Self Represented Parties

                                                     In Divorce Litigation

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

      Peter Karl Roscoe

 

               Nov  2008

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                          Contents

 

 

 

                                                                                                                                                             page

 

 

Introduction                                                                                                                                              1

 

 

Eastern Judicial Region                                                                                                                             2

 

 

Toronto Judicial Region                                                                                                                           23

 

 

Southwest Judicial Region                                                                                                                       37

 

 

Northeast Judicial Region                                                                                                                        48

 

 

Central East Judicial Region                                                                                                                    58

 

 

Central South Judicial Region                                                                                                                  72

 

 

Central West Judicial Region                                                                                                                   89

 

 

Northwest Judicial Region                                                                                                                      103

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                        Self Represented Parties in Divorce Litigation

 

 

 

                                                                Introduction

 

 

Some divorcing men and women choose to represent themselves in court. Others are forced to do so when they run out of money and can no longer afford a lawyer. A fully contested divorce may cost in the 100’s of thousands of dollars. Divorcing spouses often have lowered income and increased expenses. Bankruptcies are common. The Ministry of Justice has estimated that between one quarter and one third of divorcing litigants appear self represented.

 

Cases with self represented litigants were often protracted, acrimonius, and had poor outcomes. Many self represented parties had difficulties coping with the complex legal procedures involved. The 205 cases that follow are examples of some of the worst. The large number of problematic self represented cases would indicate it is a common with divorces. From a comparative standpoint, problematic self represented cases were found to be as common as claims of domestic violence, and orders for income imputation. A breakdown of the cases themselves shows 87 % involved male self represented litigants. Regional averages show almost 19 cases in eastern Ontario regions for every female case. The average for the central and western regions of the province are slightly less than 5 to 1

 

 

 

Self Represented Litigants in Family Cases

 

 

 

Judicial Region

Total  Cases

Male  Cases

Female  Cases

 

 

 

 

Eastern

   36   ( 100 % )

   34   ( 94.4 % )

     2   (  5.4 % )

Toronto

   25  ( 100 % )

   20   ( 80.0 % )

     5   ( 20.0 % )

Central East

   26   ( 100 % )

   25   ( 96.2 % )

     1   (  3.8 % )

Central West

   28   ( 100 % )

   25   ( 89.3 % )

     3   ( 10.7 % )

Central South

   30   ( 100 % )

   25   ( 83.3% )

     5   ( 16.7 % )

South West

   21   ( 100 % )

   15   ( 71.4 % )

     6   ( 28.6 % )

North East

   17   ( 100 % )

   16   ( 94.2 % )

     1   (  5.8 % )

North West

   22   ( 100 % )

   19   ( 84.2 % )

     3   ( 15.8 % )

 

 

 

 

Total

 205   ( 100 % )

 179   ( 87.3 % )

   26   ( 12.7 % )

 

 

Discrimination Ratios       ( DR = Male Losses / Female Losses )

 

Eastern  Ont DR = Eastern + North East + Central East = ( 34 + 25 + 16 ) / ( 2 + 1 + 1 ) = 75 / 4 = 18.8

 

Central Ont DR = Toronto + Central South = ( 20 + 29 ) / ( 5 + 5 ) = 49 / 10 = 4.9

 

Western Ont DR = South West + North West + Central West = ( 15 + 19 + 25 / ( 6 + 3 + 3 ) = 59 / 12 = 4.9

 

 

Eastern Judicial Region

 

 

 

Family Responsibility Office v. P.K.R., 2005 CanLII 33530 (ON S.C.)

 

P.K.R.         )   In person

 

Charbonneau J.:

 

However, he alleges that, “his constitutional rights have been violated by a child support order that does not conform with the laws and was obtained by fraud and error”. He further pleads that, as a result of having his pleadings struck, he was precluded from seeking relief in the action and that this constitutes a violation of his rights to have a full trial of the issues raised by him in the action

 

Here are some of the arguments he puts forward:

 

(d) The rule allowing a judge to strike a pleading breaches a party’s fundamental rights to full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”) as it provides too much discretion, lacks proper control and as such is an unreasonable power. A much more limited power would be sufficient to meet the objectives and therefore the rule contravenes his charter rights because it does not minimally impair those rights.

(e) The rule was improperly and arbitrarily applied by Justice de Sousa who he maintains is statistically the judge who uses this rule more often in the whole of Canada.

(f) He also maintains that those same statistics indicate that the rule is almost exclusively used against male self-represented litigants. As such, it’s application contravenes s. 15 of the Charter because it discriminates against a particular class of litigants.

 

17] I find that Mr. P.K.R. has not brought evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption that he does not have the ability to pay.

 

. In default of this order, Mr. P.K.R. is to be committed to jail for a period of 60 days.

 

 

 

 

P.R. v. K.R., 2005 CanLII 44186 (ON S.C.)

 

P.R.         )   In person

 

Power J.

 

[1] Enough is enough.

 

[2] I am satisfied that Mr. P.R. is a vexatious litigator. He is abusing the processes of this Court. Indeed, during the argument before me on November 18, 2005, Mr. P.R. informed the court that he has been in this Court and in the Ontario Provincial Court on seventy (70) occasions with respect to his family law issues. Even if seventy (70) is not the correct count, the actual number is substantial.

 

This confirmed my suspicion that, insofar as Mr. P.R. is concerned, the litigation is litigation for its own sake and is brought to harass Ms. K.R. and entertain Mr. P.R.. The litigation has become the thing

 

[26] I find that, throughout this litigation, Mr. P.R. has exhibited a contumelious attitude toward court orders and procedures

 

 

 

 

Orser v. Grant, 2003 CanLII 2277 (ON S.C.)

 

Andris Peter Grant, Self-Represented

 

Madam Justice Jennifer Blishen

 

Madam Justice Sachs struck Mr. Grant’s pleadings and ordered that they could not be reinstated until he paid the child support and costs previously ordered, after which the application could proceed to trial and issues of credibility could be canvassed.

 

The latter motions have all been stayed pending the disposition of a motion brought by the support recipient, Mrs. Orser, pursuant to s.140 of the Courts of Justice Act, to have Mr. Grant declared a vexatious litigant.

 

[16] After being served with notice of this motion by the FRO, Mr. Grant filed a notice of cross-motion requesting an adjournment as he had filed and served, on April 10, 2003, a notice of constitutional question, and wished to set a half day to argue that issue.

 

To require counsel for the FRO and the judge on a default hearing under s. 41 of the FRSAE Act to review 305 pages of largely irrelevant material and hear submissions based on that material would be a waste of time and cause unnecessary delay

 

Other than his financial statement which, as previously noted, did not have any supporting documentation attached, the other documents are not relevant to the issues under the FRSAE Act.

 

[24] Therefore, pursuant to Rule 14(22) and (23) of the Family Law Rules, I am striking Mr. Grant’s notice of motion and cross-motion and all affidavit evidence and documentation filed in his motion and cross-motion records, other than his recent financial statement. He is not entitled to any further order of the court and cannot file any further material on any proceeding under the FRSAE Act until he fulfils the conditions outlined in paragraph 4 of Justice de Sousa’s January 15, 2003 order.

 

 

 

 

Booth v. Hildebrandt, 2007 CanLII 57460 (ON S.C.)

 

ANDREW HILDEBRANDT       )     Self-Represented

 

Power J.

 

In a letter to Justice Aitken he said:

… You made a choice to not address those concerns and in this regard demonstrated bias.”

I have made a formal request to the Attorney General asking for a review [sic, of] your endorsement and the manner in which you conducted yourself in this case

I will communicate with the appropriate Judicial Council as well for them to review your actions

 

[23] Following Justice Aitken’s decision of May 23rd last, the respondent’s conduct has been reprehensible.

 

[35] In his factum filed on the motion, Mr. Hildebrandt accuses Aitken J. of acting in contravention of her oath of office.

 

[41] I order that the respondent refrain from commencing any further motions in these proceedings without first obtaining consent from this Court to do so.

 

 

 

 

O'Brien v. Griffin, 2004 CanLII 10709 (ON S.C.)

 

DOUGLAS GRIFFIN       )     On his own behalf

 

METIVIER J.

 

[48] Finally, I order that pursuant to Section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, Dr. Griffin is prohibited from instituting further proceedings without leave of the court.

 

He has recently sworn an information in order to have a public mischief charge laid against his ex-wife but the Crown refused to lay the charges, as a result of what Dr. Griffin refers to as the anti-male gender bias present in our courts

 

 

 

 

Sleiman v. Sleiman, 2003 CanLII 1982 (ON S.C.)

 

GHASSAN SLEIMAN       )    Not present, unrepresented

 

C. Aitken J.

 

Pursuant to Orders of Cosgrove J. dated April 3, 1997:

(i) Ghassan Sleiman was to have supervised access and telephone access to Phillip Sleiman, and after certain conditions had been met, unsupervised access to Philip

 

Pursuant to the Orders of Metivier J. dated October 7, 1999 and June 14, 2001:

(i) The pleadings of Ghassan Sleiman were struck for failure to comply with earlier court orders regarding disclosure and production

 

Pursuant to the Decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal dated May 7, 2002:

(i) Ghassan Sleiman was given the right to maintain his claim for access and to assert that claim in the divorce proceedings

 

The issue of access could not be dealt with on a final basis because Ghassan Sleiman was not given any notice of the trial date.

 

Mr. Sleiman has not seen Philip since 1997

 

 

 

 

Luedtke v. Vuletic, 2001 CanLII 2328 (ON S.C.)

 

Rutherford J

 

He told me he didn’t want to “play this court game” but just wanted his child. I told him that it was basically his unwillingness to participate properly in the court proceedings, which were not a game, which had led to his Answer having been struck leaving him a non-participant. Thereafter, the respondent sat with a young woman in the body of the Court and, after one or two interruptions during the early part of the proceedings, observed quietly.

 

 

 

 

Pike v. Cook, 2005 CanLII 2034 (ON S.C.)

 

Hackland, J:

 

Some five months later, on May 13, 2002, Ms. Cook obtained a final order from Justice Lafrance-Cardinal which granted her sole custody of Jeremy and provided Mr. Pike with alternate weekend and alternate Thursday evening access. This order was granted on an uncontested basis. The continuing record documents a series of consent adjournments and then a finding of default against Mr. Pike and an order that the matter proceed to an uncontested trial. The final order was directed to be served personally on Mr. Pike. He took no steps to appeal this order. In those circumstances, I reject Mr. Pike’s argument that the Court proceedings and final order took him by surprise because he was under the misapprehension that the mediation was still under way. Rather, I find that Mr. Pike chose not to instruct counsel to go on record on his behalf, although he was receiving legal advice.

 

I find that he acquiesced in the final order because it created a custody and access regime with which he was comfortable notwithstanding the reduction of his access.

 

[20] A somewhat unique aspect of this case is that Ms. Cook was permitted to move Jeremy to Philadelphia pursuant to a temporary without prejudice order granted 14 months before trial.

 

 

 

 

Kim v. Kim 2001 CarswellOnt 502

 

Madam Justice J.A. Blishen

 

1 This matter came before me as an uncontested trial which had been set pursuant to R. 10(5) of the Family Law Rules.

 

Mr. Kim appeared at the case conference on October 3 and indicated he wished to retain counsel. He was ordered to file all responding materials on or before October 16, 2000 and the matter was adjourned to November 7, 2000 for a further case conference.

 

On November 7 the case conference was held with both parties present with Korean interpreters. At that time, the respondent had not complied with the October 3 order in that no answer and no financial statement had been filed. He was ordered to file all responding documents on or before November 20, failing which it was made clear that pursuant to R. 10(5), the matter would be set for an uncontested trial.

 

6 Based on the evidence of the applicant, I find that during the course of the 10 year marriage, the respondent physically, mentally and emotionally abused the applicant causing her physical injury, anxiety and fear.

 

7 Since the date of separation, the respondent has not seen the children and although he has attempted to communicate with the applicant

 

I order final custody of the children Junghwan and Edward Kim to their mother. Given the abusive behaviour of their father and the lack of interest that he has shown in their welfare, access to the respondent will be supervised and in the discretion of the applicant, mother.

 

9 Given Mr. Kim's abusive and threatening behaviour, he is restrained from molesting, annoying or harassing the applicant or the children, pursuant to s. 35 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

 

I find the respondent's income to be $65,500 and order him to pay child support in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines in the amount of $884 per month for the two children of the marriage, payable on the first of each month, commencing February 1, 2001.

 

I order the respondent to pay spousal support to the applicant in the amount of $1,000 per month commencing February 1, 2001 and payable on the first of each month thereafter

 

21 The evidence before me is that Mr. Kim is an abusive, uncooperative individual who has failed to respond to the applicant's application despite two orders to do so and who has failed to make child support payments despite an existing court order. Under these circumstances and given the respondent's current financial situation, it is my view that a monetary equalization payment would not likely be paid. Mr. Kim would, in all likelihood, ignore the court's order

 

Title to the property known as 204 Barrow Crescent, Ottawa, (previously known as Kanata), Ontario, K2L 2C7, be transferred to and vested absolutely in the sole name of Ms. Wonhee Kim as her sole property.

 

26 Ms. Kim provided evidence that Mr. Kim has recently purchased a vehicle and has stocks. She attended at the license bureau and was provided with information that the vehicle purchased is a 1998 Ford WND. I hereby order that all right, title and interest in the 1998 Ford WND be transferred to and vested absolutely in the sole name of Ms. Wonhee Kim.

 

a charge shall be secured in her favour against Mr. Kim's Jetform stocks and stock options to a maximum of $30,000 to be adjusted after the sale of the home and the transfer of the vehicle and the determination of the subsequent remaining amount owing on Mr. Kim's equalization payment.

 

 

 

 

J.M.M. v. G.S.M., 2006 CanLII 6457 (ON S.C.)

 

Trousdale, J

 

[3] Mr. G.S.M.’s pleadings, except with respect to access, were ordered struck on November 10, 2005 as a result of his failure to comply with an Order made at a Trial Management Conference on September 20, 2005

 

[28] In his Financial Statement sworn May 22, 2003 when Mr. G.S.M. was represented by Counsel, Mr. G.S.M. states that he is self-employed by Clear Choice Water Systems and that he has no income whatsoever as of that date. On August 25, 2003 in a handwritten unsworn Financial Statement produced by Mr. G.S.M. in the course of the Court proceedings when he was not represented by Counsel, he states that the business is no longer in operation and that he has no income.

 

[36] In Mr.G.S.M.’s Financial Statement sworn August 26, 2004, when Mr. G.S.M. was not represented by Counsel, Mr. G.S.M. stated that he had no income and that he had been unemployed since June 24, 2004.

 

[37] In Mr.G.S.M.’s Financial Statement sworn May 30, 2005, when he was not represented by Counsel, Mr. G.S.M. stated that he was living in Seeley’s Bay, paying rent of $500.00 per month. This is contrary to his earlier statement that he was not paying rent at his parents’ cottage. Mr. G.S.M. stated that he was earning $1,600.00 per month and that he was presently employed since December of 2004 as a casual labourer and was paid on a gross basis.

 

[38] In Mr.G.S.M.’s Financial Statement sworn September 10, 2005, Mr. G.S.M. gives the identical information as set out in his Financial Statement sworn May 30, 2005

 

On the evidence, I find that an income of $70,000.00 should be imputed to Mr. G.S.M. pursuant to clause 19(1)(a) of the Ontario Child Support Guidelines

 

The retroactive child support including special and extraordinary expenses, I find and fix at $40,368.00

 

As Mr. G.S.M. has paid no spousal support whatsoever to Ms. J.M.M., Mr. G.S.M. is ordered to pay to Ms. J.M.M. retroactive spousal support fixed in the sum of $3,600.00

 

[85] Based on these calculations, I order Mr. G.S.M. to pay an equalization payment of $53,524.00 to Ms. J.M.M..

 

I find that it would be appropriate to partially satisfy this equalization payment by vesting Mr. G.S.M.’s interest in the matrimonial home in Ms. J.M.M..

 

Mr. G.S.M. has only seen two of the children, R.M. and D.M., on one supervised visit on January 1, 2004, and Mr. G.S.M. has not seen J.M. at all.

 

[90] Based on the evidence, I find there is a risk of harm to Ms. J.M.M. and the children if a restraining Order is not in place

 

[100] Mr. G.S.M. shall pay costs payable forthwith of $35,000.00 inclusive of GST to Ms. J.M.M. in addition to the Orders for costs in the amount of $5,000.00 already made in this matter.

 

 

 

 

Martin v. Martin, 2007 CanLII 8638 (ON S.C.)

 

M. Linhares de Sousa, J.

 

[3] In this matter, except on the one issue of spousal support, Ms. Martin has been substantially successful on all issues.

 

[5] Other factors to consider in awarding costs in this matter are the following. Mr. Martin was unrepresented at the trial. That was his choice. The transcript of the trial will show that he was given much flexibility throughout the trial because of his lack of legal representation and lack of legal knowledge. Nonetheless, there was no question that this matter took as long as it did because of Mr. Martin’s lack of preparedness for the trial.

 

[7] Mr. Martin’s overall financial circumstances are dire

 

A self-represented litigant cannot be treated any differently, with respect to costs, than one that is legally represented. That would be unfair to the party who seeks legal representation. It would also encourage self-represented litigants to litigate with impunity regardless of the merits or the lack of merits of their case.

 

[9] For all of the above reasons, I order Mr. Martin to pay Ms. Martin’s costs of this litigation which I fix at $40,000.00.

 

I ordered that based on his declared income of $36,000.00 Mr. Martin pay $518.00 per month child support for two children. I was under the impression that the evidence indicated that $518.00 per month was the child support payment attracted by that level of salary under the Child Support Guidelines. That was clearly incorrect. Based on that declared income, Mr. Martin should pay $537.00 per month for two children pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines

 

 

 

 

Simpson v. Grignon, 2007 CanLII 17038 (ON S.C.)

 

MICHELE LYSE GRIGNON       )    Respondent Self-represented

 

Justice J. Mackinnon

 

[6] The Respondent attended and was present throughout the uncontested trial. I permitted her to address the Court after the Applicant had presented his case.

 

 

 

 

J.B.G. v. L.B., 2004 CanLII 53230 (ON S.C.)

 

Justice Paul F. Lalonde

 

Father's attitude was factor in court's decision to convert joint custody into sole custody for mother

 

Father admitted his errors but brushed off 4-day trial as learning experience for him - Court found his conduct outrageous and levelled costs against him.

 

The father has been repeatedly found in breach of his obligations, to the point that Justice Wildman struck out his answer and he has continued to resist without explanation. I found that his motion had no merit and that much of the material filed in support of it was irrelevant and improper.

 

[109] The applicant shall pay the respondent, costs, that I set at $20,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements and G.S.T.

 

Justice Perkins allowed $12,000 on the $25,857.05 claimed.

 

I avoided discussing the offer to settle that Mr. J.B.G. handed over to me at the conclusion of the trial because it is so far off the mark that it shows that Mr. J.B.G. did not understand what he was told by Justice Manton and Justice Rutherford in previous court appearances, and I do not hold much hope that what I have said in this trial will be understood any better

 

In 2003, Mr. J.B.G.’s income was $72,175.68 and the table amount is $568 per month. Mr. J.B.G. paid $465 per month. He owes $103 per month for 12 months totalling $1,230.

In 2004, Mr. J.B.G.’s income was $72,175.68 and the table amount was ordered at trial at $568 per month. He owes six months at $568 per month for a total of $3,408.

 

 

 

 

T.P.S. v. K.E.S., 2007 CanLII 1900 (ON S.C.)

 

T.P.S.      )    Unrepresented

 

Aitken J.

 

Her impression was that Mr. T.P.S. had placed his penis in the dog’s mouth as a sexual act and had ejaculated. Ms. K.E.S. said nothing that night. The next day she called the police. They called the Children’s Aid Society (“CAS”). The CAS interviewed the girls and they claimed that their father had hit them. When interviewed by the police and the CAS, Mr. T.P.S. denied any abuse and denied doing anything inappropriate with the dog

 

[14] On January 15, 2000, Mr. T.P.S. took a Zoloft overdose and was hospitalized briefly at the Georgetown Memorial Hospital.

 

Ms. K.E.S. then accused Ms. B.S.1 and her husband of abusing the children. More particularly, she accused B.S.1, a kindergarten teacher, of being a pedophile

 

[30] In June 2005, Ms. K.E.S. contacted the CAS in Ottawa with concerns that Mr. T.P.S. was showering with T. and on occasion they slept in the same bed.

 

[31] Mr. T.P.S. is now facing two criminal charges, assault and theft, arising out of an incident in the parking lot of St. Leonard’s Church in Manotick, when T. was present. Mr. T.P.S. had picked up T. from Ms. K.E.S.’s residence and had gone to St. Leonard’s parking lot, where his car was waiting. Ms. K.E.S. arrived in the parking lot and demanded that Mr. T.P.S. not drive T. because his licence had been suspended.

 

[32] In October 2005, Ms. K.E.S. moved out of her Manotick home, … , She has moved herself and the children to Greely, Ontario, where she has rented a large home which includes use of a gym, swimming pool and tennis court, … , I do not accept that Ms. K.E.S. does not have the funds to repair the septic system in Manotick when she can afford to pay $25,200 annually in rent at the Greely home.

 

 

 

T.P.S. v. K.E.S, 2007 CanLII 17382 (ON S.C.)

 

Aitken J.

 

 

The parties were unrepresented at trial. The children were represented by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer. Mr. T.P.S. claims that he has incurred legal costs in regard to his separation from Ms. K.E.S. in the amount of $85,827. He wishes to recover 75% of those costs. Ms. K.E.S. claims that she has incurred legal costs of $62,756. In addition she has lost $20,000 in wages.

 

Mr. T.P.S. incurred legal expenses of $76,819, though some of these may have related to issues not strictly covered by this matrimonial litigation. Ms. K.E.S. incurred legal expenses of $47,000. Both figures include the cost of the family unit assessment

 

At this point, Mr. T.P.S. incurred $9,000 in legal expenses and Ms. K.E.S. incurred $18,700 in legal expenses. This latter amount includes the cost of various court appearances required because Mr. T.P.S. was not making proper financial disclosure.

 

In regard to the legal costs incurred by Ms. K.E.S., the evidence is that she paid $10,038 to Peter Brennan in Waterloo, $9,373 to Karen Thompson in Oakville, $21,567 to Susan Von Achten in Milton, $2,453 to Ian Vallance in Ottawa, and $16,325 to Sean Jones in Ottawa.

