2007 CanLII 1325 (ON S.C.)
 The Respondent has failed to comply with five court orders and did not attend on several motions before this court. His pleadings were therefore struck by Hoilett J.
Mr. Concelos attempted to evict Ms. Grimalyuk and her son from the matrimonial home and assaulted Ms. Grimalyuk on several occasions.
 On December 13, 2004, Mr. Concelos was arrested and charged with uttering death threats against Ms. Grimalyuk. Following his arrest, Mr. Concelos was removed from the matrimonial home by the police. The parties have remained separate and apart since that time.
 For the above reasons and on the basis of Ms. Grimalyuk’s earnings of $850.00 per week for 2005 and Mr. Concelos’ imputed earnings of $6,800.00 per month or $81,600.00 per annum, as at 2005, I award to Ms. Grimalyuk support payments in the amount of $2,900.00 per month commencing January 2005 up to and including December 31, 2005. For the period January 2006 to December 2007 inclusive, taking into account Ms. Grimalyuk’s income of $2,035.00 per month and assuming a modest increase in Mr. Concelos’ earnings, I award to Ms. Grimalyuk $2,600.00 per month
 Thus, for the year 2005, (taking into account the $5,000.00 paid by Mr. Concelos to Ms. Grimalyuk), Mr. Concelos owes to Ms. Grimalyuk the sum of $29,800.00. For the year 2006, Mr. Concelos owes to Ms. Grimalyuk the sum of $31,200.00. These sums are to be paid by Mr. Concelos to Ms. Grimalyuk forthwith. Interest is payable on the amounts awarded in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act
 I confirm that Mr. Concelos is to pay to Ms. Grimalyuk $2,750.00 in costs as ordered to date plus $1000.00 for costs of the uncontested trial, plus interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act from the time of the orders granted
 Finally, I am advised by Ms. Grimalyuk that, despite the existing restraining order, Mr. Concelos was seen around her property in the summer of 2006. Given this fact and Mr. Concelos’ abusive behaviour toward Ms. Grimlyuk and her son, I order that Mr. Concelos be restrained from communicating with Ms. Grimalyuk and her son Andrey Grimalyuk, and from attending at her place of business or residence and her son’s place of education or work for a period of twelve months
Cantwell v. Cantwell, 2000 CanLII 22450 (ON S.C.)
Respondent for himself
 This year, Mr. Cantwell was able to find short-term employment with Farm Business Consultants doing tax returns until tax season ended. Since about six months ago, his only income is employment insurance of $1,790 monthly. I am not prepared to find as a fact that Mr. Cantwell is deliberately unemployed for the purposes of avoiding any support obligation. On the other hand, I am confident that he can soon secure well-paying employment because of the variety of experiences and marketable talents that he has
 In May this year, Mr. Cantwell made an assignment in bankruptcy.
28] Mrs. Cantwell has established an entitlement to spousal support. I am satisfied that a lump sum is the appropriate way to resolve the issue. The respondent shall pay to the applicant $30,000 as a lump-sum for support, pursuant to section 15.2 of the Divorce Act
Ingles v. Watt, 2003 CanLII 2136 (ON S.C.)
C. James Ingles, for himself
Ellen Macdonald J
 In this motion, the father asks that the videotapes of the access visits taken by private investigators hired by the mother be produced to the father.
 Ms Cunha submitted that there has been only two visits because the supervisors will not attend. The father has paid his share of the costs of the supervision of the two previous visits. The mother has not. She challenges their accounts. She takes the position that she will not pay her share until her challenges have been satisfied. The costs of supervisors were to be shared equally by order of Mesbur J. They, in turn, say that they will not supervise until they are paid. They will not turn up at the father’s home if the children will not be delivered there by the mother.
She also knows that without payment the supervisors will not attend. She knows that if there is no supervision, there will be no access. I note that supervision was put in place to appease the mother’s concerns
 The father is correct to say that if the mother succeeds in her position, there will be no access until the trial.
Y.T. v. J.K.1, 2006 CanLII 4908 (ON S.C.)
J.K.1 ) In Person
Given all the evidence that I have heard, it is not credible for Mr. J.K.1 to allege that Ms. Y.T. took A.J.K. out of the country without his knowledge, and he did nothing about it, except to tell her teacher after the fact.
After hearing from Ms. Y.T.,
 Ms. Y.T. submitted a parenting plan at the start of the
trial. The plan proposes that A.J.K. will live with her in
More specifically, in cross-examination, Ms. Y.T. stated, with some obvious reluctance, that the journal entries caused her to have a concern that A.J.K. would be sexually assaulted by Mr. J.K.1
Ms. Y.T. shall have sole custody of A.J.K., born […], 2000,
and she is permitted to move to
Commencing on March 1, 2006, and on the first day of each subsequent month, Mr. J.K.1 shall pay $317 per month as child support, based on his income of $39,000 per year
Ms. Y.T. shall post security with this court in the amount of $20,000 to ensure compliance with the terms of this order until A.J.K. is 15 years of age; such security to be forfeited only pursuant to an order of this court
Vandenelsen v. Merkley, 2003 CanLII 1965 (ON S.C.)
CARLINE ANTONIA VANDENELSEN ) The Applicant, on her own behalf
This order effectively terminates all the previous interlocutory orders of Desotti J., May 31, 2001, October 2, 2001, December 7, 2001 and February 5, 2002. The single exception is the disposition on one of the findings of contempt against Ms. VandenElsen which has been adjourned until after the appeal in the criminal case, and which Justice Desotti will have to deal with himself.
Ms. VandenElsen's description of the time the children were
with her after she abducted them in the fall of 2000 is detailed in her book,
 Ms. VandenElsen cannot be trusted to discharge the responsibilities of custody. She not only considers Mr. Merkley her enemy, she has little or no respect for his status as a parent.
The trial judge found that Ms. VandenElsen "lacked the necessary personality profile to provide to the children a calm, secure, stress-free and emotionally stable environment". Subsequent events have proven conclusively that he was right in that assessment.
 The children are now strongly expressing a wish to spend significant time with their mother.
 At page 236 of her book, Ms. VandenElsen describes her attempts to "instill truth and integrity" in the children by having them adopt her perception of how the four of them are victims who need to understand the "different kind of abuse" they have been subjected to by the court system.
 Mr. Merkley seeks an order prohibiting Ms. VandenElsen from bringing any further applications or motions against him or his family without leave of the court. See Schedule A to his latest factum for a list of the requests for relief by Ms. VandenElsen during the current proceeding. Given the great number of those various requests for relief, the relative lack of success on them and the possibility that Ms. VandenElsen will seek to continue litigation without abatement, such an order is warranted.
 The mother's conduct, behaviour and statements since March 2000 have unfortunately confirmed the fears of the trial judge that certain of her personality traits if not controlled "have the potential of destroying the emotional well being of the children". Ms. VandenElsen is unlikely to accept the truth of that assessment. However, I hope she may come to understand that that has been the consistent perception by judges in this case and that from the court's perspective she has just about run out of second chances
She has apparently been unemployed or underemployed since the summer of 2000. She has not adduced any evidence that would enable the court to find that she is no longer capable of earning $30,000 or more per annum.
Commencing June 1, 2003 she shall pay $568.00 monthly on the first of each month, the table amount under the Child Support Guidelines on an imputed income of $30,000 per annum
MacLeod v. MacLeod, 2003 CanLII 2328 (ON S.C.)
Roderick Joseph MacLeod Defendant ) In Person
 The defendant did not attend. It is this order which he sought to set aside. As a result of the order, the defendant went from a FRO credit of $27000.00 to a $46000.00 debit, a difference of $73000.00
Herskovits v. Herskovits, 2001 CanLII 28233 (ON S.C.)
Robert Anthony Herskovits, defendant, appearing on his own behalf.
What is unusual in this case is that Mrs. Herskovits’ readily concedes that Mr. Herskovits has no financial resources other than those he discloses. She admits Mr. Herskovits is impecunious. However, she submits, nevertheless, that she is entitled to have the clear and unambiguous terms of the separation agreement enforced.
Dang v. Hornby, 2006 CanLII 12973 (ON S.C.)
Daniel Donald Hornby, acting in person as the Moving Party on the Motion, the Father
She says she paid all the expenses and once they were in court proceedings, the Father went bankrupt to “spite” her.
 The Statement of the FRO dated February 24, 2006, states that the arrears of support are $21,330.74 and they continue to accumulate
 I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the Father is intentionally under-employed in 2004 and 2005
Aneziris v. Aneziris, 2007 CanLII 250 (ON S.C.)
DIONISIA ANEZIRIS Acting in person
Since separation, each party has made an Assignment in Bankruptcy.
L.C.M. v. C.A.V., 2003 CanLII 47888 (ON S.C.)
The Respondents appearing on their own behalf
To highlight but a few of these, Ms. C.A.V. refused to attend the court at the outset of the hearing because she challenged the jurisdiction of the court and elected to rely on her “right to silence” and her “right against self-incrimination”. They contended (once Ms. C.A.V. eventually attended) that there was no jurisdiction to proceed, since the Aston J order (which in itself they argued was “illegal” and made without jurisdiction) was still under appeal; that the order was not a final order; that the present proceedings were “confusing” to them; that it was incumbent on the presently presiding justice to “explain” his/the court’s authority to proceed; that they had new evidence to present (a videotape that they had made of the children apparently expressing their “choice”; that the presently presiding justice was biased and must immediately recuse himself; that these present proceedings were illegal because there was no docket posted outside of the courtroom disclosing, in advance, who the presiding justice would be; and that the present proceedings were “legal extortion”, an “abuse of the process”, “emotional blackmail” and a “premeditated dump” of the process ).
 Throughout the two days, Ms. C.A.V. flitted about, in and out of the courtroom, into the body of the court public seating area (where she, from time to time, would shout imprecations and slurs at opposing counsel and the presiding justice), calling them both, from time to time, “child abusers”,
 As Mr. Mamo argued, Ms. C.A.V. (now joined by Mr.
L.R.F.) has escalated her “crusade” beyond that of her own three children to
include all children in
 The case law strongly supports the proposition that where there are no issues of credibility to be determined and where the best interests of the children might be jeopardized by a trial, the presiding judge should exercise his or her discretion to proceed without a trial
 I decline to offer Mr. L.R.F. or Ms. C.A.V. any further public forum at any, or great, cost to the children emotionally and developmentally. A trial would represent a great threat to their stable and consistent relationship with their father and stepmother. A trial would again cost Mr. L.C.M. great amounts of money to continue his defence of himself and the children from two litigants who have no exigible assets or any means by which any potential costs order would/could deter them or recompense him when he is again absolved of responsibility for this debacle.
Morin v. Muir, 2007 ONCA 78 (CanLII)
Michael J. Muir In person
 The appellant Michael J. Muir appeals from the order of Patterson J. of the Superior Court of Justice dated June 8, 2006 dismissing his appeal from the order of Zaltz J. of the Ontario Court of Justice dated December 14, 2005, whereby the respondent Marianne B. Morin was granted custody of Michael Darrin Morin Muir (“Michael”) born June 22, 1988, the appellant was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $442 per month, and costs of the proceedings before the motion judge were awarded to Ms. Morin in the sum of $1,000, plus GST, payable forthwith by the appellant
 The appeal judge, in succinct but clear reasons, concluded that the motion judge applied the correct legal principles in awarding custody of Michael to the respondent and that the motion judge was correct to hold that there was no genuine issue for trial. We agree with the appeal judge. We see no error in the decision of the motion judge or in the holdings of the appeal judge
 In particular, the appeal judge did not err by concluding that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has no application to this case, which involves a dispute between private individuals concerning custody and other issues related to their son.
D.R.D. v. S.E.G., 2001 CanLII 28122 (ON S.C.)
Applicant for himself
Mrs. G. instituted an application on June 12, 1996 to vary access to conform with the wishes of D. In his responding affidavit sworn June 26, 1996 Mr. D. deposed:
On Wednesday, May 8th, 1996 the Respondent
There has been no meaningful access between Mr. D. and D. since 1997.
 As I understand the submissions of Mr. D., he is alleging that there was misrepresentation on the part of Mrs. G. as she led him to believe until May, 1996 that he was the biological father of D.
 I have no doubt that Mrs. G. held out to Mr. D. at the time the Minutes of Settlement were signed and incorporated into the Judgment of Divorce granted by Mr. Justice Morin, that D. was his son. This representation was in fact false. I am not persuaded that at the time the representation was made, Mrs. G. knew the representation was false or that she recklessly made the representation without knowing whether it was true or false.
Do the former husband’s actions offend public policy? The former husband is effectively saying that every spouse has a duty to tell his or her spouse of any extramarital affair he or she may have had during the marriage. It is unclear whether the former husband thinks that this must be done when it occurs, immediately thereafter, or some time later. Marriage is still a private domain and the public through the judicial system should not be involved in scrutinizing the behaviour of spouses in private matters while they are not involved in the judicial system.
The money paid was for child support not for spousal support.
I have therefore concluded that the answers to the questions which the Defendant H. has put to the Court are as follows:
1. A wife owes no such duty to her husband;
2. A wife owes no such duty to her husband after separation;
3. The Defendant’s silence under the circumstances does not constitute a representation;
4. The terms and provisions of the separation agreement stand on their own;
5. The Release signed by the parties and the other exclusionary provisions of the separation agreement preclude the Plaintiff from bringing the claim or proceeding with the claim;
6. Public Policy also prevents the Plaintiff from bringing the claim.
Judgment shall go dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims herein.
Simmons v. Simmons, 2007 CanLII 40221 (ON S.C.)
Mr. Jeffrey David Simmons, self-represented
 The Director served a notice of default hearing returnable May 1, 2007. Campbell J. made an order staying the Director’s enforcement proceeding pending the next return date of July 10, 2007.
 On June 5, 2007, Harper J. rescinded the order of Campbell J. staying enforcement. On that date, the respondent still had not complied with the outstanding production orders and Harper J. noted “this is complete bad faith on the part of the respondent.” The respondent was ordered to pay full indemnity costs to the applicant fixed in the amount of $2,996.08 and such costs were to be enforced by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office as support
 The applicant served and filed a contempt motion
 On August 31, 2007, the respondent filed a sworn financial statement and tax summaries for 2004, 2005 and 2006, a statement of earnings, and a statement setting out details of his pension from the Armed Forces. The matters were set to September 7, 2007, for a summary hearing.
 At the commencement of this hearing, the applicant sought an order pursuant to r. 10(5) that the respondent not be entitled to participate in the proceeding. Such an order was granted
I find that the arrears of child support as of August 7, 2007 are $10,442.05. I note that it is expected that an amount garnisheed from the respondent’s account will substantially reduce those arrears by $5,040.26, however, for the sake of clarity, the finding is made that the accrued arrears as at August 7, 2007 are $10,442.05 (inclusive of the $400.00 total administration fee).
 Mr. Clark, for the Director, advised that the payment of $337.00 on account of arrears proposed by the respondent was acceptable to the Director and accordingly the respondent is ordered to pay that amount
 In the event of default of the ongoing child support or the payment on account of arrears, the Director shall be at liberty to bring a motion for a warrant of committal
In my view, in these circumstances and considering that both the 1999 and 2003 orders required the respondent to maintain these benefits for the children the respondent shall reimburse the applicant $140.00 per month, being the cost for her to cover the two children on her health care plan.
 Given the applicant’s income ($34,760.00), the respondent’s failure to pay the child support he should have paid in accordance with the Guidelines had a significant impact on his children. It is clear that the applicant has accumulated debt. The children who were entitled to this child support have done without.
 As a result, I am satisfied that it is appropriate in these circumstances that the respondent be ordered to pay to the applicant the amount of $3,252.00 representing a retroactive adjustment to the child support calculated as set out above
She learned that her credit rating was negatively impacted by the fact that their Visa account had an outstanding balance of $1,382.00 that was past due.
 I find that the respondent should be ordered to pay to the applicant this past due amount in order for her to clear her credit rating, … , reimbursement of the applicant for that debt should be enforced by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office as support, and an order will go
 The bill of costs submitted by counsel for the applicant is reasonable and the respondent is hereby ordered to pay to the applicant on account of costs the sum of $3,330.92 for costs incurred from and after August 9, 2007. This amount will also be added to the arrears and enforced by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office as support.
P.R. v. W.M.R., 2006 CanLII 28911 (ON S.C.)
P.R. ) Self-represented
 P.R. and W.M.R. separated on May 21, 2004 when P.R. was charged with assault. Part of his condition for release from custody was that he not return to the matrimonial home. In less than a month from that date, P.R. commenced this action
The order of July 23, 2004 also granted W.M.R. exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and contents and required that both parties be restrained from disposing, depleting or encumbering other assets pending further order of the court
P.R. was restrained from molesting or annoying W.M.R. and, as well, he was required to deliver a sworn Financial Statement before June 16, 2005
 At various times over the course of this litigation, P.R. had been represented by counsel but at many of the motions and at the trial he represented himself. On June 24, 2005 P.R. did not appear in court nor was he represented by counsel. His parents attended on his behalf and asked for an adjournment. Since the issue of the payment of the line of credit and child support had been stayed since December 2004, Brockenshire J. found that there was significant urgency in having these issues dealt with. He denied the request for the adjournment and proceeded with the motion. Child support was ordered paid in the amount of $843 per month commencing June 1, 2005 based on an income of $74,440 (sic). In addition, P.R. was to pay spousal support in the amount of $300 per month commencing June 1, 2005.
The result of P.R. continuing to lose 50% of his wages on an ongoing basis is that he has very little money with which to exercise access to the girls.
 As well, a litigant, self represented or otherwise, is expected to attempt to resolve issues and to inform him or herself on the law. A trial is not an opportunity to vent feelings but to present evidence which can reasonably be expected to support one’s claims.
I have, therefore, deducted $810 from the total requested and fix costs at $12,652 payable by P.R. to W.M.R
Abdelrahim v. El-Madhoun, 2004 CanLII 8386 (ON S.C.)
The Applicant, on her own behalf
No one appearing for the Respondent
 The applicant wife seeks an annulment of her marriage to the respondent. The marriage took place on August 22, 2002. It was registered and there is a valid Ontario Marriage Certificate. The applicant argues that the marriage should be annulled because the parties never cohabited and did not enter into the “Muslim marriage” as agreed. In accordance with their faith, the parties do not consider themselves married until the second ceremony takes place
 The difficulty is that they have entered into a marriage recognized by the law of this province and do not fit within the traditional grounds required for an annulment.
 Although the parties have not consummated the marriage, there is no indication that either is impotent. Both freely consented to the marriage and neither was under any mental incapacity
 There are no legal grounds for annulling this marriage. It will have to be dissolved by divorce.
Finn v. Finn, 2003 CanLII 1947 (ON S.C.)
The Applicant not appearing
The Respondent, on her own behalf
 I have the benefit of having received and reviewed all of the evidence and I decline to confirm the order rescinding arrears.
The court summarized the law regarding rescission of arrears at para.22 as follows:
 The finding of a present incapacity to pay does not, of itself, foreclose the prospect of ability to pay in the future.
There is no evidence before me, however, that he will not be able to pay the arrears at some point in the future.
Marar v. Marar, 2004 CanLII 15749 (ON S.C.)
FAIK MARAR ) Un-represented – No one appearing
 Following the commencement of this action there have been innumerable interim and permanent orders directed by this court, concerning these parties.
 The most relevant of those orders relate to:
(1) An interim order giving the wife exclusive possession of the matrimonial home as of July 2003;
(2) An interim order of spousal support (to the wife) of $1,000 per month commencing May 21, 2003;
(3) An order that the defendant husband pay all support arrears by December 27, 2003.
This last order was issued on November 26, 2003, for which failure to pay all support arrears, the defendant’s pleadings are to be struck.
 By order of Justice Quinn dated January 12, 2004, the defendant’s pleadings were struck due to his failure to comply with the order of November 26, 2003. What resulted is that this matter has now proceeded as an undefended action.
Glomba v. Wray, 2003 CanLII 1960 (ON S.C.)
The Applicant, in person
The Respondent, not appearing in
 This case presents yet another example of the injustices that can occur when matters proceed in two different provinces under reciprocal legislation. Obviously the difficulty is that one judge hears the evidence and argument of one party and another hears the evidence and argument of the opposing party.
 With respect to the matter of the Respondent's alleged claim of hardship I respectfully suggest that the reciprocating court ignored my decision and failed to consider the evidence and the law
A payor cannot frustrate his child support responsibilities by significantly increasing his debt load
 There is no doubt that the Respondent has a legal duty to support his current spouse and their two children
 My final gratuitous comments relate to the agreement entered into between the parties. The unsworn statement of the Applicant is to the effect that the agreement was entered into between the parties after Mr. Wray received notice that I had made an order for $466.25 per month for child support. The Respondent was unhappy with my order and negotiated a lower amount with the Applicant.
In my opinion, the agreement is not binding on the Applicant.
Colafranceschi v. Colafranceschi, 2005 CanLII 10646 (ON S.C.)
DOMINIC COLAFRANCESCHI ) In person
 Heeney J. was scathing in his assessment of Mr. Colafranceschi’s credibility. I also found difficulty in believing much of what he had to say.