 

 Ms. K.E.S.’s legal expenses were incurred more evenly between 2000 and 2006. It was only in the period leading up to the trial and at trial that Ms. K.E.S. was unrepresented

 

[10] As of the date of trial, Mr. T.P.S. was $57,558.43 in arrears under the original order of Walters J.

 

[12] In regard to spousal support, I refused Mr. T.P.S.’s request for spousal support from Ms. K.E.S.,

 

[17] That being said, in the early stages of the litigation, the behaviour of Ms. K.E.S. was unreasonable. She refused any access between Mr. T.P.S. and the children for a three-month period, and then refused to consent to any access – even supervised access

 

[18] Once access was commenced at the X. household, Ms. K.E.S., without justification, accused Ms. X. and her husband of abusing the children. More particularly, she accused Ms. X. of being a pedophile, an especially odious allegation considering Ms. X. is a kindergarten teacher. A.Ms. K.E.S.’s insistence, access was again stopped while an investigation ensued.

 

I find that, in a further attempt to thwart Mr. T.P.S.’s involvement with the children, Ms. K.E.S. moved the children to the Ottawa area in June 2000. Mr. T.P.S. had to seek further assistance from the court in order to get access to the children, resulting in the orders of December 13, 2000 and December 21, 2000.

 

Once again, Mr. T.P.S.’s involvement with the children went from being very frequent to being virtually non-existent. This necessitated his returning to court on July 14, 2004 for an emergency motion. The motion was adjourned to a case conference on August 18, 2004. The Office of the Children’s Lawyer was appointed on January 17, 2005

 

[21] I find that Ms. K.E.S. again acted unreasonably in regard to the children when she contacted the Children’s Aid Society in the summer of 2005

 

[22] Issues between Mr. and Ms. K.E.S. again escalated when an altercation occurred between them in the presence of T., when Mr. T.P.S. was picking him up for an access visit. Mr. T.P.S. was driving his car, even though his licence had been suspended. Ms. K.E.S. intervened in a controlling fashion and physically tried to get T. to come home with her. Subsequently she had criminal charges laid against Mr. T.P.S. for assault and theft.

 

Mr. T.P.S.’s abusive behaviour was the primary cause of the separation, and he has to assume primary responsibility for the events that subsequently unfolded

 

The trial could have been reduced to two days at the most had Mr. T.P.S. acted reasonably and accepted the recommendations of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer in regard to custody and timesharing.

 

He, on the other hand, did not assume any responsibility for his income being as low as it was in the years after his move to Ottawa. After he lost his sales position with a pharmaceutical company in Ottawa early in 2002, Mr. T.P.S.’s efforts to obtain a new position with a comparable income were mediocre at best. He could and should have done more so that he would have been in a better position to support his children. Mr. T.P.S.’s refusal or inability to generate an income comparable to what he had earned in Toronto placed added pressure on Ms. K.E.S. to have steady work at reasonable remuneration so as to support the children

 

Mr. T.P.S. was by far the least forthcoming regarding his financial circumstances, not filing any income tax returns since prior to the date of separation. As well, his contempt of the order of Walters J. regarding the freezing of his bank account where he had placed $72,000 of the parties’ joint funds requires costs sanctions. Finally, Mr. T.P.S.’s refusal to pay an appropriate level of child support to Ms. K.E.S. throughout the course of this litigation also calls for costs consequences

 

 

 

 

P.K.R. v. K.R., 2003 CanLII 2037 (ON S.C.)

 

P.K.R.    )   In person

 

M. Linhares de Sousa, J.

 

INTRODUCTION

Mr Roscoe never did comply fully and completely with the existing disclosure orders. As a result, the court on Apr 25 2003 ordered  that Mr Roscoe’s pleadings be struck.

 

BACKGROUND

[7] Mr Roscoe’s assault on Mrs Roscoe led to criminal charges. After a criminal trial, Mr Roscoe was convicted of 2 counts of domestic assault. He is currently on probation and is restrained from having any contact with Ms Roscoe that is not related to his exercise of access to the child. The restraining order will continue until August 23 2003.

 

[9] According to the evidence, Mr Roscoe is not employed. Ms Roscoe testified that to her knowledge he has had no renumerative employment since 1975.

 

Although he pursued university courses for approximately eleven years, he never obtained a university degree

 

[13] It was the evidence of Ms Roscoe that throughout the relationship of the parties, she was the main financial supporter of the family and all her resources went into the family. She worked throughout the marriage, both before and after the birth of her son. Mr Roscoe contributed his half share of the rent when they rented accomodation but did not contribute financially in any other substantial way, including any contribution to the expenses relating to the child such as childcare expenses.

 

However most of his time was spent on his many physical activities such as swimming, bicycling, canoeing, skiing, and socializing away from the family.

 

CUSTODY AND ACCESS

[23] Ms Roscoe testified that the frequent visits Karl has with his father since the order of Nov 27 2002 and his fathers inability to parent him properly may be contributing to Karls recent behavioural problems.

 

[25] Ms Owens’ social worker enquiry and report conducted by the Office of the Childrens Lawyer substanciates many of Ms Roscoe’s concerns about Mr Roscoe’s parenting of Karl

Ms Owens states at pg 21 of her report

…, Karl is going to sleep at 9:30 on school nights, … , Karl was told to eat “ only what you want “, … , Peter Roscoe does not feel the content of his play with Karl is overly violent and stated Karl knew it was pretend  when they captured the bad guys and drowned them in the bath., … , Peter Roscoe says he uses bribes, threats, distraction, time – outs, pinches Karls nose and even lets Karl hit him as methods of discipline. , …

 

[29] In response to my question, Mr Roscoe took the position that a parenting course for himself as recommended by Ms Owens is not necessary.

 

Even though Mr Roscoe had the time and opportunity to be more involved in Karls care he chose not to do so and to pursue his other interests and activities.

 

In the face of this the prognosis for the development and change in Mr Roscoe’s parenting skills, strongly recommended in her report, does not appear hopeful.

 

Mr Roscoe attempted to convince the court that Ms Roscoe has intentionally denied him access since the date of separation. Based on all the evidence I was not persuaded by this allegation.

 

When she asked the court to reconsider Mr Roscoe’s access during the course of many motions leading up to trial I cannot say she did so without the best interests of Karl in mind.

 

[45] With respect to access I am convinced that Mr Roscoe’s access to his son should be reduced to two afternoons a week as suggested by Ms Roscoe.

 

EQUALIZATION PAYMENT

[51] I have examined the values found on Ms Roscoe’s net family property statement, … , I have also heard Ms Roscoe’s oral evidence how she used her husbands own statements throughout cohabitation and in the course of this litigation in order to fix a value for some of Mr Roscoe’s assets, …

 

[52] I note there are differences in some of Mr Roscoe’s limited disclosure and in Ms Roscoe’s net family property statement.

 

At no time during the course of her evidence was I given reason to doubt the accuracy and reliability of Ms Roscoe’s evidence. I accept her net family property statement and I therefore find that the equalization payment owed to her pursuant to s.5 of the Family Law Act is $ 129, 983.07

 

CHILD SUPPORT

[57] The evidence indicated that Mr Roscoe had not been employed since 1970 despite his obvious family responsibilities. The reason for this is not clear.

 

[58] Mr Roscoe is not highly educated. He completed high school and pursued university for many many years but never succeeded in obtaining a university degree. He is not particularly trained in any field.

 

[61] I find Mr Roscoe to be intentionally unemployed. For that reason I impute employment income to him of $ 14,000 per annum.

 

[64] If one examines the notices of assessment for the years 1996 to 2000, Mr Roscoe seems to have reported the following income

1996                $ 15,320

1997                $ 22,052

1998                $ 15,713

1999                $ 15,418

2000                $ 14,670

 

[71] Based on all of the above evidence I find Mr Roscoes income to be the following for the purposes of child support pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines

Imputed Employment Income      $ 14,000

Rental Income                               $ 16,800

Investment Income                        $ 15,000

Total Annual Income                     $ 45,800

 

[75] At the end of the trial and at the request of Ms Roscoe pending my decision in this matter I granted an order preventing Mr Roscoe from depleting, transferring or accessing any money or stocks of any kind whatsoever in his TD Waterhouse account and his family property

 

[77] A restraining order prohibiting Mr Roscoe from having any contact with Ms Roscoe, except for purposes of realizing access shall continue until further order of this court

 

 

 

 

Roscoe v. Roscoe, 2003 CanLII 2037 (ON S.C.)

 

P.K.R.    )   In person

 

M. Linhares de Sousa, J.

 

On the other hand, Mr. P.K.R. has conducted himself throughout these proceedings in both an unreasonable manner and in bad faith. By his behaviour, his clear disrespect for court orders, his multiple proceedings that generally failed, his failure to provide disclosure, and his dishonesty with the Court, he has unduly prolonged the time and the cost of these proceedings.

 

I, therefore, order that Mrs. K.R.’s costs that I fix at $35,900.00 be paid by Mr. P.K.R. forthwith.

 

 

 

 

Hinke v. Lake, 2007 CanLII 8635 (ON S.C.)

 

THOMAS VINCENT HINKE      )    Self-Represented

 

M. Linhares de Sousa, J.

 

[2] On this motion to change brought by Mr. Hinke there was divided success. Mr. Hinke, by my decision, obtained a substantial change to his on-going support obligations as well as a substantial reduction in his support arrears. He was, however, not successful on the question of arrears prior to the order of Madame Justice Bell dated, March 29, 1999.

 

[3] Pursuant to Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 as amended, the successful party is presumptively entitled to its costs. In view of the divided success in this matter, I cannot conclude that any one party is presumptively entitled to their costs

 

[10] After considering all of the above factors, I come to the conclusion that Mr. Hinke should contribute to Ms. Lake’s costs, which contribution I fix in the amount of $10,000.00

 

 

 

 

Coady v. Boyle, 2004 CanLII 15122 (ON S.C.)

 

MARY MARTHA COADY       )      Self-represented

 

R. Smith J.

 

My decision directed that this part of her motion should proceed in compliance with the Family Law Rules, provided she first obtained leave from a judge, given the finding that Ms. Coady had conducted frivolous, vexatious and abusive litigation against her ex-husband, Brian Boyle

 

[29] I found that Ms. Coady’s motion was frivolous and vexatious litigation, and was an abuse of the court’s process

 

[34] Ms. Coady’s conduct in this litigation is clearly unreasonable and outrageous and deserving of disapproval of the court and her conduct justifies an award of costs on a substantial indemnity basis in order to deter any such future conduct by her against her former husband.

 

[39] In any event, Ms. Coady’s limited financial circumstances cannot be used as a shield against her unreasonable conduct, which has caused substantial unnecessary expense to her former husband.

 

Therefore, Ms. Coady is ordered to pay costs in the amount of $67,000 for fees plus GST, plus disbursements of $3,261.68 inclusive of GST

 

 

 

 

Cunningham v. Lefebvre, 2006 CanLII 5602 (ON S.C.)

 

CHARLES LEFEBVRE       )    Unrepresented

 

PANET J.

 

[3] In paragraph five of my Endorsement I noted that:

Mr. LeFebvre has advised that he will pay the costs of $500 ordered by Ratushny J. within seven days

 

[4] I ordered that Mr. LeFebvre pay interim child support for the three children of $2,283 per month commencing March 1, 2005 based on an annual income of $150,000, that he pay interim spousal support in the amount of $1,000 per month commencing March 1, 2005 and that he advance the amount of $15,000 to the Mother to enable her to retain professional advice with respect to the financial affairs of Mr. LeFebvre.

 

He ordered payment of costs of $3,000 by the Husband forthwith

 

[8] This matter was next brought before Toscano-Roccamo J. on July 27, 2005 and she ordered the Father to pay $1,500 to the Mother forthwith

 

With respect to support, Sheffield J. ordered that child support was to be paid directly to the Applicant, rather than the children, that July and September child support was to be paid to the Mother by October 1, 2005 and ordered costs of $2,000 to be paid by the Father to the Mother forthwith

 

[20] With respect to the outstanding child support and the outstanding costs order, the Father refers to an e-mail dated January 18, 2006 sent to the Mother in which, inter alia, he states:

I owe you 2,000.00 (legal) plus 3,000.00 spousal support and 2,283 x 3 child support less the abovementioned credit for child support. I will arrange for PCL to surrender the van to you in lieu of money owed to the trust.

I only have 2,000.00 in cash at this time that I can spare

 

[27] My overriding obligation is to balance the rights of these parties to ensure a just result as contemplated by the Family Law Rules.

 

[28] I find that, notwithstanding the orders made by this court referred to, the Respondent has consistently and without excuse failed to comply with the orders of this court. The Respondent has had numerous warnings as to the consequences of such failures.

 

[29] I conclude that, in these circumstances, the proper remedy is the sanction of striking the pleadings of the Respondent.

 

[33] I award costs of this motion to the Wife.

 

[34] The Wife may proceed to an uncontested trial on the basis of affidavit evidence at any time she sees fit.

 

 

 

 

Swanson v. Swanson, 2004 CanLII 48679 (ON S.C.)

 

Justice Patrick Smith

 

The Respondent has continually delayed the proceedings and is currently being represented by his sixth lawyer having also represented himself for a brief period;

 

48] During his testimony at trial the husband blamed his previous lawyers for the disclosure problems

 

57] In his financial statement sworn November 15, 2004 the husband declares that he receives the sum of $620.00 per month as social assistance and lists his monthly expenses as totaling $1,191.00 per month thereby leaving him with a deficit of $571.00 per month.

 

[83] When the behaviour of the husband is viewed in its totality, I find that the evidence establishes that, his failure to find suitable employment was, and continues to be, part of a strategy to punish his wife and children for the separation

 

The husband has two liens in his name registered against the property - a legal aid lien in the amount of $5,000.00 and an Ontario Works lien of approximately $16,000.00, which may be subject to adjustment upon negotiation in the future.

 

110] Based upon the totality of the evidence, I find that the husband is intent upon making his wife's life as difficult as possible and further, that, based upon the finding, it is highly unlikely that he will ever make periodic child support payments even if ordered by this Court to do so

 

129] In view of my finding that this is an exceptional case where a lump sum order for future child support be ordered and, based upon the expert testimony of Robert Bateman, I find that the sum of $80,203.88, with no adjustment for inflation, is an appropriate, and conservative lump sum award and so order

 

 the wife shall have judgment against the husband in the amount of $40,648.55 to equalize the net family property of the parties

 

 

 

 

Boileau v. Boileau, 2003 CanLII 2288 (ON S.C.)

 

Pierre Boileau, self-represented

 
Justice Monique Métivier

 

[6] The Court is being asked to effect an equalization by merely dividing the husband's pension, since it is the only asset which has "survived" the bankruptcy.

 

[15] The reasoning of Madam Justice Greer in Re Hughes, October 23, 1997, Doc. 32-071120, when she granted leave to pursue the equalization claim against the husband's pension, saying that "such a declaratory order is a special remedy against exempt assets", is compelling. She also stated that, in her view, bankruptcy proceedings were not "intended to wipe out property equalization claims against persons under the Divisional Act and the Family Law Act, which were instituted prior to the bankruptcy".

 

[57] Therefore, I order that the current maximum transferable amount of $96,659 be forthwith transferred to Mrs. Boileau, pursuant to the provisions of the Pension Benefits Division Act.

 

[72] I order that beginning in June 2003, Mr. Boileau shall pay his wife spousal support of $300 per month.

 

[73] As of the first of the month following termination of child support payments for Eric, Mr. Boileau shall pay $600 per month as spousal support.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2005 CanLII 47744 (ON S.C.)

 

John Hamilton     )   Self-represented

 

C. Aitken J.

 

[8] The equalization payment arises out of the fact that the capitalized values of Mr. Hamilton’s pension and sick leave benefits with the Ottawa Firefighters were included in his net family property, and no capitalized value of Ms. Hamilton’s two disability pensions were included in her net family property.

 

 

[39] Mr. Hamilton did not comply with a number of court orders. As has already been stated, he did not comply with the initial order of Mackinnon J. regarding financial disclosure. He did not comply with the order of Sedgwick J. dated July 13, 2000, and this resulted in his being found in contempt. Mackinnon J. made further orders on June 8, 2001 which again were not complied with by Mr. Hamilton, and this resulted in a further order of Roy J. on October 9, 2001 confirming that earlier orders had not been obeyed

 

 

 

 

Jonas v. Jonas, 2003 CanLII 1967 (ON S.C.)

 

RIBTON MARTIN JONAS        )     Not in attendance

 

C. Aitken J.

 

[1] On February 27 and 28, 2002, I heard the Applicant’s claim for a divorce, corollary relief and an equalization payment. The Respondent was in attendance, but did not participate in the hearing. His pleadings had been struck on December 31, 2001 as a result of his persistent non-compliance with various court orders.

 

I did not restrict the Respondent’s access to the children to the extent that the Applicant requested, though I did reduce it from the time he had been spending with the children prior to trial.

 

I refused to impute an income to the Respondent of $200,000 annually; instead I imputed an income to him of $80,000 effective September 1, 2002.

 

In short, the Respondent acted in bad faith from the commencement of this litigation. He never made proper financial disclosure, he refused to comply with court orders, he consciously took steps to place some of his assets out of reach of the Applicant and the court, and he intentionally mislead the court.

 

[12] The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Applicant $22,500 as costs for the divorce proceedings up to and including the trial on February 27 and 28, 2002, the signing of the order and the arguments on costs

 

 

 

 

Jonas v. Jonas, 2003 CanLII 1966 (ON S.C.)

 

No one appearing for any of the Respondents in regard to costs submissions

 

C. Aitken J.

 

By ex parte Order dated August 22, 2002 obtained on behalf of Jennifer Jonas:

o The funds in various accounts at TD Canada Trust were ordered paid into court.

 

By ex parte Orders dated September 6, 2002 obtained on behalf of Jennifer Jonas:

o The funds in various accounts in the names of various persons, including Ric Jonas, Karyn Jonas, Luiz Da Silva were frozen.

o September 12, 2002 was set for the return date of the motion regarding the freezing of these accounts.

o Directions were given regarding the contents of 15 Birch Avenue, Ottawa so that vacant possession could be provided to the purchasers. Costs relating to this Order have already been dealt with by earlier court order.

o Title to 15 Birch Avenue, Ottawa was vested in the new purchasers. Costs relating to this Order have already been dealt with by earlier court order

 

By Order dated October 28, 2002 relating to costs associated with the sale of 15 Birch Avenue, Ottawa:

o  The sum of $11,581.13 was ordered paid to Jennifer Jonas from the net proceeds of sale of 15 Birch Avenue, Ottawa relating to her reasonable legal fees and expenses associated with getting an order for the sale of the property, getting various orders relating to the sale of the property, and incurring out of pocket expenses related to giving vacant possession of the property

 

By Order dated May 29, 2003, arising out of the August 12-13, 2002 hearing attended by Jennifer Jonas and her counsel, but not by Ric Jonas, Jennifer Jonas, Drew Jonas or Luiz Da Silva

o  Luiz Da Silva was found to be a party to various fraudulent conveyances from Karyn Jonas to himself relating to the funds she had originally received from the Eileen M. Jonas Trust.

o  Luiz Da Silva was held to be jointly and severally liable with Ric Jonas and Karyn Jonas to pay into the Superior Court of Justice (Ontario) to the credit of this action the sum of $78,562.58 CDN

 

[20] Ric Jonas, Karyn Jonas and Luiz Da Silva are jointly and severally liable to pay Jennifer Jonas the sum of $37,315 for costs relating to the fraudulent conveyance litigation. Drew Jonas is jointly and severally liable with the other three to pay Jennifer Jonas the sum of $34,065 for costs relating to the fraudulent conveyance litigation

 

 

 

 

Jonas v. Da Silva, 2003 CanLII 49354 (ON S.C.)

 

[1] This is a Garnishment Hearing in which the Respondent Luiz Da Silva, the “Payor” disputes the validity of garnishee proceedings commended by the Applicant Jennifer Jonas, the “Recipient”, against him and his employer, the “Garnishee”.

 

It is apparent from the materials filed on behalf of Mr. Da Silva that he does not accept the basis upon which orders were made against him by Aitken J

 

[8] On December 3, 2001, Linhares de Sousa J. struck the Respondent’s pleadings and ordered that a default hearing proceed during the February 2002 Family Court sittings. The default hearing was conducted by Aitken J. On February 28, 2002, she issued a detailed endorsement. The relevant parts of her order may be summarized as follows:

(a) A divorce was granted;

(b) The Applicant was awarded sole custody of the two children subject to access by the Respondent;

(c) The Respondent was ordered to pay to the Applicant an equalization payment of $30,000;

(d) The Respondent was ordered to pay a lump sum spousal support payment of $40,000

 

Karyn Jonas is the wife of the Payor, Luiz Da Silva

 

[23] On September 5, 2002, Chadwick J. found Karyn Jonas in contempt of the orders of Aitken J. and sentenced her to sixty (60) days in the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre. He also found Ric Jonas in contempt. He was sentenced to one hundred and twenty (120) days.

 

 

 

 

M.M.F.1 v. G.R., 2004 CanLII 52811 (ON S.C.)

 

M.M.F.1      )    In Person

 

Madam Justice M.T. Linhares De Sousa

 

[11] Mr. M.M.F.1 denies that he ever assaulted his wife or his son. He explained in his evidence that he pleaded guilty to the charge of assault on his wife merely in order to see his son.

 

According to her, Mr. M.M.F.1 only began to see her and her son regularly after April 2001, when under pressure from Mr. M.M.F.1 she signed a consent to visit letter as was required under the terms of Mr. M.M.F.1’s probation.

 

[17] After she revoked her consent to have Mr. M.M.F.1 visit with M.M.F.2, Ms. G.R. made it very clear and it is clearly stipulated in exhibit #6 that Ms. G.R. consented to having Mr. M.M.F.1 continue his access to M.M.F.2 under supervision

 

[25] Mr. M.M.F.1’s lack of detail in his testimony makes his testimony and credibility suspect.

 

[26] With respect to Mr. M.M.F.1’s allegation that his son wishes to see him and that his mother has been “brainwashing” the child against him for her own motivation, this is not supported by the evidence.

 

[44] With respect to access. On the basis of the evidence before me, I must unhappily come to the conclusion that it would not be in M.M.F.2’s best interests to order access at this time.

 

He is presently on Social Assistance although he provided little evidence as to why he is not employed full-time in the work for which he is trained. His annual declared income for 2001, 2002 and 2003 were below the Child Support Guidelines threshold (See exhibits 2 and 3).

 

 

 

 

Scott v. McKinley, 2002 CanLII 13273 (ON C.A.)

 

William L. C. Scott, the appellant in person

 

[1] William Scott appeals from the order made by Linhares de Sousa J. ("the application judge") on June 29, 2001, granting him limited access to his three-year-old son.

 

[2] The history of this dispute includes a conviction of the father for assaulting the mother, allegations of failing to comply with a probation order forbidding the father from contacting the mother, and allegations that he was harassing her.

 

At the time of the application to Linhares de Sousa J., the father had not seen the child for some eight months and there had been very few access visits in the two years before that

 

[5] We essentially agree with the approach of Linhares de Sousa J. However, we are of the view that the one visit per year by the father is too restrictive to give effect to the intention of paragraph 1 of the order, namely that “[b]oth parties shall make an effort to promote contact and a relationship between the child … and his father …”.

 

 

 

 

Piskor v. Piskor, 2003 CanLII 53692 (ON S.C.)

 

Respondent, in person

 

Rutherford J

 

In this new stage of one of the longest running and most protracted family law cases in the Ottawa Courthouse, the respondent George Piskor seeks to vary the spousal support obligation placed upon him on October 29, 2000 by the judgment of Madam Justice Linhares de Sousa. Her judgment enforced the settlement agreement reached between the parties after 8 years of litigation. The agreement included provision for indefinite spousal support at the rate of $3500 each month.

 

He continued to pay the required support after the judgment, but stopped paying entirely after October 2002 and as of this month, arrears stand at $21, 000. In his oral presentation before me today, he stated, “ I stopped payment in October simply because I have no money

 

[10] Mr. Piskor stopped paying the indefinite support he agreed to pay and was then ordered to pay. He said he did so because he has no money. He says that for a number of reasons, he has not earned income since last September. I observe that there was evidence of a similar fall-off in earning capacity prior to the approach of the trial in the fall of 1999. Mr. Piskor said during argument that he was surviving only on family loans, borrowings against insurance policies, the reimbursement of some of the costs incurred following a motor vehicle accident involving his wife, and they are even renting out the barn on their rural property

 

Mr. Piskor must be current in the payment of his support obligations to Ms. Piskor if he is to pursue the variation application proceedings. He may pursue his application as long as he pays the required support. If he does not, the proceedings are stayed

 

 

 

 

Davis v. Morris, 2006 CanLII 8196 (ON C.A.)

 

On appeal from the orders of Justice Maria Linhares de Sousa

 

[9] The appellant was not present on the return date of the two motions. He had filed no materials. Métivier J. granted the appellant’s solicitor’s motion to be removed from the record. She did so despite the short service of the notice of motion. No reasons were provided.

 

As there had not been personal service of that motion, a contempt order could not be made. Respondent’s counsel nonetheless made reference in his submissions to the appellant being in contempt and, specifically, that the appellant’s conduct warranted an award of costs on a full recovery basis. Métivier J. struck the appellant’s pleading and granted most of the relief sought by the respondent.

 

[11] The appellant brought a motion returnable on November 26, 2004 to set aside Métivier J.’s order.

 

The motion judge then dismissed the motion.

 

 

 

 

Brown v. Brown, 2004 CanLII 12750 (ON S.C.)

 

MARK GORDON THOMAS BROWN    )   Unrepresented

 

C. Aitken J.

 

He claimed that he had been meeting his expenses through the use of various disability benefits which he had received since the separation ($10,880 in all) and by cashing in all of his liquid assets aside from his life insurance policies. Mark testified that he has run out of assets to liquidate, he is not in receipt of any disability benefits, and he has no other source of income

 

[61] Mark provided oral evidence and filed a number of medical reports to substantiate his claim that he is totally disabled.

 

[81] Brenda has been the primary wage earner for the Brown family.

 

In any event, I believe that Mark requires an incentive to assume financial responsibility for himself and the children. Not being able to rely on spousal support from Brenda will provide that incentive

 

[93] The equalization payment owing from Brenda to Mark is $41,386.19. This equalization payment shall be satisfied as follows:

• $2,720 shall be paid into the children’s RESP in satisfaction of the debt Mark owes to the children’s trust accounts;

• $30,000 shall be held in trust by Brenda as security for future child support payments pursuant to the terms set out above;

 

94] Commencing September 1, 2004, Mark shall pay Brenda $294 per month as child support for the three children based on an income of $15,000 imputed to Mark as of that date

 

 

 

 

J.R. v. J.G., 2005 CanLII 14983 (ON S.C.)

 

J.G. in person

 

C. Aitken J.

 

[23] Rule 14(23) of the Family Law Rules states that a party who does not obey an order that was made on motion is not entitled to any further order from the court, unless the court orders that this subrule does not apply

 

[24] I have found that the Respondent has failed to comply with earlier court orders in at least three important respects relating to the business valuation and financial disclosure. He is not entitled to come and ask for further assistance from the court, when he, himself, has not respected earlier court orders. More particularly, the Respondent cannot come to court seeking a finding of contempt against the Applicant when he has failed to live up to earlier court orders made against him. For this reason, and as a result of the findings provided below regarding access to G., the Respondent’s contempt motion is dismissed.

 

[25] For the same reason, I will not entertain the Respondent’s motion for a certificate of pending litigation at this time. That motion is stayed pending the Respondent’s compliance with earlier court orders.

 

[42] Taking all of these factors into account I conclude that it is in the best interests of the children for the Applicant to have temporary sole custody.

 

The Respondent’s access to G. shall be suspended at this time. It shall not be reinstituted until the Respondent individually has undergone counseling dealing with anger management and parenting skills and until he and G. have had some joint counseling as recommended by the Children’s Aid Society, the Family Service Centre or the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

 

[43] At the hearing of the motion, the Respondent stated that he did not need counseling because he is a good parent

 

 

 

 

Stoate v. Stoate, 2005 CanLII 13820 (ON S.C.)

 

Jeffrey David Stoate     )    Self represented

 

C. Aitken J.

 

As of trial, he remained unemployed

 

[29] Mr. Stoate acted “intentionally” within the meaning of s. 19(1)(a) when he chose to attend college rather than work. By doing so, Mr. Stoate became intentionally unemployed in January 2004

 

[43] I find that through a serious effort to find work in the fields in which he had been working for the previous 20 years, Mr. Stoate could have continued to earn at least $33,000 annually; and this is the income I impute to him

 

 

 

 

N.L. v. B.P., 2000 CanLII 22516 (ON S.C.)

 

B.P. in person.

 

Blishen J

 

[3] B.P. and N.L. had a brief relationship in the summer of 1991. They never married nor resided together. On March 13, 1992, S.L.P. was born. Mr. P. initially denied paternity. However, after blood tests confirmed that he was S.’s father, Mr. P. was ordered to pay child support. He has never had a relationship with his daughter and has no access nor contact with her

 

In addition, he argues that he has significant debts and may be forced into bankruptcy in the near future. He argues, therefore, that the existing arrears, totaling over $22,000 should be rescinded and his child support should be varied

 

[31] Mr. P. is a healthy, well-educated, articulate, 44 year old man. However, he made it clear that he has no intention of pursuing a career in social work but is intending to go on social assistance and perhaps retrain. I am satisfied that he has the skills, training and experience to obtain employment and earn income in the field of social work or child and youth work

 

[34] Therefore, given Mr. P.’s failure to provide adequate income information and my finding that he is intentionally underemployed, I will impute income to him in the amount of $40,000 per year.

 

I cannot find a material change in circumstances. Mr. P.’s motion to vary the existing child support order will be dismissed

 

42] Mr. P. has had the capacity to earn the imputed income of $40,000 since he stopped paying child support in August of 1996. Therefore, based on the above analysis, I decline to rescind or vary the amount of arrears

 

I will order that the child support payments be secured by a charge on both Mr. P.’s

 

 

 

 

Marshall Romaniuk v. Marshall Romaniuk, 2005 CanLII 14985 (ON S.C.)

 

CLIFFORD MARSHALL ROMANIUK    )       Self Represented

 

MARANGER J.

 

[7] During the relationship Mr. Marshall was the primary breadwinner. Ms. Romaniuk however always worked and the evidence demonstrated that she had a variety of part-time jobs until the date that they separated in July of 2003

 

[10] In February of 2004, Mr. Marshall declared bankruptcy ,despite the fact that negotiations were taking place between counsel with respect to how the parties were to divide the jointly held debts. , … ,

 

[11] In February of 2004, an interim order of spousal support in the amount of $2,000 per month was ordered

 

[17] Mr. Marshall should be responsible for some of the debt, and support should flow from him to Ms. Romaniuk in relationship to that debt. I find as a fact that Mr. Marshall ought not to have declared bankruptcy in the circumstances of this case. His declaration of bankruptcy directly results in Ms. Romaniuk absorbing a debt that is in part his responsibility. She is dependant upon him and some form of compensatory support to offset the increased debt load would be reasonable in all of the circumstances of this case

 

 

 

 

 

Toronto Judicial Region

 

 

 

Younger v. Younger, 2008 CanLII 155 (ON S.C.)

 

Justice D. M. Brown

 

First, in her submissions Ms. Younger challenged my rejection of her adjournment request, contending that the “system is prejudiced against people who represent themselves”.

 

 

 

 

Malerba v. Malerba, 2004 CanLII 34791 (ON S.C.)

 

Cataldo Malerba, in person

 

GREER J.

 

[3] The Husband has failed throughout the matrimonial proceedings to co-operate and failed to comply with Court Orders.

 

I find that the Bankruptcy came at a time the Husband knew that his contempt would soon be dealt with, and he deliberately tried to remove his assets from any claims his Wife had.

 

The Husband will simply have to continue to work and not take early retirement, as he financially must continue to support his children as well. Order to go that the Wife’s lump sum spousal support which I fix at $180,000 be secured against the Husband’s Pension. Interest shall run on that amount from July 13, 2004 until date of payment, at the Courts of Justice Act rate for post-judgment interest

 

[13] With respect to the Husband’s contempt and sanctions to be ordered by me, the Wife asks the Court not to Order a sentence of imprisonment for the Husband, as this would defeat his ability to continue to work and pay his child support.

 

[14] The Husband tells the Court that “I am not a villain or a crook nor will I take the money and run.” While the Husband has committed no Criminal Code offence, he has behaved in a contemptuous and egregious manner throughout these proceedings.

 

He is aware that this conduct has led his Wife and children to want no further contact with him.

 

(4) Costs of Wife are fixed at $10,500 plus GST plus disbursements plus GST. These Costs are part of the Wife’s Spousal Support

 

 

 

 

Ballentine v. Ballentine, 2001 CanLII 28151 (ON S.C.)

 

Richard Ballentine for himself

 

Backhouse J

 

1 Mr. Ballentine seeks to vary his spousal support obligation of $4,552.23 per month to nil and to cancel all arrears currently owing in the amount of $307,668.57

 

2 By counter-application, Ms. Ballentine requests an order:

(a) dismissing the application of Mr. Ballentine on the basis that it is frivolous, vexatious, and/or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court, and is barred by the doctrine of res judicata:

. . .

(c) that no further proceedings, under any form, be instituted by Mr. Ballentine with respect to spousal support and arrears of spousal support save with leave of the court

 

8 In support of this variation application he filed a financial statement sworn June 21, 2001 showing nil under every asset category.

 

Justice Cullity found that Mr. Ballentine had not provided evidence to establish that there had been a necessary material change of circumstances pursuant to section 17 of the Divorce Act. Mr. Ballentine has not provided any further or different evidence of a material change in his circumstances since August of 1999

 

18 The counter-application is allowed. No further proceedings under any form may be instituted by Mr. Ballentine with respect to spousal support and arrears of spousal support save with leave of the court.

 

19 Costs to Ms. Ballentine of the application and cross-application are fixed in the amount of $7,500

 

 

 

 

Ziomek v. La Selva, 2001 CanLII 28197 (ON S.C.)

 

Backhouse, J.

 

4] The former wife brought an application in May, 1999 to set aside the Minutes of Settlement and consent judgment. There have been numerous court appearances since then. The former husband has been ordered to provide disclosure and pay support arrears and costs. He has failed to do so, has been found in contempt and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Following a contempt finding, his pleadings were ordered struck. Greer J. ordered on May 31, 2000 that he has no further standing in this proceeding, that he is in contempt, that he pay $6,000 to cover arrears owing at the private school, $7,000 for a forensic accountant, $2,500 for costs before Day, J. who presided over one of the attendances and $2,000 for costs before Greer J. He failed to comply with the order. On the last return date, he appeared without counsel. Pursuant to an order by me, he paid $17,500 to the former wife immediately, and was required to file financial information by February 1, 2001. He agreed to return on February 26, 2001 for a hearing before me. The former husband did not appear for the hearing and did not move to defend the application. However, he retained counsel to appear only to request that the court not proceed with the hearing. No reason was given for his non-attendance. The husband has made some but not the complete disclosure that was ordered on January 15, 2001. The request for an adjournment was denied. Mr. Ziomek’s pleadings had been ordered struck in previous proceedings and he had no standing in this matter.

 

[5] The former wife sought to proceed at this hearing on an uncontested basis which was granted. She submitted that the earlier judgment and Minutes of Settlement be set aside and that the court should impute income to the former husband and order child support based upon that income of $250,000

 

[18] On the evidence, I am satisfied that the income of the former husband was greater than $50,000 at the time of his application in 1997. Because of material non-disclosure, the consent judgment on the issue of support must be set aside. Income must be attributed to the former husband for expenses claimed through the business and the related company as well as through income-splitting. A more accurate estimate of his annual income was $250,000. Had the husband properly disclosed his income in 1997, the table amount under the Guidelines on income of $250,000 was $2,801 per month. The husband paid $700. The difference is $2,101 per month. That amount must be calculated for 34 months and shall include interest. Ongoing child support shall commence on April 1, 2001 and shall be paid at the rate of $2,801 for the support of the two children, Rachel and Sara.

 

 

 

 

Writer v. Peroff, 2006 CanLII 38363 (ON S.C.)

 

GREER J.

 

The Motion to Strike was heard by Madam Justice Backhouse on February 2, 2006. She released her Endorsement on February 3, 2006. She says in paragraph 12 of her Endorsement that despite two court orders, the Father has not complied with his disclosure obligations. She then says, “It will be the rare family law litigant who will be able to continue in the face of concerted efforts to stonewall.

 

While there was more disclosure by the Father, it did not fulfill his obligations under other Orders. Therefore Madam Justice Backhouse made an addendum to her Endorsement and said, that given her findings made in that Endorsement, she struck the Father’s pleadings and evidence. She then said, “Ms. Writer is permitted to proceed to an uncontested hearing.”

 

The uncontested hearing on retroactive and on-going child support was then set down and was heard by me on November 7, 2006

 

[11] Disclosure, which was eventually made by the Father, included copies of his Income Tax Returns remitted for the years 2002 to 2004 inclusive. They show the Father’s reported income as follows:

1. 2002 - $24,107.43

2. 2003 - $50,655.67

3. 2004 - $41,780.44

 

[43] I find on the evidence before me that the Father owes the following amounts and all the following Orders shall issue accordingly:

1. Retroactive arrears of child support in the amount of $30,913 from February 2002 to November 2006.

2. Retroactive S.7 Expenses for the same period as above in the amount of $22,333.

3. On-going child support from December 2006 and 2007 in the amount of $1,294 per month based on the 2005 attributed income of $155,402.

4. S.7 Expenses on a go forward basis from December 2006 and 2007 in the amount of $28,332, as set out in Tab 7 of the Mother’s S.7 Brief of Documents. The Mother faces additional respite care for Jamie now, given the Father’s failure to keep exercising his access time, and given the Wednesday afternoon extra time.

5. The Father still owes the amount of $12,500 in Costs awarded by Madam Justice Backhouse as incidental to child support, which she says shall be enforced by F.R.O. as an incident of support. Added to this amount are the Costs of $12,000 awarded to the Mother by the Court of Appeal, which it says are also “enforceable as support by the Family Responsibility Office.”

6. The Mother shall be entitled to her Costs of this proceeding, which I fix at $32,124.78, inclusive of disbursements and GST and those Costs of the appearance before Madam Justice Sachs on one of the many adjournments requested by the Father.

 

 

 

 

Hartmann v. Frantel, 2004 CanLII 16317 (ON C.A.)

 

Peter Hartmann the appellant in person

 

[2] With respect to her order striking out the appellant’s pleading, Low J. was acting on the order of Himel J. dated August 8, 2002 which, in turn, followed upon the order of Wright J. dated March 19, 2002, which the appellant has not properly appealed and with which the appellant has not complied

 

[4] In the disposition of this appeal, we do not find it necessary to have regard to the further evidence sought to be adduced by the respondent nor the responding evidence sought to be adduced by the appellant.

 

[5] Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs, fixed in the sum of $3,000.00

 

 

 

 

Hartmann v. Amourgis, 2008 CanLII 29106 (ON S.C.)

 

Peter V. Hartmann in person

 

Jarvis, J

 

[3] In March 2002, Wright J. awarded Ms. Frantel interim exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and interim support. Mr. Hartmann paid no support and in May 2002, the Court ordered that his Answer and Counter Petition would be struck if the previously ordered support was not paid within 30 days. Mr. Hartmann’s failure to pay prompted an Order by Low J. to strike his pleadings in September 2002. His appeal from Low J.’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in January 2004. Mr. Hartmann also attempted to appeal the Order of Wright J., which was rejected by the Divisional Court on March 2, 2004.

 

His subsequent application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed in June 2005

 

[6] Katarynych J. issued the Order sought by the Director, citing specifically Mr. Hartmann’s failure to make full and frank disclosure of his financial affairs. Arrears were fixed at $45, 337.58, to be discharged in full by June 30, 2005, failing which Mr. Hartmann was to be imprisoned for a period of 90 days. Mr. Hartmann’s appeal of this Order was dismissed in November 2005 by Backhouse J. with costs payable by Mr. Hartmann to the FRO.

 

[22] The statement of claim alleges various ways that Ms. Amourgis lied to the court and thereby harmed the plaintiff. Ms. Amourgis appeared as counsel for the wife.

 

24] Insofar as the statement of claim can be said to assert that Ms. Amourgis was a party to a conspiracy against the plaintiff, it is clear that a lawyer, in acting for a client, is merely an agent of the individual and not a distinct entity and therefore incapable of being a party to a conspiracy.

 

Mr. Justice Finlayson gave reasons and concluded that the law “clearly establishes a judicial immunity from negligence for the Law Society’s discipline process, including the investigative functions at the front end”. Justice Finlayson concluded that imposing liability on the Law Society would, absent bad faith, be inconsistent with its “public interest” role

 

[51] This pleading is clearly directed against the legislation and general policy of the Government of Ontario and is not directed at operational decisions or actions, and it is unsustainable.

 

Family Court System

 

[57] The plaintiff has attempted to claim that the Government of Ontario could be held liable for the “embedded and pervasive gender based discrimination in the Family Court System” and goes on to cite specific decisions rendered by justices on the bench.

 

[58] I agree with the submissions of the Crown. The Crown cannot be held liable in tort for decisions made by judges carrying out their judicial functions (see PACA, s.5(6)). There is no basis in law for such a claim.

 

Charter Claim – Discrimination

[61] The plaintiff attempted to ground a claim on s.15(1) of the Charter, alleging that there was “rampant discrimination against fathers and men in general”. This claim arose out of dealing with the FRO, related legislation, and the Ontario Policing Manual.

 

Charter Claim – Presumption of Innocence

[63] Mr. Hartmann claimed that the default hearing procedure contained in the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, (“FRSAEA”) violated his right to be presumed innocent (and would theoretically violate s. 11(d) of the Charter, although the Charter breach is not specifically pleaded).

 

[65] The plaintiff brought a claim based on s.11(d) before Backhouse J. in previous proceedings. In addition to disclosing no cause of action here, this issue is also res judicata and a further abuse of process.

 

[68] For all these reasons, this action is dismissed in its entirety. There is no possibility that any amendment could serve to make it whole. The plaintiff’s statement of claim is struck and the action dismissed against all defendants.

 

[69] The defendants are clearly entitled to their costs, if demanded. I will accept written submissions in this regard if necessary.

 

 

 

 

Graham v. Bruto, 2007 CanLII 4867 (ON S.C.)

 

Rosario Bruto      Respondent - Self-represented

 

Backhouse, J.

 

The husband has a Business Administration diploma and is a mortgage consultant and property manager.

 

His first financial statement prepared on his behalf by his then solicitor, Gene Coleman, was sworn November 19, 2002. It showed $3,059/month as “allowances and support from others” as his only source of income and expenses of $5,686/month. His second financial statement prepared on his behalf by his then solicitors, McCarthy Tetrault, was sworn July 14, 2002. It continued to show $3,059/month in “allowances and support from others” but noted that the support will decrease to $1,600/month at September 1, 2003. His expenses were shown as $5,727/month. His third financial statement prepared on his behalf by his then solicitors, Niman Zemans Gelgoot, was sworn June 8, 2004. It showed no income and expenses of $5,148/month. His fourth financial statement prepared on his behalf by his then solicitor, Jacqueline Mills, was sworn January 19, 2006. It showed commission income based on the previous 4 months of $1,660/month and expenses of $7,835/month. His fifth financial statement he prepared himself.

 

He failed to make the most basic financial disclosure, notwithstanding his undertaking to the court to do so. His financial statements and his evidence on his income and expenses were so contradictory as to be nonsensical. I reject most of his evidence

 

The wife shall have sole custody and shall be the parent entitled to make decisions for the children

 

Since 2002, the husband has been saying that he has been looking for contracts and other employment and that he fully intends to work to support his children. Yet, he purported to have no earned income in 2002, 2003 or 2004. Either he is not being truthful about his earnings or his is deliberately underemployed. He submitted that his income should be deemed to be $35,000/year which exceeded any earned income he disclosed to date. In my view, the husband’s current income should be deemed to be $50,000/year.

 

The wife’s current income is $102,000/year.

 

Accordingly, the husband shall pay to the wife child support for 2 children in the amount of $835/month commencing January, 2007. In addition, commencing in January, 2007, he shall pay 33% of camp expenses and any tutoring expenses upon the receipts being provided to him. The Family Responsibility Office shall enforce this upon the filing of the receipts.