He was very upset that Ms. Colafranceschi ended up with three-quarters of the parties’ assets
It is important to note that Ms. Colafranceschi ended up with more of the parties’ assets because she was entitled to lump sum spousal support and costs
Ficca v. Ficca, 2004 CanLII 6226 (ON S.C.)
Claudio Ficca, unrepresented
 After many months of fruitless attempts to obtain more access to his children more to his liking, Mr. Ficca terminated his professional relationship with his former lawyer on July 5, 2004. That day on his own, he instigated a motion to change, with the “assistance” of his present partner/fiancée, Jean MacDuff. Herein lies the problem…neither Mr. Ficca nor Mr. MacDuff is a lawyer, and, as is evidenced by how matters have proceeded thereafter, proves the adage regarding being “one’s own lawyer” and “a little knowledge being a dangerous thing”.
 Mr. Ficca’s motion seeks certain “fine tuning” of existing temporary orders. But, in hindsight, he lost sight of (and never actually claimed, what was apparently very important to him; namely re-instating his Sunday overnight access, removed by Rady J. in October 2003).
P.L.M. v. L.J., 2008 CanLII 35923 (ON S.C.)
L.J. Self Represented
Added Party Respondent
B.D1 Iain D.D. Sneddon, for the added party Respondent
 As a result of my analysis and findings, I make the following order:
1. Custody of the children, S.L.M., born […] 5, 1995, and E.A.M., born […] 22, 1999, shall be with the father, P.L.M
2. There shall be no access to the mother, L.J..
 It is ordered that L.J. pay to P.L.M. commencing August 1, 2008, for support of the two children, the sum of $807 per month based on an annual income of $53,621.18.
D .K. v. D. K, 2003 CanLII 2365 (ON S.C.)
D.K. ) Self-represented
D.K. ) Michael R. Nyhof, for the Respondent
 This is a motion brought by the Respondent, (hereinafter referred to as the father), for a contempt order for denial of access by the Applicant, (hereinafter referred to as the mother), including refusing to abide by an order for counseling for the children as ordered by this court.
 This is a very sad case. The father has not seen his son R. since 1998 when R. told him he no longer wanted to have anything to do with him. On her 12th birthday, J. advised her father by letter that she too no longer wanted to see him. And now as of March of this year K., according to her mother, no longer wants to see her father.
 Regular access for the father was granted only after arguing for access in the courts. The mother objected to the father being able to have access to his children.
 As of March 1st, 1998, (3 days after the
divorce judgment is granted), the mother moves with the children from
The father brought his first motion for contempt before Justice Desotti on April 8th, 1998
 Yet again, a further denial of access occurred which led to another motion for contempt which Justice Desotti dealt with on June 24th, 1998 by providing the father with a makeup visit.
 When the mother left the office she saw K. in the corridor and grabbed her by the arm and led her out of the school and into her car. K.’s absence was seen immediately but the mother was already gone.
 K. has been in the mother’s care since that day and the father has not seen his daughter since March 28th, 2003.
I find that no contempt order is warranted
1. The Respondent, father, shall have custody of the child K. K. born July 7th, 1992
K. M. O. v. L. O., 2004 CanLII 2544 (ON S.C.)
Dr. L. O., the Respondent, personally (“Husband”)
 Unfortunately, her relationship with her father has broken down.
In any event, their relationship deteriorated further after
the separation. While they went to
 The Husband has submitted that his income is only sufficient to cover his expenses, and he cannot afford to liquidate any capital since he has to provide for his own retirement. In that regard, I observe that if he had to pay the table amount of child support based on the net income numbers arrived at above, the total amount payable over two years would have been almost $16,000. Under the Guidelines, he is effectively deemed to be able to afford to pay that much support for one child. The support he is being ordered to pay here does not represent a significant increase from that amount.
 Accordingly, it is ordered that the Husband shall pay to the Wife, as a retroactive s. 7 contribution toward the educational costs of the child K. relating to the 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 school years, the sum of $22,800.
Weiler v. Phifer, 2007 CanLII 9240 (ON S.C.)
Harold Charles Phifer in person
The separation was precipitated by Ms. Weiler, who found that she could no longer live with Mr. Phifer due to his unsupportive, narcissistic, and egocentric behaviours.
 Ms. Weiler alleges an incident when Mr. Phifer returned the girls early (towards the end of one of his parenting/access times), he became enraged when she did not answer the door and he kicked in her front door.
 Ms. Weiler alleges, however, that during that four years Mr. Phifer’s behaviour towards her became more and more demanding, “volatile and abuse (sic) toward me.”
 The parties disagree significantly with what transpired
over the next six month period. Mr. Phifer alleges that Ms. Weiler “disappeared
with the girls.” It has been his position throughout that she “abducted” the
 Ms. Weiler takes no exception to the nature and
frequency of the access being proposed. She strongly objects to that access
occurring in the
 Unlike Ms. DeVeto, I am of the view that Ms. Weiler has good reason for those concerns, since at every opportunity Mr. Phifer strongly and vociferously reiterates his view that the girls really want to live in the United States and should be entitled to make that decision on their own (presumably after he has had an extended and concerted opportunity to importune them during one of his extended access periods).
 However, when addressing or responding to either Ms. Weiler or her female counsel, he quickly escalated his behaviour, his statements and his renditions of the facts. He became loud and excited/excitable, unfocused and (the transcripts will show) his answers to simple questions became rambling diatribes that included street/gutter epithets and foul language, which evidenced an extremely derogatory opinion of Ms. Weiler, her counsel, and the female staff in her office that was startling.
 He constantly referred to Ms. Weiler as “that/this” woman and he wove a web of self-justification or minimization of his behaviour toward Ms. Weiler and the children that was fascinating to watch. He displayed a mesmerizing ability to spin his views into an oddly enticing story that evoked in the listener a sympathy for him in his self-constructed role of victim of Ms. Weiler’s designs, demands, and strategies
Most litigants attempt to show the court their “best side.” This did not seem to occur to Mr. Phifer. He seemed to perceive the trial hearing as a type of “performance” that one might see on t.v..
 I further accept Ms. Weiler’s evidence that Mr. Phifer also used to call her aged mother and also “leaves unpleasant messages on her machine.”
He further stated that he will do everything in his power to get the children back to Texas where they belong and that if the applicant dared to attempt to enter the United States, he would do everything possible to have her jailed.”
It is only Ms. Plain’s opinion, but having received “numerous telephone calls” from Mr. Phifer, her view of Mr. Phifer is that “He is unreceptive to anything which is said and refuses to listen. Instead, he simply vents about things not going his way.” I have no evidence or confidence that Mr. Phifer’s strong views or demeanour has changed since then
 I therefore conclude that Mr. Phifer should be allowed
to enjoy the access that he seeks, but only within the
Attwood v. Sharma, 2000 CanLII 22567 (ON S.C.)
William Alfred Attwood for himself.
 At the end of the applicant’s case, the respondent moved for a summary judgment on the evidence then before the court, based upon Rules 16(12) and 2(3). She seeks to rely upon the evidence called by the applicant as the evidence upon which the court should grant her (a) a dismissal of the applicant’s claims; (b) an order for custody of the child of their relationship, William Sharma Attwood, born December 27, 1995; (c) an order for specified access; (d) an order for child support of $217 per month (based on an income of $23,500); and (e) a restraining order that the applicant have no direct contact with her
 After a day-and-a-half of evidence from eight witnesses; documentary evidence from the local police of the applicant’s criminal record (Exhibit 4); several threatening letters written to the respondent by the applicant, and the demeanour of the applicant in court, it is evident why the respondent ensured that there was a visible police presence in the courtroom at all times. The applicant fluctuated from rude obnoxiousness and petulant complaint to loud aggressiveness. At times he paced throughout the courtroom and repeatedly showed an inability to control not only the nature of his comments, but the volume and aggressiveness thereof.
The applicant is also accused (although he explains it as mere coincidence) of stalking the respondent, her current boyfriend and another individual who swore an affidavit supportive of the respondent in earlier court proceedings.
As he declared in one of his rants, If I don’t win custody, I’ll appeal”.
Mr. Attwood is extremely egocentric, narcissisic, and misogynistic. He seems not to be able to consider anyone but himself and his own needs, desires and whims
When their evidence was not supportive of his position, he called them liars, friends of the respondent’s lawyer and alleged that they were part of a conspiracy to not only discredit him, but to hide and fabricate evidence and perjure themselves. His paranoia knows no bounds.
After 30 years in family law, this applicant is one of the most frightening litigants that I have had the experience of observing.
 Rule 16 is obviously intended to be invoked prior to a trial being commenced. However, in an effort to avoid the misuse of judicial and court resources, when it is read in conjunction with Rules 2(3)(b), (c) and (d) (together with the inherent jurisdiction of any trier of fact), it invites a court to intervene to shorten any proceeding that is vexatious, abusive, without merit, or a waste of limited resources. This motion for judgment at the end of the applicant’s case, similar to a non-suit in criminal proceedings, is both appropriate and timely.
 Sufficient evidence has been led through the applicant and his witnesses to make it extremely obvious that his claim for custody has no merit and absolutely no possibility of succeeding.
 After considering all of section 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, (and especially subsection (3)), the evidence and the demeanour of the applicant also clearly requires that an order be granted that there shall be no contact or access between the applicant and his son. I am convinced that young William would not only not benefit from any contact with his father, but further contact between them would be dangerous to the child’s physical health, emotional stability and healthy psychological growth.
Vandenelsen v. Merkley, 2003 CanLII 1965 (ON S.C.)
CARLINE ANTONIA VANDENELSEN ) The Applicant, on her own behalf
The single exception is the disposition on one of the findings of contempt against Ms. VandenElsen which has been adjourned until after the appeal in the criminal case, and which Justice Desotti will have to deal with himself.
Domise v. Oyadiran, 2006 CanLII 2614 (ON S.C.)
ANGELLA DOMISE ) Self-represented
I have reviewed the financial circumstances of Ms. Domise and it appears to me that she would be unable to pay any order of costs that might be made by me. I am proposing to the parties that in the place of a costs order, I make an order requiring Ms. Domise to obtain leave of this court before commencing any further application under the Divorce Act or the Family Law Act against Dr. Oyadiran
Madruga v. Madruga, 2007 CanLII 51166 (ON S.C.)
Mr. Madruga, self-represented
 Presently all three children live with the applicant their mother.
 The respondent declared bankruptcy in June of 2006
 There is no matrimonial home to dispose of., … , It has been lost to the bank presumably by power of sale
Mr. Madruga therefore owes Ms. Madruga for child support from the date of separation $20,171.69
Barta v. Barta, 2005 CanLII 468 (ON S.C.)
JOSEPH SCOTT BARTA ) Self Represented
In March of 2002 his employment was terminated by TD Canada Trust and he has been looking for full time employment since that date
 I am satisfied that the applicant who has a university degree in mathematics is under employed.
It is apparent that the applicant's efforts to start his own business have failed and by refusing to seek full time employment in the fields in which he has experience he has failed to act reasonably
 As a result of the foregoing, I am not prepared to vary the child support as requested by the applicant.
Stoangi v. Petersen, 2006 CanLII 24124 (ON S.C.)
Dr. Erin Johnson in person
In April, 2005, she engineered a very advantageous change to her work conditions which allowed her to spend at least nine days at the farm out of every three weeks and her complaints about missing her family sound hollow because of that, especially since she admitted that she really spent little time with her sons A.J. and Jeff – which she blamed on their being “very busy” – when she was home.
 When a non-custodial parent intentionally leaves secure employment knowing that she has young children to support, the policy basis of the Guidelines – that a paying parent must generate income according to capacity – is frustrated:
Commencing January 1, 2005, her responsibility to pay support increases to $846, based on an imputed continuation of her $62,000 income throughout that year
Raphael v. Raphael, 2003 CanLII 2215 (ON S.C.)
Robert Benjamin Raphael ) In person
Justice E. Loukidelis
 Mr. Raphael states he only has one employment prospect as an investment salesman earning some $25,000.00-$30,000.00 over the first year.
 I am satisfied on all the evidence that he is purposely “holding back” to present his financial position to the court in the poorest light.
 I am satisfied on all the evidence that an imputed income to Mr. Raphael of $150,000.00 gross, is reasonable
 The child support payments based on the guidelines shall therefore be $1,761.00 net of tax effective June 1, 2003.
 The section 7 add on expenses for summer camp, orthodontic work and synagogue school total $$11,554.00 per annum. I would fix the respondent’s share at 90% of that total which amounts to approximately $875.00 per month commencing January 1, 2004
 I would assess monthly spousal support at $2,500.00 per month commencing July 1, 2003, to and including May 1, 2006 when it shall be reviewed. There is in existence 2 interim support orders which are already seriously in arrears
Sharpe v. Waterhouse, 2005 CanLII
 Prior to the hearing date of this appeal, Mr. Sharpe's request for an adjournment of the appeal was refused. When he did not appear, we directed court staff to telephone him to confirm that he was aware that the appeal was being heard.
 Following commencement of default proceedings by the Family Responsibility Office, Mr. Sharpe brought a motion in the Superior Court for an order reducing arrears of child support to reflect payments made to Ms. Waterhouse directly. On November 18, 2002, the issue raised by Mr. Sharpe was set for trial at the March 31, 2003 sittings of the Superior Court, at Bracebridge. Ms. Waterhouse did not attend the trial. She now appeals from the order reducing support arrears to zero
(a) Ms. Waterhouse was not represented by counsel on Mr. Sharpe's motion
(d) as the result of the trial judge's decision, the District of Muskoka is requiring that Ms. Waterhouse re-pay the sum of $111,047.76 paid to her under the Family Benefits Act, the General Welfare Assistance Act and the Ontario Works Act on the basis that Ms. Waterhouse failed to declare support income while in receipt of assistance
(e) Ms. Waterhouse has been charged with welfare fraud
Shaw-McInnis v. Crawford, 2003 CanLII 2241 (ON S.C.)
PETER PHILIP CRAWFORD ) Personally
Psychiatric evidence filed also suggested he’d suffered an emotional breakdown as a result of the separation.
 As a result of the turmoil in his life, the husband
declared bankruptcy in
During his extended unemployment in 1997 and 1998, he received welfare, E.I. benefits and the charity of friends. In 2002 he found employment in Sault Ste. Marie as sales manager for J.F. Fitzpatrick Industries Inc
The husband’s claim for variation of support retroactively to the period prior to May 1, 1997 is denied.
Beaudry v. Beaudry, 2004 CanLII 20399 (ON S.C.)
Gerard Beaudry, representing himself
 The division of the family’s assets and the provision of child and spousal support are more complex than usual for two reasons:
a) the husband has been off work for eight months, without income for four months
 He testified that he was depressed and emotional about the serious financial pressures placed on him as a result of the separation and that this affected his performance at work. His employer became concerned for his safety and that of his co-workers. He was therefore transferred from shift work to steady days where he could be more easily supervised. Unfortunately, that created even more financial problems for him: on shift work he could work 50 to 60 hours a week but on day shift he could work only 40 hours a week. In September his employer sent him to the company doctor who recommended that the husband take a break from work. He continued to receive a salary of $9,437 while on stress leave for 17 weeks.
 The husband has been deliberately underemployed. A brief stress leave absence from work may have been justified but not a prolonged absence extending beyond eight months. For the purposes of calculating his spousal support obligation his 2003 income shall be imputed to be $79,000
For the purpose of calculating his 2004 spousal support obligation his 2004 income is therefore imputed at $83,000.
His arrears of child support are therefore fixed at $2,700
The husband has already paid $11,086 in spousal support. The lump sum due at this time is therefore $7,314
 The equalization payment due by the husband to the wife to equalize their net family property as at January 1, 2001 is $16,371
 In the usual case the equalization payment would be reduced by the other spouse’s share of the joint obligations assumed by the payor spouse, … , No such reduction will be made in this case, given that the debts run up by him have jeopardized the wife’s credit and may very well lead her to be involved in litigation or to file for bankruptcy.
 Judgement is to issue as follows:
the immediate transfer to her of the balance of the RRSPs discounted by 20% of their face value on a tax-free spousal rollover basis
the immediate payment to her of the husband’s share of the net proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial home
granting her a lien on the 1979 Harley for the balance repayable together with interest calculated at the rate of 4% per annum on the balance outstanding from time to time at the rate of $100 a month
$15,000 for costs, inclusive of disbursements and gst, repayable together with interest at 4% per annum on the balance outstanding from time to time at the rate of $100 a month on the first day of each month commencing on September 1, 2004
Lepine v. Lepine, 2007 CanLII 43741 (ON S.C.)
At the time the motion was heard, Mr. Lepine was not represented by counsel.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge awarded interim support to Mrs. Lepine in the amount of $1,000 per month for six months, moving to $1,500 per month until 2008.
 Mr. Lepine now asks this court to set aside the order for interim support
 In submissions, counsel for Mrs. Lepine advised the Court in March 2007 that her income was $14.51 per hour for 45 hours per month, for an approximate per annum income of $8000
 After the hearing of the motions, Mrs. Lepine filed her Tax Return and Assessment for 2006 which showed income of $18,912.00
 Self represented litigants pose particular challenges to the justice system and to all of those who are involved in the particular case.
In a busy motions court, a self-represented litigant could be at a disadvantage
 This motion is dismissed.
O'Neill v. O'Neill, 2004 CanLII 8369 (ON S.C.)
No one appearing for the Respondent
I impute for the year 2002 an income of $68, 545. Based on that amount, the Alberta Guidelines require a payment of $578 monthly for one child and $932 for the two children.
Accordingly, for those four months the Respondent shall pay $932 monthly for a total of $3,728
 The Respondent shall be responsible for 77% of those expenses or $3,850 yearly
This amount has been paid by the Petitioner and accordingly an Order is to issue for payment of $1,695
 The above Interim Orders are made pursuant to s. 19(7) and 19 (9) of the Divorce Act
Levesque v. Little, 2007 CanLII 1910 (ON S.C.)
TERESA LITTLE ( Self-Represented
As I stated in my Reasons for Judgment Ms. Little is quite angry and hurt over the separation. Her position became intransigent.
In my view Ms. Little frustrated any discussions that might have led to a resolution of their differences. Without consequences litigants will not have any deterrence and continue with untenable positions
 I am also concerned about Ms. Little's ability to pay. She is unemployed and most of the matrimonial assets have been dissipated because of this litigation.
 Keeping these factors in mind I award Mr. Levesque costs in the sum of $27,500 inclusive of G.S.T. and disbursements
Perkins v. Perkins, 2007 CanLII 56508 (ON S.C.)
FREDERICK PERKINS ) Self represented
33] The Husband continues to be unemployed and relies on the financial aid of family members, particularly his father.
 The Husband advised the court that he will no longer be attending for access at the Supervised Access Center, as he finds the facility and the rules uncomfortable and not conducive to open and healthy contact between himself and his son. In addition, the cost is prohibitive.
 To minimize any stress or anxiety on Bradley, the following access regime should be followed:
(a) for the next three months, that is, December, January, and February, the Husband shall be entitled to exercise access to Bradley at the Supervised Access Centre, every third Saturday, for two hours.
(b) For the following three months, that is, March, April, and May 2008, the Husband shall be entitled to exercise unsupervised access to Bradley, every third Saturday, for a five hour period, during which the child shall not be removed from the Districts of Sudbury and Nipissing.
(c) Commencing June, 2008, the Husband shall be entitled to unsupervised access to Bradley one weekend per month, from Friday after school until 8:00 pm. on Sunday
 The evidence leads me to conclude that the Husband has not, at least until recently, made significant efforts to secure employment. Thus, he has been intentionally unemployed, or under-employed
 I conclude that it is appropriate to impute income to the Husband as requested by the Wife
The Respondent shall
post a bond, without sureties, in the amount of $10,000, which will escheat to
the Crown in the Right of Ontario, in the event that the child is unilaterally
The Respondent shall, at the commencement of each period of
unsupervised access, deposit his passport and any other travel documents at the
detachment of the Ontario Provincial Police, in
The Respondent shall, once he begins exercising unsupervised access, advise the Wife in writing of where he will be exercising access
The quantum of child support is in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines and is based on imputed annual income of $36,000
Harris v. Harris, 2006 CanLII 9141 (ON S.C.)
WALTER HARRIS ) Self-represented
 After the separation, the Husband moved into, and he continues to reside at the couple’s rental property. Although he was successfully self-employed as a photographer since 1982, it appears that he has not been working for some time due to stress. He has had some financial difficulties as a result of not working. He is in arrears of child support. His driver’s license has been suspended by action of the Family Responsibility Office
 There have been some forty court appearances in this case and upwards of twenty five Orders made, prior to the trial. It is necessary to review some of those Orders
 The parties were ordered to not dissipate any assets under their control. As well, the Husband was to pay to the Wife a lump sum of $1,500 as support
As well, the Husband was to pay interim child support of $748 monthly, based on an income of $40,000 per year, and interim spousal support of $500 per month
Yet, the Husband did not make arrangements to have access at the Supervised Access Centre, after it was ordered, stating that neither he nor his children wanted to have access at that location. The result was that, for the period between October 31st and Christmas, the children did not see their father.