 

Accordingly, child support is awarded to the wife for the period from September, 2003 to December, 2006 in the amount of $626/month x 40 months = $25,040.

 

 

 

 

Bush v. Mereshensky, 2007 ONCA 679 (CanLII)

 

[1] The appellant appeals a finding of contempt made against him by Backhouse J., September 14, 2006 and the two month term of imprisonment imposed as the result.

 

[2] The appellant initiated his appeal during his incarceration and as the result his appeal was listed as an inmate appeal of a criminal matter. In fact, the appeal concerns a civil finding of contempt.

 

[3] On June 29, 2006 Jarvis J. made an order, without notice to the appellant that he:

• pay $317,000 (USD) into court pending a determination of title between spouses;

• on an interim basis, be directly and indirectly restrained from depleting any property in his control

 

[13] Finally, we note that the appellant is currently on parole as a result of a further order made by Backhouse J. on April 26, 2007 since she found he was still in contempt of the order of Jarvis J.

 

We would hope that Legal Aid Ontario would be able to assist him in that respect given that he has difficulty with the English language

 

 

 

 

Santos v. Santos, 2007 CanLII 920 (ON S.C.)

 

No one appearing for the Respondent Wife, as her Pleadings have been struck

 

GREER J

 

[20] Later, in the Wife’s Answer and Counterpetition, sworn June 23, 2003, the Wife says in paragraph 7 that she is employed as a compliance officer with Fish & Associates and earns approximately $30,000 per year and also does freelance and office work. This does not make sense, given that the Wife’s Financial Statement was sworn only 20 days earlier.

 

The Wife was in breach of Court Orders to provide full financial disclosure and she refused to do so. Therefore the Wife had her Pleadings struck

 

[45] I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the Husband should have sole custody of the two children of the marriage.

 

[49] Given this information, I impute as an approximate gross income to the Wife for the year 2003 the sum of $75,000.

 

I have attributed to the Wife, an income of $41,250 for 2006

 

The following amounts are therefore owed by the Wife to the Husband:

(a) 2003 under the old Child Support Guidelines, the sum of $605 per month or $7,260 per year.

(b) 2004 under the old Child Support Guidelines, the sum of $450 per month or $5,400 per year.

(c) 2005, the same as 2004 or $5,400 per year.

(d) 2006 under the old Child Support Guidelines from January to April at $356 per month or $1,424 for the first 4 months and under the New Child Support Guidelines at $379 per month or $3032 for the 8 months.

 

The total of this retroactive child support to December 31, 2006 is $22,120. Order to go that the Wife pay to the Husband the sum of $22,120 on account of retroactive child support

 

The Wife therefore owes the Husband and Equalization payment of $72,698.88 rounded to $72,700. Order to go accordingly

 

The total of these three payments is $133,432.00. I am of the view that the Wife will not willingly pay these sums to the Husband and there is no evidence of her current assets, other than her interest in the parties’ jointly held properties. The Wife’s one-half interest in the Kerslake, matrimonial home, is currently valued at $97,500 and her one-half interest in the Portuguese property, is currently valued at $35,000. These two values total $132,500. In my view, the most appropriate Order to make is that the Wife’s one-half interest in each of these properties shall be transferred to the Husband to satisfy the amount so owing to the Husband. The consent of the Wife to the two such transfers is hereby dispensed with.

 

 

 

 

C.A.M. v. D.M., 2003 CanLII 18880 (ON C.A.)

 

The appellant submits that in the event this court were to find that the order was improper, we should order instead that the mother be allowed unsupervised access to her child.

 

He therefore made the costs order for $49,405

 

19] The mother was not represented by counsel at the trial.

 

 

 

 

Orszak v. Orszak, 2000 CanLII 22529 (ON S.C.)

 

Erik Orszak for himself.

 

Himel J

 

[4] The parties received a divorce judgment on January 30, 1998. Prior to that, there was an interim order of access by the husband on alternate weekends with a condition that the husband abstain from the use of alcohol and drugs during access. At the time of the divorce, O’Connell J. ordered that the husband pay $1500 in child support based upon an imputed income of $125,000. There were never any orders of interim spousal support and no claim was pursued. On April 23, 1998, Wright J. ordered that an assessment take place pursuant to section 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act and that the husband have supervised access on alternate weekends.

 

The father maintained throughout that access was being denied by the wife. Various motions for contempt were brought. On July 20, 1999, Kiteley J. dismissed a motion for contempt brought against Ms. Orszak.

 

As at the date of trial, Mr. Orszak had not seen his children since October of 1999

 

10] Upon separation, Mr. Orszak provided Ms. Orszak with $6,000 per month support paid through his brother and their company. That continued from November, 1996 to May, 1997. In May, the amount of support was reduced to $3,500 and then to $2,500. In January, 1998, pursuant to O’Connell J.’s order, he began to pay $1,500 a month.

 

While Ms. Orszak hopes to complete her doctorate in education, there is no clear timeframe in mind and no evidence on the prospects of employment.

 

In 1998, his wife filed an income tax return claiming Mr. Orszak as a dependant and without income and in 1999, Mr. Orszak filed his own income tax return showing an annual income of $45,000. He testified that he worked with his brother until October, 1996 but no longer does so.

 

He also says that he tried a number of ventures after moving back to Montreal including selling products from Mexico but that he is now out of the international trading business and instead, is working in a business which sells cookies and chocolates

 

On the financial issues, he claims that he is unable to pay support at the rate of $1,500 per month and maintains that his income is only $45,000.

 

[60] My judgment is summarized below:

 

Mr. Orszak is responsible for arrears of support to May 1, 2000 which have been calculated at the rate of $1,500 per month.

 

Alternatively, he shall purchase a car on a onetime basis for the use of Ms. Orszak and the children, or provide the sum of $15,000 to Ms. Orszak to purchase the vehicle herself.

 

Commencing on June 1, 2000 and on the first day of each month thereafter, Mr. Orszak shall pay the sum of $1,240 based on an imputed income of $100,000

 

 

 

 

Akerboom v. Steele, 2004 CanLII 29451 (ON S.C.)

 

Andrew Akerboom, in person, acting on his own behalf on his Motion to vary support

 

GREER J.

 

[5] Akerboom claims that he had lost his job twice during the period in question, having been laid off in June, 2002 as manager of IT services for his employer. He then opened his own business in used computer equipment in 2003 and it failed and closed in October, 2003, when he sold off the inventory and fixtures.

 

He says that he does not qualify for legal aid and cannot afford a lawyer. He claims to have tried to get his former wife to see his position and says he has “wasted 400 hours” of his own time trying to reduce his payments. He has now filed for Bankruptcy and made a proposal to his creditors, showing debts of $198,132, of which $160,000 is a mortgage.

 

The money he and his wife live on comes from somewhere.

 

[19] It is clear that Akerboom is underemployed and this appears to be deliberately so, given his two business attempts and his bankruptcy proceedings.

 

Further, Akerboom has failed at two businesses that he really had no experience in and thereby depleted his capital.

 

[20] In his Financial Statement sworn in January, 2004, Akerboom shows his actual monthly budget as being $4,301 or requiring an income of $51,612. This “ACTUAL BUDGET”, as it is headed in the Financial Statement says what it means. The entries are to be based on actual expenses. I therefore attribute that income to Akerboom in 2003 and in 2004, since the Statement was sworn in the year 2004.

 

 

 

 

Bonair v. Bonair, 2007 CanLII 28322 (ON S.C.)

 

Wendel J. Bonair appearing in person

 

PERELL, J

 

[7] For the motions, Mr. Bonair’s position is that: (a) on a go-forward basis, he should pay child support based on an income of $11,000 per annum; namely $104 per month under the Federal Child Support Guidelines

 

If Ms. Duval is to be blamed for not paying child support for 38 months and if a retroactive order were to be made, then it would be the children for whom the child support was to be paid who would suffer.

 

[64] For the above reasons, I order (a) Mr. Bonair to pay child support on a go-forward basis based on an imputed income of $22,000; namely $335 per month under the Federal Child Support Guidelines effective as of July 2006;

 

 

 

 

Brown v. Ferguson, 2004 CanLII 43896 (ON C.A.)

 

She held that Mr. Brown had more income than what Mr. Brown submits he has. For example Mr. Brown asserts that the application judge erred in stating that he had income of $53,000 for the year 2000. The application judge had the benefit of the reasons of Kitely J. who had previously denied Mr. Brown’s variation application and whose judgment was not appealed.

 

The application judge held that the Connecticut order referring to “all arrearages” included the arrears of interest. She specifically did not include the arrears of $10,360 relating to orthodontic expenses but gave no reason for this

 

In our opinion, the arrears with respect to orthodontic expenses were encompassed by the phrase “all arrearages” and the trial judge erred in excluding this.

 

[6] Finally, the trial judge did not err in principle in declining to award costs to the appellant who was self-represented.

 

 

 

 

Richards v. Richards, 2005 CanLII 3398 (ON S.C.)

 

Gary George Richards, In Person

 

HOILETT J

 

The defendant’s threatening of his wife led to the laying of criminal charges and the ultimate separation of the parties on or about November 27, 2001. There was as well a restraining order against he defendant, arising from those unfortunate events.

 

[4] Since the separation of the parties, there has been virtually no contact between the defendant on his son

 

Mr. Richards claims now to be impecunious, and to be burdened with the support of a 16-year-old brother who lives with him and the imminent prospect of another child arising from the pregnancy of a current girlfriend of his.

 

[10] Such records as have become available indicate that at the time of the marriage, Mr. Richards had assets of $63,517.78, and at the time of separation $164,631.90. Notwithstanding the March 5, 2002 order of Kiteley J. enjoining the parties from depleting assets, the defendant now claims to be penniless.

 

[13] Concerning Mr. Richards’ financial circumstances, therefore, I am of the view that the imputation of income to him invited by counsel for the plaintiff, is wholly warranted. Accordingly, for the purposes of the child and spousal support order later made, an income of $60,000. per annum is imputed to the defendant.

 

[14] Three years in the life of a child still under the age of six is a very long time. The defendant’s failure to establish or maintain contact with the child for more than three years, which the evidence indicates, represents a singular and unilateral failure on the part of the defendant.

 

[27] In the result, therefore, the wife shall have judgment for $49,982.06 by way of equalization, together with interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act, an order for child support in the amount of $507.00 per month, plus $23.00 per month by way of section 7 expenses, and an order for spousal support in the amount of $1,000.00 per month. The support orders shall be effective as of December 1, 2004.

 

 

 

 

Grimalyuk v. Concelos, 2007 CanLII 1325 (ON S.C.)

 

THORBURN J.

 

[2] The Respondent has failed to comply with five court orders and did not attend on several motions before this court. His pleadings were therefore struck by Hoilett J.

 

Mr. Concelos attempted to evict Ms. Grimalyuk and her son from the matrimonial home and assaulted Ms. Grimalyuk on several occasions.

 

[8] On December 13, 2004, Mr. Concelos was arrested and charged with uttering death threats against Ms. Grimalyuk. Following his arrest, Mr. Concelos was removed from the matrimonial home by the police. The parties have remained separate and apart since that time.

 

[26] For the above reasons and on the basis of Ms. Grimalyuk’s earnings of $850.00 per week for 2005 and Mr. Concelos’ imputed earnings of $6,800.00 per month or $81,600.00 per annum, as at 2005, I award to Ms. Grimalyuk support payments in the amount of $2,900.00 per month commencing January 2005 up to and including December 31, 2005. For the period January 2006 to December 2007 inclusive, taking into account Ms. Grimalyuk’s income of $2,035.00 per month and assuming a modest increase in Mr. Concelos’ earnings, I award to Ms. Grimalyuk $2,600.00 per month

 

[27] Thus, for the year 2005, (taking into account the $5,000.00 paid by Mr. Concelos to Ms. Grimalyuk), Mr. Concelos owes to Ms. Grimalyuk the sum of $29,800.00. For the year 2006, Mr. Concelos owes to Ms. Grimalyuk the sum of $31,200.00. These sums are to be paid by Mr. Concelos to Ms. Grimalyuk forthwith. Interest is payable on the amounts awarded in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act

 

[41] I confirm that Mr. Concelos is to pay to Ms. Grimalyuk $2,750.00 in costs as ordered to date plus $1000.00 for costs of the uncontested trial, plus interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act from the time of the orders granted

 

[44] Finally, I am advised by Ms. Grimalyuk that, despite the existing restraining order, Mr. Concelos was seen around her property in the summer of 2006. Given this fact and Mr. Concelos’ abusive behaviour toward Ms. Grimlyuk and her son, I order that Mr. Concelos be restrained from communicating with Ms. Grimalyuk and her son Andrey Grimalyuk, and from attending at her place of business or residence and her son’s place of education or work for a period of twelve months

 

 

 

 

Cantwell v. Cantwell, 2000 CanLII 22450 (ON S.C.)

 

Respondent for himself

 

Aston J.:

 

[16] This year, Mr. Cantwell was able to find short-term employment with Farm Business Consultants doing tax returns until tax season ended. Since about six months ago, his only income is employment insurance of $1,790 monthly. I am not prepared to find as a fact that Mr. Cantwell is deliberately unemployed for the purposes of avoiding any support obligation. On the other hand, I am confident that he can soon secure well-paying employment because of the variety of experiences and marketable talents that he has

 

[22] In May this year, Mr. Cantwell made an assignment in bankruptcy.

 

28] Mrs. Cantwell has established an entitlement to spousal support. I am satisfied that a lump sum is the appropriate way to resolve the issue. The respondent shall pay to the applicant $30,000 as a lump-sum for support, pursuant to section 15.2 of the Divorce Act

 

 

 

 

Ingles v. Watt, 2003 CanLII 2136 (ON S.C.)

 

C. James Ingles, for himself

 

Ellen Macdonald J

 

[9] In this motion, the father asks that the videotapes of the access visits taken by private investigators hired by the mother be produced to the father.

 

[11] Ms Cunha submitted that there has been only two visits because the supervisors will not attend. The father has paid his share of the costs of the supervision of the two previous visits. The mother has not. She challenges their accounts. She takes the position that she will not pay her share until her challenges have been satisfied. The costs of supervisors were to be shared equally by order of Mesbur J. They, in turn, say that they will not supervise until they are paid. They will not turn up at the father’s home if the children will not be delivered there by the mother.

 

She also knows that without payment the supervisors will not attend. She knows that if there is no supervision, there will be no access. I note that supervision was put in place to appease the mother’s concerns

 

[14] The father is correct to say that if the mother succeeds in her position, there will be no access until the trial.

 

 

 

 

Y.T. v. J.K.1, 2006 CanLII 4908 (ON S.C.)

 

J.K.1      )   In Person

 

CROLL J.

 

Given all the evidence that I have heard, it is not credible for Mr. J.K.1 to allege that Ms. Y.T. took A.J.K. out of the country without his knowledge, and he did nothing about it, except to tell her teacher after the fact.

 

After hearing from Ms. Y.T., Ms. N.S. provided her with the contact information for the Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic (the “Clinic”) in Toronto, a clinic for women who have been abused.

 

[23] Ms. Y.T. submitted a parenting plan at the start of the trial. The plan proposes that A.J.K. will live with her in Japan on a permanent basis.

 

More specifically, in cross-examination, Ms. Y.T. stated, with some obvious reluctance, that the journal entries caused her to have a concern that A.J.K. would be sexually assaulted by Mr. J.K.1

 

 

Order

 

Ms. Y.T. shall have sole custody of A.J.K., born […], 2000, and she is permitted to move to Japan with A.J.K. forthwith

 

Commencing on March 1, 2006, and on the first day of each subsequent month, Mr. J.K.1 shall pay $317 per month as child support, based on his income of $39,000 per year

 

 

 Ms. Y.T. shall post security with this court in the amount of $20,000 to ensure compliance with the terms of this order until A.J.K. is 15 years of age; such security to be forfeited only pursuant to an order of this court

 

 

 

 

Vandenelsen v. Merkley, 2003 CanLII 1965 (ON S.C.)

 

CARLINE ANTONIA VANDENELSEN       )    The Applicant, on her own behalf

 

ASTON J.

 

This order effectively terminates all the previous interlocutory orders of Desotti J., May 31, 2001, October 2, 2001, December 7, 2001 and February 5, 2002. The single exception is the disposition on one of the findings of contempt against Ms. VandenElsen which has been adjourned until after the appeal in the criminal case, and which Justice Desotti will have to deal with himself.

 

Ms. VandenElsen's description of the time the children were with her after she abducted them in the fall of 2000 is detailed in her book, "America's Most Wanted Mother" which is part of the evidence in this proceeding

 

[50] Ms. VandenElsen cannot be trusted to discharge the responsibilities of custody. She not only considers Mr. Merkley her enemy, she has little or no respect for his status as a parent.

 

The trial judge found that Ms. VandenElsen "lacked the necessary personality profile to provide to the children a calm, secure, stress-free and emotionally stable environment". Subsequent events have proven conclusively that he was right in that assessment.

 

[54] The children are now strongly expressing a wish to spend significant time with their mother.

 

[56] At page 236 of her book, Ms. VandenElsen describes her attempts to "instill truth and integrity" in the children by having them adopt her perception of how the four of them are victims who need to understand the "different kind of abuse" they have been subjected to by the court system.

 

[68] Mr. Merkley seeks an order prohibiting Ms. VandenElsen from bringing any further applications or motions against him or his family without leave of the court. See Schedule A to his latest factum for a list of the requests for relief by Ms. VandenElsen during the current proceeding. Given the great number of those various requests for relief, the relative lack of success on them and the possibility that Ms. VandenElsen will seek to continue litigation without abatement, such an order is warranted.

 

[70] The mother's conduct, behaviour and statements since March 2000 have unfortunately confirmed the fears of the trial judge that certain of her personality traits if not controlled "have the potential of destroying the emotional well being of the children". Ms. VandenElsen is unlikely to accept the truth of that assessment. However, I hope she may come to understand that that has been the consistent perception by judges in this case and that from the court's perspective she has just about run out of second chances

 

She has apparently been unemployed or underemployed since the summer of 2000. She has not adduced any evidence that would enable the court to find that she is no longer capable of earning $30,000 or more per annum.

 

Commencing June 1, 2003 she shall pay $568.00 monthly on the first of each month, the table amount under the Child Support Guidelines on an imputed income of $30,000 per annum

 

 

 

 

MacLeod v. MacLeod, 2003 CanLII 2328 (ON S.C.)

 

Roderick Joseph MacLeod  Defendant   )   In Person

 

KITELEY J.

 

[8] The defendant did not attend. It is this order which he sought to set aside. As a result of the order, the defendant went from a FRO credit of $27000.00 to a $46000.00 debit, a difference of $73000.00

 

 

 

 

Herskovits v. Herskovits, 2001 CanLII 28233 (ON S.C.)

 

Robert Anthony Herskovits, defendant, appearing on his own behalf.

 

MESBUR J

 

What is unusual in this case is that Mrs. Herskovits’ readily concedes that Mr. Herskovits has no financial resources other than those he discloses. She admits Mr. Herskovits is impecunious. However, she submits, nevertheless, that she is entitled to have the clear and unambiguous terms of the separation agreement enforced.

 

 

 

 

Dang v. Hornby, 2006 CanLII 12973 (ON S.C.)

 

Daniel Donald Hornby, acting in person as the Moving Party on the Motion, the Father

 

GREER J

 

She says she paid all the expenses and once they were in court proceedings, the Father went bankrupt to “spite” her.

 

[14] The Statement of the FRO dated February 24, 2006, states that the arrears of support are $21,330.74 and they continue to accumulate

 

[24] I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the Father is intentionally under-employed in 2004 and 2005

 

 

 

 

Aneziris v. Aneziris, 2007 CanLII 250 (ON S.C.)

 

DIONISIA ANEZIRIS      Acting in person

 

GREER J

 

Since separation, each party has made an Assignment in Bankruptcy.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Southwest Region

 

 

 

L.C.M. v. C.A.V., 2003 CanLII 47888 (ON S.C.)

 

The Respondents appearing on their own behalf

 

CAMPBELL J.

 

To highlight but a few of these, Ms. C.A.V. refused to attend the court at the outset of the hearing because she challenged the jurisdiction of the court and elected to rely on her “right to silence” and her “right against self-incrimination”. They contended (once Ms. C.A.V. eventually attended) that there was no jurisdiction to proceed, since the Aston J order (which in itself they argued was “illegal” and made without jurisdiction) was still under appeal; that the order was not a final order; that the present proceedings were “confusing” to them; that it was incumbent on the presently presiding justice to “explain” his/the court’s authority to proceed; that they had new evidence to present (a videotape that they had made of the children apparently expressing their “choice”; that the presently presiding justice was biased and must immediately recuse himself; that these present proceedings were illegal because there was no docket posted outside of the courtroom disclosing, in advance, who the presiding justice would be; and that the present proceedings were “legal extortion”, an “abuse of the process”, “emotional blackmail” and a “premeditated dump” of the process ).

 

[10] Throughout the two days, Ms. C.A.V. flitted about, in and out of the courtroom, into the body of the court public seating area (where she, from time to time, would shout imprecations and slurs at opposing counsel and the presiding justice), calling them both, from time to time, “child abusers”,

 

[15] As Mr. Mamo argued, Ms. C.A.V. (now joined by Mr. L.R.F.) has escalated her “crusade” beyond that of her own three children to include all children in Canada, their “abuse”, their “rape” and their “abduction by the State”. In a recent letter, she exhorts her local Member of Parliament (September 1, 2003) to “savor [sic] the pleasant possibility that (Jean) Chretien, that shameful leader of our country, can finally be exposed for the child abuser he seemingly appears to be”.

 

[24] The case law strongly supports the proposition that where there are no issues of credibility to be determined and where the best interests of the children might be jeopardized by a trial, the presiding judge should exercise his or her discretion to proceed without a trial

 

[67] I decline to offer Mr. L.R.F. or Ms. C.A.V. any further public forum at any, or great, cost to the children emotionally and developmentally. A trial would represent a great threat to their stable and consistent relationship with their father and stepmother. A trial would again cost Mr. L.C.M. great amounts of money to continue his defence of himself and the children from two litigants who have no exigible assets or any means by which any potential costs order would/could deter them or recompense him when he is again absolved of responsibility for this debacle.