 Another major contra-indicator of joint custody is the Husband’s attitude toward the Wife. He is disrespectful of her. He undermines her parenting and her authority, and he does this in a flagrant manner. He is not only critical of her, but accuses her of abusing the children, ruining their lives and his, and for causing him financial ruin
 Likewise, I must conclude that the children’s lawyer was satisfied, on March 3rd that the resumption of unsupervised access posed no risk to the children.
 To, on March 7th, take the position that indeed a psychiatric report is required prior to the Husband exercising unsupervised access, appears somewhat gratuitous.
The Husband shall pay to the Wife the sum of $390 per month for the support of the children, effective January 1, 2005. This amount is based on the Child Support Guidelines and on an annual income imputed to the Husband, in the amount of $20,000
Mgrdichian v. Mgrdichian, 2006 CanLII 13773 (ON S.C.)
No one appeared for the Applicant
 The wife states that the husband was a controlling man. He was sometimes violent and mean to the wife. She was afraid of him
 The husband then brought an ex parte motion before this
court, falsely alleging that he and his wife had been separated since 2002;
that the wife went to
 On the basis of sworn false affidavit evidence, the husband obtained a court order evicting the wife. The wife was then left with no accommodation, no income and with no real ability to communicate in the English language
 I am satisfied that the husband has fraudulently tried to divest himself of his assets in contemplation of these family law proceedings. The husband’s actions were clearly for the purpose of defeating the wife’s claim to one-half the net family property. The husband’s actions have the following “badges of fraud” consistent with the intent to “defeat, burden, delay or defraud” the wife:
 On March 10, 2005, the husband was found to be in contempt of the court order requiring him to disclose. He was given 10 days to complete all outstanding disclosure.
 On March 31, 2005, the husband was committed to jail for his failure to disclose as required by court order. His application was also dismissed.
 The husband created a web of deceit and falsehood which would have been revealed with appropriate disclosure. As a result, he chose not to disclose, thereby maintaining a position which has been shown to be untrue in any event
He was left in the financial situation where he could claim he had nothing left;
 It is to be noted that disclosure was sought from the Added Parties, who are primarily the husband’s brothers. Court orders were obtained to compel them to provide the requested disclosure but they too would not comply with the court orders. As a result, the pleadings of the Added Parties were also struck.
 The wife requests an order granting her custody of the child, Sarah born June 6, 1991. I am satisfied it is in Sarah’s best interest that she continue to reside with her mother. It is ordered that the wife shall have custody of Sarah.
 I, therefore, find that the total net family property of the parties which existed on valuation day (August 30, 2004) had a value of $4,359,408.00. It is ordered that the wife’s claim for equalization be and is hereby fixed at $2,179,104.00, together with interest to date in the amount of $98,059.68, for a total of $2,277,164.00
 On November 16, 2004, the husband was ordered to pay a lump sum of $10,000.00 forthwith and thereafter $3,000.00 per month. The husband ignored the court order. He has paid nothing to the wife
 Having regard to the wife’s needs as set out in her Proposed Budget, the income she should earn upon receiving the equalization payment, the needs of the children and the husband’s means, it is appropriate that the sum of $6,000.00 per month, net of taxes be paid to the wife for spousal support.
 It is also appropriate that the husband pay child support at the rate of $1,500.00 per month until July 2014, and $50,000.00 in special expenses for tuition for private and post secondary schools. A lump sum of $150,000.00 reflects the present value of this periodic child support.
 It will, therefore, be ordered that the husband pay to the wife lump sum spousal support and child support fixed at $2,400,000.00
However, as a result of the husband’s bankruptcy and pursuant to the Order of Registrar Sproat under section 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S. 1985, c. B-3 (the “Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act”), the wife is the sole owner of the shares of Haig II and the sole holder of all shareholders loans owning by Haig II.
However, as a result of the husband’s bankruptcy, and pursuant to the order of Registrar Sproat under section 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the wife is the beneficial owner of one-half of the shares of 637263 Ontario Limited carrying on business as Esquire Grill, and Berg holds in trust for her one-half of any interest, investment or shareholder loan held by him in the said corporation.
 It is further ordered and declared that the arrears of support owing by the husband as at the date of bankruptcy (January 13, 2005) are fixed at $46,187.00. Since the date of his bankruptcy, further arrears of $45,000.00 have accrued, for a total outstanding of $91,187.00 plus interest of $3,351.45 to date, for a total of $94,538.95.
 It is also ordered and declared that the unpaid cost order to date total $84,660.11 owing by the husband, and $15,936.23 owing by Berg, both inclusive of interest, and the total unpaid penalties for contempt ordered to date against the husband is $26,060.27 inclusive of interest.
 It is ordered that Berg repay to Haig II the sum of $80,000.00, being the amounts drawn by him immediately prior to the appointment of the Receiver.
 It is ordered that the husband and Berg are jointly and severally liable to the wife for damages for fraud and conspiracy to defraud, fixed at $40,000.00, together with punitive damages fixed at $25,000.00.
 It is also ordered that the husband and Berg be and are jointly and severally liable for all of the fees, costs, and disbursements of the Receiver, as may be approved by the Court.
58] It is ordered that the husband be restrained from annoying, harassing or molesting the wife
61] Approval of draft Judgment as to form and content is dispensed with.
 This order bears interest at the rate of 5 percent per year from its date
v. Tremblay, 1999 CanLII 3748 (ON
Ronald Arthur Tremblay, the respondent in person
On January 3, 1994, after a marriage of approximately
17 years, the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her
husband. On the same date, she commenced an action for damages
for personal injuries arising out of alleged physical and mental
abuse. The husband made an assignment in bankruptcy in June
1996. Loukidelis J. found that he did so in order to avoid
paying his wife’s claim for damages which was in the amount of
ROLAND AUBE ) Respondent self-represented
 Unfortunately, as so often occurs after a separation, the parties’ emotions seem to have gotten the better of their common sense. The conduct of the parties through this long and tortuous litigation has resulted in the bankruptcy of the Husband. The Wife has been required to exist for the most part on a minimum wage income. As it stands today, the bulk of the property which existed at separation, and for which they worked so hard, has been lost to power of sale proceedings
13] On June 3, 1999, Justice Poupore made an order of non-dissipation of assets
 On April 6, 2000, Justice Whalen made an order that the Husband not molest, harass or annoy the Wife
 On April 20, 2000, Justice Riopelle made a temporary order that provided, among other things, that the Husband was to pay child support of $91 per month and spousal support of $2,500 per month, both commencing May 1, 2000, … , Costs were also ordered against the Husband in the amount of $1,500
 On July 4, 2001, the Applicant argued a motion asking that the Husband’s pleading be struck. Although Justice Gauthier found that the Wife had sufficient factual and legal basis to have brought the motion, she did not grant the relief. She subsequently ordered the Respondent to pay $6,000 in costs relative to this motion
 Also on July 4, 2001, Justice Gauthier entertained a motion by the Respondent to decrease the support ordered by Justice Riopelle. That motion was adjourned with a costs award of $2,000 against the Respondent
 From the above summary, it is apparent that the Husband has thus far met with little success in his litigation efforts.
 Mr. Aube filed his 2007 Income Tax Summary which indicates his total income to have been $9,092.09 and his taxable income to have been $6,998.31.
 To be sure, Mr. Aube’s conduct throughout this litigation and his separation from Mrs. Aube has been unfortunate. His early attempt at fraud upon his spouse and the court makes it difficult to give him the benefit of the doubt when questions arise relative to his evidence. However, it was clear to me from the evidence that I heard, that Mr. Aube has been accused of certain things, and that orders have been made against him, on the basis of allegations which are untrue, and that such orders have resulted in significant hardships for him.
 I therefore find that the Husband has an annual income of $36,732 and would have enjoyed income of this amount since his eligibility for CPP and OAS when he turned 65 on July 19, 2007.
On a go-forward basis, the support obligation of the Husband would be $1,400 per month.
 In all of the circumstances, it is reasonable to provide for the award of pre-trial and post-trial support of the Applicant in two ways:
1. By vesting in her name, the property at
2. Imposing upon the Husband the obligation, during his
lifetime and for so long as the Applicant resides at the apartment currently
occupied by her at
Goudie v. Stapleford, 2004 CanLII 20297 (ON S.C.)
DAVID RALPH STAPLEFORD ) In person, for the Respondent
 The Petitioner sues for a divorce and spousal support. The Respondent argues that he should not be required to pay spousal support on three grounds,
a) the Petitioner does not need it;
b) he cannot afford to pay spousal support;
c) the Petitioner signed an agreement giving up any claim to spousal support
 The wife’s signature to the separation agreement was not witnessed. According to s. 55(1) of the Family Law Act, it is unenforceable.
It would seem unjust to hold her to the agreement in these circumstances
 Some eight years have passed since separation.
28] Respondent to pay spousal support of $500.00 per month commencing April 1, 2004 for 48 months
Shelly v. Shelly, 2004 CanLII 5083 (ON S.C.)
G. Shelly, in person
 When the wife brought a motion for interim child support, the husband quit his job as a city councillor, … , He had threatened his wife to quit his job to avoid paying child support
 On August 22, 2002 an order was made requiring the husband to pay child support of $468.00 per month commencing September 1, 2002 based on an annual income imputed to him of $32,000.00. The husband has not paid a dime of the support ordered.
 The husband now claims that he works as assistant manager in a store owned by his girlfriend, with whom he resides. He says he earned $12,600 in 2003 for this work, and produced a T4 slip purporting to verify that amount.
In any event, I am not persuaded that he has made reasonable
efforts to secure employment suitable for his experience and qualifications in
 Based on his earnings history, I find that the husband could earn $30,000 if he chose to do so and impute that amount of income to him. I see no reason to vary the arrears which have accumulated.
Léveillé v. Lemieux, 2002 CanLII 2694 (ON S.C.)
JACQUES LÉVEILLÉ ) In person
In 2001 he decided to take a leave of absence from teaching, and establish a new convenience store. His most recent financial statement for the six months ending June 30, 2002 showed a loss of $6,582.46.
 In this case, I conclude that the father did not act in good faith when he took a leave of absence from his teaching position.
His debts exceed his assets and there is nothing to be gained by holding onto the property. He embarked on this business knowing it would likely seriously impair his ability to support his child and with reckless disregard of his parental duty to support his daughter
 The father could earn $60,000 if he returned to teaching. His expressed inability to pay child support results from unreasonable decisions intentionally made, and I conclude that the father is intentionally under-employed within the meaning of s. 19(1)(a) of the Child Support Guidelines and attribute income to him of $60,000 annually
 I estimate that the annual costs to transport the child by plane for access twice a year will be approximately $1,000. With imputed income of $60,000, this should not cause the father undue hardship.
Gauthier v. Gauthier, 2004 CanLII 39943 (ON S.C.)
GILLES GAUTHIER ) Respondent appearing in person
Louise L. Gauthier, S.C.J
Mr. Gauthier did indicate that he is on the verge of bankruptcy. This would be his third.
 It is ordered that the Respondent pay to the Petitioner spousal support in the amount of $950 per month, commencing December 1, 2004, and continuing on the first day of each and every month thereafter
Otis v. Gregoire, 2008 CanLII 50510 (ON S.C.)
PATRICE GREGOIRE ) Self-represented
 Michelle Elizabeth Otis (“the wife”) and Patrice Gregoire (“the husband”)
 At the beginning of the trial, the wife’s counsel objected to the husband’s participation in the trial, even though he was present and ready to proceed. The husband had never filed a response or claim of his own. Nor had he filed a sworn financial statement. This was so even though the requirement was clearly indicated on the Notice of Application served on him. The appropriate blank forms had also been attached to the Notice for his completion. The husband’s explanation was that he had not read or absorbed the meaning of the instruction
 The wife testified that the separation was the result of the husband’s angry and controlling behaviour, with frequent underlying alcohol abuse. She decided that the marriage had become a very unhealthy environment for her and the children.
At the time, the wife and children were in her bed watching television. The husband’s angry, threatening behaviour frightened them, so she called 911, resulting in the husband’s arrest for criminal harassment.
 The charge was ultimately resolved by the husband being placed on a 12-month peace bond, which was entered into on April 22, 2008 with conditions not to communicate with the wife, not to be within 50 meters of her places of residence, education or employment, and not to molest, harass or physically interfere with she or the children.
 The fact of the current recognizance is convincing evidence that the husband was responsible for criminal behaviour sufficient to support the conditions imposed. I accept that responsibility lay with the husband and that the wife had basis to fear for her safety. Such orders are not made lightly or without sufficient evidentiary foundation
 The wife testified that the prohibition against negative comments was made because right after the separation the husband regularly demeaned her when he was alone with the children – for example, calling her “a bitch”, “a thief”, “a whore”, “a lazy ass”, accusing her of keeping them from him, and suggesting that she should marry a wealthy man or get a new job. According to the wife, the children would return home and report these comments to her
 According to
the wife, the combination of the husband’s withdrawal from exercising access,
his continuing negative comments about her to the children and the prolonged
conflict between them had caused the children to oppose further access. The
wife stated that Cassidy was particularly vocal and against seeing her father.
She also insisted that there be a third party to facilitate access in view of the outstanding recognizance and her continuing fears of the husband.
He had left the Sault because his business here had failed, his bank accounts had been seized by federal tax authorities and he had felt oppressed by rumours and the fall-out of his separation.
 The husband wanted to re-establish access and then eventually expand it to include overnights on weekends and a mid-week visit.
 It is clear that the husband’s life is in considerable disorder right now. Although he had his own apartment in the west end of the downtown area of Sault Ste. Marie, he did not tell the court anything about it or whether it could accommodate the children. Because of the current criminal charges, he cannot live there in any event. There was no evidence of how the husband could accommodate the children now
 At the start of the trial, the husband was arrested on two warrants: (1) failing to appear for court on a charge of “blowing over 80”, and; (2) failing to pay $1,874.99 in interim child support arrears “immediately” as ordered in an enforcement proceeding on July 9, 2008, with the result that he was to serve 15 days in jail. The husband remained in police custody until the final day of trial when he was granted bail on conditions, including that he live with his surety, Dana Maynard, at her residence in the east end of the city.
39] The husband is presently unemployed. He has sold his car, so he must rely on someone else for transportation if he is to have access.
 The accountant also testified that the husband owed the government approximately $20,000. in unpaid G.S.T. plus interest and penalties yet to be calculated. He was also in arrears of income tax payments of about $80,000. The accountant confirmed that he had advised the husband to declare personal bankruptcy.
The husband’s annual income for purposes of Guideline child support is therefore imputed to be $46,800.00.
 Based on annual income of $46,800.00 the husband must pay basic Guideline child support of $707.00 per month for the two children of the marriage.
 Based on the foregoing analysis of the parties’ “means” and the husband’s 52% share of their combined “means”, the husband is ordered to pay a further $302.00 per month (.52 x $580.00 per month) for special child care expenses in addition to the $707.00 per month basic Guideline support earlier ordered.
Central East Judicial Region
Ojo v. Ojo, 2005 CanLII 1498 (ON S.C.)
The Applicant Otegbola Ojo - self-represented
Justice G. DiTomaso
 I find that he is under-employed to the detriment of his family
I do not accept Dr. Ojo’s income is currently $150,000.00
 Having determined that Dr. Ojo has the capacity to earn at least $500,000.00 and having decided for reasons stated not to change the income imputed to Dr. Ojo in the amount of $530,400.00, I find the calculation of child support remains the same as ordered by Justice Hatton in the amount of $7,380.00 a month
 Similarly, I am not persuaded by Dr. Ojo to change Justice Hatton’s award in favour of the respondent wife regarding spousal support payable in the amount of $9,000.00 per month.
 I calculate arrears owing for child and spousal support in the amount of $113,609.47 as of December 31, 2004
In fact, he does not believe that there are any such arrears owing and that he has, in fact, overpaid support
 In my view, having outlined the numerous concerns regarding payment of the outstanding arrears, this is an appropriate case for a charging order. Accordingly, a charging order is to issue upon the applicant husband’s properties and his RRSP account to secure accumulated support arrears together with accrued interest from February 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004 as follows:
(d) M.D. Management RRSP No. 55133.100.
 In addition to the charging order, this is an appropriate case for the applicant husband to make a lump sum payment towards the accumulated arrears. I hereby order the applicant husband to pay the lump sum of $25,000.00 to the respondent wife in respect of the accumulated arrears within the next 30 days. The applicant husband shall not be entitled to bring his motion to vary back before the court unless and until said lump sum has been paid.
Ojo v. Ojo, 2005 CanLII 9674 (ON S.C.)
The Applicant Otegbola Ojo - self-represented
 What I can say with some certainty is that Mr. Ojo was not reasonable in bringing his motion when he had not made full disclosure and when he brought his motion to fend off pressure being exerted by the Family Responsibility Office.
 Instead, Mr. Ojo presented a disorganized and deficient argument based on disorganized and deficient materials regarding which he was unsuccessful.
 For the reasons given, I hereby order Mr. Ojo to pay Mrs. Ojo fees in the amount of $40,000 plus GST in the amount of $2,800 together with all disbursements inclusive of GST in the amount of $3,003.04
Pratt v. Pratt, 2003 CanLII 2201 (ON S.C.)
CHARLES PRATT ) On his own behalf
2. I found that the Applicant father does present a risk of such harm to his daughter Charlotte.
6. Although the Respondent mother succeeded in avoiding the
Applicant’s claim for joint custody and unsupervised access, which were the
nominal issues of the trial, she did not succeed in persuading the court that
18. I fix costs at $10,000 payable at a rate of no less than $100.00 per month commencing June 1, 2003. Having set out a payment schedule, I have not made the costs payable “forthwith” but I intend that no application for a variation in access, as contemplated by my judgment, be heard by the court unless the costs are paid up to date
Spring v. Hilderbrandt-Guy, 2003 CanLII 2248 (ON S.C.)
Duty counsel Bruhn, for the Respondent SPRING
 Each of the mothers has brought updated evidence of their own income and claims for extras thereby seeking an increase in ongoing child support.
Because of the garnishment by Inga and a further garnishment for tax arrears accrued when he improperly deducted child support payments, his net income from his pension to live on was $282.45
 His support obligation therefore totals $1000 in June 2003 which leaves him only $398.98 to live. That is obviously very modest.
Millard v. Cargoe, 2004 CanLII 15955 (ON S.C.)
Mr. Cargoe on his own behalf
 The applicant Jeannette Millard moves to vary the order of December 12, 1997 and for the following orders
that the respondent be prohibited from bringing further motions without the court’s permission
 As the respondent has brought forward two proceedings which are marred by his own non-compliance with disclosure and cost orders, and he basically he did not oppose the request under rule 14(21), preferring to rail against the predicament that his own conduct has produced, the order requested under rule 14(21) is granted
 The order may be sent to me for signing without draft approval by the respondent who is not legally represented
Diciaula v. Mastrogiacomo, 2006 CanLII 11928 (ON S.C.D.C.)
 The first endorsement in this file was made on December 21, 2001, providing for temporary access. Within two months thereafter, the first motion to strike the respondent’s pleadings was scheduled, access had been suspended and then ordered to continue only if supervised.
The respondent has from time to time been represented by counsel
 On July 23, 2002, Justice Perkins ordered that the husband’s pleadings were to be struck and that the wife was to proceed to trial based on affidavit evidence alone. The husband moved before Justice Nelson on November 26, 2003, and before Justice MacKInnon on February 8, 2004, to reinstate his pleadings. Justice Nelson refused the request to reinstate pleadings and awarded costs to the wife in the amount of $3,000.00 which have never been paid. Justice MacKinnon dismissed the husband’s motion to reinstate the pleadings but did so without prejudice to his right to reapply once certain conditions had been met. Costs of $1,000.00 were ordered against the husband which have not been paid. A third informal request to reinstate the pleadings was made orally by the husband to Regional Senior Justice Shaughnessy at a trial scheduling court on July 27, 2004, and that request was dismissed by Justice Shaughnessy who was of the opinion that the terms set out in Justice MacKinnon’s order had not been complied with.
 As the respondent continued to be in default and his pleadings had not been reinstated, the applicant was at liberty to move without notice for an uncontested trial. She did so filing a substantial affidavit in Form 23(c) sworn November 19, 2004. The material was put before Justice Wildman on November 25, 2004
 At approximately the same time that Justice Wildman’s
orders were being entered and served, the respondent was bringing yet another
motion to set aside the order striking his pleadings. This motion was brought
on the respondent’s behalf by counsel who had represented him at the
Considering all of the relevant factors, however, we are satisfied that a total award of costs in the amount of $12,500.00 is appropriate and the respondent shall pay to the appellant her costs of the motion for leave to appeal and the appeal fixed in this total amount of $12,500.00, all inclusive. This order for costs shall be enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as an incident of support, and a Support Deduction Order shall issue accordingly.
Fernbach v. Fernbach, 2004 CanLII 14589 (ON S.C.)
LARRY FERNBACH ) In person
 Larry Fernbach moves to stay the final order of Justice Magda dated November 26, 2003 in favour of his wife, Isabelle Fernbach. Magda J. ordered that Mr. Fernbach pay an equalization payment together with spousal support, both ongoing and retroactive, to Mrs. Fernbach. Magda J. also awarded costs against Mr. Fernbach. These orders were made on an uncontested basis.
 Prior to the orders being made, Wood J. had made an order striking Mr. Fernbach’s pleadings. The matter had been called to trial before Wood J. on October 29, 2003 at which time the pleadings were struck out. In addition, Mr. Fernbach was ordered to pay costs.
Mr. Fernbach maintains a mistake has been made with respect to the imputation of his income at $120,000 a year
 Mr. Fernbach’s motion to stay is denied.
 Costs submissions by Isabelle Fernbach are to be made in writing by March 30, 2004
Domb v. Domb, 2002 CanLII 2661 (ON S.C.)
By this point, the father had discharged his counsel and was acting on his own.
Justice Wildman heard it. She found that the award met the conditions of section 50 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, and granted summary judgment in the terms of the award. She also found that the father admitted that he had not made the disclosure required by the order of 12 December 2000. She noted that the order of 10 January 2001 had given him a further 10 days to comply with his obligations, that he still had not done so and that he gave no adequate reason for defaulting in his obligations under the order. She accordingly struck out his answer under subrule 14(23) and directed that the mother could proceed to an uncontested trial for a final order on her outstanding claims, which included child and spousal support.
 In addition to the non-compliance that was before Justice Wildman, there is a new head of non-compliance before me. The $15,000 costs order made by Justice Wildman remains unpaid.
 So on the first branch of the father’s motion, for permission to bring a motion at all, he must fail. There are no grounds for setting aside or modifying Justice Wildman’s order of 31 March 2001 and accordingly the father’s answer remains struck out. Under subrule 10(5), he remains barred from participating in the case in any way
Domb v. Domb, 2002 CanLII 45568 (ON S.C.)
Justice Craig Perkins
 Also significant is the fact that the father has been found repeatedly in violation of orders of the court (some of them consent orders) requiring financial disclosure and requiring him to pay costs. As early as 21 March 2001, Justice Ramona A. Wildman found that he “is clearly the reason that this case has become so costly”. I agree.
 Persistent refusal to make financial disclosure has been found to be “bad faith” within the meaning of subrule 24(8):
 The father has been repeatedly found in breach of his obligations, to the point that Justice Wildman struck out his answer and he has continued to resist without explanation. I found that his motion had no merit and that much of the material filed in support of it was irrelevant and improper.
I award the mother full recovery costs of the motion in the amount of $12,000, including GST
Ho v. Ho, 2003 CanLII (ON S.C.)
Hoi Ming Ho ( aka Michael Ho ) ) Self-represented
 The applicant wife and added respondents appeared in this motion. The respondent husband’s pleadings were struck November 12, 2002 and he is not permitted to take any further steps in this case
 Dr. Michael Ho has not paid his spousal support and a partial equalisation payment. As of the time this court heard the motion herein, he owed just over $2.5 million to the applicant. Although Dr. Ho’s assets were sufficient to cover this debt shortly after the separation, and although there was a preservation order of Justice Perkins dated June 19, 2002, the assets were depleted when the applicant tried to seize them. The assets yielded just over five thousand dollars.
 The applicant wife sought relief ex parte against Dr. Ho, his company, his sisters, Donna and Nancy Ho, NPT and his parents. The applicant alleges that the family has hidden Dr. Ho’s assets to keep her from collecting monies due. Relief was granted in two ex parte orders dated May 14,2003 and May 23,2003 and the family and NPT were served after the appointed receiver was in place.
Romanenko v. Stolarsky, 2005 CanLII 9677 (ON S.C.)
 Before the court is an Uncontested trial by affidavit. The Answer of the respondent was struck February 9, 2005.
 The respondent’s equalization payment of $49,454.02 that will be available to be paid at the time of the sale of the matrimonial home shall be paid directly to the Director of the Family Responsibility Office to retire arrears as set out herein and as security for future payment of support
 The applicant has sworn to a fear of the respondent. However the applicant wishes the respondent to have access to the child as she supports the father and child bond. The court shall therefore grant a general restraining order for one year to allow a period of time for the anger of the respondent to abate
 The respondent shall pay the applicant her costs in the amount of $11,000 inclusive of G.S.T. Of this amount $7000 is for the obtaining of child and spousal support
Shamli v. Shamli, 2004 CanLII 45956 (ON S.C.)
Ali Abdalla Shamli ) In Person
The failure of the respondent to provide the disclosure in the Shamli matter has caused significant prejudice to the applicant.
 It is therefore ordered that:
1. The Answer and Claim of Dr. Shamli are struck,
2. The respondent shall not take any steps in this case,
3. The consent of the respondent for the obtaining of any disclosure is dispensed with and the applicant may deal directly with any third party record holders,
4. The applicant may bring a motion regarding any third party records,
5. The respondent shall pay the applicant her costs for this motion for September 15, 2004 in the amount of $3,000. The costs for the case conference of November 8, 2004 have already been fixed at $3,000. The costs for the balance of the work not already accounted for in the case conference costs for November 8, 2004 are fixed at $1,000.
6. The applicant shall present her evidence for an Uncontested Trial by affidavit initially and shall attend as may be required by the trial judge. As Justice Wildman has been the case management judge and this judicial officer has adjudicated on many of the motions, the trial is to be before Justice Perkins or Justice Nelson
v. Sinclair, 2003 CanLII 57393 (ON
 We are not persuaded in the circumstances of this case that it was improper for Scott J. to preside over the uncontested trial. We note that there was no appeal from the order striking his Answer in this matter, thereby leading to the uncontested trial.
 In our view, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial judge's imputation of $65,000 annual income to the appellant.
 It was within the trial judge's discretion to conclude that a "clean break" was desirable and to award a lump sum spousal support award
Cole v. Cole, 2005 CanLII 44828 (ON S.C.)
The Respondent on her own behalf
I understand that he now seeks retroactivity of child support to September, 2001 based upon her previous income of $42,000.00 as an accountant. I agree with Van Melle, J. that the respondent has been guilty of “some unfortunate decisions” since separation.
I make a specific finding that she prefers to concentrate on her efforts to appear to be a martyr than to recognize her financial obligations to her children.
I am satisfied that all of these circumstances favour an award reflecting retroactivity.
Accordingly, I find that she is really the author of her own misfortune in that regard and it does not mitigate the applicant’s claim
is results in an award to the applicant of $30,396.00 for retroactive child support to November 1, 2005. , … , . In addition, the respondent will continue to pay $596.00 monthly for ongoing child support as of December 1, 2005. A Support Deduction Order will issue.
 The applicant seeks an award of $3,664.90 up to September, 2005 for childcare, dental, school and sports-related expenses. These would appear to fit the criteria of the Guidelines and I see no reason why this award should not be made as it is based on the respondent’s imputed annual income of $42,000.00.
R.J.J. v. K.R.J., 2004 CanLII 34359 (ON S.C.)
K.R.J on his own behalf
 Only the applicant filed material for the motion. The respondent attended and opposed all of the relief sought. Counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer also attended and argued against summary judgment’s being granted with respect to the respondent’s access to his children
 There is a significant history in this file, starting with an ex parte order of Justice Barry G. A. MacDougall of 25 June 2002. That order granted a temporary restraining order against the respondent; gave the applicant custody of the two children of the marriage; namely, K.L.J., born on […] 1988 and N.C.J., born on […] 1991; restricted the respondent’s access to supervised access; gave the applicant exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and other relief.
 The separation occurred when the respondent was arrested for assault. The victim was the applicant. On his guilty plea, the respondent has now been convicted of that offence. The children were going to be called as witnesses at his trial on the assault charge until the respondent decided to plead at the last minute — in his words, to spare them from testifying. He has also since been convicted of a breach of recognizance
In December 2002, criminal charges were laid involving the respondent and members of his family. The respondent was held on those charges. Although he was still incarcerated, the access order was varied such that, upon his release, the respondent would have supervised access at the Durham Supervised Access Centre.
 As far as I can tell, access never occurred at the Durham Supervised Access Centre. The respondent has refused to see his children there and, for their part, the children have likewise declined. They want to see their father in the community, without any restrictions.
 The children are now fifteen and thirteen years of age. They continue to instruct their counsel that they want to see their father in the community. They say that they are not afraid of him. They have more or less refused to go the Durham Supervised Access Centre.
Mindzak v. Turner, 2006 CanLII 9705 (ON S.C.)
John William Turner on his own behalf
ACCESS TO CHILD — Form of order — Supervised access — Grounds — Familiarization between child and access party — Under order made almost 2 years ago, father was to have reasonable and liberal access to daughter but (for reasons not set out by court) he did not exercise it regularly until start of this year — Under that order, next stage of access was dependant upon report from supervised access centre but, because child reacted adversely to access centre, it was never used and no report was ever made
J.P.M.P. v. G.W.F., 2003 CanLII 2337 (ON S.C.)
G.W.F. ) Personally
 In this motion to change, G.W.F. seeks to change the access terms to his daughter, V.A.F., born […], 1998, that were set out in an order made on consent on January 13, 2000. The child’s mother, J.P.M.P. also seeks changes to the existing order.
 The three questions to be answered are:
(a) Should the order remain as one of joint custody or should Ms. J.P.M.P. be awarded sole custody?
(b) Should Mr. G.W.F.’s access coincide with the access that he has to his son from a former relationship, R.F., born […], 1995?
(c) What schedule of access should be put into place for V.A.F.?
 Ms J.P.M.P. was represented by counsel, Ms Valerie Pringle. Being opposed by a party without counsel poses additional challenges for counsel, however Ms Pringle facilitated the presentation of the case, by the witnesses she chose to call and by her willingness to avoid technical objections to the presentation of evidence from Mr. G.W.F..
 Post-separation contact between these parties has been characterized by frequent conflicts. Ms J.P.M.P. obtained a restraining order against Mr. G.W.F. on a motion without notice and that order has now become final. Access exchanges take place at a restaurant. Both parents have made complaints to the police and to the Children’s Aid Society about the other. Mr. G.W.F. wishes expanded access while Ms J.P.M.P. wishes to restrict his access
 Mr. G.W.F., while undoubtedly devoted to his children, is an exceedingly self-centered, stubborn man who has difficulty in communicating with others if they fail to accept his viewpoints.
 Mr. G.W.F. has had a dispute with his siblings and now has lost contact with them even though they live in the same region. He appears to have no contact with neighbours to his farm and few, if any, friends.
 R.F.’s mother, Ms W.B., testified, as did V.A.F.’s mother, Ms J.P.M.P..
Mr. G.W.F.’ lack of communication, his lack of compromise, the fear that Ms J.P.M.P. has of him together with the past violence that has resulted in a restraining order means that an order for joint custody would provide false expectations and create a forum for more conflict.
L.S.M. v. A.M., 2006 CanLII 13413 (ON S.C.)
A.M. ) In person
4] The respondent father wishes an order for joint custody. There is a long history of acrimony between these two parties. The husband was incarcerated in 1998 for an assault on the applicant mother. There have been several instances of police involvement. The Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of York has been involved, noting a concern for domestic discord. From the court’s observations during the trial, the parties still cannot agree on anything, let alone the best interests of the children
6] The father adduced no evidence to substantiate his claim of improper influence by the mother.
7] The father had the oldest daughter, now nineteen, in the courthouse waiting room to testify, much to the dismay of the mother. He did not seem to appreciate how hurtful this would be for the family. Not only would A.E.M. be asked to speak against her mother, but such testimony would ultimately divide the siblings. However, when it became clear that A.E.M. could not add to the evidence already before the court, Mr A.M. did not call her as a witness in deference to the court’s concerns about the hurt that would come from her testifying
9] The father has had an order for alternate weekend access and a mid week visit since the fall of 2003. He does not use this access and has not done anything to correct what he now says is a denial of access. It seems, rather, by his actions, that the father has not been very interested in the children
This court finds the involvement of the father in the younger children’s lives to be minimal by his own doing.
11] There will be an order for sole custody to the mother.
12] The respondent father has been so lackadaisical about access that it seems to give credence to the mother’s accusation that he was and is a drug user
17] The respondent has been unwilling to work to provide for his children. He cannot rely on the July incident to explain his poor provision for his family as he has paid very little of the order made November 28, 2003. Even if his injuries, current or past, are such that he cannot work in a field where there are significant demands for physical labour, he has done nothing about improving himself in any other field.
19] The court shall impute an income to the respondent of $35,000 commencing December 1, 2006. This late date is to accommodate an operation the respondent says he has upcoming in September. In the intervening time he can do what is necessary to improve his skills. Until then the court shall use as his annual income the sum of $24,000
Any proceeds of the sale of the condominium property shall pay off the real estate commission, the mortgage, the outstanding taxes, the outstanding utilities and the legal fees from the sale and shall then be divided into two equal shares. One equal share shall be paid to the applicant. The respondent’s share shall be paid to the Director of the Family Responsibility Office as payment of arrears of child support owing by the respondent father to the applicant mother. If the respondent’s share of the proceeds of sale of the condominium exceed the then arrears, such excess funds shall be held by the Director as security for future child support payments.
Koster v. Koster, 2002 CanLII 2693 (ON S.C.)
No one appearing for the Respondent
 By direction of Timms J. on May 8, 2002, this matter proceeded by default as the Respondent neither appeared nor filed any material though duly served.
 Indeed, the Respondent has previously asserted that he does not stand in loco parentis to the said child.
I find on the evidence before me that in fact the Respondent did stand in loco parentis to Michel
 The issue before me, both in relation to entitlement to child support and also spousal support and equalization, is whether the agreement signed by the parties on their resumption of cohabitation in 1993 governs.
 Moreover the agreement cannot withstand scrutiny and is set aside pursuant to Family Law Act section 56(4).
 Even if I assume some property at marriage deduction that the Respondent has not asserted in these proceedings, the equalization would be $40,886.02. Without that assertion equalization would be more like $125,861.02
 The Applicant estimates the Respondent's income at no less than $100,000 a year
 Guideline table support for 1 child at $100,000 income is $773/month.
 I order that title to the matrimonial home be vested in the Applicant forthwith.
 I fix costs against the Respondent in accordance with the cost memorandum filed at $4,516.03 to August 19, 2002 and $1,150 plus GST for trial preparation and attendance
Chamanlall v. Chamanlall, 2006 CanLII 1916 (ON S.C.)
Chamanlall Chamanlall on his own behalf and noted in default
Justice D. Roger Timms
While it is somewhat arbitrary, given his employment history, I am prepared to assume that he will find a job by the spring. In other words, that he will be working by the beginning of April 2006
Because of the difficulties that the applicant has experienced with the respondent, with respect to child support payments and otherwise, the reminder of his share of the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home are to be held as security (under clause 34(1)(k) of the Family Law Act) until there is no further obligation to pay child support
Ward v. Bates, 2005 CanLII 2947 (ON S.C.)
Respondent (moving party) on his on behalf
 His motion asserted $0 income.
 I have a certain sympathy for the Respondent. It is at least possible that he truly does not earn the $100,000 on which the current order is based.
 I do not accept that an experienced businessman who has been cable of earning $100,000 and acquiring, by his own effort as he proudly asserts, three valuable properties, could not get some sort of job if he chose to do so. He does not have the autonomy to choose not to when he has dependent children.
 I said I have a certain sympathy for the Respondent because it is sad from a human perspective when a person fools himself into thinking he is in the right, comes to court without marshalling the evidence to support his assertions but plaintively reviews the disappointments and frustrations he has experienced and then blames the process and the Applicant for all his troubles. I searched the materials, the submissions and my experience for some realistic strategy to bring the Respondent to his responsibilities in a manner he would accept as a means of breaking the unsatisfying cycle of his difficulties. I could find none
Lalonde v. Lalonde, 2005 CanLII 16637 (ON S.C.)
BOYD H. LALONDE ) Self-Represented
 The applicant father Boyd H. Lalonde seeks joint custody and expanded access regarding the child of the marriage Patrick-Lee Joseph Lalonde (Patrick). He further seeks the rescission of all outstanding child support arrears and that ongoing child support payments be based on Mr. Lalonde’s current zero income.
 Mr. Lalonde is 41 years old living in
 Mrs. Lalonde is 36 years old living in
 Charges were laid against Mr. Lalonde for uttering death threats against Mrs. Lalonde in 1997. At trial, he was found not guilty.
 Mr. Lalonde maintained that Mrs. Lalonde was secretive
about the whereabouts of herself and Patrick thereby denying him access and the
opportunity to have a relationship with his son. Only through one of his family
members was he able to discover that Mrs. Lalonde and Patrick were living in
 In January 2000, Mr. Lalonde moved to B.C. He was being pursued by collection agencies and FRO. According to his evidence, Mr. Lalonde “needed a fresh start”.
 The resolution of joint custody in this case does not depend on what Mr. Lalonde wants or needs. Joint custody is not a pre-emptive measure to secure the perceived rights of one parent over another in contemplation of some future dispute which might never happen. Joint custody is not about Mr. Lalonde’s happiness or unhappiness in being included or excluded from decisions involving Patrick. Joint custody does not revolve around Mr. Lalonde.
 For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss Mr. Lalonde’s claim for joint custody
 From March 7, 2004 until December 2004 (9 months) he was the recipient of Employment Insurance Benefits in the amount of $14,742.00. He took a scuba diver instructor’s course which was completed December 11, 2004. At the time of trial he was unemployed. His employment prospects were undetermined with the prospect of perhaps doing some dive work in July of 2005.
 His employment history shows that he moved from job to
job, especially in
I find the current arrears owed by Mr. Lalonde to Mrs. Lalonde is the sum of $22,067.00 as at the date of trial.
I am not satisfied that there has been any material change in circumstance that would eliminate outstanding child support arrears. I do not accept the reasons given by Mr. Lalonde for eliminating outstanding arrears. Those reasons are not legitimate and are at the very least, self-serving. Child support arrears continue to be outstanding and fixed in the amount of $22,067.00. These arrears are to be paid by Mr. Lalonde. Therefore, his claim to eliminate child support arrears is dismissed.
 I find that Mr. Lalonde is intentionally under-employed or unemployed within the meaning of section 19(1)(a) of the Guidelines.
Mr. Lalonde is capable of earning at least $27,000.00. However, Mr. Lalonde has made the deliberate choice to pursue an occupation with very limited employment prospects while there are many other jobs and careers he could pursue to earn income at this time.
Accordingly, Mr. Lalonde’s monthly child support payment is increased to the sum of $365.00 per month ($240.00 guideline amount plus $125.00 section 7 expense) with payment commencing April 1, 2005
v. Higgins, 2006 CanLII 33303 (ON
Malcolm Higgins in person
 The main issue on appeal is whether Wildman J. erred in imposing the terms set out at paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of an order dated March 22, 2006.
 Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the March 22, 2006 order provide that the appellant's pleadings will be struck unless he pays the following amounts:
i. the ongoing child and spousal support payments of $3813 per month;
ii. a lump sum of $6708 on account of the monthly child support arrears that accrued between February 25, 2005 and March 22, 2006 under the January 25, 2006 order; and
iii. $1000 per month on account of support arrears under the January 25, 2006 order until they are retired.
 Paragraph 5 of the March 22, 2006 order provides that the appellant is not entitled to request a trial date until:
i. he pays the lump sum child support arrears totalling $6708 referred to in para. 3 ii above;
ii. he pays all interim support payments that have accrued subsequent to the January 25, 2006 order, and
iii. he has complied, for a minimum of 3 months, with the terms of para. 4 of the March 22, 2006 order requiring that he pay $3813 per month on account of ongoing child and spousal support plus $1000 on account of support arrears.
 In making the March 22, 2006 order, the motion judge accepted the January motion judge’s finding that income of $100,000 per year should be imputed to the appellant. However, she also recognized that the January 25, 2006 order created substantial arrears and that, because the appellant is an undischarged bankrupt, he “has no property and no ability to borrow institutionally.”
Di Manno v. Di Manno, 2002 CanLII 2673 (ON S.C.)
GIOVANNI DI MANNO ) On his own behalf
I began the hearing by inquiring of the Respondent whether he was content to speak on his own behalf. As he was prepared to do so, the proceeding continued.
The court is very grateful Mr. Chilco's skillful effort to organize the Respondent's presentation but the bottom line is that Mr. DiManno really never bought in to the court process as a means to finalize the matrimonial issues.
This court knows that most of the people who come to us for determination of their domestic disputes are literally suffering. So, when I consider that time was wasted due to the Respondent's lack of meaningful participation, I must remember that the Applicant was also stressed and she was paying her lawyer throughout to obtain information that should reasonably have been forthcoming from the Respondent
I fix costs in favour of the Applicant in the amount of $40,000
Goodfellow v. Goodfellow, 2005 CanLII 4847 (ON S.C.)
Applicant, self represented
 I will start with the mistake submission. The father was asked and stated more than once in his submissions that the mistake arises from the fact that he cannot afford the deal that he made. After signing the agreement in July he looked at the numbers and realized he could not afford the payments. To use his words, if he was to make those payments he will be “wiped out”.