 

 

 

 

Morin v. Muir, 2007 ONCA 78 (CanLII)

 

Michael J. Muir In person

 

[1] The appellant Michael J. Muir appeals from the order of Patterson J. of the Superior Court of Justice dated June 8, 2006 dismissing his appeal from the order of Zaltz J. of the Ontario Court of Justice dated December 14, 2005, whereby the respondent Marianne B. Morin was granted custody of Michael Darrin Morin Muir (“Michael”) born June 22, 1988, the appellant was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $442 per month, and costs of the proceedings before the motion judge were awarded to Ms. Morin in the sum of $1,000, plus GST, payable forthwith by the appellant

 

[2] The appeal judge, in succinct but clear reasons, concluded that the motion judge applied the correct legal principles in awarding custody of Michael to the respondent and that the motion judge was correct to hold that there was no genuine issue for trial. We agree with the appeal judge. We see no error in the decision of the motion judge or in the holdings of the appeal judge

 

[3] In particular, the appeal judge did not err by concluding that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has no application to this case, which involves a dispute between private individuals concerning custody and other issues related to their son.

 

 

 

 

D.R.D. v. S.E.G., 2001 CanLII 28122 (ON S.C.)

 

Applicant for himself

 

Granger J

 

Mrs. G. instituted an application on June 12, 1996 to vary access to conform with the wishes of D. In his responding affidavit sworn June 26, 1996 Mr. D. deposed:

On Wednesday, May 8th, 1996 the Respondent attended in Windsor to inform me that I was not D.’s biological father. She further informed me that she told this to D. The Respondent advised me that she was having an affair with Mr. G. while married to me.

 

There has been no meaningful access between Mr. D. and D. since 1997.

 

[14] As I understand the submissions of Mr. D., he is alleging that there was misrepresentation on the part of Mrs. G. as she led him to believe until May, 1996 that he was the biological father of D.

 

[17] I have no doubt that Mrs. G. held out to Mr. D. at the time the Minutes of Settlement were signed and incorporated into the Judgment of Divorce granted by Mr. Justice Morin, that D. was his son. This representation was in fact false. I am not persuaded that at the time the representation was made, Mrs. G. knew the representation was false or that she recklessly made the representation without knowing whether it was true or false.

 

Do the former husband’s actions offend public policy? The former husband is effectively saying that every spouse has a duty to tell his or her spouse of any extramarital affair he or she may have had during the marriage. It is unclear whether the former husband thinks that this must be done when it occurs, immediately thereafter, or some time later. Marriage is still a private domain and the public through the judicial system should not be involved in scrutinizing the behaviour of spouses in private matters while they are not involved in the judicial system.

 

The money paid was for child support not for spousal support.

 

Conclusion

I have therefore concluded that the answers to the questions which the Defendant H. has put to the Court are as follows:

1. A wife owes no such duty to her husband;

2. A wife owes no such duty to her husband after separation;

3. The Defendant’s silence under the circumstances does not constitute a representation;

4. The terms and provisions of the separation agreement stand on their own;

5. The Release signed by the parties and the other exclusionary provisions of the separation agreement preclude the Plaintiff from bringing the claim or proceeding with the claim;

6. Public Policy also prevents the Plaintiff from bringing the claim.

 

Judgment shall go dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims herein.

 

 

 

 

Simmons v. Simmons, 2007 CanLII 40221 (ON S.C.)

 

Mr. Jeffrey David Simmons, self-represented

 

Justice Lynne C. Leitch

 

[4] The Director served a notice of default hearing returnable May 1, 2007. Campbell J. made an order staying the Director’s enforcement proceeding pending the next return date of July 10, 2007.

 

[5] On June 5, 2007, Harper J. rescinded the order of Campbell J. staying enforcement. On that date, the respondent still had not complied with the outstanding production orders and Harper J. noted “this is complete bad faith on the part of the respondent.” The respondent was ordered to pay full indemnity costs to the applicant fixed in the amount of $2,996.08 and such costs were to be enforced by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office as support

 

[8] The applicant served and filed a contempt motion

 

[9] On August 31, 2007, the respondent filed a sworn financial statement and tax summaries for 2004, 2005 and 2006, a statement of earnings, and a statement setting out details of his pension from the Armed Forces. The matters were set to September 7, 2007, for a summary hearing.

 

[10] At the commencement of this hearing, the applicant sought an order pursuant to r. 10(5) that the respondent not be entitled to participate in the proceeding. Such an order was granted

 

I find that the arrears of child support as of August 7, 2007 are $10,442.05. I note that it is expected that an amount garnisheed from the respondent’s account will substantially reduce those arrears by $5,040.26, however, for the sake of clarity, the finding is made that the accrued arrears as at August 7, 2007 are $10,442.05 (inclusive of the $400.00 total administration fee).

 

[22] Mr. Clark, for the Director, advised that the payment of $337.00 on account of arrears proposed by the respondent was acceptable to the Director and accordingly the respondent is ordered to pay that amount

 

[23] In the event of default of the ongoing child support or the payment on account of arrears, the Director shall be at liberty to bring a motion for a warrant of committal

 

In my view, in these circumstances and considering that both the 1999 and 2003 orders required the respondent to maintain these benefits for the children the respondent shall reimburse the applicant $140.00 per month, being the cost for her to cover the two children on her health care plan.

 

[27] Given the applicant’s income ($34,760.00), the respondent’s failure to pay the child support he should have paid in accordance with the Guidelines had a significant impact on his children. It is clear that the applicant has accumulated debt. The children who were entitled to this child support have done without.

 

[28] As a result, I am satisfied that it is appropriate in these circumstances that the respondent be ordered to pay to the applicant the amount of $3,252.00 representing a retroactive adjustment to the child support calculated as set out above

 

She learned that her credit rating was negatively impacted by the fact that their Visa account had an outstanding balance of $1,382.00 that was past due.

[34] I find that the respondent should be ordered to pay to the applicant this past due amount in order for her to clear her credit rating, … , reimbursement of the applicant for that debt should be enforced by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office as support, and an order will go

 

[39] The bill of costs submitted by counsel for the applicant is reasonable and the respondent is hereby ordered to pay to the applicant on account of costs the sum of $3,330.92 for costs incurred from and after August 9, 2007. This amount will also be added to the arrears and enforced by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office as support.

 

 

 

 

P.R. v. W.M.R., 2006 CanLII 28911 (ON S.C.)

 

P.R.      )       Self-represented

 

Nolan J.

 

[3] P.R. and W.M.R. separated on May 21, 2004 when P.R. was charged with assault. Part of his condition for release from custody was that he not return to the matrimonial home. In less than a month from that date, P.R. commenced this action

 

The order of July 23, 2004 also granted W.M.R. exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and contents and required that both parties be restrained from disposing, depleting or encumbering other assets pending further order of the court

 

P.R. was restrained from molesting or annoying W.M.R. and, as well, he was required to deliver a sworn Financial Statement before June 16, 2005

 

[14] At various times over the course of this litigation, P.R. had been represented by counsel but at many of the motions and at the trial he represented himself. On June 24, 2005 P.R. did not appear in court nor was he represented by counsel. His parents attended on his behalf and asked for an adjournment. Since the issue of the payment of the line of credit and child support had been stayed since December 2004, Brockenshire J. found that there was significant urgency in having these issues dealt with. He denied the request for the adjournment and proceeded with the motion. Child support was ordered paid in the amount of $843 per month commencing June 1, 2005 based on an income of $74,440 (sic). In addition, P.R. was to pay spousal support in the amount of $300 per month commencing June 1, 2005.

 

The result of P.R. continuing to lose 50% of his wages on an ongoing basis is that he has very little money with which to exercise access to the girls.

 

[51] As well, a litigant, self represented or otherwise, is expected to attempt to resolve issues and to inform him or herself on the law. A trial is not an opportunity to vent feelings but to present evidence which can reasonably be expected to support one’s claims.

 

I have, therefore, deducted $810 from the total requested and fix costs at $12,652 payable by P.R. to W.M.R

 

 

 

 

Abdelrahim v. El-Madhoun, 2004 CanLII 8386 (ON S.C.)

 

The Applicant, on her own behalf

 

No one appearing for the Respondent

 

MARSHMAN J

 

[1] The applicant wife seeks an annulment of her marriage to the respondent. The marriage took place on August 22, 2002. It was registered and there is a valid Ontario Marriage Certificate. The applicant argues that the marriage should be annulled because the parties never cohabited and did not enter into the “Muslim marriage” as agreed. In accordance with their faith, the parties do not consider themselves married until the second ceremony takes place

 

[2] The difficulty is that they have entered into a marriage recognized by the law of this province and do not fit within the traditional grounds required for an annulment.

 

[3] Although the parties have not consummated the marriage, there is no indication that either is impotent. Both freely consented to the marriage and neither was under any mental incapacity

 

[4] There are no legal grounds for annulling this marriage. It will have to be dissolved by divorce.

 

 

 

 

Finn v. Finn, 2003 CanLII 1947 (ON S.C.)

 

The Applicant not appearing

 

The Respondent, on her own behalf

 

MARSHMAN J

 

[3] I have the benefit of having received and reviewed all of the evidence and I decline to confirm the order rescinding arrears.

 

The court summarized the law regarding rescission of arrears at para.22 as follows:

[22] The finding of a present incapacity to pay does not, of itself, foreclose the prospect of ability to pay in the future.

 

There is no evidence before me, however, that he will not be able to pay the arrears at some point in the future.

 

 

 

 

Marar v. Marar, 2004 CanLII 15749 (ON S.C.)

 

FAIK MARAR        )    Un-represented – No one appearing

 

Cusinato, Justice

 

[4] Following the commencement of this action there have been innumerable interim and permanent orders directed by this court, concerning these parties.

 

[5] The most relevant of those orders relate to:

(1) An interim order giving the wife exclusive possession of the matrimonial home as of July 2003;

(2) An interim order of spousal support (to the wife) of $1,000 per month commencing May 21, 2003;

(3) An order that the defendant husband pay all support arrears by December 27, 2003.

 

This last order was issued on November 26, 2003, for which failure to pay all support arrears, the defendant’s pleadings are to be struck.

 

[6] By order of Justice Quinn dated January 12, 2004, the defendant’s pleadings were struck due to his failure to comply with the order of November 26, 2003. What resulted is that this matter has now proceeded as an undefended action.

 

 

 

 

Glomba v. Wray, 2003 CanLII 1960 (ON S.C.)

 

The Applicant, in person

 

The Respondent, not appearing in Ontario

 

MARSHMAN J

 

[1] This case presents yet another example of the injustices that can occur when matters proceed in two different provinces under reciprocal legislation. Obviously the difficulty is that one judge hears the evidence and argument of one party and another hears the evidence and argument of the opposing party.

 

[17] With respect to the matter of the Respondent's alleged claim of hardship I respectfully suggest that the reciprocating court ignored my decision and failed to consider the evidence and the law

 

A payor cannot frustrate his child support responsibilities by significantly increasing his debt load

 

[22] There is no doubt that the Respondent has a legal duty to support his current spouse and their two children

 

[29] My final gratuitous comments relate to the agreement entered into between the parties. The unsworn statement of the Applicant is to the effect that the agreement was entered into between the parties after Mr. Wray received notice that I had made an order for $466.25 per month for child support. The Respondent was unhappy with my order and negotiated a lower amount with the Applicant.

 

In my opinion, the agreement is not binding on the Applicant.

 

 

 

 

Colafranceschi v. Colafranceschi, 2005 CanLII 10646 (ON S.C.)

 

DOMINIC COLAFRANCESCHI       )   In person

 

MARSHMAN J

 

[3] Heeney J. was scathing in his assessment of Mr. Colafranceschi’s credibility. I also found difficulty in believing much of what he had to say.

 

He was very upset that Ms. Colafranceschi ended up with three-quarters of the parties’ assets

 

It is important to note that Ms. Colafranceschi ended up with more of the parties’ assets because she was entitled to lump sum spousal support and costs

 

 

 

 

Ficca v. Ficca, 2004 CanLII 6226 (ON S.C.)

 

Claudio Ficca, unrepresented

 

CAMPBELL J

 

[1] After many months of fruitless attempts to obtain more access to his children more to his liking, Mr. Ficca terminated his professional relationship with his former lawyer on July 5, 2004. That day on his own, he instigated a motion to change, with the “assistance” of his present partner/fiancée, Jean MacDuff. Herein lies the problem…neither Mr. Ficca nor Mr. MacDuff is a lawyer, and, as is evidenced by how matters have proceeded thereafter, proves the adage regarding being “one’s own lawyer” and “a little knowledge being a dangerous thing”.

 

[2] Mr. Ficca’s motion seeks certain “fine tuning” of existing temporary orders. But, in hindsight, he lost sight of (and never actually claimed, what was apparently very important to him; namely re-instating his Sunday overnight access, removed by Rady J. in October 2003).

 

 

 

 

P.L.M. v. L.J., 2008 CanLII 35923 (ON S.C.)

 

L.J.                                             Self Represented

Added Party Respondent        

B.D1                                          Iain D.D. Sneddon, for the added party Respondent

 

HARPER J.

 

[187] As a result of my analysis and findings, I make the following order:

 

1. Custody of the children, S.L.M., born […] 5, 1995, and E.A.M., born […] 22, 1999, shall be with the father, P.L.M

 

2. There shall be no access to the mother, L.J..

 

[190] It is ordered that L.J. pay to P.L.M. commencing August 1, 2008, for support of the two children, the sum of $807 per month based on an annual income of $53,621.18.

 

 

 

 

D .K. v. D. K, 2003 CanLII 2365 (ON S.C.)

 

D.K.         )     Self-represented

 

D.K.             )       Michael R. Nyhof, for the Respondent

 

MORISSETTE J

 

[1] This is a motion brought by the Respondent, (hereinafter referred to as the father), for a contempt order for denial of access by the Applicant, (hereinafter referred to as the mother), including refusing to abide by an order for counseling for the children as ordered by this court.

 

[5] This is a very sad case. The father has not seen his son R. since 1998 when R. told him he no longer wanted to have anything to do with him. On her 12th birthday, J. advised her father by letter that she too no longer wanted to see him. And now as of March of this year K., according to her mother, no longer wants to see her father.

 

[8] Regular access for the father was granted only after arguing for access in the courts. The mother objected to the father being able to have access to his children.

 

[11] As of March 1st, 1998, (3 days after the divorce judgment is granted), the mother moves with the children from Sarnia to London, Ontario without any notice to the father. The father is informed of the move by the school principal who advised him that the children were no longer in school and was wondering why. The mother had left no phone number or address.

 

The father brought his first motion for contempt before Justice Desotti on April 8th, 1998

 

[13] Yet again, a further denial of access occurred which led to another motion for contempt which Justice Desotti dealt with on June 24th, 1998 by providing the father with a makeup visit.

 

[56] When the mother left the office she saw K. in the corridor and grabbed her by the arm and led her out of the school and into her car. K.’s absence was seen immediately but the mother was already gone.

[57] K. has been in the mother’s care since that day and the father has not seen his daughter since March 28th, 2003.

 

I find that no contempt order is warranted

 

1. The Respondent, father, shall have custody of the child K. K. born July 7th, 1992

 

 

 

 

K. M. O. v. L. O., 2004 CanLII 2544 (ON S.C.)

 

Dr. L. O., the Respondent, personally (“Husband”)

 

HEENEY J.:

 

[14] Unfortunately, her relationship with her father has broken down.

 

In any event, their relationship deteriorated further after the separation. While they went to Jamaica for a holiday during Christmas of 2000, they communicated very little afterward, and have not seen each other since, until recently at the trial. A small present and card that K. sent to the Husband for Christmas of 2001 was returned with a note that read: “I think you have sent this to the wrong person”.

 

[64] The Husband has submitted that his income is only sufficient to cover his expenses, and he cannot afford to liquidate any capital since he has to provide for his own retirement. In that regard, I observe that if he had to pay the table amount of child support based on the net income numbers arrived at above, the total amount payable over two years would have been almost $16,000. Under the Guidelines, he is effectively deemed to be able to afford to pay that much support for one child. The support he is being ordered to pay here does not represent a significant increase from that amount.

 

[65] Accordingly, it is ordered that the Husband shall pay to the Wife, as a retroactive s. 7 contribution toward the educational costs of the child K. relating to the 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 school years, the sum of $22,800.

 

 

 

 

Weiler v. Phifer, 2007 CanLII 9240 (ON S.C.)

 

Harold Charles Phifer in person

 

 CAMPBELL J

 

The separation was precipitated by Ms. Weiler, who found that she could no longer live with Mr. Phifer due to his unsupportive, narcissistic, and egocentric behaviours.

 

[4] Ms. Weiler alleges an incident when Mr. Phifer returned the girls early (towards the end of one of his parenting/access times), he became enraged when she did not answer the door and he kicked in her front door.

 

[5] Ms. Weiler alleges, however, that during that four years Mr. Phifer’s behaviour towards her became more and more demanding, “volatile and abuse (sic) toward me.”

 

[6] The parties disagree significantly with what transpired over the next six month period. Mr. Phifer alleges that Ms. Weiler “disappeared with the girls.” It has been his position throughout that she “abducted” the girls from Texas and hid them from him.

 

[16] Ms. Weiler takes no exception to the nature and frequency of the access being proposed. She strongly objects to that access occurring in the United States. She still harbours a fear, in light of Mr. Phifer’s strongly held views (which he shows no restraint to expounding to anyone who will listen), that the girls remain U.S. citizens and should be entitled to live in the United States. Her concern is that should Mr. Phifer be granted access to the girls in the United States that he would ensure that they were not returned to their mother or to Ontario.

 

[17] Unlike Ms. DeVeto, I am of the view that Ms. Weiler has good reason for those concerns, since at every opportunity Mr. Phifer strongly and vociferously reiterates his view that the girls really want to live in the United States and should be entitled to make that decision on their own (presumably after he has had an extended and concerted opportunity to importune them during one of his extended access periods).

 

[21] However, when addressing or responding to either Ms. Weiler or her female counsel, he quickly escalated his behaviour, his statements and his renditions of the facts. He became loud and excited/excitable, unfocused and (the transcripts will show) his answers to simple questions became rambling diatribes that included street/gutter epithets and foul language, which evidenced an extremely derogatory opinion of Ms. Weiler, her counsel, and the female staff in her office that was startling.

 

[22] He constantly referred to Ms. Weiler as “that/this” woman and he wove a web of self-justification or minimization of his behaviour toward Ms. Weiler and the children that was fascinating to watch. He displayed a mesmerizing ability to spin his views into an oddly enticing story that evoked in the listener a sympathy for him in his self-constructed role of victim of Ms. Weiler’s designs, demands, and strategies

 

Most litigants attempt to show the court their “best side.” This did not seem to occur to Mr. Phifer. He seemed to perceive the trial hearing as a type of “performance” that one might see on t.v..

 

[27] I further accept Ms. Weiler’s evidence that Mr. Phifer also used to call her aged mother and also “leaves unpleasant messages on her machine.”

 

He further stated that he will do everything in his power to get the children back to Texas where they belong and that if the applicant dared to attempt to enter the United States, he would do everything possible to have her jailed.”

 

It is only Ms. Plain’s opinion, but having received “numerous telephone calls” from Mr. Phifer, her view of Mr. Phifer is that “He is unreceptive to anything which is said and refuses to listen. Instead, he simply vents about things not going his way.” I have no evidence or confidence that Mr. Phifer’s strong views or demeanour has changed since then

 

[40] I therefore conclude that Mr. Phifer should be allowed to enjoy the access that he seeks, but only within the Province of Ontario, upon one month’s notice, in writing, by email or regular mail.

 

 

 

 

Attwood v. Sharma, 2000 CanLII 22567 (ON S.C.)

 

William Alfred Attwood for himself.

 

Campbell J

 

[1] At the end of the applicant’s case, the respondent moved for a summary judgment on the evidence then before the court, based upon Rules 16(12) and 2(3). She seeks to rely upon the evidence called by the applicant as the evidence upon which the court should grant her (a) a dismissal of the applicant’s claims; (b) an order for custody of the child of their relationship, William Sharma Attwood, born December 27, 1995; (c) an order for specified access; (d) an order for child support of $217 per month (based on an income of $23,500); and (e) a restraining order that the applicant have no direct contact with her

 

[2] After a day-and-a-half of evidence from eight witnesses; documentary evidence from the local police of the applicant’s criminal record (Exhibit 4); several threatening letters written to the respondent by the applicant, and the demeanour of the applicant in court, it is evident why the respondent ensured that there was a visible police presence in the courtroom at all times. The applicant fluctuated from rude obnoxiousness and petulant complaint to loud aggressiveness. At times he paced throughout the courtroom and repeatedly showed an inability to control not only the nature of his comments, but the volume and aggressiveness thereof.

 

The applicant is also accused (although he explains it as mere coincidence) of stalking the respondent, her current boyfriend and another individual who swore an affidavit supportive of the respondent in earlier court proceedings.

 

As he declared in one of his rants, If I don’t win custody, I’ll appeal”.

 

Mr. Attwood is extremely egocentric, narcissisic, and misogynistic. He seems not to be able to consider anyone but himself and his own needs, desires and whims

 

When their evidence was not supportive of his position, he called them liars, friends of the respondent’s lawyer and alleged that they were part of a conspiracy to not only discredit him, but to hide and fabricate evidence and perjure themselves. His paranoia knows no bounds.

 

After 30 years in family law, this applicant is one of the most frightening litigants that I have had the experience of observing.

 

[10] Rule 16 is obviously intended to be invoked prior to a trial being commenced. However, in an effort to avoid the misuse of judicial and court resources, when it is read in conjunction with Rules 2(3)(b), (c) and (d) (together with the inherent jurisdiction of any trier of fact), it invites a court to intervene to shorten any proceeding that is vexatious, abusive, without merit, or a waste of limited resources. This motion for judgment at the end of the applicant’s case, similar to a non-suit in criminal proceedings, is both appropriate and timely.

 

[11] Sufficient evidence has been led through the applicant and his witnesses to make it extremely obvious that his claim for custody has no merit and absolutely no possibility of succeeding.

 

[15] After considering all of section 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, (and especially subsection (3)), the evidence and the demeanour of the applicant also clearly requires that an order be granted that there shall be no contact or access between the applicant and his son. I am convinced that young William would not only not benefit from any contact with his father, but further contact between them would be dangerous to the child’s physical health, emotional stability and healthy psychological growth.

 

 

 

 

Vandenelsen v. Merkley, 2003 CanLII 1965 (ON S.C.)

 

CARLINE ANTONIA VANDENELSEN      )    The Applicant, on her own behalf

 

The single exception is the disposition on one of the findings of contempt against Ms. VandenElsen which has been adjourned until after the appeal in the criminal case, and which Justice Desotti will have to deal with himself.

 

 

 

 

Domise v. Oyadiran, 2006 CanLII 2614 (ON S.C.)

 

ANGELLA DOMISE        )     Self-represented

 

Nolan J

 

I have reviewed the financial circumstances of Ms. Domise and it appears to me that she would be unable to pay any order of costs that might be made by me. I am proposing to the parties that in the place of a costs order, I make an order requiring Ms. Domise to obtain leave of this court before commencing any further application under the Divorce Act or the Family Law Act against Dr. Oyadiran

 

 

 

 

Madruga v. Madruga, 2007 CanLII 51166 (ON S.C.)

 

Mr. Madruga, self-represented

 

Rogin J.

 

 

[3] Presently all three children live with the applicant their mother.

 

[5] The respondent declared bankruptcy in June of 2006

 

[8] There is no matrimonial home to dispose of., … , It has been lost to the bank presumably by power of sale

 

Mr. Madruga therefore owes Ms. Madruga for child support from the date of separation $20,171.69

 

 

 

 

Barta v. Barta, 2005 CanLII 468 (ON S.C.)

 

JOSEPH SCOTT BARTA     )      Self Represented

 

JENKINS J.

 

In March of 2002 his employment was terminated by TD Canada Trust and he has been looking for full time employment since that date

 

[10] I am satisfied that the applicant who has a university degree in mathematics is under employed.

 

It is apparent that the applicant's efforts to start his own business have failed and by refusing to seek full time employment in the fields in which he has experience he has failed to act reasonably

 

[13] As a result of the foregoing, I am not prepared to vary the child support as requested by the applicant.

 

 

 

 

Stoangi v. Petersen, 2006 CanLII 24124 (ON S.C.)

 

Dr. Erin Johnson in person

 

VOGELSANG J.

 

In April, 2005, she engineered a very advantageous change to her work conditions which allowed her to spend at least nine days at the farm out of every three weeks and her complaints about missing her family sound hollow because of that, especially since she admitted that she really spent little time with her sons A.J. and Jeff – which she blamed on their being “very busy” – when she was home.

 

[28] When a non-custodial parent intentionally leaves secure employment knowing that she has young children to support, the policy basis of the Guidelines – that a paying parent must generate income according to capacity – is frustrated:

 

Commencing January 1, 2005, her responsibility to pay support increases to $846, based on an imputed continuation of her $62,000 income throughout that year

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Northeast Region

 

 

 

Raphael v. Raphael, 2003 CanLII 2215 (ON S.C.)

 

Robert Benjamin Raphael            )  In person

 

Justice E. Loukidelis

 

[14] Mr. Raphael states he only has one employment prospect as an investment salesman earning some $25,000.00-$30,000.00 over the first year.

 

[15] I am satisfied on all the evidence that he is purposely “holding back” to present his financial position to the court in the poorest light.

 

[22] I am satisfied on all the evidence that an imputed income to Mr. Raphael of $150,000.00 gross, is reasonable

 

[23] The child support payments based on the guidelines shall therefore be $1,761.00 net of tax effective June 1, 2003.

 

[24] The section 7 add on expenses for summer camp, orthodontic work and synagogue school total $$11,554.00 per annum. I would fix the respondent’s share at 90% of that total which amounts to approximately $875.00 per month commencing January 1, 2004

 

[25] I would assess monthly spousal support at $2,500.00 per month commencing July 1, 2003, to and including May 1, 2006 when it shall be reviewed. There is in existence 2 interim support orders which are already seriously in arrears

 

 

 

 

Sharpe v. Waterhouse, 2005 CanLII 3198 (ON C.A.)

 

[1] Prior to the hearing date of this appeal, Mr. Sharpe's request for an adjournment of the appeal was refused. When he did not appear, we directed court staff to telephone him to confirm that he was aware that the appeal was being heard.

 

[2] Following commencement of default proceedings by the Family Responsibility Office, Mr. Sharpe brought a motion in the Superior Court for an order reducing arrears of child support to reflect payments made to Ms. Waterhouse directly. On November 18, 2002, the issue raised by Mr. Sharpe was set for trial at the March 31, 2003 sittings of the Superior Court, at Bracebridge. Ms. Waterhouse did not attend the trial. She now appeals from the order reducing support arrears to zero

 

(a) Ms. Waterhouse was not represented by counsel on Mr. Sharpe's motion

 

(d) as the result of the trial judge's decision, the District of Muskoka is requiring that Ms. Waterhouse re-pay the sum of $111,047.76 paid to her under the Family Benefits Act, the General Welfare Assistance Act and the Ontario Works Act on the basis that Ms. Waterhouse failed to declare support income while in receipt of assistance

 

(e) Ms. Waterhouse has been charged with welfare fraud

 

 

 

 

Shaw-McInnis v. Crawford, 2003 CanLII 2241 (ON S.C.)

 

PETER PHILIP CRAWFORD        )   Personally

 

WHALEN, J.:

 

Psychiatric evidence filed also suggested he’d suffered an emotional breakdown as a result of the separation.

 

[21] As a result of the turmoil in his life, the husband declared bankruptcy in Ontario on February 19, 1997. He was discharged on January 7, 1998. He didn’t find full time employment again until 1999,

 

During his extended unemployment in 1997 and 1998, he received welfare, E.I. benefits and the charity of friends. In 2002 he found employment in Sault Ste. Marie as sales manager for J.F. Fitzpatrick Industries Inc

 

The husband’s claim for variation of support retroactively to the period prior to May 1, 1997 is denied.

 

 

 

 

Beaudry v. Beaudry, 2004 CanLII 20399 (ON S.C.)

 

Gerard Beaudry, representing himself

 

Justice Robert Riopelle

 

[1] The division of the family’s assets and the provision of child and spousal support are more complex than usual for two reasons:

a) the husband has been off work for eight months, without income for four months

 

[7] He testified that he was depressed and emotional about the serious financial pressures placed on him as a result of the separation and that this affected his performance at work. His employer became concerned for his safety and that of his co-workers. He was therefore transferred from shift work to steady days where he could be more easily supervised. Unfortunately, that created even more financial problems for him: on shift work he could work 50 to 60 hours a week but on day shift he could work only 40 hours a week. In September his employer sent him to the company doctor who recommended that the husband take a break from work. He continued to receive a salary of $9,437 while on stress leave for 17 weeks.

 

[12] The husband has been deliberately underemployed. A brief stress leave absence from work may have been justified but not a prolonged absence extending beyond eight months. For the purposes of calculating his spousal support obligation his 2003 income shall be imputed to be $79,000

 

For the purpose of calculating his 2004 spousal support obligation his 2004 income is therefore imputed at $83,000.

 

His arrears of child support are therefore fixed at $2,700

 

The husband has already paid $11,086 in spousal support. The lump sum due at this time is therefore $7,314

 

[23] The equalization payment due by the husband to the wife to equalize their net family property as at January 1, 2001 is $16,371

 

[27] In the usual case the equalization payment would be reduced by the other spouse’s share of the joint obligations assumed by the payor spouse, … , No such reduction will be made in this case, given that the debts run up by him have jeopardized the wife’s credit and may very well lead her to be involved in litigation or to file for bankruptcy.

 

[28] Judgement is to issue as follows:

 

the immediate transfer to her of the balance of the RRSPs discounted by 20% of their face value on a tax-free spousal rollover basis

 

the immediate payment to her of the husband’s share of the net proceeds of the sale of the matrimonial home

 

granting her a lien on the 1979 Harley for the balance repayable together with interest calculated at the rate of 4% per annum on the balance outstanding from time to time at the rate of $100 a month

 

$15,000 for costs, inclusive of disbursements and gst, repayable together with interest at 4% per annum on the balance outstanding from time to time at the rate of $100 a month on the first day of each month commencing on September 1, 2004

 

 

 

 

Lepine v. Lepine, 2007 CanLII 43741 (ON S.C.)

 

Hennessy, S.C.J.

 

At the time the motion was heard, Mr. Lepine was not represented by counsel.

 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge awarded interim support to Mrs. Lepine in the amount of $1,000 per month for six months, moving to $1,500 per month until 2008.

 

[4] Mr. Lepine now asks this court to set aside the order for interim support

 

[12] In submissions, counsel for Mrs. Lepine advised the Court in March 2007 that her income was $14.51 per hour for 45 hours per month, for an approximate per annum income of $8000

 

[13] After the hearing of the motions, Mrs. Lepine filed her Tax Return and Assessment for 2006 which showed income of $18,912.00

 

[25] Self represented litigants pose particular challenges to the justice system and to all of those who are involved in the particular case.

 

In a busy motions court, a self-represented litigant could be at a disadvantage

 

[31] This motion is dismissed.

 

 

 

 

O'Neill v. O'Neill, 2004 CanLII 8369 (ON S.C.)

 

No one appearing for the Respondent

 

DEL FRATE, S.C.J

 

I impute for the year 2002 an income of $68, 545. Based on that amount, the Alberta Guidelines require a payment of $578 monthly for one child and $932 for the two children.

 

Accordingly, for those four months the Respondent shall pay $932 monthly for a total of $3,728

 

[7] The Respondent shall be responsible for 77% of those expenses or $3,850 yearly

 

This amount has been paid by the Petitioner and accordingly an Order is to issue for payment of $1,695

 

[9] The above Interim Orders are made pursuant to s. 19(7) and 19 (9) of the Divorce Act

 

 

 

 

Levesque v. Little, 2007 CanLII 1910 (ON S.C.)

 

TERESA LITTLE     (   Self-Represented

 

Mr. Justice R.G.S. Del Frate

 

As I stated in my Reasons for Judgment Ms. Little is quite angry and hurt over the separation. Her position became intransigent.

 

In my view Ms. Little frustrated any discussions that might have led to a resolution of their differences. Without consequences litigants will not have any deterrence and continue with untenable positions

 

[10] I am also concerned about Ms. Little's ability to pay. She is unemployed and most of the matrimonial assets have been dissipated because of this litigation.

 

[11] Keeping these factors in mind I award Mr. Levesque costs in the sum of $27,500 inclusive of G.S.T. and disbursements

 

 

 

 

Perkins v. Perkins, 2007 CanLII 56508 (ON S.C.)

 

FREDERICK PERKINS     )    Self represented

 

Gauthier, S.C.J

 

33] The Husband continues to be unemployed and relies on the financial aid of family members, particularly his father.

 

[41] The Husband advised the court that he will no longer be attending for access at the Supervised Access Center, as he finds the facility and the rules uncomfortable and not conducive to open and healthy contact between himself and his son. In addition, the cost is prohibitive.

 

[91] To minimize any stress or anxiety on Bradley, the following access regime should be followed:

(a) for the next three months, that is, December, January, and February, the Husband shall be entitled to exercise access to Bradley at the Supervised Access Centre, every third Saturday, for two hours.

(b) For the following three months, that is, March, April, and May 2008, the Husband shall be entitled to exercise unsupervised access to Bradley, every third Saturday, for a five hour period, during which the child shall not be removed from the Districts of Sudbury and Nipissing.

(c) Commencing June, 2008, the Husband shall be entitled to unsupervised access to Bradley one weekend per month, from Friday after school until 8:00 pm. on Sunday

 

[118] The evidence leads me to conclude that the Husband has not, at least until recently, made significant efforts to secure employment. Thus, he has been intentionally unemployed, or under-employed

 

[120] I conclude that it is appropriate to impute income to the Husband as requested by the Wife

 

 The Respondent shall post a bond, without sureties, in the amount of $10,000, which will escheat to the Crown in the Right of Ontario, in the event that the child is unilaterally removed from Ontario.

 

The Respondent shall, at the commencement of each period of unsupervised access, deposit his passport and any other travel documents at the detachment of the Ontario Provincial Police, in Sturgeon Falls.

 

The Respondent shall, once he begins exercising unsupervised access, advise the Wife in writing of where he will be exercising access

 

The quantum of child support is in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines and is based on imputed annual income of $36,000

 

 

 

 

Harris v. Harris, 2006 CanLII 9141 (ON S.C.)

 

WALTER HARRIS      )    Self-represented

 

Gauthier, S.C.J

 

[6] After the separation, the Husband moved into, and he continues to reside at the couple’s rental property. Although he was successfully self-employed as a photographer since 1982, it appears that he has not been working for some time due to stress. He has had some financial difficulties as a result of not working. He is in arrears of child support. His driver’s license has been suspended by action of the Family Responsibility Office

 

[9] There have been some forty court appearances in this case and upwards of twenty five Orders made, prior to the trial. It is necessary to review some of those Orders

 

[11] The parties were ordered to not dissipate any assets under their control. As well, the Husband was to pay to the Wife a lump sum of $1,500 as support

 

As well, the Husband was to pay interim child support of $748 monthly, based on an income of $40,000 per year, and interim spousal support of $500 per month

 

Yet, the Husband did not make arrangements to have access at the Supervised Access Centre, after it was ordered, stating that neither he nor his children wanted to have access at that location. The result was that, for the period between October 31st and Christmas, the children did not see their father.

 

[92] Another major contra-indicator of joint custody is the Husband’s attitude toward the Wife. He is disrespectful of her. He undermines her parenting and her authority, and he does this in a flagrant manner. He is not only critical of her, but accuses her of abusing the children, ruining their lives and his, and for causing him financial ruin

 

[117] Likewise, I must conclude that the children’s lawyer was satisfied, on March 3rd that the resumption of unsupervised access posed no risk to the children.

 

[119] To, on March 7th, take the position that indeed a psychiatric report is required prior to the Husband exercising unsupervised access, appears somewhat gratuitous.

 

The Husband shall pay to the Wife the sum of $390 per month for the support of the children, effective January 1, 2005. This amount is based on the Child Support Guidelines and on an annual income imputed to the Husband, in the amount of $20,000

 

 

 

 

Mgrdichian v. Mgrdichian, 2006 CanLII 13773 (ON S.C.)

 

No one appeared for the Applicant

 

Rivard J.

 

[6] The wife states that the husband was a controlling man. He was sometimes violent and mean to the wife. She was afraid of him

 

[20] The husband then brought an ex parte motion before this court, falsely alleging that he and his wife had been separated since 2002; that the wife went to Iraq in March of 2003; and that the husband had not heard from the wife since March 2004.

 

[21] On the basis of sworn false affidavit evidence, the husband obtained a court order evicting the wife. The wife was then left with no accommodation, no income and with no real ability to communicate in the English language

 

[22] I am satisfied that the husband has fraudulently tried to divest himself of his assets in contemplation of these family law proceedings. The husband’s actions were clearly for the purpose of defeating the wife’s claim to one-half the net family property. The husband’s actions have the following “badges of fraud” consistent with the intent to “defeat, burden, delay or defraud” the wife:

 

[26] On March 10, 2005, the husband was found to be in contempt of the court order requiring him to disclose. He was given 10 days to complete all outstanding disclosure.

 

[27] On March 31, 2005, the husband was committed to jail for his failure to disclose as required by court order. His application was also dismissed.

 

[31] The husband created a web of deceit and falsehood which would have been revealed with appropriate disclosure. As a result, he chose not to disclose, thereby maintaining a position which has been shown to be untrue in any event

 

He was left in the financial situation where he could claim he had nothing left;

 

[33] It is to be noted that disclosure was sought from the Added Parties, who are primarily the husband’s brothers. Court orders were obtained to compel them to provide the requested disclosure but they too would not comply with the court orders. As a result, the pleadings of the Added Parties were also struck.

 

[35] The wife requests an order granting her custody of the child, Sarah born June 6, 1991. I am satisfied it is in Sarah’s best interest that she continue to reside with her mother. It is ordered that the wife shall have custody of Sarah.

 

[38] I, therefore, find that the total net family property of the parties which existed on valuation day (August 30, 2004) had a value of $4,359,408.00. It is ordered that the wife’s claim for equalization be and is hereby fixed at $2,179,104.00, together with interest to date in the amount of $98,059.68, for a total of $2,277,164.00

 

[40] On November 16, 2004, the husband was ordered to pay a lump sum of $10,000.00 forthwith and thereafter $3,000.00 per month. The husband ignored the court order. He has paid nothing to the wife

 

[43] Having regard to the wife’s needs as set out in her Proposed Budget, the income she should earn upon receiving the equalization payment, the needs of the children and the husband’s means, it is appropriate that the sum of $6,000.00 per month, net of taxes be paid to the wife for spousal support.

 

[44] It is also appropriate that the husband pay child support at the rate of $1,500.00 per month until July 2014, and $50,000.00 in special expenses for tuition for private and post secondary schools. A lump sum of $150,000.00 reflects the present value of this periodic child support.

 

[45] It will, therefore, be ordered that the husband pay to the wife lump sum spousal support and child support fixed at $2,400,000.00

 

However, as a result of the husband’s bankruptcy and pursuant to the Order of Registrar Sproat under section 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S. 1985, c. B-3 (the “Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act”), the wife is the sole owner of the shares of Haig II and the sole holder of all shareholders loans owning by Haig II.

 

However, as a result of the husband’s bankruptcy, and pursuant to the order of Registrar Sproat under section 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the wife is the beneficial owner of one-half of the shares of 637263 Ontario Limited carrying on business as Esquire Grill, and Berg holds in trust for her one-half of any interest, investment or shareholder loan held by him in the said corporation.

 

[50] It is further ordered and declared that the arrears of support owing by the husband as at the date of bankruptcy (January 13, 2005) are fixed at $46,187.00. Since the date of his bankruptcy, further arrears of $45,000.00 have accrued, for a total outstanding of $91,187.00 plus interest of $3,351.45 to date, for a total of $94,538.95.

 

[51] It is also ordered and declared that the unpaid cost order to date total $84,660.11 owing by the husband, and $15,936.23 owing by Berg, both inclusive of interest, and the total unpaid penalties for contempt ordered to date against the husband is $26,060.27 inclusive of interest.

 

[52] It is ordered that Berg repay to Haig II the sum of $80,000.00, being the amounts drawn by him immediately prior to the appointment of the Receiver.

 

[53] It is ordered that the husband and Berg are jointly and severally liable to the wife for damages for fraud and conspiracy to defraud, fixed at $40,000.00, together with punitive damages fixed at $25,000.00.

 

[54] It is also ordered that the husband and Berg be and are jointly and severally liable for all of the fees, costs, and disbursements of the Receiver, as may be approved by the Court.

 

58] It is ordered that the husband be restrained from annoying, harassing or molesting the wife

 

61] Approval of draft Judgment as to form and content is dispensed with.

 

[62] This order bears interest at the rate of 5 percent per year from its date

 

 

 

 

Tremblay v. Tremblay, 1999 CanLII 3748 (ON C.A.)

 

Ronald Arthur Tremblay, the respondent in person

 

On January 3, 1994, after a marriage of approximately

17 years, the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her

husband.  On the same date, she commenced an action for damages

for personal injuries arising out of alleged physical and mental

abuse.  The husband made an assignment in bankruptcy in June

1996.  Loukidelis J. found that he did so in order to avoid

paying his wife’s claim for damages which was in the amount of

$750,000.

 

 

 

 

Aube v. Aube, 2008 CanLII 43572 (ON S.C.)

 

ROLAND AUBE       )   Respondent self-represented

 

Robbie Gordon, S.C.J

 

[8] Unfortunately, as so often occurs after a separation, the parties’ emotions seem to have gotten the better of their common sense. The conduct of the parties through this long and tortuous litigation has resulted in the bankruptcy of the Husband. The Wife has been required to exist for the most part on a minimum wage income. As it stands today, the bulk of the property which existed at separation, and for which they worked so hard, has been lost to power of sale proceedings

 

13] On June 3, 1999, Justice Poupore made an order of non-dissipation of assets

 

[14] On April 6, 2000, Justice Whalen made an order that the Husband not molest, harass or annoy the Wife

 

[15] On April 20, 2000, Justice Riopelle made a temporary order that provided, among other things, that the Husband was to pay child support of $91 per month and spousal support of $2,500 per month, both commencing May 1, 2000, … , Costs were also ordered against the Husband in the amount of $1,500

 

[17] On July 4, 2001, the Applicant argued a motion asking that the Husband’s pleading be struck. Although Justice Gauthier found that the Wife had sufficient factual and legal basis to have brought the motion, she did not grant the relief. She subsequently ordered the Respondent to pay $6,000 in costs relative to this motion

 

[18] Also on July 4, 2001, Justice Gauthier entertained a motion by the Respondent to decrease the support ordered by Justice Riopelle. That motion was adjourned with a costs award of $2,000 against the Respondent

 

[22] From the above summary, it is apparent that the Husband has thus far met with little success in his litigation efforts.

 

[39] Mr. Aube filed his 2007 Income Tax Summary which indicates his total income to have been $9,092.09 and his taxable income to have been $6,998.31.

 

[46] To be sure, Mr. Aube’s conduct throughout this litigation and his separation from Mrs. Aube has been unfortunate. His early attempt at fraud upon his spouse and the court makes it difficult to give him the benefit of the doubt when questions arise relative to his evidence. However, it was clear to me from the evidence that I heard, that Mr. Aube has been accused of certain things, and that orders have been made against him, on the basis of allegations which are untrue, and that such orders have resulted in significant hardships for him.

 

[48] I therefore find that the Husband has an annual income of $36,732 and would have enjoyed income of this amount since his eligibility for CPP and OAS when he turned 65 on July 19, 2007.

 

On a go-forward basis, the support obligation of the Husband would be $1,400 per month.

 

[62] In all of the circumstances, it is reasonable to provide for the award of pre-trial and post-trial support of the Applicant in two ways:

1. By vesting in her name, the property at 61 Devonshire Street and 208 Martel Street. By doing so, she may elect both to sell the property and use the proceeds of the sale towards her support, or she may retain the property and utilize the net rental income.

2. Imposing upon the Husband the obligation, during his lifetime and for so long as the Applicant resides at the apartment currently occupied by her at 31/35 Devonshire Street, to pay her rent on her behalf. For income tax purposes, the rent so assumed by the Husband, shall from this date forward only, be considered support paid by the Husband and received by the Wife, at the rate of $595 per month.