 The father’s motion to vary is dismissed.
Benmergui v. Bitton, 2008 CanLII 11639 (ON S.C.)
NORA RUTH BENMERGUI ) Unrepresented
SHIMON BITTON ) Unrepresented
JUSTICE RAMONA A. WILDMAN
Both often broke down in tears, sometimes sobbing so much they could not carry on. Mr. Bitton twice made references to being so distraught that he might kill himself during the trial;
 The “justice” this court will be able to deliver is likely to fall far short of what they crave. I will never be able to right all their perceived wrongs and I doubt that I can do anything to address the stress from which they are obviously suffering as a result of their difficult and angry relationship. I urge each of them to consider getting counselling, as this judgment alone is unlikely to give either of them the peace they need to move forward with their life.
 Given the understandable difficulties each of them faced as self-represented litigants, it is not an easy task to determine the correct answer to the legal questions before me. Both of the parties had trouble focusing on the legal issues and the necessity for providing an evidentiary basis for my decision. It was not an option to adjourn for more or better evidence. Neither of these parties intends to retain a lawyer. Legal Aid is not available to either of them for this case. Both are so stressed by this trial that they want an end to these legal proceedings
 It is interesting that there does not seem to be any benefit, other than a right of unspecified access to his children, provided to Mr. Bitton in this agreement. , … , It is an entirely one-sided agreement, drawn up by Ms. Benmergui’s lawyer, on her instructions alone, with no regard for Mr. Bitton’s interests. In fact, it is so one-sided that the agreement itself is not even signed by Ms. Benmergui
I know that the debts that Mr. Bitton listed on his bankruptcy in April of 2001 amounted to $40,000 or $44,000
Central South Judicial Region
F.(J.) v. C.(V.) (No. 7), 2002 CanLII 46717 (ON S.C.)
Mr. J.F. did not respond to it, however. His reasons, which I think I can discern, are as follows:— that, although the offer might have appeared reasonable, the courts, police and children’s aid societies and treatment components in the system, which attend to the care and treatment of children, are gender-biased and incompetent and had to be exposed.
Your Honour, yesterday, and I put my personal needs in front of maybe the needs of many others, Your Honour, trying to show the systemic complicity and the blatant bias that exists here, Your Honour, and I should have just done it the original — I should have never given him the [Ms. M. Go.] tape. I should have never brought out the fact I had tapes of the C.A.A.P. and the C.C.A.S. and others, and now I may have done more harm than good, and it kept me up most of the night last night and there is another father in here who wanted my help and I know I can’t probably help them and this system just feeds on that, Your Honour. I am just another father that was led to the slaughter here. I’m chow for your meal, and when you’re done with me, you’re going to grind up whatever is left over and make it grease for the wheels of this system like you did to Wayne Allen and Jim Crawford, and I can go down the list, Your Honour. And I don’t know what else to say, Your Honour, but I will tell you that yes, there was some calculated subterfuge here.
You stated you expected orders to be adhered to; the police when you go, when I tried to get my order enforced, they laughed at me; the CCAS scoffed at order of this court by telling [Ms. V.C.] to deny me access. I’m, in, I lodged complaints against these authorities, Your Honour; they went nowhere despite you saying they acted inappropriate, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission said it was alright for the police officers to, to continually question my child and come and visit me late at night when my child was sleeping. The CCAS says they had every right to do this, interview, interrogate and examine my child over a dozen times. Your Honour, there has to be some accountability here, I’ve never seen it.
In the Stevenson case, Justice Beckett stated what had occurred with that poor little child that the mother was burning, beating and scolding for two years. She went to medical professionals 50 times that, they were looking the other way and said it was some kind of skin rash disease or disorder. There’s a problem with the system here, Your Honour, there’s a problem with the system
Why was this allowed to go on? This is child abuse, Your Honour. And, and the system is respon — this is systemic child abuse.
 Mr. Flaherty submits that that extraordinary statement indicates first, that the applicant has not intended to litigate this matter in good faith and that he was initially trying to execute a subterfuge upon the court. Second, he argues that there has been a twin motive for this proceeding, that is, that there has been an intention on the part of Mr. J.F. to attempt to use this proceeding to expose the “system” rather than just concentrate on the best interests of A.J.C.-F..
 Having regard to all of the above and given the limited assets and income of the applicant as set out in his financial statement, net costs against the applicant in favour of the respondent should be awarded in the sum of $90,000 plus G.S.T.
H.1 v. H.2, 2004 CanLII 43947 (ON S.C.)
The Respondent was self-represented
Justice D. J. Gordon
 As Mr. H.2 represented himself, I have reviewed Mr. Thrasher’s submissions and draft bill of costs
 The issues should have been resolved by the parties without a trial. An interim agreement was a good start and a final resolution might have occurred had Mr. H.2 continued to retain a solicitor.
 Mr. H.2 had the right to litigate the issues; however, Ms. H.1 ought not be penalized.
 Accordingly, Ms. H.1 is entitled to her costs as claimed and an order is granted directing Mr. H.2 to pay Ms. H.1 her costs fixed in the amount of $5,879.35
Coletta v. Jones Coletta, 2003 CanLII 2412 (ON S.C.)
Sandra Jones Coletta, ) self-represented
Although the applicant did not seek a finding of contempt against the respondent, this court, on its own motion, brought contempt proceedings against her, based upon these instances: selling the farm in the face of a non-depletion order; failing to pay into court the proceeds from that sale as ordered; and, failing to provide an accounting in respect of those proceeds as also ordered.
 The wife denied that the husband lived on the farm. However, I do not accept her testimony.
 With respect to selling the farm in contravention of the order of August 15, 2000, the sentence I impose is five days in custody. Regarding the failure to pay into the court the sum of $22,277.73, as ordered on May 23, 2002, the wife shall be sentenced to 10 days in custody. And for not providing the accounting, as ordered on May 23rd, she shall serve a further 15 days in custody. The sentences are consecutive and total 30 days
 Mr. DiGregorio seeks full-recovery costs of $2,500 plus GST. He did not have a bill of costs prepared. Normally, I would not fix costs without such a bill, but here, as the amount involved is patently modest, I award the amount claimed
Wood v. Greer-Wood, 2005 CanLII 31296 (ON S.C.)
Barbara Joan Greer-Wood, self-represented
 From a judicial perspective, I would not have thought there to be any advantage to presiding over a trial with a self-represented litigant. However, I may have encountered one in this case. The respondent/responding party (“respondent”), without the muzzling, tethering or filtering effect of a lawyer (who generally is able to control much of what his or her client does or says during a trial), revealed, through word and conduct in the courtroom, one of the very character traits about which the applicant/moving party (“applicant”) and his witnesses testified
 The motion of the applicant is allowed in respect of the alternative relief. Paragraph 1(a) of the Order is varied so as to provide that the principal residence of the children shall be the residence of the applicant.
 At the time of trial, the husband, self-represented, was in custody for his third breach of a matrimonial probation order.
 In a pure financial sense, there were gains, for the husband (through his bankruptcy) and the wife (via the HSBC right-off). Both shed much debt.
 The wife is a survivor; the husband is not.
A.P. v. G.P., 2006 CanLII 9976 (ON S.C.)
G.P., appearing in person
Justice D. J. Gordon
 I accept the evidence of Ms. A.P. regarding her care of the children and reject the complaints of Mr. G.P
 In the circumstances of this family, it is in the best interests of N. and A. to continue to be in the sole care and custody of their mother, and I so find
 Mr. G.P. acknowledged using a female friend to impersonate his wife in an attempt to obtain another credit card for use at the casino. He said he became addicted to gambling and blames such on Ms. A.P. for ending their marriage
 Given his other debt of about $70,0000, Mr. G.P. stated he will be making an assignment in bankruptcy in due course
 Given his failure to comply with the prior order and to produce documents, this was an appropriate case to strike the answer of Mr. G.P..
 Further, Mr. G.P. was not a credible witness. His evidence defies common sense and is simply not believable.
 Mr. G.P.’s credibility is damaged by his conduct and his plans.
 The anger of Mr. G.P. can be seen in his testimony and in his conduct since October 2004
 In result, I conclude an unequal division of net family properties is appropriate and necessary.
 I do not hesitate to conclude Mr. G.P.’s actions were intentional, reckless and in bad faith. He fully intended to punish Ms. A.P. for what he perceived to be her marital misconduct. He cannot succeed in his plan of having his spouse and children share his debt
 In result, Ms. A.P. is to receive the sum of $94,421.
Mr. G.P. is prohibited from claiming any monies owed to Ms. A.P. in any future assignment in bankruptcy
A.P. v. G.P., 2006 CanLII 17600 (ON S.C.)
G.P., appearing in person
At the completion of the trial, I initiated a discussion as to the methodology for addressing costs as the respondent appeared in person. I am satisfied he fully understood the options presented and agreed to provide written submissions or request a cost hearing. He has done neither and the time period for such has long expired
 The applicant is entitled to a cost award on a full indemnity basis. This action should not have been required and resulted solely from the conduct of the respondent. The primary issue at trial dealt with property. The respondent alleged significant funds were lost by him on gambling activities resulting from depression caused by the behaviour of the applicant. That position was rejected, there being neither evidence to support it nor merit in the presentation.
 In result, I find the request presented by Mr. Chaimovitz to be reasonable. Costs are awarded to the applicant, fixed in the amount of $17,463.15.
Peacock v. Greenhead-Peacock, 2007 CanLII 24674 (ON S.C.)
CORY JAMES PEACOCK ) Appeared on his own behalf
 On the other hand, the father alleges that because of the mother’s mental health issues, he is the more competent and stable parent and should therefore be awarded sole custody of Kaeli and joint custody of Rowan. In addition, he submits that Kaeli has lived with him for five years and is well settled into a home and school environment that should not be disturbed.
The placement of Kaeli with the mother’s parents was prompted by the fact that the mother was too ill to look after her newborn baby. To her credit, she recognized that fact and acted out of the best interests of Kaeli in placing the child with her parents.
 The placement of Kaeli with the father was prompted by the report of the Children’s Lawyer, Lorraine Castonguay, dated May 7, 2002, which noted that the mother did not have good parenting skills whereas the father had developed parenting skills to a point that the investigator felt that he should be given the opportunity to raise Kaeli.
 I have no doubt that Kaeli loves her father and that it is in Kaeli’s interest that she maintain a close connection to him. For that reason, I hesitate to terminate the joint custody order with respect to Kaeli even though the father’s attitude warrants termination.
 I would expect that the situation would only get worse if he were to be awarded sole custody of the children.
 For the foregoing reasons, I have concluded that the best interests of these two children would best be served if the mother is awarded joint custody and principal residence of Kaeli and sole custody of Rowan with access to the father as agreed between the parties or fixed by the court in the event that agreement is not possible.
The Greenheads have borne the full burden and cost of transportation associated with access visits over the past 5 years, and it is fitting that they either be compensated by the father perhaps in lieu of retroactive support or that they be relieved of the future obligation. Since this issue was not addressed during the trial either in argument or in the evidence, I am prepared to hear submissions on a date to be arranged through the local trial coordinator’s office.
In the meantime, child support in the amount of $753 per month for Kaeli and Rowan, based on the father’s income of $50,000 per annum will be paid by the father to the mother in accordance with the Guidelines commencing July 1, 2007 and a support deduction order shall issue
Hockey-Sweeney v. Sweeney, 2002 CanLII 2721 (ON S.C.)
Louise Hockey-Sweeney, represented herself
Throughout the interim proceedings Louise was represented by eight lawyers in succession. At trial Louise represented herself.
The judgment required that she make an equalization payment
of $553,000. The offer gave Louise support in the amount of $5,000 per month.
The judgment gave her support in the amount of $3,500 per month. The judgment
dismissed Louise’s claim for damages. The divorce was granted on
 Louise’s position was based on
 In the fall of 1998 Louise fell in love with Greg Ogier, who was her next door neighbour. Greg Ogier is a homosexual. He did not reciprocate the intense feelings that Louise had for him.
After receiving the letter dated May 29, 1999 Louise vowed revenge against her husband for interfering with her relationship with Greg Ogier. She set out her intentions clearly in her novel, “In Perspective – Bitch to Bitch”. In pursuit of this objective she caused a petition for divorce to issue dated September 28, 1999 in which she sought a divorce on the grounds of adultery based on an alleged homosexual relationship between Lawrence and Greg Ogier. She had no evidence to support this. It was a complete fabrication
 Louise’s objective throughout these proceedings was to embarrass her husband and to cause him to incur substantial legal fees.
Louise has debts of $615,000 and is required to make an equalization payment of $553,390. The total of these liabilities is $1,168,390
In my view, Louise’s assets exceed her liabilities in an amount somewhere between $250,000 and $400,000 and probably at the low end of that range
 Any litigant who attempts to use the court for a purpose other than the resolution of honest differences between the parties on the facts or the law or both must suffer the consequences in costs. The Court cannot permit itself to be used by a litigant for that litigant’s own agenda.
 Louise shall pay costs to
J.L.C. v. S.B.L., 2006 CanLII 13759 (ON S.C.)
S.B.L., ) self-represented
The order as changed is a final order and it shall further prohibit access by the father to his son.
35] In addition, pursuant to section 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, I order that the father shall require leave of a judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to commence or continue any litigation involving his son or the mother. This order has a wider scope than one made under rule 14(21) of the Family Law Rules (wherein the court has the power to curtail only motions).
I think fairness requires that the mother receive full indemnity for her costs. Therefore, the father shall pay costs fixed at $46,764.31, all-inclusive, which is, in large measure, the amount sought by Mr. Toppari.
Kelly v. Mitts, 2008 CanLII 4783 (ON S.C.)
 This appeal is from a final order granted in the Ontario Court of Justice after the appellant’s pleadings had been struck for non-compliance with prior court orders. For the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed
 Mr. Kelly, also self-represented, served an answer dated 5 October 2006, well after the requisite time period
 In Hughes v. Hughes, 2007 CarswellOnt. 1977 (Ont. S.C.J.), J.W. Quinn J. heard evidence during the trial indicating the respondent was in breach of an order previously made in the proceeding. He had ceased making payments on a life insurance policy and, as a result, the insurer cancelled the policy. The respondent was unable to provide an acceptable reason for his actions. In striking the respondent’s answer-claim, J.W. Quinn J. relied, in part, on Rule 1 (8).
 The scheduled event for 16 February 2007 was a settlement conference. Once Mr. Kelly’s pleadings were struck, the conference came to an end. Thereafter, Caspers J. purported to grant an order pursuant to Rule 17 (8) (c) which allows a judge to “make an unopposed order”. Mr. Kelly was then in default.
 On my review of the transcript, it appears the hearing was converted to an uncontested trial
I am not persuaded Casper J. erred in law or in principle. Indeed, I am of the view her decision on this issue was correct. Striking Mr. Kelly’s pleadings was the only reasonable option; otherwise, he would have been in a position of dictating the rules to follow and thumbing his nose at the legal system, as J.W. Quinn J. said in Hughes, supra. Mr. Kelly lost his right of an audience in this proceeding as a result of his own conduct
Kuzmanovic v. Kuzmanovic, 2001 CanLII 28195 (ON S.C.)
 At some point prior to trial the husband had successive solicitors of record. He is now self represented. Although he suffered the usual inabilities of such litigants (he had a nodding acquaintance with relevance but was a complete stranger to matters of proof), he was consistently courteous to the court and, for this, I am appreciative
No doubt he has the trust of numerous people who consider him an honourable man. However, he has a flaw and it is laid bare in this law suit. On matters involving money and his wife, he will say anything to serve his purposes.
 I sentenced the husband to five days in custody. , … , To be effective, the administration of justice requires compliance with court orders. A sentence of five days was inadequate.
 By way of summary: (1) the husband shall make an equalization payment to the wife in the sum of $456,728; (2) the interest of the husband in the matrimonial home and in 1278 Victoria Street shall be vested in the wife, thus serving as a s. 5-credit of $365,000, leaving $91,728 owing; (3) the husband shall transfer to the wife, in trust, his shares in the Company, in accordance with paragraph 53 above; (4) he shall be enjoined from attending at the premises of the Company, also in accordance with paragraph 53 above; (5) he shall pay to the wife lump-sum spousal support of $50,000; (6) the counterpetition is dismissed; and (7) the wife is entitled to her costs which I fix at $46,750, inclusive of disbursements and GST
S.D. v. T.D., 2005 CanLII 23681 (ON S.C.)
T.D. ) Unrepresented and not present
 T.D.’s pleadings were struck by the order of Justice Flynn dated April 15, 2005. As such, the matter proceeded on an uncontested basis.
Guy Bridgewater, in person
 Scott J. also was incredulous of the financial status of the father, and held that he was claiming an inability to work for health reasons with no supporting medical evidence, while purportedly receiving financial assistance from his parents of up to $3,000 monthly. Income was imputed to him of $52,000.
 As the father voluntarily decided not to work in 2004 and in 2005, and did so for no good reason, I impute annual income to him of $55,523.
Bukvic v. Bukvic, 2007 CanLII 47147 (ON S.C.)
No one appearing for the Applicant
 The following corrections are made to my endorsement released 29 March 2007:
(i) Paragraph 12 – The reference to the wife’s income should say $28,000; and
(ii) Paragraph 22 – The following is added:
(a) a divorce;
(b) custody of the children to the wife;
(c) husband prohibited from access with the children;
(d) lump sum child support award payable by the husband retroactive to 1 October 2006, in the amount of $144,666.00;
(e) lump sum spousal support award payable by the husband retroactive to 1 October 2006, in the amount of $244,800.00;
(f) leave to the wife to present future claims for additional periodic or lump sum child and spousal support;
(g) leave to the wife to present future claim for assault;
(h) husband to maintain life insurance policy on his life in the face value of not less than $300,000.00 designating the wife as irrevocable beneficiary to secure the husband’s support obligations;
(i) husband to maintain wife and children as beneficiaries of any health insurance available to him through his employment;
(j) restraining husband from coming within 500 meters of the wife’s residence or place of employment or the children’s schools;
(k) husband prohibited from contacting the wife or children;
(l) costs awarded to the wife in the amount of $15,000
Hoddinott v. Hoddinott, 2002 CanLII 2791 (ON S.C.)
No one, for the Respondent/Husband
I have received no submissions from Mr. Hoddinott, who was self represented at trial
The respondent did not succeed on any matters that were in dispute as of the date of trial
I take into account that she was not advised of the husband’s assignment in bankruptcy until near the scheduled trial date.
 For these reasons, I order the respondent to pay costs to the petitioner fixed in the amount of $12,000.00 for fees, $794.00 for disbursements and GST on the fees in the amount of $840.00, for a total of $13,634.00
Reitsma v. Reitsma-Leadsom, 2005 CanLII 47762 (ON S.C.)
JODY REITSMA-LEADSOM Respondent ) In Person
 I have before me a motion brought by the applicant, Ynze Reitsma, to terminate spousal support and I have a cross-motion by the respondent, Jody Reitsma-Leadsom, for an increase to spousal support.
She spoke of his attempt to poison her and succumbing to an anaphylactic shock, although she stated she was in a coma for three days, Mr. Reitsma would not call 911. She reported the incident to the police. She stated that it is currently an open file and that there is an ongoing investigation but no charges have been laid against Mr. Reitsma. She spoke of Mr. Reitsma’s motive - proceeds of a life insurance policy on Ms. Reitsma-Leadsom’s life for $1,000,000.00
 She testified that Mr. Reitsma had poisoned her pets and that he was responsible for the resurfacing of her post-traumatic stress disorder. She blamed him for her inability to have children stating he caused her infertility and blamed Mr. Reitsma for her mental issues which required psychiatric therapy and which resulted in her inability to care for children. She testified to being stalked by Mr. Reitsma at various jobs that she had managed to obtain, only to lose them because of what she said was his behaviour.
Mr. Reitsma testified that, upon separation, he declared bankruptcy and became a discharged bankrupt one year later.
 I find that Mr. Reitsma should not benefit from his illegal act of assault. I further find that although his violent behaviour towards Ms. Reitsma-Leadsom may not have been the major cause of her unemployability
 As for the inconsistencies of Ms. Reitsma-Leadsom in her testimony as referred to by Ms. Bale, I find that those inconsistencies are minor
S.A.S. v. J.J.S., 2007 CanLII 1901 (ON S.C.)
J.J.S ) in Person, Self-represented
 On October 4, 2006, I released a 29 page typewritten endorsement in which I summarized the evidence received to that point in the trial, the submissions of both parties with respect to the Respondent father’s access and my reasons for ordering that his access would be supervised pending the resumption of the trial.
 Dr. McKay was qualified as an expert in clinical psychology and child development. Her report was filed with the court. She administered the following tests:
1) Rorschach Psychodiagnostiks;
2) Million Multi-Axial Clinical Inventory (MCMI-III); and,
 Dr. McKay concluded that her testing did not reveal any diagnosable mental disorder.
 She states that Mr. J.J.S. has difficulty processing complex, abstract information and that this impairment would not result in a physical hazard to the children.
 It is not in the best interests of K.E.P.S. and S.J.S. that their father have unrestricted and unsupervised access to them.