 

 

 

 

Goudie v. Stapleford, 2004 CanLII 20297 (ON S.C.)

 

DAVID RALPH STAPLEFORD     )    In person, for the Respondent

 

Pardu, J

 

[1] The Petitioner sues for a divorce and spousal support. The Respondent argues that he should not be required to pay spousal support on three grounds,

a) the Petitioner does not need it;

b) he cannot afford to pay spousal support;

c) the Petitioner signed an agreement giving up any claim to spousal support

 

[15] The wife’s signature to the separation agreement was not witnessed. According to s. 55(1) of the Family Law Act, it is unenforceable.

 

It would seem unjust to hold her to the agreement in these circumstances

 

[27] Some eight years have passed since separation.

 

28] Respondent to pay spousal support of $500.00 per month commencing April 1, 2004 for 48 months

 

 

 

 

Shelly v. Shelly, 2004 CanLII 5083 (ON S.C.)

 

G. Shelly, in person

 

Pardu, J

 

[3] When the wife brought a motion for interim child support, the husband quit his job as a city councillor, … , He had threatened his wife to quit his job to avoid paying child support

 

[5] On August 22, 2002 an order was made requiring the husband to pay child support of $468.00 per month commencing September 1, 2002 based on an annual income imputed to him of $32,000.00. The husband has not paid a dime of the support ordered.

 

[6] The husband now claims that he works as assistant manager in a store owned by his girlfriend, with whom he resides. He says he earned $12,600 in 2003 for this work, and produced a T4 slip purporting to verify that amount.

 

In any event, I am not persuaded that he has made reasonable efforts to secure employment suitable for his experience and qualifications in Elliot Lake. I find that he is intentionally under-employed. He has not established that his proposed course of study to become a realtor is reasonable.

 

[10] Based on his earnings history, I find that the husband could earn $30,000 if he chose to do so and impute that amount of income to him. I see no reason to vary the arrears which have accumulated.

 

 

 

 

Léveillé v. Lemieux, 2002 CanLII 2694 (ON S.C.)

 

JACQUES LÉVEILLÉ         )    In person

 

Pardu, J

 

In 2001 he decided to take a leave of absence from teaching, and establish a new convenience store. His most recent financial statement for the six months ending June 30, 2002 showed a loss of $6,582.46.

 

[28] In this case, I conclude that the father did not act in good faith when he took a leave of absence from his teaching position.

 

His debts exceed his assets and there is nothing to be gained by holding onto the property. He embarked on this business knowing it would likely seriously impair his ability to support his child and with reckless disregard of his parental duty to support his daughter

 

[29] The father could earn $60,000 if he returned to teaching. His expressed inability to pay child support results from unreasonable decisions intentionally made, and I conclude that the father is intentionally under-employed within the meaning of s. 19(1)(a) of the Child Support Guidelines and attribute income to him of $60,000 annually

 

[34] I estimate that the annual costs to transport the child by plane for access twice a year will be approximately $1,000. With imputed income of $60,000, this should not cause the father undue hardship.

 

 

 

 

Gauthier v. Gauthier, 2004 CanLII 39943 (ON S.C.)

 

GILLES GAUTHIER          )   Respondent appearing in person

 

Louise L. Gauthier, S.C.J

 

Mr. Gauthier did indicate that he is on the verge of bankruptcy. This would be his third.

 

[49] It is ordered that the Respondent pay to the Petitioner spousal support in the amount of $950 per month, commencing December 1, 2004, and continuing on the first day of each and every month thereafter

 

 

 

 

Otis v. Gregoire, 2008 CanLII 50510 (ON S.C.)

 

PATRICE GREGOIRE      )    Self-represented

 

WHALEN, J

 

[1] Michelle Elizabeth Otis (“the wife”) and Patrice Gregoire (“the husband”)

 

[7] At the beginning of the trial, the wife’s counsel objected to the husband’s participation in the trial, even though he was present and ready to proceed. The husband had never filed a response or claim of his own. Nor had he filed a sworn financial statement. This was so even though the requirement was clearly indicated on the Notice of Application served on him. The appropriate blank forms had also been attached to the Notice for his completion. The husband’s explanation was that he had not read or absorbed the meaning of the instruction

 

[11] The wife testified that the separation was the result of the husband’s angry and controlling behaviour, with frequent underlying alcohol abuse. She decided that the marriage had become a very unhealthy environment for her and the children.

 

At the time, the wife and children were in her bed watching television. The husband’s angry, threatening behaviour frightened them, so she called 911, resulting in the husband’s arrest for criminal harassment.

 

[13] The charge was ultimately resolved by the husband being placed on a 12-month peace bond, which was entered into on April 22, 2008 with conditions not to communicate with the wife, not to be within 50 meters of her places of residence, education or employment, and not to molest, harass or physically interfere with she or the children.

 

[14] The fact of the current recognizance is convincing evidence that the husband was responsible for criminal behaviour sufficient to support the conditions imposed. I accept that responsibility lay with the husband and that the wife had basis to fear for her safety. Such orders are not made lightly or without sufficient evidentiary foundation

 

[22] The wife testified that the prohibition against negative comments was made because right after the separation the husband regularly demeaned her when he was alone with the children – for example, calling her “a bitch”, “a thief”, “a whore”, “a lazy ass”, accusing her of keeping them from him, and suggesting that she should marry a wealthy man or get a new job. According to the wife, the children would return home and report these comments to her

 

[26] According to the wife, the combination of the husband’s withdrawal from exercising access, his continuing negative comments about her to the children and the prolonged conflict between them had caused the children to oppose further access. The wife stated that Cassidy was particularly vocal and against seeing her father. While Walker had expressed similar views, the wife did not think he was as strongly opposed. Because of the children’s views, the wife also opposed the access.

 

She also insisted that there be a third party to facilitate access in view of the outstanding recognizance and her continuing fears of the husband.

 

He had left the Sault because his business here had failed, his bank accounts had been seized by federal tax authorities and he had felt oppressed by rumours and the fall-out of his separation.

 

[36] The husband wanted to re-establish access and then eventually expand it to include overnights on weekends and a mid-week visit.

 

[37] It is clear that the husband’s life is in considerable disorder right now. Although he had his own apartment in the west end of the downtown area of Sault Ste. Marie, he did not tell the court anything about it or whether it could accommodate the children. Because of the current criminal charges, he cannot live there in any event. There was no evidence of how the husband could accommodate the children now

 

[38] At the start of the trial, the husband was arrested on two warrants: (1) failing to appear for court on a charge of “blowing over 80”, and; (2) failing to pay $1,874.99 in interim child support arrears “immediately” as ordered in an enforcement proceeding on July 9, 2008, with the result that he was to serve 15 days in jail. The husband remained in police custody until the final day of trial when he was granted bail on conditions, including that he live with his surety, Dana Maynard, at her residence in the east end of the city.

 

39] The husband is presently unemployed. He has sold his car, so he must rely on someone else for transportation if he is to have access.

 

[66] The accountant also testified that the husband owed the government approximately $20,000. in unpaid G.S.T. plus interest and penalties yet to be calculated. He was also in arrears of income tax payments of about $80,000. The accountant confirmed that he had advised the husband to declare personal bankruptcy.

 

The husband’s annual income for purposes of Guideline child support is therefore imputed to be $46,800.00.

 

[68] Based on annual income of $46,800.00 the husband must pay basic Guideline child support of $707.00 per month for the two children of the marriage.

 

[85] Based on the foregoing analysis of the parties’ “means” and the husband’s 52% share of their combined “means”, the husband is ordered to pay a further $302.00 per month (.52 x $580.00 per month) for special child care expenses in addition to the $707.00 per month basic Guideline support earlier ordered.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Central East Judicial Region

 

 

 

Ojo v. Ojo, 2005 CanLII 1498 (ON S.C.)

 

The Applicant Otegbola Ojo - self-represented

 

Justice G. DiTomaso

 

[37] I find that he is under-employed to the detriment of his family

 

I do not accept Dr. Ojo’s income is currently $150,000.00 U.S. a year.

 

[43] Having determined that Dr. Ojo has the capacity to earn at least $500,000.00 and having decided for reasons stated not to change the income imputed to Dr. Ojo in the amount of $530,400.00, I find the calculation of child support remains the same as ordered by Justice Hatton in the amount of $7,380.00 a month

 

[44] Similarly, I am not persuaded by Dr. Ojo to change Justice Hatton’s award in favour of the respondent wife regarding spousal support payable in the amount of $9,000.00 per month.

 

[47] I calculate arrears owing for child and spousal support in the amount of $113,609.47 as of December 31, 2004

 

In fact, he does not believe that there are any such arrears owing and that he has, in fact, overpaid support

 

[55] In my view, having outlined the numerous concerns regarding payment of the outstanding arrears, this is an appropriate case for a charging order. Accordingly, a charging order is to issue upon the applicant husband’s properties and his RRSP account to secure accumulated support arrears together with accrued interest from February 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004 as follows:

(a) 221 Simcoe Street North, Oshawa, Ontario;

(b) 215 Simcoe Street Notth, Oshawa, Ontario;

(c) 1459 Ontario Street, Hamilton Township, Northumberland County, Ontario;

(d) M.D. Management RRSP No. 55133.100.

 

[56] In addition to the charging order, this is an appropriate case for the applicant husband to make a lump sum payment towards the accumulated arrears. I hereby order the applicant husband to pay the lump sum of $25,000.00 to the respondent wife in respect of the accumulated arrears within the next 30 days. The applicant husband shall not be entitled to bring his motion to vary back before the court unless and until said lump sum has been paid.

 

 

 

Ojo v. Ojo, 2005 CanLII 9674 (ON S.C.)

 

The Applicant Otegbola Ojo - self-represented

 

Justice G. DiTomaso

 

[18] What I can say with some certainty is that Mr. Ojo was not reasonable in bringing his motion when he had not made full disclosure and when he brought his motion to fend off pressure being exerted by the Family Responsibility Office.

 

[19] Instead, Mr. Ojo presented a disorganized and deficient argument based on disorganized and deficient materials regarding which he was unsuccessful.

 

[30] For the reasons given, I hereby order Mr. Ojo to pay Mrs. Ojo fees in the amount of $40,000 plus GST in the amount of $2,800 together with all disbursements inclusive of GST in the amount of $3,003.04

 

 

 

 

Pratt v. Pratt, 2003 CanLII 2201 (ON S.C.)

 

CHARLES PRATT     )    On his own behalf

 

EBERHARD J

 

2. I found that the Applicant father does present a risk of such harm to his daughter Charlotte.

 

6. Although the Respondent mother succeeded in avoiding the Applicant’s claim for joint custody and unsupervised access, which were the nominal issues of the trial, she did not succeed in persuading the court that Charlotte’s unfortunate loss of opportunity for relationship with her beloved father is due to his conduct.

 

18. I fix costs at $10,000 payable at a rate of no less than $100.00 per month commencing June 1, 2003. Having set out a payment schedule, I have not made the costs payable “forthwith” but I intend that no application for a variation in access, as contemplated by my judgment, be heard by the court unless the costs are paid up to date

 

 

 

 

Spring v. Hilderbrandt-Guy, 2003 CanLII 2248 (ON S.C.)

 

Duty counsel Bruhn, for the Respondent SPRING

 

EBERHARD J

 

[1] James Spring is the Appellant in two files to vary orders of child support, fix arrears and set out a payment schedule. He is the father of Inga’s child Melissa and Cheryl’s children Justin, Matthew and Samantha.

 

[2] Each of the mothers has brought updated evidence of their own income and claims for extras thereby seeking an increase in ongoing child support.

 

Because of the garnishment by Inga and a further garnishment for tax arrears accrued when he improperly deducted child support payments, his net income from his pension to live on was $282.45

 

[25] His support obligation therefore totals $1000 in June 2003 which leaves him only $398.98 to live. That is obviously very modest.

 

 

 

 

Millard v. Cargoe, 2004 CanLII 15955 (ON S.C.)

 

Mr. Cargoe on his own behalf

 

Justice P.H. Howden

 

[1] The applicant Jeannette Millard moves to vary the order of December 12, 1997 and for the following orders

        that the respondent be prohibited from bringing further motions without the court’s permission

 

[12] As the respondent has brought forward two proceedings which are marred by his own non-compliance with disclosure and cost orders, and he basically he did not oppose the request under rule 14(21), preferring to rail against the predicament that his own conduct has produced, the order requested under rule 14(21) is granted

 

[13] The order may be sent to me for signing without draft approval by the respondent who is not legally represented

 

 

 

 

Diciaula v. Mastrogiacomo, 2006 CanLII 11928 (ON S.C.D.C.)

 

[3] The first endorsement in this file was made on December 21, 2001, providing for temporary access. Within two months thereafter, the first motion to strike the respondent’s pleadings was scheduled, access had been suspended and then ordered to continue only if supervised.

 

The respondent has from time to time been represented by counsel

 

[5] On July 23, 2002, Justice Perkins ordered that the husband’s pleadings were to be struck and that the wife was to proceed to trial based on affidavit evidence alone. The husband moved before Justice Nelson on November 26, 2003, and before Justice MacKInnon on February 8, 2004, to reinstate his pleadings. Justice Nelson refused the request to reinstate pleadings and awarded costs to the wife in the amount of $3,000.00 which have never been paid. Justice MacKinnon dismissed the husband’s motion to reinstate the pleadings but did so without prejudice to his right to reapply once certain conditions had been met. Costs of $1,000.00 were ordered against the husband which have not been paid. A third informal request to reinstate the pleadings was made orally by the husband to Regional Senior Justice Shaughnessy at a trial scheduling court on July 27, 2004, and that request was dismissed by Justice Shaughnessy who was of the opinion that the terms set out in Justice MacKinnon’s order had not been complied with.

 

[6] As the respondent continued to be in default and his pleadings had not been reinstated, the applicant was at liberty to move without notice for an uncontested trial. She did so filing a substantial affidavit in Form 23(c) sworn November 19, 2004. The material was put before Justice Wildman on November 25, 2004

 

[7] At approximately the same time that Justice Wildman’s orders were being entered and served, the respondent was bringing yet another motion to set aside the order striking his pleadings. This motion was brought on the respondent’s behalf by counsel who had represented him at the Assignment Court before Justice Shaughnessy in July 2004, relying on an affidavit which was allegedly sworn by the respondent in July 2004, but for some unexplained reason neither served nor filed until January 2005. This motion was originally before Justice Perkins on January 26, 2005, the notice was subsequently amended to include a request to set aside the final orders of Justice Wildman and eventually after some confusion with respect to scheduling and the location of materials, the matter got before Justice Timms for argument on April 21, 2005. It is Justice Timms’ order of April 21, 2005, which is the subject matter of this appeal.

 

Considering all of the relevant factors, however, we are satisfied that a total award of costs in the amount of $12,500.00 is appropriate and the respondent shall pay to the appellant her costs of the motion for leave to appeal and the appeal fixed in this total amount of $12,500.00, all inclusive. This order for costs shall be enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as an incident of support, and a Support Deduction Order shall issue accordingly.

 

 

 

 

Fernbach v. Fernbach, 2004 CanLII 14589 (ON S.C.)

 

LARRY FERNBACH       )   In person

 

NELSON J.

 

[1] Larry Fernbach moves to stay the final order of Justice Magda dated November 26, 2003 in favour of his wife, Isabelle Fernbach. Magda J. ordered that Mr. Fernbach pay an equalization payment together with spousal support, both ongoing and retroactive, to Mrs. Fernbach. Magda J. also awarded costs against Mr. Fernbach. These orders were made on an uncontested basis.

 

[2] Prior to the orders being made, Wood J. had made an order striking Mr. Fernbach’s pleadings. The matter had been called to trial before Wood J. on October 29, 2003 at which time the pleadings were struck out. In addition, Mr. Fernbach was ordered to pay costs.

 

Mr. Fernbach maintains a mistake has been made with respect to the imputation of his income at $120,000 a year

 

[6] Mr. Fernbach’s motion to stay is denied.

 

[7] Costs submissions by Isabelle Fernbach are to be made in writing by March 30, 2004

 

 

 

 

Domb v. Domb, 2002 CanLII 2661 (ON S.C.)

 

Justice Craig Perkins

 

By this point, the father had discharged his counsel and was acting on his own.

 

Justice Wildman heard it. She found that the award met the conditions of section 50 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, and granted summary judgment in the terms of the award. She also found that the father admitted that he had not made the disclosure required by the order of 12 December 2000. She noted that the order of 10 January 2001 had given him a further 10 days to comply with his obligations, that he still had not done so and that he gave no adequate reason for defaulting in his obligations under the order. She accordingly struck out his answer under subrule 14(23) and directed that the mother could proceed to an uncontested trial for a final order on her outstanding claims, which included child and spousal support.

 

[33] In addition to the non-compliance that was before Justice Wildman, there is a new head of non-compliance before me. The $15,000 costs order made by Justice Wildman remains unpaid.

 

[34] So on the first branch of the father’s motion, for permission to bring a motion at all, he must fail. There are no grounds for setting aside or modifying Justice Wildman’s order of 31 March 2001 and accordingly the father’s answer remains struck out. Under subrule 10(5), he remains barred from participating in the case in any way

 

 

 

Domb v. Domb, 2002 CanLII 45568 (ON S.C.)

 

Justice Craig Perkins

 

[3] Also significant is the fact that the father has been found repeatedly in violation of orders of the court (some of them consent orders) requiring financial disclosure and requiring him to pay costs. As early as 21 March 2001, Justice Ramona A. Wildman found that he “is clearly the reason that this case has become so costly”. I agree.

 

[4] Persistent refusal to make financial disclosure has been found to be “bad faith” within the meaning of subrule 24(8):

 

[5] The father has been repeatedly found in breach of his obligations, to the point that Justice Wildman struck out his answer and he has continued to resist without explanation. I found that his motion had no merit and that much of the material filed in support of it was irrelevant and improper.

 

I award the mother full recovery costs of the motion in the amount of $12,000, including GST

 

 

 

 

Ho v. Ho, 2003 CanLII  (ON S.C.)

 

Hoi Ming Ho ( aka Michael Ho )        ) Self-represented

 

ROGERS J.

 

[1] The applicant wife and added respondents appeared in this motion. The respondent husband’s pleadings were struck November 12, 2002 and he is not permitted to take any further steps in this case

 

[2] Dr. Michael Ho has not paid his spousal support and a partial equalisation payment. As of the time this court heard the motion herein, he owed just over $2.5 million to the applicant. Although Dr. Ho’s assets were sufficient to cover this debt shortly after the separation, and although there was a preservation order of Justice Perkins dated June 19, 2002, the assets were depleted when the applicant tried to seize them. The assets yielded just over five thousand dollars.

 

[5] The applicant wife sought relief ex parte against Dr. Ho, his company, his sisters, Donna and Nancy Ho, NPT and his parents. The applicant alleges that the family has hidden Dr. Ho’s assets to keep her from collecting monies due. Relief was granted in two ex parte orders dated May 14,2003 and May 23,2003 and the family and NPT were served after the appointed receiver was in place.

 

 

 

 

Romanenko v. Stolarsky, 2005 CanLII 9677 (ON S.C.)

 

ROGERS J.

 

[1] Before the court is an Uncontested trial by affidavit. The Answer of the respondent was struck February 9, 2005.

 

[29] The respondent’s equalization payment of $49,454.02 that will be available to be paid at the time of the sale of the matrimonial home shall be paid directly to the Director of the Family Responsibility Office to retire arrears as set out herein and as security for future payment of support

 

[30] The applicant has sworn to a fear of the respondent. However the applicant wishes the respondent to have access to the child as she supports the father and child bond. The court shall therefore grant a general restraining order for one year to allow a period of time for the anger of the respondent to abate

 

[35] The respondent shall pay the applicant her costs in the amount of $11,000 inclusive of G.S.T. Of this amount $7000 is for the obtaining of child and spousal support

 

 

 

 

Shamli v. Shamli, 2004 CanLII 45956 (ON S.C.)

 

Ali Abdalla Shamli        )    In  Person

 

Rogers J.

 

The failure of the respondent to provide the disclosure in the Shamli matter has caused significant prejudice to the applicant.

 

[10] It is therefore ordered that:

1.       The Answer and Claim of Dr. Shamli are struck,

2.       The respondent shall not take any steps in this case,

3.       The consent of the respondent for the obtaining of any disclosure is dispensed with and the applicant may deal directly with any third party record holders,

4.       The applicant may bring a motion regarding any third party records,

5.       The respondent shall pay the applicant her costs for this motion for September 15, 2004 in the amount of $3,000. The costs for the case conference of November 8, 2004 have already been fixed at $3,000. The costs for the balance of the work not already accounted for in the case conference costs for November 8, 2004 are fixed at $1,000.

6.       The applicant shall present her evidence for an Uncontested Trial by affidavit initially and shall attend as may be required by the trial judge. As Justice Wildman has been the case management judge and this judicial officer has adjudicated on many of the motions, the trial is to be before Justice Perkins or Justice Nelson

 

 

 

 

Kennedy v. Sinclair, 2003 CanLII 57393 (ON C.A.)

 

[1] We are not persuaded in the circumstances of this case that it was improper for Scott J. to preside over the uncontested trial. We note that there was no appeal from the order striking his Answer in this matter, thereby leading to the uncontested trial.

 

[2] In our view, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial judge's imputation of $65,000 annual income to the appellant.

 

[3] It was within the trial judge's discretion to conclude that a "clean break" was desirable and to award a lump sum spousal support award

 

 

 

 

Cole v. Cole, 2005 CanLII 44828 (ON S.C.)

 

The Respondent on her own behalf

 

Justice J.R. McIsaac

 

I understand that he now seeks retroactivity of child support to September, 2001 based upon her previous income of $42,000.00 as an accountant. I agree with Van Melle, J. that the respondent has been guilty of “some unfortunate decisions” since separation.

 

I make a specific finding that she prefers to concentrate on her efforts to appear to be a martyr than to recognize her financial obligations to her children.

 

I am satisfied that all of these circumstances favour an award reflecting retroactivity.

 

Accordingly, I find that she is really the author of her own misfortune in that regard and it does not mitigate the applicant’s claim

 

is results in an award to the applicant of $30,396.00 for retroactive child support to November 1, 2005. , … , . In addition, the respondent will continue to pay $596.00 monthly for ongoing child support as of December 1, 2005. A Support Deduction Order will issue.