 Also, Mr. J.J.S. will have the report of some parenting coach who has had the opportunity to work with him in the presence of the children and report that he is making progress or has made sufficient progress that it is no longer a risk to his children’s emotional health.
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 2004 CanLII 12100 (ON S.C.)
MARK ARMSTRONG ) Self-represented
 The husband exercised regular access to the children until June 2003 and he has not been given any access since that time.
 As noted above, the husband has had no access to his children since June of last year when Family and Children’s Services indicated after an investigation that his accommodations were not suitable for overnight stays. No explanation was given at trial for the lack of any access whatsoever including daytime access since that time.
An investigation of the husband’s home by one Family and Children’s Services worker resulted in a letter of concern for the children as the residence was in a completely unfinished state without furniture.
There was a dispute by the husband at the trial that the location investigated by Family and Children’s Services was his place of residence
 It is obvious that the husband loves his children but it is equally obvious to the court that he appears to be oblivious to the fact that the children are his financial responsibility and that part of caring for them is to be financially responsible for them.
 Accordingly, I am prepared to order child support retroactive to 2001 and to impute income for the present and future.
Arrears therefore are in the total amount of $24,084.00 in total.
Platonova v. Platonov, 2005 CanLII 2951 (ON S.C.)
V. Platonov represented himself
 On this latter appearance, Reilly J. granted the divorce and ordered the transfer of the matrimonial home to the Petitioner, subject to solicitors’ liens
 It is equally clear that the Respondent is intransigent. He uses his submissions to further denigrate the Petitioner and calls her submissions false, misleading and irrelevant.
14] Accordingly, there shall be an Order that the Respondent pay to the Petitioner, within 30 days, the sum of $2,050.80 for costs.
Purves v. Purves, 2004 CanLII 6249 (ON S.C.)
Alec Purves represented himself
 On 22 December 1999, pursuant to the consent of the parties, Sills J. granted an order for interim joint custody
 Father is demanding and controlling, although I suspect he is not aware of such personality problems.
 Father fails to recognize mother’s role as a parent. He has been demeaning of her in the presence of the children.
 Father has been frustrated with the issues not being resolved. He initiated several contempt motions and has contacted the police on numerous occasions.
 In April 2003, father stopped seeing the children on a regular basis. He said he was frustrated and assumed the trial would be in a few months.
 Father stated his income to be $18,600 on an annual basis. He is underemployed. He has the ability to obtain better employment and greater income.
 In result, judgment is granted, effective 4 June 2004, on the following terms:
(a) sole custody of Jonathan, David And Alijoy to mother;
R.J.R.H. v. A.A.H., 2004 CanLII 34792 (ON S.C.)
A.A.H. ) The Respondent represented himself
JUSTICE D.J. GORDON
 Father quit his job after separation. He described this as a stress leave
 Father, however, has only seen A. on a few occasions. Normally, these visits have been supervised or controlled by mother as, she said, she did not trust him to return the child
Father, for some unexplained reason, terminated the services of his lawyer. He has not seen A. since December 2003 nor has he pursued the issue, save for this trial.
 Father paid child support for November and December 2003 but declined to further provide financial assistance for his daughter
 On the basis of the evidence presented a trial, the only logical custody order is for A. to remain in mothers care.
 Supervised access, hopefully for a limited time period, will allow father and daughter develop this relationship but the responsibility is on father to make such access be meaningful
DeMarco v. DeMarco, 2005 CanLII 6389 (ON S.C.)
MARK DEMARCO ) Self
 The pleadings of the husband were struck by order of Bain J. dated May 7th, 2003 as the result of his failing to comply with an order of Henderson J.
 In the result the applicant wife is entitled to judgment against the respondent in the amount of $263,735.28 being the equalization payment due
Majkut-Giammarco v. Giammarco, 2004 CanLII 34797 (ON S.C.)
DINO GIAMMARCO ) No one appearing for the Respondent
 Statement of Claim served on the Respondent, no Statement of Defence filed and Notice of Default was signed;
 Pursuant to Rule 19.02, a defendant who has been noted in default is deemed to admit the truth of the allegations of fact made in the Statement of Claim. This is subject to Rule 19.06. After hearing evidence given by the Applicant I am satisfied that the facts entitle the Applicant to judgment
Therefore, there will be a judgment as follows:
i. There will be spousal support to the Applicant in the amount of $500.00 per month, retroactive to October 1, 2004;
ii. The home known as
iii. Title to the Ford vehicle will vest in the Applicant, subject to any lien outstanding
Mahood v. Mahood, 2005 CanLII 19841 (ON S.C.)
J. Mahood, Respondent/Moving Party, appeared personally
There has been little contact between the moving party/father and the children from the date of separation. The moving party/father appears to be devastated by this separation and the loss of contact with his children. He maintains that the termination of contact is due to the applicant/mother’s manipulation.
 The father also sought other forms of relief, which I conclude this court has no jurisdiction to direct at this time, including an order that father receive immediate notification of any material change of circumstance for his son and daughter and an order that mother “cease and desist of any form of alienation”.
Bolentiru v. Radulescu, 2004 CanLII 6239 (ON S.C.)
MARCEL RADULESCU ) Self represented
The plaintiff claims:
a) a declaration that the alleged
marriage to the defendant in
b) judgment for the return by the
defendant of funds in the amount of $15,889.71 Canadian derived from the sale
of her residential apartment in
c) judgment for compensatory
damages for work and services performed for the defendant on his property at
945 Queen’s Boulevard,
d) general damages for false representation and deceit
 As a result, the defendant remains liable to the plaintiff for the full amount of $15,889.71 Canadian dollars and the plaintiff shall have judgment against the defendant for that amount
In the result the plaintiff shall have judgment against the defendant in this regard in the amount of $2,500.00.
 Given the conduct of the defendant with respect to the marriage and the circumstances given rise to it as I have found, the plaintiff is entitled to general damages, which I fix in the amount of $10,000.00.
 I will entertain submissions from both parties with respect to costs
Beal v. Beal, 2005 CanLII 30326 (ON S.C.)
RICHARD LESLIE BEAL ) Self Represented
2. Ownership of the Matrimonial Home: The applicant/wife sought an order that the title to the matrimonial home known as 324893 Norwich Road, Part Lot 23, Concession 4, R.R.#3 Norwich be transferred to and vest in her absolutely, including the Respondent’s Part 11 Family Law Act interest, as full and final satisfaction of the equalization payment owing. At the conclusion of hearing the evidence and submissions, I immediately made this order, and reserved the balance of my Judgment to this time
3. Spousal Support: The applicant sought an order that the arrears of support accrued pursuant to the Order of Justice Tucker dated January 18, 2005 is $19,804.00 and I declare that this sum is owing to the applicant in addition to any other amounts found payable herein by respondent.
He testified that he had made no income from Blue Dot and that he was unable to pay spousal support.
 I find that the based on the limited financial statements and financial information of Blue Dot provided to this Court and because current information was not provided to refute it, I impute an annual income to Mr. Beal of $35,000.00 per year
Perry v. Perry, 2007 CanLII 20982 (ON S.C.)
Sean Patrick Perry, self-represented
 In these proceedings, the respondent indicated that he had declared bankruptcy on July 6, 2006
 It would appear from his failure to file affidavit material, his failure to file an updated financial statement, and his failure to provide proper documentation relating to that bank account, that the respondent is either choosing to purposely ignore the order of this court or to hide income that he is in fact making from his business.
 A further review of the transcript of the respondent’s cross examination indicates that he intentionally excluded a $93,000.00 debt to his parents from his disclosure to his trustee in bankruptcy. , … , The $93,000.00 line of credit was secured by a mortgage in favor of the bank, against the title to his parents’ home. The applicant alleges that if he included the $93,000 debt in his bankruptcy, his parents would likely have had to sell their home. She contends that by failing to disclose this $93,000.00 debt pursuant to his obligations under the Bankruptcy Act, the applicant was extending to his parents a fraudulent preference and, in doing so, he has falsified his disclosure in the bankruptcy proceeding. She contends therefore that his credibility is impugned.
 When the respondent appeared before this court on April 13 and on May 11, 2007, he threw his arms in the air and said "what can I do". He indicated that he did not have sufficient funds to hire a lawyer.
This court has given him an opportunity to produce documentation to refute the position of the applicant with respect to his income. Essentially, he has ignored this opportunity and neglected to answer many of the undertakings in a meaningful way or at all
 With respect to the allegation that he had received cash receipts not included in his income tax returns, the respondent was given ample opportunity in these proceedings to respond to those allegations and he has chosen not to do so. I have imputed $1000.00 per month of income to the respondent representing cash receipts not reflected in his annual income tax returns.
 This application for retroactive child support was commenced in March 2007. In the circumstances this court orders the child support be retroactively varied for the years 2004, 2005, and up to April 2006 in accordance with his declared income and imputed income and the 1997 Federal Basic Child Support Guidelines, and thereafter commencing May 1, 2006 in accordance with the revised Federal Basic Child Support Guideline amounts
 Thus the total child support arrears owing for 2004 and 2005 and which shall be paid to the applicant by the respondent are $19,042.00
 In the circumstances the applicant shall be entitled to the sum of $11,000.00 as substantial indemnity costs inclusive of GST. This litigation could have been avoided by the respondent acting in a forthright, timely manner in responding to requests for financial expenses. I do not feel that he has acted reasonably in these proceedings and he should be required to pay the applicant’s costs on a substantial indemnity basis.
Wiltshire v. Wiltshire, 2005 CanLII 370 (ON S.C.)
Robert William Wiltshire, Self-represented Respondent
 The parties agree that the wife is entitled to an equalization payment of $18,074. They disagree on how and when the amount should be paid.
 In this regard, the husband was ordered to pay spousal support at the rate of $2,250 per month on December 4, 2003. The order is in arrears as of December 1, 2004 in the sum of $14,434.85.
 In addition to the foregoing amounts, paragraph 19(g) of the Minutes of Settlement require the husband to forthwith pay $9,300 towards the wife’s legal fees
 Having said that, I nevertheless recognize that the husband’s only capacity to pay this debt in a lump sum is dependent upon his ability to refinance his house at 60 Battle St. and since he has provided some plausible evidence that suggests that he might not be able to do so, I am prepared to give him 60 days from the date of these reasons to raise the funds necessary to retire these debts by remortgaging his interest in the Battle St. property. If he is unable to do so, and provides sworn and reliable information to this effect, I will structure the payment of the debts differently. However, the onus will be on the husband and if he fails to satisfy this onus, an order may issue upon separate application by the wife for a charging order on the property in question
D.B. v. J.B., 2006 CanLII 726 (ON S.C.)
J.B in person
FATHER’S REQUEST FOR ADJOURNMENT OF TRIAL
 At the beginning of the trial, the Father requested an adjournment of the trial to allow him to retain a lawyer. He was unable to say when he would be ready for trial. His position was that his new lawyer should be the one to fix the date. This matter was scheduled for trial in April 2005. The Father was represented by counsel, at that time. The Father and his counsel parted shortly after the date for trial was set. The Father said he has been looking for a new lawyer since April 2005. I did not grant the Father’s adjournment request for the following reasons:
1. he had several months to secure new counsel;
2. he knew the date for trial had been set, yet took no steps to advise the Mother’s counsel or the court that he was not ready to proceed;
3. he did not attend at purge court and seek the adjournment;
4. he could offer no suggestion as to when he would be ready but simply wanted an adjournment to no fixed date;
5. this matter was on the trial list for several months; and,
6. the Mother and especially the three dependant children are entitled to have the matter finalized.
19] The Mother says she never received any direct payments from the Father and has supported the children financially without assistance from him.
 The Mother says that he always kept cash at home and was concerned that people would sue him and that if he kept his money in a bank account, it would be accessible to collection by judgment creditors, but she is not sure where he kept the cash
 The Mother says the Father’s access to the children was sporadic during the first year and in fact he hardly saw the children
 Ms. Geraldo recommended counselling for the children. The Mother has been advised that counselling cannot start until the custody litigation is resolved. She and the children are going to start therapy with Debbie at their family doctor’s office.
The Father appeared at Mr. T.M.’s home at 5:30 in the morning and brought the three children to the door. Mr. T.M. answered the door and the Father said that he wanted to see his wife and when the Mother came downstairs, the Father called her a “slut” and “skank”. , … , The Father pushed her aside at the door of her home when she met him at her home a little while later and grabbed the TV and VCR. The children had entered the house and were on the couch and were asking their Mother “Why is Daddy taking the VCR and TV?” She called 911
 The police have been involved with these parents on a number of occasions as related by the Mother.
 In August 2005, the Father refused to return M.B.B. to the Mother’s care after an access occasion.
 The next time the Father had an access occasion he kept M.B.B.. He alleged that Mr. T.M. had been inappropriate with M.B.B. and contacted the police and the Children’s Aid Society.
She has never denied the Father access to the children except on one Thursday evening because the children did not want to go and be in the car while he was delivering pizza and she believes that on that occasion, the Father stole the basketball net from the driveway in retaliation.
 Therefore, the children will be in their Mother’s custody.
 With respect to child support, I find that the Father’s income is at least the $26,600.00 gross annually that the Mother has asked the court to impute.
L.A.G. v. M.E.F.G., 2004 CanLII 53222 (ON S.C.)
 For reasons that follow, I find the respondent, M.E.F.G., was virtually ungovernable throughout the trial. Indeed, his general deportment gives me cause to question his emotional stability. His trial tactics and abusive conduct throughout turned this custody trial into a long, expensive nightmare for his wife and her counsel.
During this second statement he inveighed against the Canadian legal system. He states that in the past 18 months the Court had been engaged in a deliberate misuse of authority or abuse of power. He claimed that he had been forcibly prevented from seeing his children. He alleged that the Court had helped Mrs. L.A.G. in her “criminal harassment” of her own children. He claimed that the Court was gender-biased and prejudiced and wholly incapable of deciding impartially and fairly any issues relating to the children and himself. He alleged that the Court was incompetent and corrupt.
When the trial began Mr. M.E.F.G was in receipt of public assistance. During the relationship he had been employed on and off, sometimes for himself. His last full-time employment was in 2001.
Mr. M.E.F.G’s access to P.G. and S.G. was suspended by order of Justice Langdon on April 25, 2003. Justice Clarke’s order of May 7, 2003, provided that Mr. M.E.F.G have supervised access to S.G. and P.G. for 2 hours on both Saturday and Sunday of each week at the Family Visiting Centre
Mr. M.E.F.G has not seen T.G. since January of 2001.
23] The Halton Regional Police have been frequently involved. Most of their interventions dealt with custody and access issues or Mr. M.E.F.G’s protests. Mr. M.E.F.G called 10 police witnesses. Mrs. L.A.G. called 3. Mr. M.E.F.G also provided a list to the Court listing as many as approximately 24 additional officers who had been involved. Other police officers have been involved as well.
 On April 7, 2001, Mr. M.E.F.G was charged with assaulting Mrs. L.A.G. and uttering a threat. On December 20, 2001, he was convicted. He unsuccessfully appealed the conviction. His sentence appeal was allowed in part. The assault and threat occurred at the former matrimonial home during an access exchange
 During the summer of 2003, while he was refusing to see the children, Mr. M.E.F.G began to protest at the main intersection closest to Mrs. L.A.G.’s home. She then shared that home with the three children. He protested on 10 or more weekends in the summer and fall of 2003. The protests were small at first. Mrs. L.A.G. describes the first time she saw Mr. M.E.F.G alone at the intersection carrying a sign saying something like “Daddy loves you S.G. and P.G. and T.G.”.
 The protests grew to the extent that on October 18, 2003, Robert Partridge, a police officer, observed 10-12 people, including Mr. M.E.F.G, protesting at the intersection. Partridge described the protestors as carrying placards with slogans relating to children and families and issues relating to fathers’ rights and parents’ rights. He described that some protestors, including Mr. M.E.F.G, were wearing black gowns resembling judges’ robes. He described seeing 2 effigies of judges being hanged from City property. One of the protestors, not gowned, wore a black stocking-mask over his face. He observed that the protestors shouted and waved signs at motorists.
 Mr. M.E.F.G faces 16 Provincial Offences Act offences and 16 Criminal Code charges relating to his protesting activities. Mrs. L.A.G. had begun a contempt motion, before the charges were laid, arising from these activities.
The total arrears to and including November 1, 2004, are $49,459.76.
94] Mr. M.E.F.G did not give any evidence that would warrant a retroactive variation of the existing order. Therefore, I do not rescind arrears for any period prior to November 1, 2004.
95] Mr. M.E.F.G was receiving public assistance, whether Ontario Works or disability, as the trial began. His financial status was not canvassed. Respecting Mr. M.E.F.G’s ability to work pre-trial, the Court had only the evidence of Dr. Reuven Jharid, Mr. M.E.F.G’s family doctor. Dr. Jharid said that Mr. M.E.F.G wasn’t able to seek employment and maintain employment because his pursuit of equal access interfered with his ability to pursue it.
 Mr. Graham has requested that income be imputed at $40,000.00 gross per year. I accept this as reasonable.
Mr. M.E.F.G shall have no access or contact of any nature or kind with the child T.G. born [...], 1991.
Mr. M.E.F.G shall be entitled to supervised access only to the children S.G. and P.G.
v. Wildman, 2006 CanLII 33540 (ON
The appellant did not comply with Snowie J.’s order. Nor did he appeal it. His pleadings were struck
 An uncontested trial took place before Kruzick J. In an order dated March 1, 2006, the trial judge granted the respondent’s petition for divorce. He awarded sole custody of the children of the marriage to the respondent.
 The trial judge fixed the appellant’s income at $700,000. He ordered the appellant to pay spousal support of $16,072 per month, child support of $7,481 per month, and 72 per cent of special and extraordinary expenses under s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines. The trial judge ordered that spousal and child support be paid from November 1, 2003; accordingly, he fixed the arrears for these payments at $450,016 and $73,743 respectively, after taking account of some child support payments during the relevant period. The trial judge also ordered that the appellant post security for future support in the amount of $350,000 and maintain a $1,000,000 term policy of life insurance with the respondent designated as the irrevocable beneficiary.
 The trial judge ordered that the appellant pay the respondent an equalization payment of $98,190.12 less $59,133.39 already paid. The mutual non‑depletion and preservation order made by Belleghem J. on May 5, 2004 was continued with respect to the appellant.
 The trial judge awarded costs to the respondent fixed at $239,260.32 and prejudgment interest relating to the equalization payment fixed at $6,578.28
Dennis v. Dennis, 2007 CanLII 738 (ON S.C.)
Sylvester Dennis, Self-represented
 The first order of the court ordering that the respondent provide a pension valuation was made by Justice O’Connell in May 10, 2004. The next order of the Court was a consent order dated December 1, 2005 made by Justice Sanderson. That order required a pension valuation before December 15, 2005
 Given the continuing lack of co-operation and failure to comply with court orders, I grant the motion of the applicant striking the answer and counter petition of the respondent and an order to this effect shall issue.
Haaksma v. Haaksma, 2006 CanLII 2772 (ON S.C.)
Mrs. Haaksma is an honest, hard working, fair-minded, dignified and resilient woman. She deserves better treatment than she has received from Mr. Haaksma
He spent a lot of money on lawyers but came to trial without legal representation. In the proceedings leading up to trial, he failed to take responsible positions with respect to disclosure of information. He impaired the gathering of relevant information by the petitioner. He is the reason why Mrs. Haaksma brought many interlocutory motions. These motions of course only add to his costs of the litigation he so obviously resents.
Given the facts and Mr. Haaksma's position at trial, when he did not contest Mrs. Haaksma's entitlement to this money, it seems, in retrospect, that his challenge to her entitlement was nothing if not mean-spirited
Mr. Haaksma's formally declared income has been quite low over the years. Often it has been around $30,000.
 I therefore find that Mrs. Haaksma's argument that it his income be imputed at $110,000 per year is reasonable and supported by the evidence
 In the circumstances of this case and taking into account the factors set out in the Divorce Act and the guidance of the courts in Moge v. Moge, , 3 SCR 813 and Bracklow v. Bracklow  1 SCR 420, a monthly spousal support payment of $3200 per month is appropriate commencing January 1, 2006 and continuing monthly thereafter on the first day of each and every month until altered by agreement of the parties or by order of this court.
 Given Mr. Haaksma's conduct throughout these proceedings, which is documented by judicial endorsements and multiple orders made prior to trial, I am not prepared to reduce the quantum of the arrears owed by Mr. Haaksma to Mrs. Haaksma.
2) It is ordered that the money paid into court in this action being $169,851.02, plus interest accrued thereon since the date of payment, is to be paid to the TD Canada Trust personal line of credit of Mrs. Anna Haaksma.
3) It is ordered that any moneys received by Mr. Haaksma from their son, Alan Haaksma, in repayment of the $90,000 loan made to him by his parents shall be immediately turned over by Mr. Haaksma to Mrs. Haaksma or shall immediately be applied against the TD Canada Trust line of credit of Mrs. Anna Haaksma
7) It is ordered that Mr. Haaksma shall pay to Mrs. Haaksma an equalization payment of $775,708.62.