 

[8] The applicant seeks an award of $3,664.90 up to September, 2005 for childcare, dental, school and sports-related expenses. These would appear to fit the criteria of the Guidelines and I see no reason why this award should not be made as it is based on the respondent’s imputed annual income of $42,000.00.

 

 

 

 

R.J.J. v. K.R.J., 2004 CanLII 34359 (ON S.C.)

 

K.R.J on his own behalf

 
Justice D. Roger Timms

 

[2] Only the applicant filed material for the motion. The respondent attended and opposed all of the relief sought. Counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer also attended and argued against summary judgment’s being granted with respect to the respondent’s access to his children

 

[3] There is a significant history in this file, starting with an ex parte order of Justice Barry G. A. MacDougall of 25 June 2002. That order granted a temporary restraining order against the respondent; gave the applicant custody of the two children of the marriage; namely, K.L.J., born on […] 1988 and N.C.J., born on […] 1991; restricted the respondent’s access to supervised access; gave the applicant exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and other relief.

 

[6] The separation occurred when the respondent was arrested for assault. The victim was the applicant. On his guilty plea, the respondent has now been convicted of that offence. The children were going to be called as witnesses at his trial on the assault charge until the respondent decided to plead at the last minute — in his words, to spare them from testifying. He has also since been convicted of a breach of recognizance

 

In December 2002, criminal charges were laid involving the respondent and members of his family. The respondent was held on those charges. Although he was still incarcerated, the access order was varied such that, upon his release, the respondent would have supervised access at the Durham Supervised Access Centre.

 

[11] As far as I can tell, access never occurred at the Durham Supervised Access Centre. The respondent has refused to see his children there and, for their part, the children have likewise declined. They want to see their father in the community, without any restrictions.

 

[14] The children are now fifteen and thirteen years of age. They continue to instruct their counsel that they want to see their father in the community. They say that they are not afraid of him. They have more or less refused to go the Durham Supervised Access Centre.

 

 

 

 

Mindzak v. Turner, 2006 CanLII 9705 (ON S.C.)

 

John William Turner on his own behalf

 

Justice Linda M. Walters

 

ACCESS TO CHILD — Form of order — Supervised access — Grounds — Familiarization between child and access party — Under order made almost 2 years ago, father was to have reasonable and liberal access to daughter but (for reasons not set out by court) he did not exercise it regularly until start of this year — Under that order, next stage of access was dependant upon report from supervised access centre but, because child reacted adversely to access centre, it was never used and no report was ever made

 

 

 

 

J.P.M.P. v. G.W.F., 2003 CanLII 2337 (ON S.C.)

 

G.W.F.         )     Personally

 

INGRAM, J

 

[1] In this motion to change, G.W.F. seeks to change the access terms to his daughter, V.A.F., born […], 1998, that were set out in an order made on consent on January 13, 2000. The child’s mother, J.P.M.P. also seeks changes to the existing order.

 

[2] The three questions to be answered are:

(a) Should the order remain as one of joint custody or should Ms. J.P.M.P. be awarded sole custody?

(b) Should Mr. G.W.F.’s access coincide with the access that he has to his son from a former relationship, R.F., born […], 1995?

(c) What schedule of access should be put into place for V.A.F.?

 

[4] Ms J.P.M.P. was represented by counsel, Ms Valerie Pringle. Being opposed by a party without counsel poses additional challenges for counsel, however Ms Pringle facilitated the presentation of the case, by the witnesses she chose to call and by her willingness to avoid technical objections to the presentation of evidence from Mr. G.W.F..

 

[8] Post-separation contact between these parties has been characterized by frequent conflicts. Ms J.P.M.P. obtained a restraining order against Mr. G.W.F. on a motion without notice and that order has now become final. Access exchanges take place at a restaurant. Both parents have made complaints to the police and to the Children’s Aid Society about the other. Mr. G.W.F. wishes expanded access while Ms J.P.M.P. wishes to restrict his access

 

[9] Mr. G.W.F., while undoubtedly devoted to his children, is an exceedingly self-centered, stubborn man who has difficulty in communicating with others if they fail to accept his viewpoints.

 

[10] Mr. G.W.F. has had a dispute with his siblings and now has lost contact with them even though they live in the same region. He appears to have no contact with neighbours to his farm and few, if any, friends.

 

[11] R.F.’s mother, Ms W.B., testified, as did V.A.F.’s mother, Ms J.P.M.P..

 

Mr. G.W.F.’ lack of communication, his lack of compromise, the fear that Ms J.P.M.P. has of him together with the past violence that has resulted in a restraining order means that an order for joint custody would provide false expectations and create a forum for more conflict.

 

 

 

 

L.S.M. v. A.M., 2006 CanLII 13413 (ON S.C.)

 

A.M.       )     In person

 

ROGERS J.

 

4] The respondent father wishes an order for joint custody. There is a long history of acrimony between these two parties. The husband was incarcerated in 1998 for an assault on the applicant mother. There have been several instances of police involvement. The Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of York has been involved, noting a concern for domestic discord. From the court’s observations during the trial, the parties still cannot agree on anything, let alone the best interests of the children

 

6] The father adduced no evidence to substantiate his claim of improper influence by the mother.

 

7] The father had the oldest daughter, now nineteen, in the courthouse waiting room to testify, much to the dismay of the mother. He did not seem to appreciate how hurtful this would be for the family. Not only would A.E.M. be asked to speak against her mother, but such testimony would ultimately divide the siblings. However, when it became clear that A.E.M. could not add to the evidence already before the court, Mr A.M. did not call her as a witness in deference to the court’s concerns about the hurt that would come from her testifying

 

9] The father has had an order for alternate weekend access and a mid week visit since the fall of 2003. He does not use this access and has not done anything to correct what he now says is a denial of access. It seems, rather, by his actions, that the father has not been very interested in the children

 

This court finds the involvement of the father in the younger children’s lives to be minimal by his own doing.

 

11] There will be an order for sole custody to the mother.

 

12] The respondent father has been so lackadaisical about access that it seems to give credence to the mother’s accusation that he was and is a drug user

 

17] The respondent has been unwilling to work to provide for his children. He cannot rely on the July incident to explain his poor provision for his family as he has paid very little of the order made November 28, 2003. Even if his injuries, current or past, are such that he cannot work in a field where there are significant demands for physical labour, he has done nothing about improving himself in any other field.

 

19] The court shall impute an income to the respondent of $35,000 commencing December 1, 2006. This late date is to accommodate an operation the respondent says he has upcoming in September. In the intervening time he can do what is necessary to improve his skills. Until then the court shall use as his annual income the sum of $24,000

 

Any proceeds of the sale of the condominium property shall pay off the real estate commission, the mortgage, the outstanding taxes, the outstanding utilities and the legal fees from the sale and shall then be divided into two equal shares. One equal share shall be paid to the applicant. The respondent’s share shall be paid to the Director of the Family Responsibility Office as payment of arrears of child support owing by the respondent father to the applicant mother. If the respondent’s share of the proceeds of sale of the condominium exceed the then arrears, such excess funds shall be held by the Director as security for future child support payments.

 

 

 

 

Koster v. Koster, 2002 CanLII 2693 (ON S.C.)

 

No one appearing for the Respondent

 

EBERHARD J

 

[1] By direction of Timms J. on May 8, 2002, this matter proceeded by default as the Respondent neither appeared nor filed any material though duly served.

 

[3] Indeed, the Respondent has previously asserted that he does not stand in loco parentis to the said child.

 

I find on the evidence before me that in fact the Respondent did stand in loco parentis to Michel

 

[4] The issue before me, both in relation to entitlement to child support and also spousal support and equalization, is whether the agreement signed by the parties on their resumption of cohabitation in 1993 governs.

 

[6] Moreover the agreement cannot withstand scrutiny and is set aside pursuant to Family Law Act section 56(4).

 

[15] Even if I assume some property at marriage deduction that the Respondent has not asserted in these proceedings, the equalization would be $40,886.02. Without that assertion equalization would be more like $125,861.02

 

[17] The Applicant estimates the Respondent's income at no less than $100,000 a year

 

[18] Guideline table support for 1 child at $100,000 income is $773/month.

 

[20] I order that title to the matrimonial home be vested in the Applicant forthwith.

 

[23] I fix costs against the Respondent in accordance with the cost memorandum filed at $4,516.03 to August 19, 2002 and $1,150 plus GST for trial preparation and attendance

 

 

 

 

Chamanlall v. Chamanlall, 2006 CanLII 1916 (ON S.C.)

 

Chamanlall Chamanlall on his own behalf and noted in default

 

Justice D. Roger Timms

 

While it is somewhat arbitrary, given his employment history, I am prepared to assume that he will find a job by the spring. In other words, that he will be working by the beginning of April 2006

 

Because of the difficulties that the applicant has experienced with the respondent, with respect to child support payments and otherwise, the reminder of his share of the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home are to be held as security (under clause 34(1)(k) of the Family Law Act) until there is no further obligation to pay child support

 

 

 

 

Ward v. Bates, 2005 CanLII 2947 (ON S.C.)

 

Respondent (moving party) on his on behalf

 

EBERHARD J

 

[11] His motion asserted $0 income.

 

[13] I have a certain sympathy for the Respondent. It is at least possible that he truly does not earn the $100,000 on which the current order is based.

 

[15] I do not accept that an experienced businessman who has been cable of earning $100,000 and acquiring, by his own effort as he proudly asserts, three valuable properties, could not get some sort of job if he chose to do so. He does not have the autonomy to choose not to when he has dependent children.

 

[16] I said I have a certain sympathy for the Respondent because it is sad from a human perspective when a person fools himself into thinking he is in the right, comes to court without marshalling the evidence to support his assertions but plaintively reviews the disappointments and frustrations he has experienced and then blames the process and the Applicant for all his troubles. I searched the materials, the submissions and my experience for some realistic strategy to bring the Respondent to his responsibilities in a manner he would accept as a means of breaking the unsatisfying cycle of his difficulties. I could find none

 

 

 

 

Lalonde v. Lalonde, 2005 CanLII 16637 (ON S.C.)

 

BOYD H. LALONDE         )    Self-Represented

 

DiTomaso J.

 

[1] The applicant father Boyd H. Lalonde seeks joint custody and expanded access regarding the child of the marriage Patrick-Lee Joseph Lalonde (Patrick). He further seeks the rescission of all outstanding child support arrears and that ongoing child support payments be based on Mr. Lalonde’s current zero income.

 

[2] Mr. Lalonde is 41 years old living in Sechelt, British Columbia. He is in the process of completing an 8-month scuba dive instructor’s course which commenced in September of 2004

 

[3] Mrs. Lalonde is 36 years old living in Barrie, Ontario with her partner and Patrick who is 12 years of age. She is employed by the Children’s Aid Society, …

 

[10] Charges were laid against Mr. Lalonde for uttering death threats against Mrs. Lalonde in 1997. At trial, he was found not guilty.

 

[11] Mr. Lalonde maintained that Mrs. Lalonde was secretive about the whereabouts of herself and Patrick thereby denying him access and the opportunity to have a relationship with his son. Only through one of his family members was he able to discover that Mrs. Lalonde and Patrick were living in Barrie.

 

[12] In January 2000, Mr. Lalonde moved to B.C. He was being pursued by collection agencies and FRO. According to his evidence, Mr. Lalonde “needed a fresh start”.

 

[23] The resolution of joint custody in this case does not depend on what Mr. Lalonde wants or needs. Joint custody is not a pre-emptive measure to secure the perceived rights of one parent over another in contemplation of some future dispute which might never happen. Joint custody is not about Mr. Lalonde’s happiness or unhappiness in being included or excluded from decisions involving Patrick. Joint custody does not revolve around Mr. Lalonde.

 

[38] For the foregoing reasons, I dismiss Mr. Lalonde’s claim for joint custody

 

[62] From March 7, 2004 until December 2004 (9 months) he was the recipient of Employment Insurance Benefits in the amount of $14,742.00. He took a scuba diver instructor’s course which was completed December 11, 2004. At the time of trial he was unemployed. His employment prospects were undetermined with the prospect of perhaps doing some dive work in July of 2005.

 

[63] His employment history shows that he moved from job to job, especially in Ontario. He moved to British Columbia from Ontario to escape creditors and the Family Responsibility Office (FRO). Mr. Lalonde has a history of non-compliance with FRO. He deliberately did not disclose his whereabouts while in Ontario which would invariably attract FRO’s attention. He did not advise FRO about his move to British Columbia in 2000. FRO was unaware of Mr. Lalonde’s whereabouts in British Columbia until 2003 when FRO began to garnishee his wages.

 

I find the current arrears owed by Mr. Lalonde to Mrs. Lalonde is the sum of $22,067.00 as at the date of trial.

 

I am not satisfied that there has been any material change in circumstance that would eliminate outstanding child support arrears. I do not accept the reasons given by Mr. Lalonde for eliminating outstanding arrears. Those reasons are not legitimate and are at the very least, self-serving. Child support arrears continue to be outstanding and fixed in the amount of $22,067.00. These arrears are to be paid by Mr. Lalonde. Therefore, his claim to eliminate child support arrears is dismissed.

 

[75] I find that Mr. Lalonde is intentionally under-employed or unemployed within the meaning of section 19(1)(a) of the Guidelines.

 

Mr. Lalonde is capable of earning at least $27,000.00. However, Mr. Lalonde has made the deliberate choice to pursue an occupation with very limited employment prospects while there are many other jobs and careers he could pursue to earn income at this time.

 

Accordingly, Mr. Lalonde’s monthly child support payment is increased to the sum of $365.00 per month ($240.00 guideline amount plus $125.00 section 7 expense) with payment commencing April 1, 2005

 

 

 

 

Higgins v. Higgins, 2006 CanLII 33303 (ON C.A.)

 

Malcolm Higgins in person

 

[1] The main issue on appeal is whether Wildman J. erred in imposing the terms set out at paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of an order dated March 22, 2006.

 

[3] Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the March 22, 2006 order provide that the appellant's pleadings will be struck unless he pays the following amounts:

i. the ongoing child and spousal support payments of $3813 per month;

ii. a lump sum of $6708 on account of the monthly child support arrears that accrued between February 25, 2005 and March 22, 2006 under the January 25, 2006 order; and

iii. $1000 per month on account of support arrears under the January 25, 2006 order until they are retired.

 

[4] Paragraph 5 of the March 22, 2006 order provides that the appellant is not entitled to request a trial date until:

i. he pays the lump sum child support arrears totalling $6708 referred to in para. 3 ii above;

ii. he pays all interim support payments that have accrued subsequent to the January 25, 2006 order, and

iii. he has complied, for a minimum of 3 months, with the terms of para. 4 of the March 22, 2006 order requiring that he pay $3813 per month on account of ongoing child and spousal support plus $1000 on account of support arrears.

 

[5] In making the March 22, 2006 order, the motion judge accepted the January motion judge’s finding that income of $100,000 per year should be imputed to the appellant. However, she also recognized that the January 25, 2006 order created substantial arrears and that, because the appellant is an undischarged bankrupt, he “has no property and no ability to borrow institutionally.”

 

 

 

 

Di Manno v. Di Manno, 2002 CanLII 2673 (ON S.C.)

 

GIOVANNI DI MANNO         )    On his own behalf

 

EBERHARD J.

 

I began the hearing by inquiring of the Respondent whether he was content to speak on his own behalf. As he was prepared to do so, the proceeding continued.

 

The court is very grateful Mr. Chilco's skillful effort to organize the Respondent's presentation but the bottom line is that Mr. DiManno really never bought in to the court process as a means to finalize the matrimonial issues.

 

This court knows that most of the people who come to us for determination of their domestic disputes are literally suffering. So, when I consider that time was wasted due to the Respondent's lack of meaningful participation, I must remember that the Applicant was also stressed and she was paying her lawyer throughout to obtain information that should reasonably have been forthcoming from the Respondent

 

I fix costs in favour of the Applicant in the amount of $40,000

 

 

 

 

Goodfellow v. Goodfellow, 2005 CanLII 4847 (ON S.C.)

 

Applicant, self represented

 

Justice J. E. Ferguson

 

[6] I will start with the mistake submission. The father was asked and stated more than once in his submissions that the mistake arises from the fact that he cannot afford the deal that he made. After signing the agreement in July he looked at the numbers and realized he could not afford the payments. To use his words, if he was to make those payments he will be “wiped out”.

 

[16] The father’s motion to vary is dismissed.

 

 

 

 

Benmergui v. Bitton, 2008 CanLII 11639 (ON S.C.)

 

NORA RUTH BENMERGUI       )     Unrepresented

 

SHIMON BITTON      )    Unrepresented

 

JUSTICE RAMONA A. WILDMAN

 

Both often broke down in tears, sometimes sobbing so much they could not carry on. Mr. Bitton twice made references to being so distraught that he might kill himself during the trial;

 

[2] The “justice” this court will be able to deliver is likely to fall far short of what they crave. I will never be able to right all their perceived wrongs and I doubt that I can do anything to address the stress from which they are obviously suffering as a result of their difficult and angry relationship. I urge each of them to consider getting counselling, as this judgment alone is unlikely to give either of them the peace they need to move forward with their life.

 

[4] Given the understandable difficulties each of them faced as self-represented litigants, it is not an easy task to determine the correct answer to the legal questions before me. Both of the parties had trouble focusing on the legal issues and the necessity for providing an evidentiary basis for my decision. It was not an option to adjourn for more or better evidence. Neither of these parties intends to retain a lawyer. Legal Aid is not available to either of them for this case. Both are so stressed by this trial that they want an end to these legal proceedings

 

[54] It is interesting that there does not seem to be any benefit, other than a right of unspecified access to his children, provided to Mr. Bitton in this agreement. , … , It is an entirely one-sided agreement, drawn up by Ms. Benmergui’s lawyer, on her instructions alone, with no regard for Mr. Bitton’s interests. In fact, it is so one-sided that the agreement itself is not even signed by Ms. Benmergui

 

I know that the debts that Mr. Bitton listed on his bankruptcy in April of 2001 amounted to $40,000 or $44,000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Central South Judicial Region

 

 

 

F.(J.) v. C.(V.) (No. 7), 2002 CanLII 46717 (ON S.C.)

 

Mr. J.F. did not respond to it, however. His reasons, which I think I can discern, are as follows:— that, although the offer might have appeared reasonable, the courts, police and children’s aid societies and treatment components in the system, which attend to the care and treatment of children, are gender-biased and incompetent and had to be exposed.

 

Your Honour, yesterday, and I put my personal needs in front of maybe the needs of many others, Your Honour, trying to show the systemic complicity and the blatant bias that exists here, Your Honour, and I should have just done it the original — I should have never given him the [Ms. M. Go.] tape. I should have never brought out the fact I had tapes of the C.A.A.P. and the C.C.A.S. and others, and now I may have done more harm than good, and it kept me up most of the night last night and there is another father in here who wanted my help and I know I can’t probably help them and this system just feeds on that, Your Honour. I am just another father that was led to the slaughter here. I’m chow for your meal, and when you’re done with me, you’re going to grind up whatever is left over and make it grease for the wheels of this system like you did to Wayne Allen and Jim Crawford, and I can go down the list, Your Honour. And I don’t know what else to say, Your Honour, but I will tell you that yes, there was some calculated subterfuge here.

 

You stated you expected orders to be adhered to; the police when you go, when I tried to get my order enforced, they laughed at me; the CCAS scoffed at order of this court by telling [Ms. V.C.] to deny me access. I’m, in, I lodged complaints against these authorities, Your Honour; they went nowhere despite you saying they acted inappropriate, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission said it was alright for the police officers to, to continually question my child and come and visit me late at night when my child was sleeping. The CCAS says they had every right to do this, interview, interrogate and examine my child over a dozen times. Your Honour, there has to be some accountability here, I’ve never seen it.

 

In the Stevenson case, Justice Beckett stated what had occurred with that poor little child that the mother was burning, beating and scolding for two years. She went to medical professionals 50 times that, they were looking the other way and said it was some kind of skin rash disease or disorder. There’s a problem with the system here, Your Honour, there’s a problem with the system

 

Why was this allowed to go on? This is child abuse, Your Honour. And, and the system is respon — this is systemic child abuse.

 

[18] Mr. Flaherty submits that that extraordinary statement indicates first, that the applicant has not intended to litigate this matter in good faith and that he was initially trying to execute a subterfuge upon the court. Second, he argues that there has been a twin motive for this proceeding, that is, that there has been an intention on the part of Mr. J.F. to attempt to use this proceeding to expose the “system” rather than just concentrate on the best interests of A.J.C.-F..

 

[53] Having regard to all of the above and given the limited assets and income of the applicant as set out in his financial statement, net costs against the applicant in favour of the respondent should be awarded in the sum of $90,000 plus G.S.T.

 

 

 

 

H.1 v. H.2, 2004 CanLII 43947 (ON S.C.)

 

The Respondent was self-represented

 

Justice D. J. Gordon

 

[2] As Mr. H.2 represented himself, I have reviewed Mr. Thrasher’s submissions and draft bill of costs

 

[4] The issues should have been resolved by the parties without a trial. An interim agreement was a good start and a final resolution might have occurred had Mr. H.2 continued to retain a solicitor.

 

[5] Mr. H.2 had the right to litigate the issues; however, Ms. H.1 ought not be penalized.

 

[6] Accordingly, Ms. H.1 is entitled to her costs as claimed and an order is granted directing Mr. H.2 to pay Ms. H.1 her costs fixed in the amount of $5,879.35

 

 

 

 

Coletta v. Jones Coletta, 2003 CanLII 2412 (ON S.C.)

 

Sandra Jones Coletta,      )   self-represented

 

Quinn J

 

Although the applicant did not seek a finding of contempt against the respondent, this court, on its own motion, brought contempt proceedings against her, based upon these instances: selling the farm in the face of a non-depletion order; failing to pay into court the proceeds from that sale as ordered; and, failing to provide an accounting in respect of those proceeds as also ordered.

 

[30] The wife denied that the husband lived on the farm. However, I do not accept her testimony.

 

[52] With respect to selling the farm in contravention of the order of August 15, 2000, the sentence I impose is five days in custody. Regarding the failure to pay into the court the sum of $22,277.73, as ordered on May 23, 2002, the wife shall be sentenced to 10 days in custody. And for not providing the accounting, as ordered on May 23rd, she shall serve a further 15 days in custody. The sentences are consecutive and total 30 days

 

[57] Mr. DiGregorio seeks full-recovery costs of $2,500 plus GST. He did n