8) It is ordered that Mrs. Haaksma is entitled to prejudgment interest on the equalization payment of $775,708.62 in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act from January 1, 2003 until the date of judgment and post-judgment interest from the date of judgment until the date of payment.
 Mrs. Haaksma is entitled to her costs.
Helmy v. Helmy, 2000 CanLII 22452 (ON S.C.)
Mohamed Helmy for himself.
 The plaintiff, Rose Frieda Helmy, is the defendant Mohamed Gamil Helmy’s former wife. They were married in 1971, separated on March 30, 1991 and divorced on June 27, 1992. Rose has sued Mohamed, all his brothers and sisters, or their estates, some of their spouses and their mother for conspiracy to defraud her of her share of the 2.5 million dollars
 Accordingly, the full $2.5 million, including the
$375,000.00, $25,000.00 and $20,000.00
The damages for civil conspiracy, therefore, are assessed at $1,022,882.00, less her recovery under item (c
As such the conduct was malicious in nature and deserving of punishment. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages as against the defendants, Mohamed, Andrew, Jolanta and Souhair Helmy, and Foutna and Mourad Thakib in the amount of $50,000.00, in addition to the damages for the tort of conspiracy
As such the conduct was malicious in nature and deserving of punishment. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages as against the defendants, Mohamed, Andrew, Jolanta and Souhair Helmy, and Foutna and Mourad Thakib in the amount of $50,000.00, in addition to the damages for the tort of conspiracy
Moudry v. Moudry, 2005 CanLII 22220 (ON S.C.)
 The respondent chose not to personally attend trial although the trial date of May 9, 2005 was set in Ms. Moudry’s solicitor’s presence and marked peremptory by Belleghem J. in his order of March 29, 2005. She has had ample notice.
At the commencement of trial on May 9, 2005, Ms. Oliver, solicitor for the respondent, made two motions. They were:
(1) to be removed as Solicitor of Record as she had been unable to secure a further retainer from the respondent; and/or
(2) to adjourn the commencement of the trial for one day
Ms. Oliver has the usual remedies available to her to collect her fees and disbursements. Ms. Moudry has chosen not to appear at the trial.
2. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT the Applicant, father Michal Moudry, shall have sole custody of Megan Moudry, born May 2, 2002.
3. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT the Respondent, Shelley Moudry shall immediately deliver up, Meagan Moudry, born May 2, 2002, to Michal Moudry or a person authorized by him
9. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT the respondent, Shelley Moudry, pay to the applicant, Michal Moudry the sum of $3,623.66 with respect to the equalization payment owed.
THIS COURT DECLARES THAT the respondent, Shelley Moudry, stands in contempt by reason of her disobedience of the orders of Justice MacKenzie, dated September 2, 2003, the order of Justice Corbett dated May 13, 2004 and the order of Dunn J. dated April 13, 2005. As such, the applicant’s costs are awarded on a substantial indemnity basis for the motion for contempt and are fixed in the amount of $9,426.36 to be paid by the respondent forthwith to the applicant pursuant to R.60.11(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, the respondent mother shall pay a fine of $5,000.00 to the Treasurer of Ontario forthwith
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT the applicant shall have his costs of this trial, on a substantial indemnity basis forthwith after assessment
Hitchens v. Hitchens, 2004 CanLII 12899 (ON S.C.)
 At the commencement of the trial, Mr. Hitchens failed to attend and was not represented by counsel. Mrs. Hitchens did attend and was represented by Ms. McKerroll.
 As a preliminary matter, counsel for Mrs. Hitchens made the following motions:
1. for an order dismissing the petitioner’s action pursuant to Rule 52.01(2)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure;
He indicates he continues to take on jobs when available in the construction and design fields. He earned approximately $8,000.00 in 2003.
I also find that he has chosen not to remain in
Therefore, Mr. Hitchens is ordered to pay child support in the amount of $387.00 per month retroactive to the date of separation, which would be December 6, 2001.
Therefore, this Court makes an order for lump sum payment in the amount of $30,000.00 spousal support, payable by Mr. Hitchens to Mrs. Hitchens.
42] This Court, therefore, makes an order that the RRSPs and any and all other deposits being held by the Bank of Nova Scotia to the credit of Mr. Hitchens be vested in Mrs. Hitchens.
 With respect to the issue of costs, this Court orders costs against Mr. Hitchens payable to Mrs. Hitchens on a substantial indemnity basis
Singh v. Singh, 2007 CanLII 8933 (ON S.C.)
Hardial Singh, in Person
 In his endorsement of February 15, 2007 Justice Gray indicated that an order striking out the Respondent’s pleadings is a serious order and should only be made in clear cases. He found this was such a case. Justice Gray stated:
The Respondent has demonstrated an appalling disregard of his responsibilities as a litigant, including the disregard of orders of this Court. He has failed to comply with undertakings. His behaviour at the examination of January 12, 2007 (which was conducted as a means of purging his contempt as found by Dunn J.), was nothing more than a series of evasions and a blatant disregard of his obligations as a witness.
 I do not accept Mr. Singh’s assertion that he was unaware of the proceedings
B.R. v. E.K., 2007 CanLII 1875 (ON S.C.)
E.K. In Person
1] K. is 10 years old, and in grade five. She lives with her mother. She has not seen her father for the past 4-½ years, since June of 2002, when access was refused on the basis that K. would not willingly go with her father for access
This urgent family case, although ordered expedited, has not been reached in a timely manner because of the long backlog of civil and family cases that has accrued while judges have struggled to meet the constitutionally mandated requirement of reaching criminal cases before they are stayed on the basis of delay
 Had the matter been properly expedited as ordered, that
is, had reasonable court resources been available, the best interests of K., as
well as the ancillary but nonetheless important interests of each of her
parents, could have been much better served. The mother and family would not
have had a significant delay in their plans to relocate in
 Ms B.R., K.’s mother, has been in a common-law marriage
with a new partner and they have two children, now in grade one and senior
kindergarten. K.’s mother and her stepfather are both from
 I find that whether this was because of the sexual
allegations or for other reasons, the fact remains that that relationship has
not developed. As Ms Chisholm noted, K. is now a member of an intact and
emotionally healthy family. She has a psychological father (her stepfather) in
that family. She is functioning well within that family and is well cared for.
The proposed move to
Therefore, child support will be varied to $387.00 per month. This amount reflects the father’s presumed income of $45,000 per year.
Wentzell v. Schumacher, 2004 CanLII 4032 (ON S.C.)
Kent Wentzell )In Person
 In considering the issue of costs, it must be noted that while success was divided and sole custody was not given to the mother, this was largely because of the mother's willingness, against historical odds, to accept a parallel parenting regime
 With respect to the costs of the aborted trial, it appears from correspondence from the father's counsel at the time of the conversion of the trial into a case conference that there was an agreement that the matter proceed in that way on a without costs basis
 However, the father did revive the contempt application when the case conference failed to resolve all issues . That application was not withdrawn until the eve of trial.
 Taking these factors into account, but without doing a line by line assessment of costs, it is my view that the father should pay costs to the mother in the amount of $19,500, inclusive of G.S.T. and disbursements.
Lawrence v. Mortensen, 2000 CanLII 22525 (ON S.C.)
Respondent for himself.
b) The respondent shall pay to the petitioner a lump sum child support payment for the child, Tanya Margaret Mortensen Lawrence, in the amount of $38,160.00.
There were several separations and reconcilliations. The parties finally separated for the last time in December 1980. The respondent claims the marriage lasted only hours. At most, this marriage lasted six months. The child, Tanya Mortensen, was born December 2, 1980 and has resided with the petitioner since her birth
f) From his tax return for 1996 his income was $12,016.00
g) From his tax return for 1997 his income was $9,937.00.
h) From his tax return for 1998 his income was $10,124.94.
Ramphal v. Doodnauth, 2008 CanLII 19793 (ON S.C.)
Umrow Doodnauth, Respondent, In Person
 The Applicant claims child support on a temporary basis. The Respondent seeks to pay an amount below Guideline support on the basis of undue hardship, as he is also supporting two of the three children from his marriage. The Respondent has a cross-claim for access.
 The Respondent agreed to pay the Applicant the lump sum of $24,000 to resolve her claim for retroactive child support and s. 7 expenses
 Undue hardship involves a high threshold standard; the hardship must be exceptional, excessive and disproportionate. The burden of proof is on the payor, who must present the court with cogent evidence of the hardship:
 For those reasons I give the agreement little weight. As the Respondent’s claim of undue hardship rests primarily on his responsibilities under this alleged agreement, that claim must fail.
 As noted above, the Respondent has had virtually no relationship with Matthew or Timothy.
 While the Respondent undoubtedly has vast life experience to share, both his sons are now of the age where enforcing access is impractical and unrealistic.
Scott v. Scott, 2008 CanLII 8617 (ON S.C.)
EARDLEY SCOTT )Eardley Scott, On his Own Behalf
M.G.J. QUIGLEY J
 Regrettably, there are neither liquid assets nor real or personal properties present here that are definitively known to be owned by Mr. Scott that could readily be attached to satisfy the remaining amount of Ms. Scott’s entitlement as I have determined it. As such, the only mechanism available to the Court to recognize and remedy the existing deficit in Ms. Scott’s share of net family property is to declare that the $23,000 balance owing constitutes a debt owing from Mr. Scott to Ms. Scott as an equalization payment due to her, apart from the other amounts he owes to her for support. Mr. Scott shall be required to pay that amount in full within 5 years, that is on or before April 30, 2013, being the spousal support termination date. Mr. Scott shall satisfy that obligation in minimum annual instalments of $4,600 per year to be paid on or before each of April 30, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and ending in 2013.
S.R.S. v. A.H.H., 2004 CanLII 5038 (ON S.C.)
 Following the release of the judgment in this matter, Mr. A.H.H. retained counsel for the purposes of making oral costs submissions.
 The information suggests that the Respondent is still not working at this time. In my reasons I noted that his income should be attributed at $22,000 by September of 2004 if he was not reporting a higher income by that time.
 Costs are fixed at $8,000 plus $132.32 in disbursements for a total of $8,132.32 all-inclusive, payable by the Respondent to the Applicant.
Balram v. Balram, 2003 CanLII 15395 (ON S.C.)
Petitioner In Person
The mother was awarded custody of the child and the father was ordered to pay a total of $484.00 per month in child support, comprised of $340.00 per month as the base amount and $144.00 per month for child expenses
 The father submits that his present income is only $413.00 per week from unemployment insurance as stated in his financial statements sworn June 26, 2003.
 The mother’s position is that the father is intentionally unemployed and considering the father’s past work history, he is able to work and earn sufficient funds to make the child support payments pursuant to the Divorce Judgment.
I find that the applicant has not established a material change in circumstances
Bhasin v. Bhasin, 2006 CanLII 3270 (ON S.C.)
Raghbir Singh Bhasin, Respondent, unrepresented
 The husband argues that he does not have the ability to pay spousal support. He states that he has no fixed abode and no income since he lost his job at Home Depot. He presently receives $314 per month from interest earnings plus a CPP disability pension.
 He also submits that since Van Melle J. froze $100,000 of his assets he is in dire financial straits.
the husband shall pay to the wife interim spousal support in the sum of $1,500 per month commencing February 1, 2006 and payable monthly thereafter. Any issue relating to retroactivity or arrears is adjourned to be dealt with by the trial judge
Derek Cross v. Lila Cross, 2004 CanLII 13409 (ON S.C.)
Derek Cross, self represented Petitioner
 The husband argues that he has no steady substantial income. He states that he has done his best at attaining work at the income levels previously held but the opportunities have been few and there have been no offers.
ORDER TO ISSUE AS FOLLOWS:
1. that the husband shall pay to the wife for the support of the two children of the marriage the sum of $700 per month commencing December 1, 2003 based on an imputed annual income of $50,000.00;
2. that the child support arrears is fixed at $15,579 up to November 2003;
3. that the husband shall contribute to the ongoing s. 7 expenses for the two children the sum of $500 per month commencing December 1, 2003 based on his imputed annual income of $50,000.
4. that the arrears relating to the s. 7 expenses are fixed at $25,000;
Pochodaj v. Pochodaj, 2006 CanLII 13104 (ON S.C.)
Jadwiga Pochodaj, self-represented
 The father also asked to have his child support obligations reduced based on his taxable income of 2005 which is $14,287.00.
 On the basis of the material before me, I am not satisfied that he is making reasonable efforts to earn more income or that he has any physical limitation that would prevent him from earning more income.
 Therefore, I am not prepared to base child support on an income different than that imputed to the father by Mr. Justice Belleghem. This was $35,000.00 per annum
Sherwood v. Sherwood, 2006 CanLII 40795 (ON S.C.)
PAUL JAMES SHERWOOD ) On his Own behalf
 Prior to the completion of the evidence in this family law trial, Mr. Paul Sherwood made an assignment in bankruptcy.
 Mr. Sherwood testified that he was terminated by Paccar because of incidents arising from his marriage breakdown and the court dispute. He said the dispute caused him to be absent from work, or late, when he had to deal with the police and frequent court attendances. He blamed Ms. Sherwood for the loss of his job
 Where the underemployment or unemployment is the result of one’s own actions (an event over which the payor had some control) or misconduct, the support obligations will not be reduced or cancelled.
 The onus is on Mr. Sherwood to prove a medical inability to work. He provided no such evidence.
Therefore, I determine his imputed income to be $91,439.69.
Euteneier v. Euteneier, 2007 CanLII 9609 (ON S.C.)
Lynda Euteneier, on her own behalf
 The applicant, Lynda Euteneier is hereby ordered to pay to the respondent Albert Euteneneir his costs in the amount of $6,300.00 inclusive of G.S.T. forthwith. This is a modest amount. On a substantial indemnity basis the bill of costs total $18,868.00, however, the respondent is only seeking $6,300.00 inclusive of G.S.T.
 The respondent was not only 100% successful on the summary judgment dated July 7, 2006, but the applicant was declared a vexatious litigant who was using the court process to harass and/or oppress the respondent. As such, this court ordered that the applicant was not able to institute any further proceedings against the respondent in any court except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court
McNally v. McNally, 2007 CanLII 9613 (ON S.C.)
Paul McNally, Self-Represented
 The applicant submits that he has endured tremendous financial hardship including bankruptcy, loss of his small business and four months of unemployment, while the respondent has made no effort to become economically self-sufficient since the order of Madame Justice Van Melle.
 The applicant submits that it has been more than eight
years since the respondent left the matrimonial home. She is still not working
or looking for work and has only applied for 10 jobs in eight years. He states
that her retraining efforts consisted of globe trotting to
 The applicant further submits that because living arrangements of the children have now changed wherein, one child lives with the father full time, one child lives with both parents on a 50% basis, and the eldest daughter lives independently, the respondent should be paying child support to him based on her 2005 income of $44,433.80 for two children
 In May 2003, Madame Justice Van Melle ordered the father to pay the respondent, mother an equalization of $180,000.00 and spousal support of $2,600.00 per month. In addition, the father was to pay child support in the amount of $2,000.00 per month.
 The respondent is also to pay to the applicant child support payments in the amount of $670.00 per month for two children based on her 2005 income of $44,433.80
 On the issue of spousal support, I am prepared to make an interim order, as I am satisfied that there should be an immediate reduction in spousal support payments to $1,000.00 per month, effective the date of this order.
G.A.F. v. L.E.D., 2005 CanLII 32923 (ON S.C.)
Mr. G.A.F., self-represented Plaintiff
I am persuaded that sole custody of J.F. shall be to the defendant
 The plaintiff testifies that he has been unable to work since the 23rd of February, 2005 due to anxiety and depression. In support, he has filed a form of statement in support of his claim for long-term disability benefits (Exhibit 6).]
 The date of the application is July 28th, 2005 and the Physician’s Information part of the statement indicates the plaintiff’s most recent appointment with the physician was the same date, i.e. July 28th, 2005. The Physician’s Information part of the statement reveals his first appointment with the plaintiff was February 24th, 2005 and that he recommended the plaintiff cease work as of the first appointment date, i.e. February 24th, 2005.
 In these circumstances, I am not prepared to treat the plaintiff’s income for 2005 as being any different than his income for 2004 for purposes of determining the appropriate quantum of child support.
 In the result, the retroactive arrears from January 1st, 2002 to August 1st, 2005 shall be $2,584.00, comprising $1,1968.00 (representing the aggregate annualized differences) plus $616.00 (representing the first 8 months of 2005). I find then that the total arrears in child support from June 1st, 2001 to August 1st, 2005 is $6,732.78
 Applying the plaintiff’s proportionate share at 85%, the monthly payment by the plaintiff for s.7 extraordinary expenses is $331.97
I fix spousal support for the period at $600.00 per month for total spousal support of $10,800.00
 The defendant shall be entitled to her costs.
Lawrie v. Turcotte, 2006 CanLII 12971 (ON S.C.)
Damian Brett Lawrie, Self-Represented
 On this motion, the mother seeks orders from the court for summary judgment for sole custody of Seon, aged 8, and for the Father to be granted final or temporary access to Seon only in accord with the second report of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. That report recommended that access to the Father be supervised, and that consideration be given to unsupervised access only once the Father has agreed to undergo psychiatric assessment and treatment, if so recommended, for his severe aggressive tendencies.
 For his part, the Father seeks custody or unrestricted access to Seon. He also asserts an entitlement to spousal support
 In addition, in his argument, counsel for the Mother asserts that the Father is simply unwilling to abide by orders of the court.
There are at least 12 if not more separate orders of the court issued in response to the Father’s continuing applications for unsupervised access.
However, he made a lengthy presentation to the court, backed up by three medical reports, one by a psychiatrist done in November of 2005, eight months after the March 2005 second report of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. He puts these reports forward as evidence of him not having a medical or psychiatric issue that would require him to have only supervised
Father seems to regard these results as consistent with his ____________ belief that there is a conspiracy of some sort in the Superior Court designed to deprive him of access to his son Seon.
As other colleagues have observed on prior orders, however, and as I myself observed, what is clear to me is that the Father simply is not prepared to accept the authority of the court’s orders, regardless of what lies behind them, if they are not in accord with the situation that he thinks should be in existence.
 With respect to the summary judgment, section 4, custody, however, the Father made clear at the argument of the motion that he is agreeable to the Mother having that custody. What he disagrees with and what remains the triable issue are the terms upon which he should be entitled more access to his son.
Cavic v. Carroccia, 2006 CanLII 28554 (ON S.C.)
10] Mr. Carroccia states that he spent in excess of $25,000 in legal fees prior to representing himself. Ms. Cavic states that she spent in the range of $16,000 on legal fees prior to representing herself. Both sides cast blame on the other for the matter not settling and for the matter resulting in a lengthy and protracted trial.
Miles Roy respondent, appearing in person
On appeal from order of Justice Terrance P. O'Connor
 We are of the view that the “shared parenting” component of the trial judge’s order cannot stand.
 In light of partial success, the appellant is entitled to a costs recovery which we fix at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.
Beitel v. Beitel, 2006 CanLII 60944 (ON S.C.)
Allan Beitel ) In person
Van Melle, J.
Allan attempted to show that Micheline was involved in the timing of his arrest and in having him re-arrested for breaches of his recognizance, so that he would be unable to properly address the issues in this litigation
 In December of 1999 Allan made a proposal of bankruptcy.
 The major creditor was Revenue
 Allan did not establish his total disability. It appears that he has been assessed many times by many different physicians. He had available to him all of the reports and letters but as I set out earlier, refused to produce all of them. I must conclude that he chose to rely upon only those reports that he thought were most favourable to his position
 The last full year that Allan worked was 2002. In that year he earned $162,000.00. It is appropriate to impute that amount of income to him
The retroactive child support and the contribution to the tuition expenses total $93,879.95
Those expenses total $12,492.70 of which two-thirds is $8,328.46. That amount will be credited to Micheline from the equalization payment due to Allan.
I am however, prepared to order that the funds payable to Allan after the issue of costs of this trial has been determined, remain in trust as a fund from which these payments can be made upon a determination of Allan’s appropriate contribution.
 The amount of $10,070.31, made up of the following, is to be reimbursed to Micheline as well:
Stutz v. Stutz Sorrenson, 2002 CanLII 2815 (ON S.C.)
In previous matters, they each had counsel but now, funds are exhausted and both have appeared before me unrepresented by counsel.
Walsh v. Walsh, 2007 ONCA 218 (CanLII)
JoAnne Constance Walsh in person
An important step in the history of the litigation between these parties includes the decision of this court in Walsh v. Walsh (2004), 69 O.R. (3d) 577. In that judgment, this court overturned an award of retroactive child support of almost $43,000 that was to have been paid by the father to the mother.
Paragraph 2 of the October 11, 2006 order will therefore be varied as follows:
2. The Respondent (JoAnne Constance Walsh) shall not be at liberty to bring any further proceedings of any kind in this ongoing litigation, except an application for variation of child support in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines, until Justice Tulloch’s cost order of $3,000.00 and this cost order of $21,700.29 in favour of the Applicant, Michael Walsh are satisfied in full
Prosser-Blake v. Blake, 2007 CanLII 10414 (ON S.C.)
 For reasons delivered orally the motion of Burkley Blake the Respondent to have his Answer reinstated and to adjourn the trial was dismissed by reason of his non-compliance with the order of Justice Shaw dated January 25, 2007 for the payment of costs as a pre-condition to the bringing of such a motion.
 The Respondent father is presently incarcerated, with charges pending. It is not clear when his release may be expected. The primary issue before me is father’s access to the child, if any, upon his release.
 The applicant testified that the respondent was
physically and verbally abusive from the time they first cohabited in
An argument ensued and he pulled her around their apartment by her hair. He also kicked her in the stomach, knowing that she was pregnant.
 The applicant awakened Drake and together they went to the hospital. The respondent was arrested on September 30, 2002 and was incarcerated until April or May of 2003
The applicant testified that there are outstanding warrants
 The respondent pushed the applicant to the ground and took off in the car leaving his mother and niece standing on the sidewalk.
 The police attended and charged the respondent. He pleaded guilty and was jailed from September of 2004 to February of 2005
 Notwithstanding the order of Mr. Justice Smith dated September 7, 2005, that the respondent refrain absolutely from any and all contact with the applicant, the applicant testified that the respondent continued to harass her on her cell phone calling from private numbers. He began calling at her school. A police investigation led to a charge against him of criminal harassment as well as charges of breach of probation.
 In September of 2005 the respondent requested a visit and suggested they met at the County Fair Plaza. The applicant unwisely decided to supervise this visit herself. She took Ashtyn and met the respondent in the food court at the plaza. She testified that she believed the respondent had been drinking and called the police. He was then arrested.
 Ashtyn’s last contact with his father was January 1, 2006 when the child was two years old. The applicant testified that Ashtyn has no recollection of his father
23] Ashtyn’s visits with his father have been supervised, on occasion by the applicant, and on other occasions by his paternal grandparents. The applicant testified that the grandparents cannot control their son and were ineffective as his sureties. As an example, she testified that during the early part of their marriage, when the parties lived in the basement of Mr. Blake’s parents’ home, Mr. Blake’s parents yelled at her to “shut up” when their son was beating her as they didn’t want the police called.
 By prearrangement and court order the respondent was not to come to the door when the applicant brought Ashtyn to visit him at his parents’ home. However the applicant testified that there was an incident on every occasion and the respondent would come to the door every time. During one visit, he called the applicant a “bitch,” “whore,” “slut,” in front of the child and told her to get off his property
 January 1, 2006 was the last visit. She took Ashtyn to the home of the respondent’s parents for a visit. When she arrived she said the respondent reeked of alcohol. She informed him that she was not leaving the child and the respondent blocked the door. In response to this the paternal grandparents yelled at the respondent to “Let the fucking bitch go.” It is Ms. Prosser-Blake’s position that the respondent’s parents are inappropriate supervisors. She also testified that she cannot locate anyone she trusts to supervise the visits who will agree to be a supervisor. She objects to any access stating that the respondent is alcoholic and irresponsible with the child
 It is therefore ordered that the respondent may have access to Ashtyn once he is released from custody at the Supervised Access Facility for a maximum of two hours per week at a date and time to be agreed upon.
 In addition the respondent is prohibited from visiting with the child except at the premises of the Supervised Access facility. He is prohibited from removing the child from his school or from any other third party
Remus v. Remus, 2008 CanLII 22141 (ON S.C.)
 The end result of that application was that of the thirteen variations sought in the order of Wright J., all but one were dismissed, primarily on the basis that no material change had been demonstrated, or that some of the matters being sought were clear in the judgment and thus required no variation. The one change that was made by Justice McCartney was to vary the order by terminating the mother’s responsibility to pay child support to the father effective December 2005.
 With regard to the issue of the variation of access and custody, the Respondent relies upon the information in his affidavit that the mother had previously been charged under the Criminal Code with threats against him. He further claims that the children were restricted by the mother from attending important paternal family events and that the only reason for her de facto custody is that she has refused to provide access to the father and has alienated the children. He also relies upon the mother being found in contempt by Smith J. of the previous order of December 3
 The manner in which this case has proceeded so far, the voluminous material, the fact that much of the material is filed improperly as exhibits to affidavits are not properly sworn, letters filed as exhibits which should not properly be attached as exhibits, and in general, an inordinate amount of overlapping information in the affidavits have made it extremely difficult to determine exactly what it is the parties rely upon in support of their motions. This may very well be one of those cases where, in dealing with self-represented parties who are in high conflict with each other, a strict application of the Rules would result in both parties having significant deficiencies in their material to the point where neither party would have their issues dealt with, and the war would continue until both come to a realization that their energy should be focused on their children and not on each other
 It seems to me that this is an obvious example for the application of Rule 2.2 of the Family Law Rules which notes: “The primary objective of these rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly.”
 This is the approach I have taken to this case. I have attempted overall to be more concerned about attempting to do justice between them rather than determine who broke what rule, or breached which order.
 In some circumstances, it is appropriate to maintain an order of joint custody where the parties are at least able to communicate for the purposes of considering the best interests of the children. The history of this file demonstrates that these parties would be highly unlikely to be able to agree on anything relating to the children.
I am satisfied that the circumstances have now changed such that the orders of Justice Wright and Justice Pierce should be varied to the effect that the children shall now be in the sole custody of the mother with full and generous access to the father, such access to be determined by the children
Mr. Remus’ 2006 income can only be determined as $2,775.00 as noted in his income tax return.
 That results in a determination that Mr. Remus is currently in arrears of payments for medical and health benefits in the amount of $1,280.51; for orthodontic expenses in the amount of $1,500.00; for special and extraordinary expenses for Conner and/or Abigail in the amount of $2,455.00.
Dustin v. Dustin, 2003 CanLII 2106 (ON S.C.)
WILLIAM DUSTIN, ) William Dustin being unrepresented
 This is a trial for relief claimed by the plaintiff (wife) against the defendant (husband) under the Children’s Law Reform Act and the Family Law Act. The defendant filed a financial statement, but no other documentation, was duly noted in default, and the trial proceeded without his participation, even though he was present
Arsenault v. Arsenault, 2008 CanLII 35668 (ON S.C.)
 The Applicant claims custody of one child, Nicole Lynn Arsenault, born August 18, 1990; child support based on the Guidelines; spousal support; and an equalization of net family property. The Respondent has not complied with the order of Stach J. dated May 17, and this matter has therefore proceeded on an undefended basis.
McEvoy v. McEvoy, 2003 CanLII 2178 (ON S.C.)
NOLE NANCY McEVOY, ) No one appearing for the Respondent
 The applicant moves to strike the respondent’s pleadings and affidavit in this matter under Rule 34.15 for failure to attend to be examined.
 The respondent, although duly served with the notice of motion, did not appear, and her solicitor has removed himself from the record. The motion is granted
Bolt v. Bolt, 2006 CanLII 8876 (ON S.C.)
In the end, the husband failed to attend the trial, his pleadings were struck, and the wife proceeded to complete the matter based on her counterclaim.
 The wife (Respondent) Mieke Bolt, is awarded all inclusive costs herein of $31,000.00
Gray v. Gray, 2006 CanLII 28736 (ON S.C.)
Mr. Justice D. C. Shaw
 I am satisfied that Mr. Gray has had ample opportunity to respond to Ms. Gray’s Application and Notice of Motion, but has chosen not to do so.
 The motion for summary judgment therefore proceeded on August 10, 2006, on an uncontested basis.
There is no competing version of events before me and no apparent reason to question the credibility of Ms. Gray’s Affidavit.
 With respect to custody, Ms. Gray has been the primary caregiver of the children
Mr. Gray has refused to make formal financial disclosure. In the circumstances, an award of child support retroactive to the first month after the month of separation is appropriate.
The pension plan administrator will value the pension benefits accrued during the marriage and one-half that value will be transferred to Ms. Gray’s locked-in R.R.S.P
 The solicitor for Ms. Gray presents a Bill of Costs for this Application, on a partial indemnity basis, in the sum of $2,420, plus GST and disbursements, for a total of $3,010.53. , … , I am satisfied that the costs claimed are reasonable.
Enns v. Hawkins, 2008 CanLII 35675 (ON S.C.)
Mr. Justice D. C. Shaw
 This trial proceeded on an uncontested basis. Mr. Enns did not attend.
 Ms. Hawkins has been the child’s primary caregiver since the child’s birth.
She testified that he had been involved in five motor vehicle accidents in the six months leading up to March 2006 and that the child had been in his vehicle on each occasion. Ms. Hawkins stated that when she insisted after the fifth accident that Mr. Enns’ access be supervised, he refused. Three months later she lost all contact with Mr. Enns.
 In light of the fact that Ms. Hawkins has been the only parent in the child’s life since March 2006 and in light of the fact that the child appears to be doing well in her mother’s care, I have no hesitation in awarding permanent custody to Ms. Hawkins. In the circumstances, I will not make any order for access.
I impute income to him in the amount shown in both his 2005 T-4 and his March 10, 2006, financial statement, namely, $25,500.00.
There is also no evidence of any reasonable excuse for why support was not sought earlier. However, I am satisfied that on the basis of the conduct of Mr. Enns, who remained in the matrimonial home after separation, indulging in drug abuse and alcohol abuse, while ignoring his financial obligations to his child, and on the basis of the circumstances of the child, whose only support has come from her mother who makes about $500.00 every two weeks, that a retroactive order is warranted
Retroactive child support for the three years after separation has been calculated at $7,871.00. Arrears of $1,300.00 brings that amount to $9,171.00. Mr. Enns’ whereabouts are unknown. He has outstanding costs and support orders. In my opinion, there is no realistic possibility that Ms. Hawkins will be able to collect retroactive child support and arrears from Mr. Enns, other than by way of a vesting order.
Pursuant to s. 100 of the Courts of Justice Act, title to the lands and premises located at
Bauer v. Bauer, 2006 CanLII 14400 (ON S.C.)
ANTHONY BAUER, ) Self-represented, for the Defendant
The courts always favour mothers and that is why they gave custody of you to your mother. It was nothing I said or did that’s just the way they do it and it is very unfair and sexist. That means it favours woman over man for no real reason.
Bauer v. Bauer, 2007 CanLII 16624 (ON S.C.)
 Mr. Bauer was unsuccessful on his motion for contempt and Mrs. Bauer was successful in obtaining an order preventing Mr. Bauer from bringing further motions without first receiving a court order
Skirten v. Lengyel, 2007 CanLII 4890 (ON S.C.)
 An application in this matter was filed on October 26,
2006, and served on the Respondent on November 1, 2006. No responding materials
have been filed. Pursuant to Rule 10(5)(d), a date was
set for an uncontested trial. That proceeded on December 12, 2006, via
 On the basis of the information before me, again recognizing that there are no responding materials, I am satisfied that there should be an order for custody in favour of the Applicant Ms. Skirten.
Valente v. Valente, 2003 CanLII 1985 (ON S.C.)
DAMIANO (COSMO) VALENTE ) Self-Represented
JUSTICE T. A. PLATANA
 The difficulty in this case is that this Respondent simply does not accept what he is being directed to do by court orders, or what is being indicated to him by the letters from various counsel which he has received.
 The frustrating situation in this case is that this Respondent must be made to understand his responsibility to adhere to court orders. I find that his actions have been flagrant, deliberate and without reason.
 I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Valente in all of the circumstances, deliberately and intentionally and willingly has refused to comply with the court order
 I find Mr. Valente in contempt.
 There will be an order:
(1) That Mr. Valente be committed to jail for a period of 45 days unless he purges his contempt prior to June 5, 2003 by complying fully with the order of Wright J. dated November 28th, 2000
Jones v. Cole, 2007 CanLII 21956 (ON S.C.)
 This was a motion by the Applicant mother to vary child custody and a cross motion by the Respondent father to vary child support.
 The Applicant was self-represented at trial and on the hearings for fixation of costs. She indicated that she was not in a position to pay costs, since she was required to pay her child support, and her income would be decreasing due to alterations in her employment
 All considered, I am fixing total fees and disbursements as follows:
Preparation time – 100 hours @ $125./hour $12,500.00
Trial time – 9 days @ $1200./day $10,800.00
TOTAL FEES $23,300.00
GST on Fees @ 6% $ 1,398.00
Disbursements $ 3,246.03
GST on Disbursements @ 6% $ 195.00
TOTAL COSTS ALLOWED $28,139.03
Jellison v. Jellison, 2008 CanLII 35682 (ON S.C.)
LEE JELLISON, ) The Applicant is self-represented
Undertaking No. 20: Mr. Jellison has requested his bankruptcy file from the Trustee in Bankruptcy and shall produce it upon receipt.
Boissy v. Boissy, 2004 CanLII 7047 (ON S.C.)
DANIEL JOSEPH BOISSY, ) The Respondent (Husband) being self-represented
 Subsequent to incurring the obligation for occupation rent the Father made an assignment in bankruptcy.
Stokaluk v. Stokaluk, 2003 CanLII 2252 (ON S.C.)
. It is the plaintiffs position that after suffering years of emotional abuse she has finally summonsed the courage to take action, but due to the controlling nature of the defendant, he must be removed from the home because now he will make life even more impossible than before.
 In the last 24 hours the police were called twice, once last night by the eldest son, and then this morning by the plaintiffs lawyer. But no physical violence was involved, only emotional upset
 Due to the allegations of the husbands propensity to gamble, as well as his controlling and intrusive conduct towards the wife, an order will issue for non dissipation of family assets, as well as a restraining order restraining the husband from annoying or harassing the wife or the children in any fashion whatsoever
Korczynski v. Korczynski, 2007 CanLII 16631 (ON S.C.)
TERRY EDWARD KORCZYNSKI, ) The Applicant being self-represented.
 After the first morning of trial, the father conceded the mother’s position with respect to supervised access
When the case returned in the afternoon of the first day the remaining issues which were not agreed upon were confined to s. 7 expenses, both retroactive and current, and retroactive child support for slightly more than 2 years.
The father retained counsel at the beginning of the action until he could no longer afford to do so and has incurred legal fees of some $30,000
 For all these reasons, the mother is allowed her costs of $9,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements and GST.
Regaudie v. Thomas, 2002 CanLII 49531 (ON S.C.)
No one for Respondent/Husband
As the father does not advance a claim for custody or access, being noted in default, and as the mother states that she has been the prime care-giver for the children, there will be judgment granting the petitioner custody of the children, with the respondent to have reasonable access on reasonable notice.
L.J.J.C. v. V.S.C., 2006 CanLII 3470 (ON S.C.)
V.S.C. ) The Respondent being self-represented.
 An application for custody was originally issued by L.J.J.C. in February of 2003. In June of 2003, V.S.C. instituted a Petition for Divorce. In addition to these two matters, Mrs. V.S.C. instituted a civil action against her husband for injuries she suffered in an alleged sexual assault which took place after the parties had originally separated
 Subsequent to the Trial Management Conference, Mrs. V.S.C. brought a motion for adjournment which was refused by Justice Pierce on January 12. Specifically, Justice Pierce noted that the material filed made no reference to any pending surgery as apparently had earlier been claimed by the wife. That endorsement further noted that the parties have been separated for nearly four years during which time the wife had had the assistance of five previous lawyers and that she had elected to represent herself since spring of 2005. Subsequent to spring of 2005 the wife had always appeared on her own behalf on motions and conferences
 A recess was then taken. When court resumed following the recess, Mrs. V.S.C. was not present. It was noted that all of the materials which she had previously brought into the court room were gone. I requested the court staff to conduct inquiries as to her whereabouts. I allowed an additional twenty minutes following the recess in order to confirm that she had not been delayed in returning. I ultimately determined that she had absented herself from the proceedings.
She described that Mrs. V.S.C. would spank N.A.S.C., lock him in his room for very lengthy periods, or at times restrain him by sitting on him with her knees on his legs. Mrs. McIver referred to situations when Mrs. V.S.C. would say, “N.A.S.C., it’s time for restraint.”
 She also described how Mrs. V.S.C. was always complaining about how much marijuana costs. This witness noted that she had seen occasions where Mrs. V.S.C. was holding N.A.S.C. on her knee while smoking marijuana and at one point in time had dropped ashes on him.
Mrs. V.S.C. will have access for a period of two hours, two times per week and such access shall be supervised
 The very unfortunate aspect of the balance of this claim is that Mrs. V.S.C. is not present in order to pursue any of the rest of her claims either under her divorce action, or under her civil action. On that basis, I have no choice but to dismiss her claims in action number CV-04-0935. All other claims which she makes in the divorce action, including claims for support, must also be dismissed as there is no evidence before me upon which any judgment can be based. Since any interim orders expire at the time of trial when final orders are made, the dismissal of her claim now effectively discontinues and terminates any orders previously being enforced by Family Responsibility Office
Maratib v. Zafar, 2005 CanLII 19844 (ON S.C.)
Maratib A. Zafar being self-represented
 The sole remaining issue for determination is costs. In his argument on this issue Mr. Zafar, who represented himself, is patently unfamiliar with the rules that govern and expresses surprise that the Applicant is seeking costs.
 Ms. Maratib was successful in achieving a divorce and sole custody.
 Mr. Zafar had no contact with his family for 1 ½ years yet he was bound by a restraining order which now continues because it was not seriously opposed. This is despite the fact that Mr. Zafar had done nothing to seek out or to intimidate, harass or otherwise offend either Ms. Maratib or the children during the period of separation.
I accept that costs of a lawyer necessitated self-representation. Had Mr. Zafar been represented by counsel at the initial stages of these child and custody issues it is reasonable to believe that matters could have been resolved, or at least, that fewer and different orders would be generated.
M.C.J. v. J.J.J., 2006 CanLII 23936 (ON S.C.)
J.J.J., ) No one appearing for the Respondent.
 Mr. J.J.J.'s Answer, filed in this proceeding by his then solicitor, does not contest the mother having custody of the child provided he is given generous access. Notwithstanding this pleading he moved, before me, on November 1, 2005, for interim custody of E.A.J.. His motion was dismissed. He has not appeared at trial to contest E.A.J.’s custody and has not amended his Answer to claim custody.
The evidence discloses that Mr. J.J.J. encouraged the children to blame their mother for breaking up the family and reporting his assaultive behaviour to the police, with the result that he was prosecuted and jailed. The flavour of the evidence called at trial is that Mr. J.J.J. actively and consciously has attempted to alienate both the children from their mother. The result of this conduct is undoubtedly hurtful to both the children and likely to affect their adult relationships, both with their parents and with future partners and others
 The mother shall have sole custody of E.A.J..
 Mr. J.J.J. ignored court orders requiring him to verify and value assets.
 The applicant asks the court for orders to transfer assets in order to satisfy the judgment for equalization. That is a reasonable request given the recalcitrance of the respondent in these proceedings about which more will be said.
 Mr. J.J.J. was charged with assault. After 2 or 3 days in jail he was released on an undertaking to stay away from the matrimonial home and to have no contact with his wife
The applicant called the police and the respondent was arrested and jailed in May and June of 2002. He subsequently pleaded guilty to break and enter, breach of an undertaking and assault. He was subject to a conditional sentence of 18 months imposed on June 4, 2002.
 The ink was scarcely dry on this order before the husband breached it.
The applicant called the police and the respondent was again jailed until July of 2002. Unfortunately this did not appear to deter his behaviour. Since then Mr. J.J.J. has continued to harass the applicant, her parents and her common law partner, P.H.. He writes hostile and insulting letters to the applicant. In the beginning, these were sent directly to the applicant; now they are sent through counsel
 The applicant testified that the respondent continues
to stalk her at work and around the city. He will, for example, drive by, slow
down, stare at her, scream and swear at her. This behaviour also extends to her
current home. He continues to follow her home from work. She testified that in
the month and a half leading up to trial on two occasions she found the
respondent holding up traffic on
 The respondent breached the order for supervision in any event, arriving at E.A.J.’s school to take her out for lunch and picking her up after work. The respondent has refused to use the supervised access center for exchanges
 I am satisfied that a permanent restraining order is warranted in this case, … , The police force having jurisdiction, including the Thunder Bay Police Services, Ontario Provincial Police, R.C.M.P., or other police forces having notice of this order are ordered to enforce it
 In addition, the respondent is ordered to enter into a recognizance with the court pursuant to r. 32 (2) of the Family Law Rules in the amount of $5,000 without deposit with one surety.
 The respondent did not appear at trial. The applicant was put to the expense of proving her case. Trial comprised approximately one and one-half days.
 In my view the bill of costs is reasonable having regard for the multiplicity of motions necessitated by the respondent’s conduct. The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant her costs inclusive of fees, disbursements and GST fixed at $31,383.40.
B. P. v. T.-L. P., 2003 CanLII 2446 (ON S.C.)
B. P. ) Self represented
 The Father did not file any responding material but has filed Notice of Intention to Act in Person in which he states:
I understand that the Court can make something called a provisional order which would allow me to handle the matter here where I live
 When the Father commenced this Application he attorned
to the jurisdiction of this Court. The fact that the Father moved out of
 With respect to the issue of custody, the Mother has
had interim custody of the children since December 1993. Although the Father
had access to the children in